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THESIS SUMMARY 
 
Advertising and other forms of communications are often used by government bodies, non-
government organisations, and other institutions to try to influence the population to either 
a) reduce some form of harmful behaviour (e.g. smoking, drunk- driving) or b) increase 
some more healthy behaviour (e.g. eating healthily). It is common for these messages to be 
predicated on the chances of some negative event occurring if the individual does not either 
a) stop the harmful behaviour, or b) start / increase the healthy behaviour. This design of 
communication is referred to by many names in the relevant literature, but for the purposes 
of this thesis, will be termed a ‘threat appeal’. Despite their widespread use in the public 
sphere, and concerted academic interest since the 1950s, the effectiveness of threat 
appeals in delivering their objective remains unclear in many ways. In a detailed, 
chronological and thematic examination of the literature, two assumptions are uncovered 
that have either been upheld despite little evidence to support them, or received limited 
attention at all, in the literature. Specifically, a) that threat appeal characteristics can be 
conflated with their intended responses, and b) that a threat appeal always and necessarily 
evokes a fear response in the subject. A detailed examination of these assumptions 
underpins this thesis. The intention is to take as a point of departure the equivocality of 
empirical results, and deliver a novel approach with the objective of reducing the confusion 
that is evident in existing work. More specifically, the present thesis frames cognitive and 
emotional responses to threat appeals as part of a decision about future behaviour.  
 
To further develop theory, a conceptual framework is presented that outlines the role of 
anticipated and anticipatory emotions, alongside subjective probabilities, elaboration and 
immediate visceral emotions, resultant from manipulation of the intrinsic message 
characteristics of a threat appeal (namely, message direction, message frame and graphic 
image). In doing so, the spectrum of relevant literature is surveyed, and used to develop a 
theoretical model which serves to integrate key strands of theory into a coherent model. In 
particular, the emotional and cognitive responses to the threat appeal manipulations are 
hypothesised to influence behaviour intentions and expectations pertaining to future 
behaviour.  
 
Using data from a randomised experiment with a sample of 681 participants, the conceptual 
model was tested using analysis of covariance. The results for the conceptual framework 
were encouraging overall, and also with regard to the individual hypotheses. In particular, 
empirical results showed clearly that emotional responses to the intrinsic message 
characteristics are not restricted to fear, and that different responses to threat appeals were 
clearly attributed to specific intrinsic message characteristics. In addition, the inclusion of 
anticipated emotions alongside cognitive appraisals in the framework generated interesting 
results. Specifically, immediate emotions did not influence key response variables related to 
future behaviour, in support of questioning the assumption of the prominent role of fear in 
the response process that is so prevalent in existing literature. The findings, theoretical and 
practical implications, limitations and directions for future research are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The general public are regularly exposed to advertising campaigns that encourage the 
adoption of behaviours that will benefit their health or well-being (e.g. eating more 
vegetables, wearing a seatbelt whilst driving or driving within the speed limit) or to 
discourage risky or unhealthy behaviours (e.g. stopping smoking, stopping binge drinking or 
advising against breaking the speed limit). The issues of health and well-being have 
become an important agenda in many countries, including the UK. The publication of the 
HM Government Department of Health (2004) white paper “Choosing Health” formed the 
keystone of government policy for communicating with the public regarding health and 
lifestyle issues (e.g. stopping smoking, eating more healthy food or not using a mobile 
phone when driving). Indeed “Choosing Health” (Department of Health, 2004) was 
positioned as the “start, not the end of a journey” (Department of Health, 2004, p7). The 
white paper identifies means by which government agencies can provide more of the 
information the public need to make healthy decisions and “aims to inform and encourage 
people as individuals, and to help shape the commercial and cultural environment we live in 
so that it is easier to choose a healthy lifestyle” (Department of Health, 2004, p4). 
The integral influence of advertising messages are acknowledged in the latter white paper, 
both in terms of the influence of the advertising of products that are linked with risky 
behaviours (e.g. tobacco) as well as of campaigns that encourage individuals to make more 
healthy decisions (e.g. stop smoking). Indeed, guidelines for how to utilise a wide variety of 
marketing and advertising techniques to communicate with the public to encourage better 
decision making (e.g. to give up smoking) are clearly set out by the Health Development 
Agency (2004). The guidelines include a range of activities such as, community based 
interventions, mass media campaigns and the promotion of solutions (e.g. condom use, 
opposed to informing people of what not to do). In the academic literature, the activities and 
campaigns intended to dissuade individuals from partaking in risky behaviours, or to 
encourage individuals to adopt behaviours that are beneficial to health or well-being are 
studied particularly in the social marketing domain, which attracts researchers from a 
number of disciplines (e.g. marketing, consumer behaviour and psychology, to name a few). 
Moving forward 11 years from the Department of Health (2004) white paper, it can be seen 
that the journey of encouraging the public to make decisions that enhance their health or 
well-being is ongoing. Indeed, according to government information the UK National Health 
Service (NHS) has planned a wide variety of marketing campaigns for 2015 which either 
have been, or will be, implemented over the course of the year. These campaigns are 
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targeted at issues such as reducing alcohol intake, obesity awareness, issues associated 
with ovarian cancer, stopping smoking, the importance of nutrition and hydration, issues 
associated with bowel cancer, allergies, sun awareness, mental health awareness and 
stress (NHS, 2015). 
The variety of campaigns identified above, utilise numerous methods to communicate with 
the public (for example, community interventions, warnings on cigarette packaging, or 
information leaflets). The academic field of social marketing also reflects this breadth and 
tackles whether generic marketing principles can be used to deal with health, welfare and 
social issues. Indeed, scholars in social marketing explore a wide variety of issues from 
marine conservation (Hayden and Dills, 2015), to understanding women’s pre-conception 
health goals (Lynch et al, 2014), to student alcohol consumption behaviours (Thompson et 
al, 2013), and utilise a wide variety of research approaches and techniques.  
Social marketing advertising campaigns require significant financial investments by 
government, charitable bodies and / or third sector organisations. For example, the 2007 
THINK ‘moment of doubt’ campaign which focussed on asking men to think carefully about 
what they drink before they drive, cost £3 million. The 2009 THINK ‘kill your speed or live 
with it’ campaign, which focussed on the guilt and regret that will stay with a driver who kills 
someone while speeding, cost £3.2 million (Angle et al, 2009). The focus of the 2015 THINK 
campaign is the issue of drug driving based on the change in legislation on 2nd March 2015 
to make it easier for police to catch and convict individuals driving under the influence of 
drugs (THINK, 2015).  
With this in mind, it is vital for those providing funding to ascertain the success of such 
campaigns. It is thus unsurprising to discover that THINK conducts a wide variety of 
research ranging from annual reports about driver and non-driver perceptions of pertinent 
issues, to pre- and post-campaign evaluations. According to post-campaign research by 
Angle et al (2008, p5) the 2007 ‘moment of doubt’ campaign was successful because “A 
third (36%) of respondents stated that the advert stuck in their mind, which is a core 
measure of its cut through. This is in line with January 2008 (35%) which was an increase 
from September 2007 (28%). Another measure of cut through is how much the ad is 
enjoyed. This had slipped back between September 2007 (21%) and January 2008 (17%), 
but recovered to 22% in July 2008” (THINK, 2015). Similarly, the THINK annual survey from 
2009 showed that dropping litter was considered more unacceptable (82% of people) than 
driving at 40mph on a 30mph road (71%) and the department for transport report that “A 
combination of engineering and enforcement measures alongside the education campaigns 
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have seen some improvements in speeding behaviours. For example, in 1999 67% of cars 
exceeded the speed limit on 30mph roads; by 2009 this had reduced to 48%” (THINK, 
2015).  THINK attribute the decline in speeding behaviour, at least in part, to the influence 
of their campaigns and take this evidence to mean that the campaigns are effective in 
achieving their objective. Considering the sheer number of advertising campaigns the public 
are exposed to, this would appear to be an impressive result, and it is even more so when 
one considers that research has shown that health-promoting information can create 
defensive responses in individuals, where they are motivated to dismiss or disregard the 
message (van ‘t Riet and Ruiter, 2013).  
Research that focusses on the use of threats or warnings to encourage individuals to adopt 
healthy or positive behaviours, or to deter from engaging in risky or unhealthy behaviours is 
extensive (e.g. Johnston et al 2015; Rhodes, 2015; Haljelskvik and Rise, 2015; Nabi, 2015; 
Faseur et al, 2015). Whilst there are many different means by which to communicate 
messages to the general public concerning behaviour change to benefit health and well-
being (as evidenced above), the use of threats as a communication device have been 
widely used in practise. However, academic research examining the effectiveness of the 
use of threats as a means to persuade individuals to change behaviour has been varied and 
remains “a matter of ongoing debate and investigation” (Morales et al, 2012, p383). This 
thesis focuses specifically on the use of threat appeals in advertising, which is part of a 
smaller domain within the social marketing field; social advertising. As will be discussed in 
section 1.1, there are numerous terms used to name the use of threats in advertising, such 
as “threat appeals” (e.g. Carey et al, 2013) “fear appeals” (e.g. Ruiter et al, 2014) and ”fear 
arousal” (e.g. La Tour and Tanner, 2003). However, this thesis presents a justification for 
why threat appeal is the most appropriate term, enabling clarity and consistency in future 
work. Of course, throughout the thesis, original authors’ terminology will be acknowledged, 
however the use of threat to communicate the negative consequences of the health, welfare 
or social issue that is the focus of the advertisement is referred to as a threat appeal, and is 
the specific focus of the present study. 
For the last six decades, scholars from a wide variety of disciplines, including Information 
systems (e.g. Johnson et al, 2015), health psychology (e.g. Peters et al (2012), marketing 
(e.g. Morales et al, 2012), communication (e.g. O’Keefe, 2003), transportation (e.g. Lewis et 
al, 2007), and psychology (e.g. Carey et al, 2013), have examined individuals’ responses to 
threat appeals. However, despite the widespread use of, and investment in, social 
advertising campaigns such as those referred to above, and their apparent positive 
reception by policy makers and practitioners, it is clear that academic research has been 
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more equivocal in its support. Indeed, the “effectiveness [of threat appeals] as a form of 
communication has been questioned” by scholars (Carey et al, 2013, p 1).  Such 
questioning is partly attributed to the notably inconsistent findings in existing empirical 
research (examined in more detail in section 1.1 and Chapter 2).  In addition, there are 
practical grounds for controversy in the field. For example, Guttman and Salmon (2004) 
raise concerns about the possibility of unintended adverse effects, in terms of a possible 
negative influence on individuals’ psychological well-being or cultural beliefs. Specifically 
Guttman and Salmon (2004) raise the issue of the use of graphic images of injury, which 
while designed to capture the attention of the audience, that may, in fact, amplify 
perceptions of risk. Such a technique “may fail to meet stipulations for truthfulness and 
sincerity, as well as correctness and accuracy” (Guttman and Salmon, 2004, p 539). 
Hastings et al (2004) also raise concerns about the potential for heightened chronic anxiety 
in individuals who engage in the particular behaviour being warned against, and highlight 
the areas for potential “collateral damage” (Hastings et al, 2004, p 972) caused by such 
campaigns. In addition, Hastings et al (2004) emphasise that research has demonstrated 
that individuals with high self-efficacy (an individual’s belief in their own ability to complete 
tasks) are more persuaded by this type of message, because such individuals are better 
psychologically and socially equipped to act upon the message. However, individuals who 
have low self-efficacy may actually feel worse as a result of exposure to such messages, 
generating anger or defensive feelings and perhaps increasing the individual’s risk and 
vulnerability (Hastings et al, 2004).  
Based on their concerns, Hastings et al (2004) propose that the use of humour or positive 
reinforcement is a more ethically sound approach than the use of threat appeals to 
delivering social advertising information. Equally, O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) 
acknowledge that while the use of threats or warnings may serve to gain the attention of an 
audience, such an approach does not lead to genuine audience engagement with issues 
such as climate change. Given the complex nature of the issues addressed by social 
marketers –for example, persuading people to drink less alcohol (Szmigin et al, 2009), or 
reduce smoking (Hassan et al, 2008) – the type of appeal used is very important in terms of 
credibility of message, capturing attention, ensuring information processing and, perhaps 
most importantly, increasing the likelihood of behaviour change. Indeed, when considered in 
conjunction with the questioning of the effectiveness of threat appeals (e.g. Carey et al, 
2013) these concerns highlight the need for further examination of consumer responses to 
threat appeals to ascertain whether they are effective and create the intended response.  
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As evidenced above, threat appeals are widely used to communicate with the public. 
Certainly there are many examples of other methods of communication (e.g. the positive 
reinforcement of the NHS ‘change 4 life’ campaign), however, the prevalence of the use of 
threat appeals suggests that it is assumed (which is not proven in the academic literature) 
to be the effective and appropriate method of communication. Indeed, as Ruiter et al (2014, 
p63) state “members of the general population and health promoters who design these 
messages tend to believe in the persuasive power of fear arousal”. This is evidenced by the 
THINK campaigns and NHS initiatives described above, as well as the numerous threat 
appeal campaigns implemented (e.g. The 2010 Department of Children, Schools and 
Families campaign to encourage parents to talk to children about underage drinking; The 
2014 SmokeFree campaign showing a decaying roll-up cigarette with the claim that 
smoking rots the body from within; The DoE 2013 speeding campaign that depicts an entire 
class of primary children been killed by a car that rolls off the road because it was speeding. 
The intended message is that the class of children represents the number of children who 
have died as a direct result of speeding since 2000.) In light of the widespread use of threat 
appeals, and the aforementioned questioning of the effectiveness of threat appeals (e.g. 
Carey et al, 2013), it is imperative that research is conducted to establish a more detailed 
understanding of how individuals respond to threats in advertising. Indeed, the equivocal 
findings require examination and further research to establish whether or not threat appeals 
are effective. Firstly, establishing the effectiveness of threat appeals will ensure that 
practitioners are not investing poorly, but also that the public are not being unnecessarily 
exposed to threat appeals.   
The consequences of the risky behaviours that are the focus of threat appeals research 
(e.g. use of graphic pictures to persuade people to stop smoking (Gallopel-Morvan et al, 
2009) or warning against distracted driving (Lennon et al, 2010) are significant and 
ultimately, potentially fatal. As such, research that examines threat appeals and establishes 
whether they are indeed, effective or not, has significant consequences. It is acknowledged 
though, that both the practical and ethical concerns and differences between research 
results, make this a difficult academic area to engage with. However this does not mean the 
issue should be shied away from. Quite to the contrary, these are the exact reasons why 
there is a pressing need for research in the area, alongside the fact that these methods are 
employed by government, charities and third sector organisations and comprise a 
significant financial investment from those organisations. The purpose of this thesis is to 
untangle a number of issues that have developed over time and move thinking forward with 
a new approach, albeit one that is grounded in the extant literature.  
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It is widely acknowledged that the intention behind the use of threat appeals; to ultimately 
discourage unhealthy or risky behaviour, or conversely, encourage healthy, or beneficial 
behaviour is positive (e.g. Department of Health, 2004). As evidenced above, the financial 
investments in such campaigns are significant. Moreover, these campaigns often use public 
financial resources as a funding source (e.g. NHS and THINK). As such, it is imperative to 
understand responses to such campaigns, to ensure public finances are well utilised.  
Indeed, practitioners widely use threat appeals, and present research findings to evidence 
their effectiveness (e.g. THINK, 2015). However, the concept of effectiveness is not upheld 
in the academic literature. Indeed there is a distinct dichotomy in approach between 
practitioners who employ threat appeals, and academics who examine their effectiveness. 
This will be discussed in more detail in section 1.1. Nevertheless, the academic empirical 
findings are equivocal, as is evidenced in chapter 2. The academic domain is fragmented, 
and, as a result some researchers (e.g. Hastings et al 2004) call for the discontinued use of 
threat appeals. However, whilst there is equivocal empirical evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of threat appeals, this thesis examines assumptions that have been upheld 
within the literature and re-conceptualises consumer responses to threat appeals, in order 
to develop a platform for future research.  
This thesis examines the theoretical development of academic understanding regarding 
individuals’ responses to threat appeals. This is scrutinised in detail, using a chronological 
and thematic approach, in chapter 2. Nevertheless, building on empirical research and 
theoretical advancements, this thesis employs a different approach, to that adopted by most 
studies, which comprise the main body of research in this area. The intention is to depart 
from the equivocality of empirical results and take a fresh approach. Namely, to frame 
cognitive and emotional responses to threat appeals as part of a decision. More precisely, 
given that the exposure to a threat appeal in this context (i.e. the intended reduction of 
some negative behaviour) usually occurs at a different time to the behaviour the 
advertisement is designed to warn against, the response process generally involves a 
decision about future behaviour. As such, the present study specifically focuses on this 
decision process, allowing for a more detailed examination of the cognitions and emotions 
generated as a result of exposure to a threat advertisement.  
1.1 Domain of research 
According to prior literature, threat appeals are widely defined according to four elements. 
First, a threat is presented using vivid or personalised language and pictures (Witte, 1992) 
and depicts “a personally relevant and significant threat” (Witte, 1994, p114). Second, 
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emphasis is placed upon the consequences of that threat. A threat appeal “is a means of 
persuasion that threatens the audience with a negative physical, psychological, or social 
consequence that is likely to occur if they engage in a particular behaviour” (Algie and 
Rossiter, 2010, p264-265). It is important to note that the negative consequence can be 
presented as something that can be avoided if individuals do not engage in the specified 
behaviour.  Third is an assumption (which as will be discussed throughout the thesis is 
problematic) that the audience will experience fear (Witte, 1994), as the messages are 
“designed to scare people” (Witte, 1992, p329).  Fourth, a recommendation regarding how 
to reduce or eliminate the consequences of the threat is outlined. Threat appeals are used 
to “stimulate anxiety in an audience with the expectation that the audience will attempt to 
reduce this anxiety by adopting, continuing, discontinuing, or avoiding a specified course of 
thought or action” (Spence and Moinpour, 1972, p28).  
1.1.1 Identification of gaps in the literature 
The ability of scholars to offer reliable insights into the most effective use of threat appeals 
is particularly hampered by a number of specific gaps and areas of lack of clarity in the 
literature. These range from questioning the science behind the use of graphic warnings on 
cigarette packaging (Ruiter et al, 2014), to concerns regarding the effectiveness of using 
distressing images in advertisements (Brown and West, 2015), to the interactions between 
concepts such as perceived threat and efficacy (Peters et al, 2013). Indeed, as Leshner et 
al (2011, p77) state “while extensive research has explored the impact of fear based health 
messages on persuasion … there are still significant gaps in understanding how individuals 
process such messages.” As previously identified these gaps in understanding, alongside 
the questioning by scholars and inconsistent findings in existing empirical research require 
further examination. 
Ruiter et al (2014) summarised the current state of research in the threat appeals field and 
identified key problems with current knowledge based on the existing empirical evidence. 
Importantly, Ruiter et al (2014) review what they consider to be the two dominant theories in 
the field, protection motivation theory and the extended parallel process model (which will 
be discussed in section 2.2 of this thesis) and the findings of six meta-analytic studies. 
Ruiter et al (2014) concluded from the review that the information provided by an 
advertisement regarding how to cope with the identified threat is more important than the 
threat itself, or the perception of risk from that threat. This finding highlights two issues. 
First, results show that severity of threat is often the most prominent component of a threat 
appeal, but is conversely seemingly the least persuasive. Second, based on their review of 
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the evidence Ruiter et al (2014, p63) conclude (emphasis added) “that the choice of fear 
appeals is often a poor choice because of the limited and even sometimes 
counterproductive effects of fear arousal and the extensive knowledge base available on 
more effective methods of behaviour change”.  
Whilst research has shown mixed results and inconclusive findings, and researchers (e.g. 
Hastings et al, 2004) call for the use of alternative message strategies in place of threat 
appeals, this is not a justification to move away from research into the effects of threat 
appeals. Given the position taken in this thesis, as described in the introduction above, 
there is a pressing need for research in the area because results are mixed and there are 
“gaps” (Leshner et al, 2011, p77) in understanding. Also given that threat appeals are 
employed by government, charities and third sector organisations and require significant 
financial investment, as evidenced in the previous section, the public are regularly exposed 
to threat appeals. Therefore, whilst suggesting other methods of communication may be 
more effective (Ruiter et al, 2014) this should not be interpreted as a signal to cease 
attempts to understand the effects of threat appeals.  
To elaborate, a significant gap in understanding is the role of emotional responses to threat 
appeals. Indeed, a noteworthy assumption that underpins the theoretical foundations of the 
entire six decades of research is that threat appeals contain a threat that generates an 
instinctive fear response. As is demonstrated in chapter 2, little research has focused on 
emotions as part of responses to threat appeals, and the assumption that fear is the 
emotion generated has never been questioned. A re-examination of the fundamental 
cognitive and emotional response variables and inclusion of a wider consideration of 
emotional responses will reduce the fragmentation between approaches, draw together 
prior research and reduce the equivocality in the field. Chapter 2 details the theories and 
models developed to explain consumer responses to threat appeals and identifies the 
assumption that has permeated through the literature; that fear is the emotional response to 
a threat appeal. This assumption is examined in more detail in Chapter 3. The need for 
research regarding emotional responses to threat appeals has been proposed in different 
ways. For example, in a meta-analysis Carey et al (2013, p6) specifically identify that the 
findings of their study “suggest a disconnect between emotion (i.e. fear) and behaviour (i.e. 
driving) – a disconnect that is reflected in the inconsistent findings in the threat appeal 
driving literature.” In fact, over a quarter of a century ago, Rotfeld (1988, p24) argued that 
confusion has been caused by a “failure to distinguish between the threats that aim to 
engender a fear response, and the actual fear arousal subjects might experience.” 
However, it is clear that this lack of distinction between the threats contained in stimulus 
- 19 - 
variables and the emotional responses they cause, continues throughout more modern 
literature, as seen when researchers commonly consider the ‘level of fear’ or ‘level of fear 
appeal’ depicted in stimuli (e.g. Keller and Block, 1996; LaTour et al 1996; Steenkamp et al, 
1996; Ruiter et al, 2003; Janssens and De Pelsmacker, 2007; Leshner et al, 2010; 
Terblanche-Smit and Terblanche, 2010). More specifically, such an approach confounds the 
inherent features of a stimulus (threats) with the potential emotional response (fear) 
generated by that stimulus, and as such makes the tacit assumption that all people will 
respond to a threat appeal with the emotion of fear. Within this broad assumption are in turn 
embedded a large number of further assumptions, including that a threat will be perceived 
by all subjects as such, and that this can be encoded into an advertisement as a level of 
fear, when in fact fear is the theoretically desired response, not an objective characteristic of 
the stimulus that can somehow be designed into it.  
Distinguishing between characteristics (such as threats) contained within advertising stimuli, 
and individual emotional responses to those advertising stimuli, clarifies the difference 
between those things which can be directly and consistently manipulated by researchers / 
practitioners (i.e. stimulus characteristics), and the emotional responses experienced by 
subjects / consumers resulting from exposure to the stimulus. While the stimulus is intended 
to influence some form of response (e.g. fear), it cannot be guaranteed that all consumers 
will respond in the same way to the same stimulus on every occasion. As previously 
mentioned, Rotfeld (1988) noted the confusion generated in the literature and attributed this 
partly due to the interchangeable terminology used to describe stimuli, such as “threat 
appeals” (e.g. Carey et al, 2013) “fear appeals” (e.g. Ruiter et al, 2014) and ”fear arousal” 
(e.g. La Tour and Tanner, 2003). In echo of this sentiment, Donovan and Henley (1997, 
p57) note that such terms are “used rather loosely and interchangeably” in existing literature 
on social advertising. The position taken in this research study is that a threat appeal 
consists of intrinsic message characteristics that are not to be conflated with response 
variables, such as fear.  
Furthermore, LaTour and Rotfeld (1997) identified that in many cases, stimuli used in 
research studies on social advertising have been categorised according to ‘levels of fear’, 
with the categorisation often based upon different degrees of harm portrayed or types of 
threats. The ‘level’ has thus referred to the degree of potential risk or consumer harm 
portrayed in the stimulus, with the assumption that all respondents would perceive the 
stimulus in the same way, and respond with a specified ‘level’ of fear. Tao and Bucy (2007, 
p398) refer to this idea as an “effect-labelled media attribute” where message properties are 
assumed to vary reliably along psychological dimensions, for example fear. Thus, stimuli 
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are classified into groups according to media attributes (such as fear appeals e.g. 
Haljelskvik and Rise, 2015; or hope appeals e.g. Chadwick, 2015), but the groupings are 
identified by the emotions which are evoked in subjects by those attributes, for example a 
‘high fear appeal’. This is a conceptual issue that translates into a methodological issue. In 
particular, using levels of fear assumes that all individuals perceive the same level to be in 
the advertisement. This conceptual issue therefore causes a problem when comparing 
results of studies across the field. Chapters 2 and 3 identify the many cases where research 
studies present differing or even conflicting findings. One possible cause of this are the 
varied manipulations of ‘levels of fear’ in the advertisements that mean the independent 
variables are not comparable. 
1.1.2 Examining threat appeals 
While it can be seen above that scholars have repeatedly identified the confound between 
stimuli characteristics and their intended effects, for six decades, even recent research 
investigating the effects of threat appeals adopts such an approach. For example, 
Mukherjee and Dube (2012) conducted a 2x2 experimental design which had the 
independent variables of ‘fear tension arousal’ at either moderate or high levels and humour 
which was either absent or present. Further, Leshner et al (2011) investigate the interaction 
between ‘high and low fear appeals’ and ‘high and low disgust images’. Other examples 
include Morales et al (2012), who used a neutral appeal, a fear appeal and a fear and 
disgust appeal, and Lee and Shin (2011) who used fear appeals and humour appeals. 
These studies assume that stimuli themselves can vary in terms of some level of fear, when 
fear is clearly an individual emotional response to some stimulus. As discussed above, the 
idea that a particular emotional response to a stimulus can be considered as an inherent 
feature that a stimulus can have – such as an inherent ‘level of fear’ – can cause confusion 
(Rotfeld, 1988, Leshner et al, 2011) and is a gap in the understanding of responses to 
threat appeals.  
Tao and Bucy (2007) discuss the conflation of media attributes and psychological states in 
communication research, particularly with reference to the stimuli that are constructed or 
used for experimental studies. Tao and Bucy (2007) state that effect-labelled media 
attributes (e.g. a so-called ‘fear appeal’) assume the properties of a message or 
advertisement reliably vary according to a specific psychological dimension. Messages are 
defined according to the experimental participants’ response to the psychological dimension 
and is named accordingly (e.g. fear appeal). This is problematic as the message 
characteristics that cause the response and the response itself are combined. Indeed, 
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O’Keefe (2003, p268) states “when message variables are defined in terms of effects rather 
than intrinsic properties, researchers forfeit the ability to speak to questions of the 
relationship between message properties and persuasive outcomes’’ Tao and Bucy (2007, 
p404) recommend; “media stimuli, serving as an independent variable, should be defined in 
terms of media attributes or intrinsic message properties rather than psychological states”. 
Research that confounds media attributes with their effects exemplifies the confusion 
between the independent variables in the stimuli that can be manipulated and the emotional 
reactions to that manipulation, which should in fact be considered mediating or dependent 
variables.  
Drawing from the above, evidence shows that distinctions between stimuli and emotional 
responses have not been consistently made in prior research (e.g. Janssens and De 
Pelsmacker, 2007; Leshner et al, 2010; Terblanche-Smit and Terblanche, 2010). This is 
echoed by O’Keefe (2003, p251) who indicates that variables which are defined in terms of 
their effects on psychological states, such as the aforementioned variations in ‘fear appeals’ 
that are defined on the basis of aroused fear, “impede progress in understanding 
persuasion processes and effects and hence should be avoided in favour of definitions 
expressed in terms of intrinsic message features.” Similarly, Kay (1972, p16) observed that 
contradictions have occurred in research concerning ‘fear appeals’ due to a failure to 
explicitly define the nature of the specific factor, or intrinsic message features to be 
measured. This has meant that researchers “whose findings were at variance with each 
other appeared to believe they were all measuring the same thing, but in likelihood were 
not.”  
Despite Kay’s (1972) criticism, when looking across the subsequent four decades or more 
of research that have explored the use of threats in stimuli, from advertising to consumer 
behaviour, social marketing and psychology, there remains little consistency across and 
within disciplines in terms of the variables manipulated (or claimed to be manipulated) in the 
stimuli. For example, it has already been shown that a number of researchers have claimed 
to look at the ‘level of fear’ encoded in stimuli, usually comparing low versus high (Keller, 
1999; LaTour et al 1996; Janssens and De Pelsmacker, 2007). Alternatively ‘level of fear’ 
has been combined with other variables, a brief list of which would include humour and 
‘level of involvement’ (Cochrane and Quester, 2005); direction of message to self or others 
(Block, 2002), imagery or objective processing (Keller and Block 1996); presence or 
absence of disgust (Leshner et al, 2010); and action framing of loss or gain (Ruiter et al, 
2003). However, rather than a clear cumulative body of knowledge developing over many 
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years of research, the overall picture painted by such research is rather one of confusion, 
and lack of coherence. 
While there remains much inconsistency in general across research regarding threats 
appeals, Rotfeld’s (1988) work does appear to have heralded at least something of a shift in 
thinking, with some recent researchers quite clearly making efforts to distinguish between 
the threat in a stimuli and the response of the consumer. In such cases, the stimulus 
variables are referred to as ‘level of threat’ (Wauters and Brengmen, 2013; Jones and 
Owen, 2006; Lewis et al, 2007), usually comparing high v low (Cauberghe et al, 2009; 
Chabat et al, 1995; Vincent and Dubinsky, 2005; Schmitt and Blass, 2009). Again, ‘level of 
threat’ has been combined with other variables such as coping  (Eppright et al, 2002); 
presence of ‘young’ or ‘old’ models (Jones and Owens, 2006); or presence of high efficacy 
or no efficacy (Muthusamy et al 2009). 
However, while a move towards the use of ‘threat’ rather than ‘fear’ as a stimulus variable is 
positive, a key issue with the use of both ‘fear’ and ‘threat’ in this regard is that both 
variables, particularly when presented as a ‘level’ of fear or threat, can be construed as 
“effect-labelled media attributes” (Tao and Bucy 2007, p398), and are thus both somewhat 
open to individuals’ perception. Specifically, in such research, the ‘level of threat’ variable 
generally refers to the degree of potential risk or consumer harm portrayed in the stimulus, 
with the assumption that all respondents would perceive the stimulus in the same way, and 
respond with a specified level of fear (e.g Panic et al, 2014). Yet, there is no guarantee that 
every individual will perceive the same stimulus in the same way. For example, what may 
be highly threatening to one individual may not be threatening at all to another, and may 
generate a range of different emotional responses, not just fear (Donovan and Henley, 
1997). As Janssens and De Pelsmacker (2007, p175) state “The same threat can evoke 
different levels of fear in different people, and different threats can also evoke different 
levels of fear.” Variables that are open to interpretation by respondents do not allow for the 
consistency across stimulus variables which would enable researchers to move away from 
the problem identified by Kay (1972) – which remains evident in even contemporary 
research (e.g. Brown and West, 2015; Janssens and De Pelsmacker, 2007) – and to create 
a platform from which a consistent body of knowledge can develop regarding consumer 
responses to comparable variables. A move toward the use of variables could be 
considered as ‘concrete’ attributes as intrinsic message characteristics would be welcome 
in this regard. Concrete attributes are those that “nearly everyone ... describes … 
identically” (Rossiter, 2002, p. 310), and using such variables allows for a clearer 
identification of the relationships between stimuli and responses, where differing individual 
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perceptions of the stimulus does not confound the understanding of cause and effect. 
Examples of concrete variables include gender of the individual portrayed in the 
advertisement (male or female), use of a graphic image or a non-graphic image (a 
discussion of graphic images is presented in Chapter 3), scenes that either do or do not 
include the presence of the emergency services, or the number of visual images contained 
in a print advertisement.  
As well as a move towards the use of intrinsic message characteristics, the use of more 
complex models has been presented as a way to further address the need to distinguish 
between intrinsic message characteristics and responses (Tao and Bucy, 2007).  Three 
principles underpin the use of such models in this context. First, independent variables are 
(as previously discussed) defined in terms of intrinsic message characteristics (and not their 
assumed effects on psychological states, for example fear). Second, psychological states 
(for example, emotions and cognitive responses) serve as intervening variable(s) between 
intrinsic message characteristics and intended responses (e.g. behavioural intention or 
change). Third, testing of hypotheses must necessarily include both intrinsic message 
characteristics and psychological states “to capture a more complete picture of media 
influence and increase explanatory power” (Tao and Bucy, 2007, p404). Such a model 
avoids the problematic conflation of two different classes of media variables (intrinsic 
message characteristics and psychological states) and “allows the analysis to proceed 
without erroneously assuming uniform responses to messages or other media stimuli” (Tao 
and Bucy, 2007, p 404). 
While much research continues to conflate intrinsic message characteristics with response 
states, a number of researchers have indeed made welcome steps toward identifying 
intrinsic message features for manipulation in threat-based stimuli. In an anti-smoking 
context, Smith and Stutts (2003) looked at the difference between short term cosmetic 
messages and long term heath messages; Arthur and Quester (2004), and Dickinson and 
Holmes (2008), distinguished between physical threats and social threats; Dillard et al 
(2007) identified threats to health and threats to freedom as stimulus variables; while Hunt 
and Shehryar (2002) considered death-related and non-death-related variables. Further, a 
complementary research stream has begun to look at what can be called the direction of 
messages, or whether they are directed to the self or others (Basil et al, 2008; Block, 2005; 
Miller et al, 2007). The direction of the message has concrete attributes and, as with the 
type of message variables identified above such as cosmetic or health messages, is not 
open to misinterpretation by individuals. In other words, a ‘threat to health’ versus a ‘threat 
to freedom’ will almost certainly be perceived in a common manner by all respondents (see 
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Rossiter 2002). That is not to say that individuals may not avoid the message, or that the 
cognitive or emotional processing of the message may differ from that intended by the 
sender of course. Rather, the use of concrete variable attributes at least allows for a 
consistency across stimulus variables.   
A more detailed review of stimulus variables used in prior research will be presented later in 
this thesis (see Chapter 3). However, a key motivator for the present study concerns the 
move away from the problematic use of ‘fear’ as a stimulus variable, and a corresponding 
move toward the examination of intrinsic message characteristics (such as direction of 
message). In particular, the move away from fear as a stimulus variable has occurred in 
concert with a rise in the use of the term ‘threat appeal’ in the literature. According to 
Donovan and Henley (1997, p57), rather than the use of ‘fear’, “the term ‘threat appeal’ 
encourages a broader study of potentially important mediating emotions and cognitive 
responses… [and] demands a greater focus on stimulus factors (i.e. message content and 
how this is communicated), and simultaneously demands a separate and sharper focus on 
response factors (i.e. audience emotional and cognitive reactions to the message).” The 
differentiation between the concepts of threat and fear has been discussed above, but it is 
also necessary to consider the idea of whether it is possible to conceptualize differing 
‘levels’ of these concepts as stimuli characteristics. In fact, ‘levels’, by definition, are based 
on subjective interpretation of the subject and are therefore not intrinsic to the stimulus. In 
other words, different subjects will interpret the same message as being more or less of a 
threat for example, and this distinction helps to clarify the difference between variables that 
can be manipulated by researchers and practitioners (which should not be subjectively 
interpreted), and the emotional responses experienced by subjects resulting from exposure 
to the intended threatening stimuli. Of course, these are not one and the same. 
1.1.3 Responses to threat appeals 
Having emphasised the need for greater clarity around the independent variables or 
“intrinsic message features” (Tao and Bucy, 2007, p398) of threat appeals, it is imperative 
to examine the mediating and dependent variables. In particular, in keeping with the 
aforementioned emphasis on the importance of separating intrinsic message characteristics 
from emotional responses, this study re-examines the often-neglected role of emotion. 
Whilst the foundations of the threat appeals field (as will be discussed in chapter 2) are 
based on the assumption that simply the presentation of a supposedly threatening stimulus 
automatically causes a consistent fear response in subjects, detailed discussion of 
emotional responses beyond this appears far less frequently. Indeed, with the development 
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of the field of psychology towards a cognitive focus in the 1970s, the consideration of the 
effects of this advertising technique followed accordingly, and cognitive responses such as 
perceptions of severity and efficacy were the focus of theoretical development (This is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2). Whilst there is nothing inherently wrong with considering 
cognitive factors, the overwhelming focus on cognition has led to the threat – fear 
relationship seemingly becoming a truism, and an assumption, which has seemingly 
become accepted with little detailed scrutiny for many years.  
That said, in more recent years, a return to focus on the importance of emotional responses 
to threatening messages has occurred (e.g. Morales et al, 2012; Agrawal and Duhacheck, 
2010; Passyn and Sujan, 2006; de Hooge, 2007). Interestingly however, this body of 
research does not critically examine the threat-fear relationship assumption, but rather 
extends the model to include other emotions as well as fear. For example, Morales et al 
(2012) examine the combination of ‘fear appeals’ with or without disgust on persuasion, 
while Passyn and Sujan (2006) look at the influence of adding hope, challenge, guilt and 
regret to ‘fear appeals’, and the influence of this on behavioural intention. In the context of 
argument presented above, it can be seen that both these studies fall prey to conflating the 
message characteristics with emotional responses. Even so, the widening of consideration 
to a range of emotions beyond fear is beneficial because it more accurately reflects reality. 
In other words, it seems somewhat naïve to assume that the only possible emotion one 
experiences as a result of viewing a threatening advertisement is fear. As such, studies that 
only measure fear are somewhat restricted by design (a recent example of this is the study 
by Wauters and Brengman, 2013). The move to examining a range of emotional responses, 
for example the effects of guilt and shame in response to anti-binge drinking advertisements 
(Argawal and Duhacheck, 2010), widens consideration of emotional responses to threat 
appeals. Of course, it could be argued that adding to the field in this way creates a new 
body of research that will further the confusion in exactly what are the individuals responses 
to threat appeals. In this sense then, the mediating role of the interplay between cognitions 
and emotions in response to threat appeals requires further examination, which is the focus 
of this thesis.  
1.2 Research objectives and research design 
Drawing from the previous discussion, the broad objectives of this research are: 
1. To develop a theoretical model that incorporates emotional, cognitive, and conative 
(e.g. behavioural intention and expectation) responses to threat appeals. 
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2. To provide empirical evidence of the impact of intrinsic message characteristics of 
threat appeals on consumer response variables (as identified in the theoretical 
model from objective 1).  
In order to achieve these broad objectives, a number of more specific tasks need to be 
completed, which together comprise the beginnings of the overall research design: 
1. Conduct a detailed review of the literature and identify areas of conceptual and 
methodological equivocality. 
 
2. Identify gaps in the literature that require further empirical investigation in order to 
develop theory explaining consumer responses to threat appeals. 
 
3. Conduct rigorous data collection to explore the gaps identified and proposed 
theoretical developments. 
In more detail, one aim of this research is to unpick the areas of equivocality regarding 
cognitive, emotional and conative responses to threat appeals, in a detailed review of the 
extant literature (This is presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4). The literature suggests that prior 
research has returned confusing results that have hindered rather then helped the 
development of a coherent and empirically sound understanding of threat appeals and the 
responses to these appeals. In order to reduce confusion between scholars or empirical 
findings, it is first necessary to clearly identify where the confusion lies. Identification of 
areas of confusion reveals a number of assumptions that have been upheld in the literature 
which are closely examined. As mentioned above, examples of such assumptions are the 
conflation of message characteristics and emotional response and the assumption that 
upon exposure to a threat advertisement, an individual will experience fear and fear drives 
responses such as persuasion or behaviour change.  
The present study adopts a different approach to that adopted by most studies which 
comprise the main body of research in this area, by framing the response process to 
exposure to a threat advertisement as a decision. More precisely, given that the exposure to 
an advertisement in this present context (i.e. the intended reduction of some negative 
behaviour) usually occurs at a different time to the behaviour the advertisement is designed 
to warn against, the response process generally involves a decision about future behaviour. 
As such, the present study specifically focuses on this decision process, allowing for a 
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greater examination of the cognitions and emotions generated as a result of exposure to a 
threat advertisement. This also enables the consideration of different types of emotion that 
have received recent attention in other fields, namely anticipatory and anticipated emotions 
(e.g. Baumgartner et al, 2008), alongside the immediate emotional responses (e.g. fear) 
traditionally examined in the field. In addition, the influence of cognitions and emotions on 
intended and expected future behaviour is examined. Changing individuals’ future 
behaviour is arguably the fundamental objective of threat appeals and as such, is the most 
appropriate way to measure whether the advertisements are ‘effective’ or not. 
The definition and manipulation of intrinsic message characteristics further allows for the 
identification of the precise elements of the advertisement that influence the cognitive and 
emotional responses in subjects, as a result of exposure to the advertisement. This is in 
contrast to (as previously discussed) much existing research, which has confounded 
message characteristics with responses. Indeed, the aim of this research is to develop a 
model that describes the relationship between intrinsic message characteristics and 
emotional and cognitive responses, and in turn the influence of those responses on 
intended and expected behaviour (this is presented in chapter 3). This model will then be 
empirically tested and the results presented (chapters 5 and 6).  In order to test the 
hypothesised relationships in the model, a web based experiment was conducted. The full 
details of the research design are presented in chapter 4. Advertisements with intrinsic 
message characteristics, manipulated according to the hypothesised constructs were 
created and rigorously tested. The web experiment was pre-tested and then conducted with 
a sample of 681 participants.  
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured into nine chapters, including the present chapter.  The present 
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter which introduces the topic of research, justification of 
the need for research and outlines the contribution of the thesis. Research objectives are 
identified. Chapter 2 presents a thematic and chronological review and analysis of theory 
pertaining to individuals responses to threat appeals. The existing research is categorised 
according to the primary focus of the theories that have been developed, which are either 
emotional or cognitive. This review of the literature examines the theoretical frameworks 
utilised to examine responses to threat appeals and identifies a number of assumptions that 
have been upheld in the literature.   
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Chapter 3 reviews in depth the results of empirical research concerning intrinsic message 
characteristics and responses to those characteristics. The assumptions identified in 
Chapter 2 are further examined in Chapter 3 and shown to require empirical investigation. 
To this end, a new theoretical approach to re-examine consumer responses to threat 
appeals is developed in Chapter 4.  
In Chapter 4, the field of judgement and decision making is drawn upon to assist with the 
creation of a framework regarding how best to understand consumer responses to threat 
appeals. Indeed, this effort allows for the clear acknowledgement that the response to a 
threat appeal message is usually not at the time of the behaviour in question. In other words 
an individual is usually exposed to a threat appeal at a time when they are not engaging in 
the behaviour in question (e.g. when exposed to a print advertisement about the negative 
consequences of speeding the individual is not driving at the point of exposure). As such, it 
is argued that the consideration of anticipatory and anticipated emotions, alongside 
immediate emotions and cognitions, is needed. While anticipated and anticipatory emotions 
have been explored before (as will be discussed in depth in Chapter 4), the incorporation of 
these concepts into a model of threat appeals is novel. Drawing from the theoretical and 
empirical reviews Chapter 4 develops and presents the theoretical framework of this 
present study, and formally states the hypotheses to be tested.  
Chapter 5 presents the philosophical and methodological underpinnings of the empirical 
study employed to test the hypotheses developed in earlier chapters, and details the design 
of the advertising materials and the web experiment, including the measures to be used to 
test the constructs and hypotheses. Chapter 6 presents the descriptive analysis of the data 
collected, a description of the sample of participants and the exploration of the measures by 
means of exploratory factor analyses.  
Chapter 7 presents the results of the manipulation checks and web experiments. A number 
of factorial Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVAs) are conducted and reported to test the 
hypotheses generated in Chapter 4.  Chapter 8 elaborates on the main findings of the 
research and highlights how the results make a contribution to the research domain. 
Additionally, the conclusions, research contributions, and implications are presented. The 
limitations of the study are outlined, and following on from this, a number of 
recommendations for future research are presented. 
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1.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented a detailed explanation and justification for the need for this 
research. In brief, threats are commonly used by government, charities and third sector 
organisations across the world, in advertisements to promote behaviour change concerning 
well-being and social issues. Given, the vast body of literature from many different fields 
and the identified confusion in this literature, it is important that research continues to 
investigate the effectiveness of threat appeals. In particular, it is not uncommon to find a 
lamentation at the beginning of articles that focus on the use of threats in advertising, 
regarding the confusion in the field. For example Peters et al (2012, p1) state “despite 
decades of research, consensus regarding the dynamics of fear appeals remains elusive.” 
Johnston et al (2015, p113) identify that “empirical assessments of the effectiveness of fear 
appeals have yielded mixed results” and Morales et al (2012, p383) suggests that “the 
question of exactly how fear appeals work is still a matter of ongoing debate and 
investigation”. The position taken in this thesis is that the confusion itself needs to be 
addressed in order to move the field forward. In fact, it could be argued that many 
researchers are guilty of acknowledging the confusion and then adding to it. 
The review of the literature conducted in the next chapter will outline the main theoretical 
approaches utilised by researchers over the last six decades. This analysis of key theories 
will identify and expand upon a number of assumptions that have been identified above in 
section 1.1. These will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 2 and developed further in 
Chapter 3. By addressing the confusion and clearly identifying intrinsic message 
characteristics and the mediating role of cognitions and emotions on decision making about 
future behaviour the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4 alongside the conceptual 
framework, are grounded in the literature and are a step toward reducing the confusion in 
the field.  
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Chapter 2 - A review of the models and theories 
developed and used to explain responses to threat 
appeals 
This chapter presents a review of the models and theories developed and used by scholars 
to understand the cognitive, emotional and conative responses to threat appeals. This 
review of the literature will highlight a number of assumptions that have been made in the 
literature and compare the theoretical approaches taken to understanding consumer 
responses to threat appeals. Following on from the discussion regarding the variables 
manipulated in threat appeals in section 1.1 of chapter 1, the evaluation of the literature 
presented in this chapter examines the theoretical approaches taken by scholars to 
cognitive and emotional responses to threat appeals, before a more detailed review of the 
literature concerning the specific variables of interest is provided in Chapter 3. As identified 
in chapter 1, a vast range of research from scholars in numerous disciplines has been 
conducted and there is consensus that ‘confusion’ exists in the field (Rotfeld, 1997; Leshner 
et al, 2011, Morales et al, 2012). Indeed, precisely because the threat appeals field is varied 
and attracts scholars from a wide variety of disciplines, (e.g. marketing, consumer 
behaviour, psychology, health psychology, communication, information systems and 
medicine) a restrictive approach to identifying literature to review is not appropriate. 
When standing back and viewing the vast body of research that has explored threat 
appeals, it is necessary to create a structure or framework to assist with understanding how 
the field has developed and where the most critical areas of confusion lie. Such a 
framework allows a clearer picture of the field, and helps chart the course of theoretical 
development over time. In particular,  when reading articles concerning the use of threat 
appeals, often reference is made to the very first theories that were employed to explain 
consumer responses to those appeals; specifically, the drive reduction models (e.g. 
Hovland et al, 1953; Janis, 1967). These are emotion focused models (which will be 
discussed in more detail in section 2.1 of this chapter) which centre on the mechanism of 
the threat – fear relationship. Whilst these theories were never empirically supported (as 
discussed in section 2.1.1.) it is important to acknowledge them as they ‘set the tone’ for the 
field, and more importantly instigated a set of assumptions that have been upheld, until 
recently.  
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As previously, stated in Chapter 1, a shift in thinking within the general field of threat 
appeals research occurred in the 1970s, alongside a similar shift in the field of psychology, 
to a more cognitive focused approach. In line with this, the present chapter examines the 
theories and models used in the vast extant literature thematically, according to their 
emotional or cognitive focus. That said, identifying the focus of a theory does not imply that 
there are not, for example, emotional elements to a cognitively focused theory (and vice 
versa). Rather, the categorization of the focus of a theory refers to the idea that the 
rationale for the development of the theory or model focuses on the importance of either 
emotions or cognitions. Section 2.1 will examine emotional focussed theories, section and 
2.2 will examine cognition focussed theories. Figure 1 below is a pictorial representation of 
the two foci of the theories and models and their chronological introduction to the field. 
Figure 1 also notes which focus corresponds to the relevant section of this chapter in the 
diagram. It can be seen through charting the chronology of the two different focal 
approaches not only how the field has developed but also insights regarding why, for 
example, the cognitive focussed theories have received sustained research attention, and 
the emotion focussed theories have not.  Such issues will be discussed in the balance of 
this chapter, beginning with a detailed exposition of emotion-focused theories. 
 
Figure 1 - Overview of the themes and chronology of the theories and models 
developed 
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2.1 Emotion focused theories 
As previously stated, this section of the literature review will examine theoretical models and 
theories that have been developed and employed to examine responses to threat appeals, 
which have an emotional focus. That is not to say there are not cognitive or behavioural 
elements to the models rather that the theoretical underpinnings of the theories and models 
focus on the emotional response as the primary result of exposure to threat appeals. The 
underpinnings of the field are based on the psychological relationship between the 
presentations of a threat, which subsequently generates a fear response. First, the very 
early drive reduction models will be examined in section 2.1.1. These models set the 
foundations of the field as they were the first to be developed for this context. The use of 
fear arousal models is analysed in section 2.1.2 and then fear pattern models are examined 
in section 2.1.3. It is important to acknowledge that much of the work cited in this section is 
rather old. However, it is imperative to consider how the foundations of the field were laid in 
order to then follow how the field developed. Indeed, the move away from, and then return 
to, a focus on the role of emotion is charted.   
2.1.1 Drive Reduction Model 
Early research, on what were then uniformly called ‘fear appeals’ in the 1950s and 1960s, 
was guided by the assumptions of the drive reduction model (Hovland et al, 1953; Janis, 
1967). The main tenet of the drive reduction model is that the emotion of fear has the 
properties of a drive, which in turn, is a motivator for action. This model proposes that when 
the drive (or fear) is stronger, greater motivation occurs. As such, when individuals are 
presented with a threat they are motivated to reduce that threat (e.g. Hovland et al, 1953). 
Essentially, the emotion of fear serves as a motivator to remove or reduce the threat, and 
increased fear will result in increased likelihood of action. The implication therefore is that a 
‘stronger’ threat will create a ‘stronger’ emotional fear response which will result in an 
increased likelihood of action. If the action taken is then successful at removing the threat 
then the action is reinforced and therefore is likely to be repeated (as per learning theory at 
the time e.g. Dollard and Miller, 1950; Mowrer, 1950). 
A key component of the application of the drive reduction model is that the action to reduce 
the threat can be presented as a recommendation component of an advertisement. 
Theoretically, when fear is aroused enough to constitute a drive state, the silent rehearsal of 
the recommendation is followed by a reduction in fear. However, the recommendation can 
fail to reduce the fear because it is perceived as either irrelevant to the threat, or impossible 
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to carry out. In this situation the fear is not reduced and the recommendation is not 
reinforced. Based on this reasoning the drive reduction model proposes that generating fear 
from exposure to a threat, will result in increased persuasion. However, this is conditional 
upon the action recommendation being perceived as effective in preventing or reducing the 
threat. (Hovland et al, 1953). Essentially this theoretical perspective posits that if an 
advertisement can generate ‘just the right amount of fear’ then individuals will pay attention 
to the action recommendations and adopt the suggested behaviour accordingly. However, if 
too much fear is generated and it isn’t reduced by the recommendation presented, the 
emotion of fear will dominate, and the recommendation will not be followed.  
Indeed, according to this theoretical paradigm, when the action recommendation is not 
effective in reducing the aroused fear, the drive reduction model (Hovland et al, 1953; Janis 
and Feshbach, 1953) describes several defensive reactions to a threat appeal. These may 
also serve to reduce the influence of the fear response in a given individual. The first is 
defined as inattention to message content, which results either from avoidance of thinking 
about the threat or reduced concentration due to increased fear. Second, individuals could 
react to threat appeals with aggression toward the communicator, demonstrating rejection 
of the message content or a derogation of the message source (which is the discrediting of 
the source of the message). Third, when no defensive reactions occur, individuals actively 
avoid subsequent cognition regarding the threat or reduce the importance of the threat in 
relation to themselves.  In addition, high levels of fear are proposed to evoke defensive 
reactions that undermine persuasion. As such, this model outlines the specific mechanisms 
by which exposure to a threat could be ‘ineffective’ or in other words generate avoidance or 
defensive reactions. 
According to this early paradigm, the potential introduction of defensive reactions is 
considered to alter the relationship between the level of aroused fear and persuasion. 
Although an increasing level of fear, should lead to increased persuasion, the theory 
suggests that at some point the emotional tension will reach a level at which the reassuring 
recommendation will not sufficiently reduce the tension. Residual emotional tension might 
then give rise to defensive avoidance, causing a decrease in persuasion. As such a 
curvilinear relationship between fear arousal and persuasion is hypothesised (figure 2), 
where low to moderate levels of fear arousal increase persuasion but high levels of fear 
arousal decrease persuasion (Hovland et al, 1953; Janis, 1967). 
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Figure 2 - Curvilinear relationship between fear and persuasion as explained by drive 
reduction models 
Extensions of the drive reduction model were developed by Janis (1967) in the ‘family of 
curves’ model and McGuire (1968) with the ‘reception-yielding’ model. These extensions 
use the same basic principles of the drive model (as described above) but introduce 
mediating variables to the relationship. Janis (1967) proposed that if an individual has an 
increased awareness this mediates the fear and persuasion relationship. Accordingly, 
increased awareness will generate increased attention to the threat, which in turn will 
increase cognitions concerning the removal of the threat. This theory also proposed that the 
relationship between fear and persuasion is mediated by an individual’s need for 
reassurance, as higher need for reassurance increases an individual’s readiness to accept 
the action recommendation. In addition, defensive avoidance reactions were identified as 
factors that could interfere with the relationship between fear and persuasion. Nonetheless, 
Janis’ (1967) theory sticks to the principle that beyond a certain level of fear, persuasion will 
decrease. McGuire’s reception-yielding model (1968) is very similar to the model developed 
by Janis (1967) but adds the dimension of the fear response acting as a cue. So whilst fear 
can be a motivator and act as a drive, the emotion can also act as a cue that generates 
habitual responses associated with that emotion which interfere with the relationship 
between fear and persuasion. Again the curvilinear relationship between fear and 
persuasion is proposed and moderate amounts of fear posited as the most effective 
(McGuire, 1968). 
This early research is fundamentally based on the notion that a threatening advert will 
create a fear response that can vary in terms of strength. Too much fear will mean that 
individuals are unable to follow the recommended action (like being scared stiff in popular 
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terminology). However, moderate or lower levels of fear will be motivating and individuals 
will carry out the recommended action, which if successful is more likely to be repeated. 
Janis and Feshbach (1953) conducted research that confirmed the curvilinear relationship 
as they found that mild rather than strong fear appeals about dental hygiene created 
increased attitude and behaviour change. Another contribution of the drive reduction model 
and its extensions (Hovland et al, 1953; Janis 1967; McGuire, 1968) has been the focus on 
defensive reactions that individuals may display in response to a threat appeal. Arguably 
these models form the foundations on which subsequent work are based and this can be 
evidenced by the recurrence of similar issues addressed in later models, as will be 
discussed in more depth in due course.  
Despite these early predictions from drive reduction models though, the majority of 
experiments examining threat appeals have found that – in contrast to predictions made by 
the drive reduction models - higher levels of fear in general lead to more persuasion than 
lower levels (see meta analyses by Boster and Mongeau, 1984; Sutton, 1982; Witte and 
Allen, 2000), rather than the curvilinear effect posited by drive reduction models. More 
specifically, Rotfeld (1988) reviewed the literature concerning fear arousal and concluded 
that the notion of a so-called ‘optimal level’ of fear stimulation, central to drive reduction 
theories, has not been upheld by research. He stated that “extensive literature reviews and 
meta-analysis of past data have repeatedly failed to find the inverted-U as a potentially 
meaningful or valid explanation for why high fear treatment was not always most 
persuasive” (Rotfeld, 1988, p28) Meta analytic studies (see Witte and Allen, 2000) have in 
fact identified the opposite effect to that postulated by drive theories; that high fear arousal 
conditions lead to increased persuasion in comparison to low fear arousal, and most studies 
have been unable to find significant fear-efficacy interactions on persuasion (Maddux and 
Rogers, 1983; Rogers and Mewborn, 1976). Thus, research has resulted in only limited (at 
best) support for the predictions of the drive reduction model. 
Despite the varied criticisms of the central tenet of the drive reduction models though, 
“consumer researchers have repeatedly sought to validate it or explain it…[and] It has 
become a mainstay of textbooks” (LaTour and Rotfeld, 1997, p46).  That said, this quote is 
from 1997 and, of course, thinking has inevitably advanced since, indeed it is now generally 
accepted that there is no empirical evidence to support the drive reduction models. 
However, these models do leave an important legacy of two very important assumptions 
that run through the literature, as will be demonstrated throughout this chapter. First, that 
threat appeals, or ‘fear appeals’ as they were referred to in the 1950s and 1960s, inherently 
generate fear (in fact, as will be shown later, other emotional responses received little 
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examination by academics until the turn of the millennium).  In addition, the ‘fear appeals’ 
examined as part of this body of research conflate the stimulus variable and the emotional 
response (as discussed in section 1.1). 
It can be seen then, that despite their contribution, drive reduction models are somewhat 
problematic, although they have had a major influence on the development of threat 
appeals research. Chronologically speaking, at this point in the field’s evolution (around the 
1970s), alongside a corresponding move in general psychology, researchers studying threat 
appeals moved to a cognitive focus in the 1970s, which will be discussed in chapter 2.2. In 
terms of emotion focused research though, it was not until the late 1980s and 1990s that 
scholars revisited the place of emotion, and focused on the role of fear arousal as the 
response to threat appeals, which will be discussed in section 2.1.2 below. 
2.1.2 Fear Arousal Models 
The role of fear, or more specifically the construct of ‘fear arousal’, was re-examined by a 
group of researchers in the context of individuals’ responses to threat appeals in the late 
1980s and 1990s (e.g. Henthorne et al, 1993; LaTour and Rotfeld, 1997; Tanner, Hunt and 
Eppright, 1991). According to LaTour and Pitts (1989), the Model of Arousal developed by 
Thayer (1967; 1978) explains the mediating role of fear arousal between a threat appeal 
and cognition. Whilst Thayer’s (1967; 1978) work was not specifically developed to explain 
individuals’ responses to threat appeals, researchers (e.g. LaTour and Pitts, 1989) applied it 
to this context. Thayer (1978) puts forward the notion that arousal is a key factor in the 
generation of feelings and thoughts, and that it is a complex multidimensional phenomenon. 
The model of arousal developed by Thayer (1967; 1978) thus identifies two dimensions, 
which interact and create four factors of activation (see figure 3). The first dimension is 
energy, which ranges from feelings of high energy to feelings of fatigue. This dimension is 
associated with positive cognitions. The second dimension, tension, ranges from high inner 
tension to inner calm. This dimension relates to negative cognitions (LaTour and Zahra, 
1988).   
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Figure 3 - Thayer’s arousal model (adapted from LaTour and Pitts, 1989) 
Taken together, according to Thayer (1978), the four activation factors are known as 
general activation (energy), deactivation (fatigue), high activation (tension) and general 
deactivation (calmness). To summarise, general activation is associated with positive 
affective responses whereas high activation is associated with negative affective responses. 
To put this into context, according to this theory, an advertisement could generate mainly 
energy in certain individuals, which would result in a positive emotion. However, another 
advertisement could generate tension arousal as the dominant factor, which would result in 
negative feelings. The dimension that is dominant (tension or energy) will determine the 
positive or negative nature of arousal experienced. Thayer (1978) however states that if 
tension does not increase beyond moderate levels it does not have a detectable impact, 
and high levels of tension are required to generate negative emotions ( see also LaTour and 
Pitts, 1989).   
In the context of the application of the arousal model to individuals responses to threat 
appeals, the theoretical process begins with a deliberate attempt to elicit tension in 
individuals (through exposure to an advertisement). According to the application of the 
model, if the individual is not excessively stimulated, or the level of tension is not high 
enough to suppress the energy response, energy is generated and the individual 
experiences a positive feeling towards the advertisement. However, if tension surpasses the 
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negative impact on the individual’s feeling towards the advertisement (LaTour and Zahra 
1989). LaTour and Pitts (1989) therefore posits that if the ‘level of fear’ contained in the 
advertisement is too low, then the emotional response generated by the advertisement and 
experienced by the individual, will not be forthcoming. If this is the case, then the threat 
appeal will not be successful in gaining an individual’s attention. LaTour and Zahra (1988) 
note that the Thayer model of arousal suggests that individual differences are accounted 
for, as an arousing advertisement may evoke predominantly energy in some individuals and 
tension in others. Clements et al (1976) argue that the two dimensions of the model 
proposed by Thayer provide a more accurate reflection of the total body arousal 
experienced by an individual as opposed to the measurement of separate physiological 
systems.  
LaTour and Pitts (1989) support the model of arousal, and state that the dimension that 
dominates in an individual’s reaction to an advertisement varies in accordance with the 
complex psychological and physiological make-up of the individual. As such, their study is 
founded on Thayer’s model of arousal, and based on the proposition that arousal is unique 
to an individual, or idiosyncratic. LaTour and Pitts (1989) contend that the idiosyncratic 
nature of arousal has been the missing element of other research and models, and suggest 
that tension and energy may result from the same advertisement, but that certain individuals 
would experience greater energy and other individuals would experience greater tension. 
The study tested whether advertisements concerning the issue of AIDS prevention 
provoked reactions of tension, which would suppress reactions of energy. The results from 
this study indicated that an advertisement designed to stimulate high levels of fear did 
generate more tension arousal, yet did not pass the threshold. In summary, this research 
suggests that threat appeals can produce a reaction of energy without generating excessive 
levels of tension, resulting in generalised positive feelings towards the advertisement.  
Furthermore, LaTour, Snipes and Bliss (1996) conducted a mall intercept study with ‘fear 
appeals’ designed to advertise stun guns. This research found that the ‘stronger’ fear 
appeal generated significantly more tension, and that it had more of a positive effect on 
consumers’ attitudes toward the ad and purchase intension” (LaTour, Snipes and Bliss, 
1996, p65) in comparison to the effects of the ‘milder’ fear appeal. In support of this LaTour 
and Rotfeld (1997) found empirical evidence that tension consistently generated energy and 
thus positively influenced brand and purchase intention (again, of a stun gun). They 
describe the relationship between tension and response variables as being indirect, as 
energy directly influenced response variables and results did not find a direct effect between 
tension and response variables. In support of this finding, Henthorne, LaTour and 
- 39 - 
Nataraajan (1993) and Strong and Dubas (1993) also found that the level of tension did not 
cross the proposed hypothetical threshold. It was concluded from this study that a print 
advertisement containing a strong threat did produce increased tension and energy 
responses in individuals and performed better than an advertisement containing mild 
threats. However, it is possible to conclude that the theoretical premise that high levels of 
tension will suppress energy arousal has not been supported by either study.  
More recently LaTour and Tanner (2003) also found no evidence to indicate that a tension 
threshold was reached, leading to the suggestion that few stimuli are capable of reaching or 
exceeding such a threshold. Indeed, they conclude that “researchers have yet to find that 
threshold, even though there have been many studies that attempted to do so” (LaTour and 
Tanner, 2003, p378) and refined their approach by combining the application of the arousal 
model with protection motivation theory (LaTour and Tanner, 2003, p380). Protection 
motivation theory (Rogers, 1975; 1983) is a cognitive focussed theory (which will be 
discussed in section 2.2). The ‘fear appeals’ concerned the dangers of Radon, and were 
categorised according to whether they contained a ‘moderate’ threat or an ‘explicit’ threat. It 
was hypothesised that both tension and energy would be higher in the group exposed to the 
explicit threat, which was partially upheld. The group exposed to the explicit threat reported 
significantly more tension, yet there was no difference in reported energy between the 
moderate and explicit threat groups. LaTour and Tanner (2003) also reported that the 
explicit threat condition activated protection motivation processes. 
It can be seen that scholars developed a strong theoretical justification for applying Thayers 
(1967; 1978) model of arousal, and tested its application over a number of years (mainly in 
the 1990s). However, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that a tension threshold 
can be reached with the use of a threat appeal (e.g. LaTour and Rotfeld, 1997; LaTour and 
Tanner, 2003; LaTour and Pitts, 1989). As such, interest in the application of this theory and 
investigating the role of fear arousal in response to threat appeals appears to have 
somewhat fizzled out. This may be because other theoretical approaches (to be identified in 
this chapter) were generating more interesting and insightful results about individuals’ 
responses to threat appeals at the time.  
An important conclusion that can be drawn from a review of the arousal model however, is 
that (aside from LaTour and Tanner, 2003 which demonstrates the shift in thinking in the 
field) researchers in the area consistently exhibited the problematic issues identified in 
section 1.1 of this thesis. First, researchers often conflated the stimulus and response 
variables of fear. In addition, researchers applied a model with a focus on fear arousal, 
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assuming that fear is the only emotional response to such and appeal. These 
characteristics seem to clearly uphold the assumptions made by the researchers who 
focused on the drive reduction models discussed in section 2.1.1. Therefore, given the 
prevalence of cognitive theories at the time (as discussed in the introduction to this chapter) 
it is unsurprising that after what were generally unfruitful attempts by threat appeal 
researchers to apply the arousal model to the field, there was somewhat of a dearth of 
emotion focussed research until the millennium, with primary focus moving to cognitive 
based theories (see section 2,2). However, a contemporary refocussing on emotions as a 
key component of the responses to threat appeals has occurred from the year 2000. First, 
with the development of fear pattern models which will be described in section 2.1.3, and 
then with a more generalised approach which will be discussed in section 2.1.4. 
2.1.3 Fear Pattern Model 
Interestingly, Rossiter and Thornton (2004) brought a reconsideration of the drive reduction 
paradigm to the fore, almost six decades after its introduction. Considering the generally 
consistent evidence against this theoretical approach, as described in section 2.1.1, this 
may seem surprising. However, Rossiter and Thornton (2004) depart from the 
conceptualisation of fear responses in terms of ‘levels of fear’ (which in itself is a subjective 
construct as discussed in section 1.1.) and move towards a consideration of patterns of 
fear. They offer the following definition: “A pattern of fear refers to the sequence of fear and 
relief felt by the audience during the advertisement, if indeed there is any relief to be felt.” 
(Rossiter and Thornton, 2004, p946)  Indeed, the fear drive paradigm identifies fear arousal, 
and then relief, as central constructs which is reflected in this approach (as described in the 
curvilinear relationship between fear and persuasion discussed in section 2.1.1).  
According to the Rossiter and Thornton (2004) theory, the constructs of fear and relief have 
not been tested accurately because post exposure measures of fear arousal “cannot 
capture the essential drive-reduction, negative reinforcement process that is the central 
mechanism of the fear-drive model.” (Rossiter and Thornton, 2004, p947). Moment to 
moment ratings of fear and relief (central to the fear drive paradigm) were measured for the 
duration of exposure to a television based threat appeal. Results for fear-relief stimuli 
showed a curvilinear pattern; “during the middle or middle-to-late phase of the ad, peak fear 
is reached, and then the fear is reduced toward the end of the ad, where the 
recommendation is placed, resulting in relief felt by the viewer.” (Rossiter and Thornton, 
2004, p950). Whilst this approach presents a significant enhancement to the field, there are 
temporal issues that require further consideration. These will be explored in more detail in 
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chapter 3 but to summarise here, whilst measuring emotional responses during exposure to 
a threat appeal captures the immediate responses to the advertisement but does not 
account for the fact that often there is a time delay between exposure to the threat appeal 
and engaging in the behaviour that is the subject of that appeal. 
That is not to say that Rossiter and Thornton (2004) do not provide a line worthy of further 
enquiry. Indeed, Nabi (2015) examines the ‘emotional flow’ of persuasive health messages 
and posits that it “might prove valuable to explore the flow, or evolution, of emotional 
experience over the course of exposure to a health message.” (Nabi, 2015, p114). Hence 
whist considering emotional responses to threat appeals, there is some evidence to suggest 
that a temporal element is relevant. Whilst Rossiter and Thornton (2004) focus on the 
variety of responses that occur during exposure to the threat appeals,  Nabi (2015) 
theorises, but unfortunately does not empirically test, the idea that mixed emotions may be 
a result of exposure to a threat appeal and indeed, that there is an order to emotional 
responses. Whilst this may seem a small step forward, this represents a major shift in the 
field which will be explored in more detail in section 2.1.4. 
2.1.4 Summary 
The previous three sections have outlined the theories and models which focus on 
emotional responses in order to attempt to understand individuals’ reactions to threat 
appeals. It can be seen that over time, emotion focused approaches have risen and 
declined in popularity, as shown in figure 1. The use of drive reduction models and fear 
arousal models yielded mixed results (as previously discussed) and the use of the fear 
pattern model is currently in its relative infancy. However, a wider shift towards a re-
focusing on the role of emotions has occurred more recently. Importantly, these studies do 
not specifically employ emotion based theories or models, hence they are not included in 
the above discussion. Rather, the approach taken in these more recent studies is to widen 
the consideration of the emotional element of cognitive focussed models (and are therefore 
discussed in Section 2.2). As stated in the introduction to this chapter and in section 2.1, the 
categorisation of the theories and models according to their ‘focus’ does not mean that 
other relevant variables are neglected.  
The cognitive focused theories and models will be discussed in detail in section 2.2. In brief 
though, there are a number of examples of research with a cognitive focus, but which has 
also widened the consideration of the role of emotions. Passyn and Sujan (2006) build on 
appraisal based research and consider the effects of ‘adding’ emotions that are either high 
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or low in self-accountability to the appeal. The study uses protection motivation theory 
variables (to be discussed in detail in section 2.2.3) which is a cognitive focused model. The 
threat appeals were designed to be a ‘fear appeal’ or a ‘fear with hope appeal’, ‘fear with 
regret appeal’, ‘fear with guilt appeal’ or ‘fear with challenge appeal’. Hope is defined as a 
low self-accountability emotion, whilst regret, guilt and challenge are high accountability 
emotions. Results showed that the high self-accountability emotions were more effective. 
Whilst this study conflates stimulus variables and emotional responses as discussed in 
section 1.1, the notion of examining emotions and their differing properties is welcomed.  
Indeed, So (2013) expands the cognitive focused extended parallel process model (to be 
discussed in section 2.2.5) to include anxiety as well as fear. Lewis et al (2013) also 
expanded the extended parallel process model and added annoyance/ agitation, pride and 
humour alongside fear. In differing approaches Leshner et al (2010) examine the role of 
disgust alongside fear and Agrawal and Duhachek (2010) examine shame and guilt in an 
anti-binge drinking context. These research studies will be examined in more detail in 
section 2.2 below and also in Chapter 3. While many of these studies fall prey to the 
problematic conflation of stimulus variables and responses (as can be seen with Passyn 
and Sujan, 2006 above), the move away from purely considering fear to be the only 
possible response to a threat appeal is welcome. The shift towards re-focusing on the role 
of emotions is gathering momentum and the move away from the long held assumption that 
the ‘threat causes fear’ mechanism is applicable in this context, which may liberate 
researchers to more accurately understand individuals’ responses to threat appeals. 
Indeed, the results of research studies that focused on the drive reduction model and fear 
arousal model generated mixed and inconclusive results. This confusion was not only a 
factor that has generated the reported confusion in the field but also calls into question the 
fundamental assumption of the role of fear as a response to threat appeals. Attention will 
now turn to cognition focused theories as indicated in figure 1. 
2.2 Cognition focused theories 
As previously identified in the introduction to this chapter, cognitive focused theories used to 
explain responses to threat appeals gained popularity in the 1970s. This was alongside the 
shift towards a cognitive focus in the field of psychology. As shown in figure 1, cognitive 
focused theories are the most numerous and have received sustained research attention. 
While, as discussed in section 2.1.4 above, researchers have started to widen the 
emotional component of cognition focused theories (e.g. Passyn and Sujan, 2006; Argawal 
and Duhachek 2010; Lewis et al, 2013), in order to better grasp how these developments 
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have occurred, it is first necessary to examine more specifically cognition focused theories. 
The cognition focused theories focus on cognitions that individuals utilise to understand and 
evaluate a threat appeal. Some approaches include an emotion component to the theory or 
model, however the core focus is the understanding of cognitive responses and how they 
influence whether the threat appeal is ‘effective’ or not.  
The first cognitive focused model, the parallel response model (Leventhal, 1970, see 
section 2.2.1) has received a variety of criticism and has not been subject to empirical 
testing. However, despite such weaknesses it serves (in the same way to the drive 
reduction model discussed in section 2.1.1) as an important platform for subsequent 
cognitive focused models and theories because principles and elements of the proposed 
theory were re-examined and adapted by other researchers. Indeed, later theoretical 
models of ‘fear appeals’ all built on the danger control process described in the parallel 
response model (this will be explained in more detail in section 2.2.1). Researchers who 
theorised about cognitive responses to threat appeals in the context of danger control 
processes also introduced the expectancy-value principle (e.g. Leventhal, 1970). This 
proposes that behaviour is a function of its expected consequences and the perceived value 
of these consequences. As such, expectancy-value models assume that decisions between 
different courses of action are based on two types of cognition: the subjective probability 
that a given action will lead to an expected outcome, and the evaluation of these action 
outcomes. Individuals will choose among alternative courses of action that one that will be 
most likely to lead to positive consequences or avoid negative consequences. Rosenstock’s 
(1974) health belief model (to be discussed in section 2.2.2), and Roger’s (1975, 1983) 
protection motivation theory (to be discussed in section 2.2.3), all assess the cognitions that 
motivate individuals to engage in health enhancing behaviour. In comparison to the emotion 
focused theories discussed in section 2.1, the cognition focused theories and associated 
research present a lot more explanation about understanding responses to threat appals. 
In a similar manner to section 2.1, this section will examine the key cognitive focused 
models in turn. Section 2.2.1 discuses parallel response models, section 2.2.2 details health 
belief models and section 2.2.3 discusses protection motivation theory.  Section 2.2.4 will 
than examine the extended parallel process model, section 2.2.5 will discuss the stage 
model and section 2.2.6 presents an overview of the cognitive approach. 
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2.2.1 Parallel Response Model 
One of the first cognition focussed theoretical developments to examine individuals 
responses to threat appeals is the parallel response model (Leventhal, 1970). In this model, 
threat appraisal (i.e. the cognitive perception of a threat) acts as a mediator between a 
threat appeal and behaviour. According to this theoretical perspective, the cognitive 
evaluation of a threat leads to two parallel processes, namely fear control and danger 
control. Despite having an emotion in its name (which can be misleading) fear control as a 
construct in this context is a cognitive coping response. Fear control represents the 
cognitions associated with reducing the felt emotion of fear through the denial of a threat or 
avoidance of the message to generate reassurance (e.g. an individual may think ‘this 
message is not relevant to me’). On the other hand, danger control focuses on reducing or 
eliminating the threat through cognitive appraisal. It differs from fear control as the danger 
control construct concerns engaging with the threat appeal message. The cognitions 
resultant from the engagement regard how to cope with the threat presented and adopt the 
recommended action that usually forms part of the message, instructing individuals how to 
avoid or reduce the threat.  
The model is based on the contention that “a cognitive response, the belief that harm is 
likely to occur, is evoked in addition to the emotional (fear) response” (Batra, Aaker and 
Myers, 1996, p56). Fear control and danger control are conceptualised as two distinct 
processes that may interact (Leventhal, 1970) and occur in parallel (as opposed to 
sequentially, which is a feature of other cognitive models such as protection motivation 
theory which will be discussed in section 2.2.3). Given that fear control occurs in parallel to 
danger control, the two constructs are not dependent on each other. So, whilst fear control 
is directly linked to reducing the felt emotion of fear through cognitive appraisals, the 
process of danger control has no link with emotion and therefore may occur whether fear is 
generated or not. It is theorised that the fear and danger control processes influence the 
choice and direction actions taken by an individual. The fear control process focuses on 
reducing the felt emotion of fear and may have little or no effect on coping with the 
presented threat. Coping with the presented threat is determined by the danger control 
process and influences the acceptance (or not) of recommended action presented in the 
stimuli. Figure 4, outlines the parallel response model and indicates the combined effects of 
danger control and fear control indicated by middle curve in the diagram. According to 
LaTour and Zahra (1988) the shape of the curve is determined by the dominating element, 
either fear control or danger control.   
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Figure 4 - The Parallel Response Model (adapted from LaTour and Zahra, 1988) 
Unfortunately the parallel response model has been criticised for it’s lack of empirical testing 
and has been described as solely an illustrative device (e.g. Sutton, 1982). Witte and Allen, 
(2000) go further and critique the model as untestable, due to a lack of specificity. More 
precisely the lack of specificity is described in terms of how the theory “fails to specify the 
conditions that lead to each of the two processes of fear and danger control. It also does not 
tell us when and how these two processes interact or how people switch from one to the 
other. The model only broadly categorises emotional and cognitive responding as two 
distinct reactions to a health risk” (de Hoog et al, 2007, p259). Without these specifics, the 
model is impossible to empirically test. In addition, conceptually, no distinction is made 
between the threat appeal and the cognitive and emotional responses, instead the model 
assumes that exposure will occur and only examines the cognitions and link to the emotion 
of fear. In addition, the model does not consider “the moderating effect of individuals’ unique 
patterns of feeling and thinking upon responses to fear appeals” (LaTour and Zahra, 1988, 
p7). However, despite these criticisms, the parallel response model (akin to the drive 
theories discussed in section 2.1.1) set an important foundation for the cognitive focussed 
approach by examining the cognitions and emotion of fear and considering how this 
process occurs. It also moved scholars away from fear as a central explanatory concept, 
particularly with regard to the fear – persuasion relationship. The principles and components 
of the model were apparently worth of further consideration and were revisited and 
reconceptualised by Witte (1992) in the development of the extended parallel process 
model (which will be discussed in section 2.2.5). Indeed some of the principles of the 
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danger control process were developed as part of the health belief model which will be 
examined in section 2.2.2. 
2.2.2 Health Belief Model 
The health belief model (Rosenstock, 1974) was not developed specifically to aid 
understanding of responses to threat appeals, rather it is a more general model to explain 
why and when individuals engage in health enhancing behaviours. The model has rarely 
been applied to the threat appeals context (e.g. Becker et al, 1977). However, combined 
with the parallel process model, some of the core constructs of the health belief model form 
later theories designed to model responses to threat appeals, for example protection 
motivation theory (to be discussed in section 2.2.3) and the extended parallel process 
model (to be examined in section 2.2.5).  The health belief model (Janz and Becker, 1984; 
Rosenstock, 1974) assumes that the likelihood that individuals engage in a health 
enhancing behaviour (e.g. getting a flu vaccination or stopping smoking) depends on the 
extent to which individuals believe that they are personally susceptible to a particular 
disease/health issue and their perceptions of the severity of the consequences of that 
disease/ health issue. The fundamental theory behind the health belief model (Rosenstock, 
1966) is that behaviour is determined by individual’s perceptions of a health issue itself and 
then the perceptions of strategies available to decrease the likelihood of occurrence of the 
health issue. Additionally perceived benefits to adopting the behaviour and perceived 
barriers to adopting the behaviour influence the likelihood of the behaviour in question 
occurring. These perceptions are, of course, cognitions (Rosenstock, 1974).  
Individuals cognitions, in the form of perceptions about susceptibility and severity combined 
are assumed to determine the perceived threat of the disease/ health issue. Perceptions of 
susceptibility are essentially cognitions about personal risk. The more an individual believes 
themselves to be vulnerable to the health issue, the more likely they are to engage in 
behaviours to reduce the risk (e.g. de Wit et al, 2005; Chen et al, 2007). Conversely, 
research has shown that when individuals perceive low susceptibility and believe 
themselves to be not at risk from the health issue, in fact unhealthy behaviours are more 
likely to occur (Maes and Louis, 2003). Perceived severity refers to the perceptions of the 
severity of the health issue, usually informed by thinking about the consequences of that 
issue. If the health issue is perceived to be serious and the individual perceives themselves 
to be at risk from the issue, the perception of threat will be larger, which in turn increases 
the likelihood of behaviour change (Stretcher and Rosenstock, 1997). 
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When individuals perceive a threat of contracting a disease/ health issue, the likelihood of 
engaging in the behaviour will depend on the extent to which individuals believe that the 
health behaviour will result in certain benefits that outweigh the barriers associated with the 
health behaviour.  Perceived benefits are an individual opinion of the value of a new 
behaviour in it’s effectiveness of decreasing the risk of the health issue. On the other hand, 
perceived barriers to change are individuals’ evaluations of obstacles that would prevent 
adopting the new behaviour. In order for behaviour change to occur, the benefits of the new 
behaviour must outweigh the perceived barriers (Janz and Becker, 1984). 
The health belief model (Rosenstock, 1974) also proposes that certain cues to action 
influence perceptions of threat, which in turn will affect the likelihood of behaviour. Cues to 
action is a vague term that encompasses events, people or things that move people to 
change behaviour. These can include threat appeal advertisements but also warning labels 
on cigarette packaging, media reports or illness of a family member (Graham, 2002). The 
variables and the relationship between the variables as proposed by the health belief model 
are presented in figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 - The health belief model (adapted from Janz and Becker, 1984) 
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Research on the impact of the components specified by the health belief model on 
protective health behaviour has found support for the model in a wide variety of contexts, for 
example child vaccinations (Smith et al, 2011), papillomavirus vaccination (Gerend and 
Shephers, 2012), HIV and AIDS prevention behaviour (Yep, 1993). Indeed, it is generally 
seen to be a strong explanatory framework (Jones, et al 2015). However, the cues to action 
are varied and while they may include threat appeals (e.g. Becker et al, 1977), can also 
include many other forms of communication or intervention (e.g. the H1N1 vaccination 
campaign, Jones et al, 2015). Whilst this theoretical approach does not allow for a specific 
examination of responses to threat appeals, or consider the role of any emotional response, 
the constructs of perceived threat, perceived severity and perceived susceptibility are of 
great importance. These constructs were developed in a threat appeals context by Rogers 
(1975) who proposed protection motivation theory, which will now be discussed in section 
2.2.3. 
2.2.3 Protection Motivation Theory 
Rogers (1975, 1983) developed protection motivation theory which, as identified above in 
sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) draws upon elements of both the parallel response model 
(Leventhal, 1970) and the health belief model (Rosenstock, 1974). Protection motivation 
theory is based on the principle that an individual’s motivation toward protection of the self, 
results from the perception of a threat and a desire to avert the negative outcome, both 
depicted in a threat appeal. Protection motivation is proposed as the variable that 
encourages the adoption of the suggested behaviour to avert the threat presented in a 
threat appeal. Thus, when protective motivation does not occur, the suggested behaviour 
presented as the recommendation to avert the threat, has been deemed to be ineffective or 
impossible to carry out and therefore no intention to act results from the cognitive 
processing.  
Rogers (1975) identified two core appraisal processes in protection motivation theory that 
dictate behaviour responses, namely threat appraisal and coping appraisal. Threat 
appraisal is the process by which individuals judge factors that increase or decrease the 
probability of maladaptive behaviour (e.g. avoiding the message or inaction). Coping 
appraisal on the other hand refers to an individual’s evaluation of their ability to cope with 
and avert the negative consequences depicted in the advertisement. These two appraisal 
processes expand the danger control process identified by Leventhal (1970) in the parallel 
response model. As described in section 2.2.1, the parallel response model theorises the 
cognitive appraisals that occur in response to exposure to a threat appeal, where danger 
- 49 - 
control, represents cognitive appraisals to identify how an individual can cope with the 
threat presented and influences the acceptance (or not) of recommended action presented 
in a threat appeal.  
Indeed, Rogers (1975; 1983) elaborated on the parallel response model’s process of 
danger control by specifying in more detail the actual processes of cognitive appraisal. This 
occurred in two stages. First, Rogers (1975) identified three elements that comprise the 
threat appraisal and the coping appraisal processes. Perception of severity of the threat and 
perception of susceptibility to the threat underpin the threat appraisal process. This is akin 
to the role of perceived severity and perceived susceptibility presented by Rosenstock 
(1974) in the health belief model as discussed in section 2.2.2.  An individual’s belief that 
the recommended response is effective in averting the threat (response efficacy) underpins 
the coping appraisal process. Rogers (1975) proposed a three-way interaction between 
severity, susceptibility and response efficacy, which was not supported by empirical 
research (e.g. Rogers and Mewborn, 1976; Kleinot and Rogers, 1982; Maddux and Rogers, 
1983). Based on this evidence Rogers (1983) reviewed protection motivation theory and 
added further variables to the model. The first of these variables was self–efficacy which is 
defined as an individual’s belief in their ability to perform that recommended response was 
added to the coping appraisal process (Rogers, 1975). Additionally, Rogers (1983) 
introduced response costs (perceived costs of engaging in adaptive behaviour) and 
perceived rewards (benefits of maladaptive responses) to protection motivation theory. 
These constructs reflect those of perceived benefits and perceived barriers proposed in the 
health belief model (Rosenstock, 1974) as discussed in section 2.2.2. 
Rogers (1983) proposed that threat appraisals specifically evaluate the threat and the 
factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of a maladaptive response (e.g. avoidance 
or denial). The perceived severity and susceptibility to the threat (e.g. the perceived severity 
of lung cancer and likelihood of developing the disease from smoking), and any fear 
associated with this appraisal, serve to reduce the likelihood of maladaptive responses. 
Rogers (1983, p96) identified that “fear may be considered a relational construct, aroused in 
response to a situation that is judged as dangerous and toward which protective action is taken”. 
However, it is important to note that here fear is treated as an incidental construct (to be discussed 
later in this section). These evaluations are weighed against the perceived rewards of 
engaging in maladaptive behaviour (e.g. the belief that smoking prevents weight gain or 
facilitates social interaction) and a threat appraisal is reached. Alternatively, coping 
appraisal processes refer to the resources available to an individual to avert the threat 
which will increase or decrease the likelihood of adaptive responses (e.g. undertaking the 
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recommendation for action presented in a threat appeal such as stop smoking). The 
individual’s belief that the recommended action is capable of averting the threat is response 
efficacy (e.g. giving up smoking will reduce the risk of lung cancer) and belief that the 
individual can undertake the recommended action is self-efficacy (e.g. I have the ability to 
give up smoking). These appraisals are weighed against perceived costs of engaging in the 
adaptive behaviour (e.g. if I give up smoking I will gain weight and be miserable) to form the 
coping appraisal. In order for protection motivation (i.e. the intention to perform a 
recommended behaviour) to occur, the perceptions of severity and vulnerability should 
outweigh the perceived rewards of engaging in the maladaptive behaviour and the response 
efficacy and self-efficacy should outweigh the costs of engaging in the adaptive behaviour. 
Figure 6 below depicts the cognitive mediating processes of protection motivation theory, as 
described.   
 
 
Figure 6 - Cognitive mediating processes of protection motivation theory (adapted 
from Floyd et al, 2000) 
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mediating process. These processes would, in turn, influence protection motivation.” Thus, 
Rogers (1975) proposed that the variables of severity, susceptibility, response efficacy (and 
then in 1983 self-efficacy) could be included in the so-called fear appeal and would 
therefore be received as intended by individuals and as such underpin the threat appraisal 
and coping appraisal processes. As previously discussed in section 1.1, this clearly 
conflates the stimulus variables and cognitive responses to those variables, but nonetheless 
the cognitive threat and coping appraisals are grounded in theory (as described above) and 
were subject to empirical testing (to be discussed later in this section). Rogers (1983, p96) 
identified that “fear may be considered a relational construct, aroused in response to a 
situation that is judged as dangerous and toward which protective action is taken”. Thus an 
emotional response was included in protection motivation theory but it was viewed as 
incidental. Indeed, Rogers (1983) suggests that the emotion of fear may occur but not as a 
necessary factor to influence behaviour. The appraisal process outlined in protection 
motivation theory concentrates upon the cognitive appraisals to the threat appeal and not 
any emotional response.  
As previously indicated, protection motivation theory has been subject to empirical testing which 
has generated mixed results. Interestingly, while little support was observed for the three-way 
interaction proposed in Rogers (1975) original protection motivation theory (severity, 
susceptibility and response efficacy), more support has been found for the two-way threat 
appraisal by coping appraisal interaction predicted by Rogers’ (1983) revised protection 
motivation theory. In fact, many early studies have found two-way interactions between one 
of the threat appraisal variables (severity or susceptibility) and one of the coping appraisal 
variables (response efficacy or self- efficacy) on outcome measures such as attitudes, 
intention, and behaviour (e.g. Maddux and Rogers, 1983; Mulilis and Lippa, 1990; Wurtele 
and Maddux, 1987). However, the specific variables which interact have been inconsistent 
across studies. For example, whereas some studies have found that susceptibility interacts 
with response efficacy (e.g. Mulilis and Lippa, 1990), others have found instead that severity 
interacts with self-efficacy to change attitudes, intentions or behaviour (e.g., Maddux and 
Rogers, 1983; Wurtele and Maddux, 1987). Indeed, even though a large number of studies 
have found at least some interaction-effects between threat appraisal and coping appraisal 
variables, an equally large number of studies have been unable to find any of these 
interaction-effects (see Rogers and Prentice-Dunn, 1997). 
These inconsistencies in results have been observed since the early studies that empirically 
tested protection motivation theory (as described above). However, a number of meta-
analyses have been conducted which generate a more consistent synopsis of empirical 
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findings. Floyd et al (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of studies that used protection 
motivation theory variables and behaviour intention or behaviour as a dependent measure. 
Results showed that the threat appraisal variables (severity and susceptibility) and the 
coping appraisal variables (response efficacy and self-efficacy) all facilitated adaptive 
behaviour across the studies, although coping appraisal variables were found to have more 
impact on adaptive responses. Indeed, decreases in maladaptive response rewards and 
adaptive response costs, increased adaptive intentions or behaviours. Milne et al (2000) 
also conducted a meta-analysis which demonstrated that both threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal variables were found to predict health related behaviour intentions. Milne et al 
(2000) also found that the coping appraisal variables, specifically self-efficacy, were found 
to have greater predictive ability on behavioural intention than the threat appraisal variables, 
which is in line with the finding by Floyd et al (2000).  Moreover, they suggested that threat 
appraisal (severity and susceptibility) variables are poor predictors of behaviour intention in 
comparison to self-efficacy (Milne et al, 2000). Interestingly Milne et al (2000) found that 
protection motivation theory was more useful when the dependent variables concerned 
concurrent behaviour (i.e. behaviour that was occurring at the time of exposure to the threat 
appeal) in comparison to measures of behaviour intention which measure future behaviour. 
Indeed, other studies report the success of protection motivation variables in predicting 
behaviour (e.g. Pechmann et al, 2003 and Beck, 1994).  
Protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1983) has been criticised on the basis that more 
research is needed regarding the impact of fear generated by threat appeals (e.g. 
Henthorne et al, 1993). Indeed, Tanner et al (1991) highlighted that a weakness of 
protection motivation theory is a lack of recognition concerning the importance of emotional 
responses to threats. It is their contention that emotional responses are important to 
cognitive appraisal and that they are indirectly linked to behavioural intentions through 
cognitive appraisal.  Another limitation of the theory identified by Tanner et al (1991) is the 
assumption that individuals have not already adopted a coping response to the threat, either 
in terms of removal of the threat or reducing the fear associated with the threat. In light of 
these criticisms Tanner et al (1991) proposed four amendments to the protection motivation 
theory which were intended to include additional variables that may influence behaviour. 
The first amendment was an emphasis placed on the emotional aspects of the model as the 
authors surmised that this had been ignored. Second, the authors suggested that the 
appraisal processes of the theory were sequential or ordered, rather than parallel or 
unordered as Rogers (1983) had indicated. Third, a consideration was given to maladaptive 
coping behaviours. These were defined as behaviour of individuals, when faced with a 
threat, to employ a coping response that reduces the emotion of fear experienced but not 
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reduce the threat or danger (the cause of the emotional response of fear.) The authors cite 
that such maladaptive coping responses are greatly influenced by past experience. Fourth, 
the social context of danger was introduced into the model on the basis that many adaptive 
behaviours are influenced by normative components.  
Tanner et al (1991) empirically tested the adapted protection motivation theory and found 
support for the ordering of the variables. However, Hall et al (2006) could not replicate this 
finding. Tanner et al (1991) found evidence that fear response has an impact on the threat 
appraisal variables and is not necessarily merely a consequence of the threat appraisal 
process. However, Schoenbachler and Whittler (1996) found that fear had no impact on 
persuasion but rather sensation seeking moderated the relationship between threat appeal 
and protection motivation variables.  In addition, Tanner et al (1991) found prior maladaptive 
behaviours were found to influence the perceptions of probability of occurrence. In support 
of this, Eppright et al (1994) found that prior knowledge or past experience increased self-
efficacy and susceptibility which increased adaptive behaviour intention. However, in this 
study, susceptibility also increased maladaptive behaviour intention. Tanner et al (1991) 
found no support for the introduction of the social danger context to protection motivation 
theory.  
As can be seen, modifications to protection motivation theory have also generated mixed 
results. Nevertheless, protection motivation theory is utilised in many contemporary studies 
(e.g. Ritland and Rodriguez, 2014; Cismaru et al, 2011; Nelson et al, 2011). Indeed, 
Dickinson-Delaporte and Holmes (2011) focus solely on the coping appraisal process and 
examine how coping appraisal and health resistance responses to threat appeals impact 
attitude to behaviour (in this case, smoking). Dickinson-Delaporte and Holmes (2011) 
compared the effect of social compared to physical threat appeals and found that social 
threat appeals resulted in more adaptive coping responses than psychical threat appeals. In 
other words, social threat appeals encouraged more participants in the study to have 
increased response efficacy and self-efficacy, which resulted in increased negative attitudes 
toward smoking behaviour. Passyn and Sujan (2006) also focus on the coping appraisal 
process in response to ‘fear appeals’ that add high accountability (regret, guilt or challenge) 
or low accountability emotions (hope) to the appeal. As identified in section 2.1.4 this study 
conflates stimulus variables and emotional responses (see also section 1.1). However, 
Passyn and Sujan (2006) identified two different levels of coping (abstract and specific) and 
found that the high accountability emotions (regret, guilt and challenge) when added to fear, 
resulted in the generation of specific and concrete coping strategies that are representative 
of a readiness for action. Interestingly, no differences were found in perceptions of severity, 
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susceptibility, response efficacy or self-efficacy, which protection motivation theory suggests 
are the key variables that influence behaviour. The findings of the study by Passyn and 
Sujan (2006) therefore suggest that self-efficacy and self-accountability are separate 
constructs, and that accountability (or obligation) is more important than self-efficacy (an 
individual’s belief they can carry out an action) in determining behaviour responses.  
Studies that have empirically tested protection motivation theory have generated mixed 
results (see Rogers and Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Floyd et al, 2000; Milne et al, 2000).  
Arguably more recent studies (e.g. Dickinson-Delaporte and Holmes, 2011; Passyn and 
Sujan, 2006) have actually split the theory according to the two original processes (threat 
appraisal processes and coping appraisal; Rogers, 1975) and focused primarily on coping 
appraisal processes. This is not surprising, because the results of the meta-analyses (e.g. 
Floyd, 2000 and Milne et al, 2000) identify that coping appraisal processes, particularly the 
variable of self-efficacy, are most effective in generating behaviour intention or behaviour 
change. Despite the equivocal empirical support, the development of protection motivation 
theory (Rogers 1975; 1983) heralded a significant shift in the field. Whilst the parallel 
response model (Leventhal, 1970) was not empirically tested and the health belief model 
concerned generalised health behaviour, they both laid the foundations for the development 
of protection motivation theory. Specifically, protection motivation theory made a significant 
contribution by attempting to identify the relationship between stimulus variables and 
cognitive responses in the specific context of responses to threat appeals. Whilst, as 
discussed in section 1.1 a retrospective view allows the identification of flaws in the 
approach taken (e.g. conflation of stimulus and response variables) this was at the time a 
very novel approach (as opposed to the assumptions of the fear and persuasion 
relationship as identified in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2).  
However, the mixed findings (e.g. Rogers and Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Floyd et al, 2000; Milne 
et al, 2000) serve to add to the identified confusion in the field (as described in chapter 1). 
Indeed, a number of specific criticisms are presented by Witte (1992), which in hindsight 
can be seen to have instigated another development in the cognitive focussed approach, 
namely the introduction of the extended parallel process model. Specifically, Witte (1992) 
identifies logical flaws regarding the variables in protection motivation theory (e.g. an 
absence of explanation regarding how threat appraisal and coping appraisal work together 
to result in protection motivation). This is evidenced, in part, by researchers to focusing on 
coping appraisals and neglecting threat appraisals as outlined above. Interestingly, it could 
be argued that this split actually highlights that indeed, the two processes were never 
theorised to interact. Additionally, Witte (1992) identifies a failure of protection motivation 
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theory to offer an explanation of what happens when threat appeals do not work, in other 
words how and when they may fail to generate a behavioural response. Indeed (as reported 
above) Eppright et al (1994), found in their examination of the adapted protection motivation 
theory (Tanner et al, 1991)  that susceptibility increased both adaptive and maladaptive 
behaviour intentions. Whilst Witte (1992) presents strong criticisms of the adapted and 
developed protection motivation theory (e.g. Tanner et al, 1991) it is acknowledged that the 
original constructs of the protection motivation theory (severity, susceptibility, response 
efficacy and self-efficacy) have explanatory power as mediators between exposure to a 
threat appeal and message acceptance (Witte, 1992). Based on the criticism and 
acknowledgement of the positives of protection motivation theory, Witte (1992) re-examined 
the cognitive processes that underpin the responses to threat appeals and developed the 
extended parallel process model which will be discussed in section 2.2.4.  
2.2.4 Extended Parallel Process Model 
The extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992; 1994) can be seen to combine and 
elaborate on concepts and constructs from the parallel response model (Leventhal, 1970), 
protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975; 1983), as well as the drive-reduction model 
(Hovland et al, 1953).  As previously identified, Witte (1992) set out some strong criticisms 
(whilst acknowledging what were viewed to be positives) of protection motivation theory 
(Rogers 1975; 1983). As such, a new model was developed that addressed some of the 
criticism of protection motivation theory and the developments in the field in general (as 
cited to this point in this chapter).  According to the extended parallel process model 
exposure to a threat appeal creates two appraisal processes; threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal (Witte, 1992). The more that individuals believe they are susceptible to a serious 
threat (i.e. high perceptions of susceptibility to threat), the more motivated those individuals 
are to engage in coping appraisal. However, if the threat is perceived as irrelevant or 
insignificant (i.e. low perceptions of susceptibility to threat), the extended parallel process 
model indicates there should be no motivation to process the threat appeal any further, and 
individuals will simply ignore the remainder of the message. This implies the importance 
identifying the process that occurs when a threat appeal is ineffective (see above). In 
contrast, when a threat is believed to be severe and individuals feel susceptible, and 
response and self-efficacy are low, the extended parallel process model assumes that 
individuals will experience fear (Witte, 1992; 1994). It can be seen then, that the 
consideration of a fear response is a return to the fundamental assumption that underpins 
so much of threat appeals research, that threats generate fear which in turn effects 
persuasion or action (see sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2). 
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According to the extended parallel process model, the fear generated is caused by 
perceptions of severity and susceptibility. The efficacy responses serve to determine the 
magnitude of fear experienced. If efficacy is low (In other words the individual does not 
believe they can carry out the recommended action or that the recommended action would 
be effective) then fear increases. Increases in fear are suggested to increase defensive 
motivation responses, leading to maladaptive behaviours. However, if efficacy is high, it is 
proposed that threat and associated fear are perceived to be manageable and therefore the 
fear motivates individuals to take some action that is intended to reduce fear, such as a 
recommended course of action from an advertisement (e.g. reduce speeding or stop 
smoking; fear control). The perceived efficacy of the recommended action (a combination of 
the response efficacy and self-efficacy) will determine whether those individuals who 
believe that they are susceptible to a serious threat, will engage in either danger or fear 
control. More specifically, Witte (1992, 1994) assumes that individuals will mainly engage in 
danger control when they perceive the recommended action as effective in reducing the 
threat, and they will mainly engage in fear control when they perceive the recommended 
action as ineffective in reducing the threat, or when they feel unable to perform the 
recommended action. In the latter case (high perceived threat and low perceived efficacy), a 
defence motivation is elicited, which the extended parallel process model defines as an 
individual focusing on eliminating their fear through denial or defensive avoidance.  
Whereas as seen above, perceived efficacy determines the direction of the response 
(danger or fear control), the extended parallel process model suggests that perceived threat 
determines the actual magnitude of the response to a threat appeal. As such, the extended 
parallel process model integrates ideas of both protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1983) 
and the parallel response model (Leventhal, 1970), and extends these ideas by identifying 
how threat appraisal and coping appraisal relate to each other, as well as specifying the role 
of perceived fear in threat and coping appraisal. A feedback loop is presented (see figure 7) 
whereby an individual may first experience fear but, as explained above, if perceptions of 
efficacy are high the fear does not lead to fear control processes, rather danger control 
processes occur. Indeed this suggests that initial maladaptive responses may indirectly 
affect adaptive responses as mediated by the perceived threat and efficacy. Additionally, 
the extended parallel process model acknowledges the role of individual differences upon 
coping and threat appraisals. The extended parallel process model is represented in figure 
7.  
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External stimuli       Message       Outcomes           Process 
 
 
Figure 7 - The extended parallel process model (adapted from Witte, 1992) 
The extended parallel process model presents a departure from prior theory in the cognitive 
focussed category, as it emphasises the role of fear in processing and acceptance of threat 
appeals. The parallel response model (Leventhal, 1970) forms the basis of the extended 
parallel process model, with central constructs from protection motivation theory explaining 
danger and fear control processes (Rogers, 1975; 1983). This synthesis of theoretical 
constructs attempts to explain how, through danger processes, threat appeals can be 
effective in changing attitudes, intention and behaviours, and how, through fear control 
processes, they can instead, be ineffective. Research that has empirically tested the 
extended parallel process model has been somewhat supportive (e.g. Lewis et al, 2013; 
Witte, 1994; Witte and Morrison, 2000), but overall, findings have been mixed (e.g. Witte 
and Allen, 2000; Lewis et al, 2010).  
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As can be seen in figure 7 above, the message characteristics, precisely reflect the 
perceived threat and perceived efficacy variables. Again, this is an example where the 
message features are conflated with the intended response. Possibly, this is the reason 
some studies have generated results that rest on an assumption that these effects occur. 
For example, Smalec and Klingle (2000) manipulated ‘levels’ of threat and efficacy in the 
threat appeal and identified that in high efficacy conditions the perception of threat 
correlated with message acceptance, yet they did not measure perceived threat. 
Unfortunately the explanatory power of studies that do not measure the mediating role of 
perceptions is weakened. Indeed, it could be argued that the fundamental objective of the 
extended parallel process model is to assist understanding regarding how the responses 
occur and as such making assumptions about responses less appropriate.  
However, a number of the proposed relationships between variables in the extended 
parallel process model (Witte, 1992) have been supported in the literature. Tay and Watson 
(2002), found that increased fear served to increase message rejection, which is an 
indicator or defensive motivation and fear control processes which lead to maladaptive 
responses. Indeed, in a meta-analysis Witte and Allen (2000) found that as fear responses 
increased or intensified, the fear control responses (as shown in figure 7) increased 
accordingly. These results suggest that intense fear responses create defensive avoidance, 
and suggest that increased fear therefore facilitates maladaptive responses. However, 
Lewis et al (2010) found that when individuals experience high fear responses and high 
efficacy responses, message rejection is actually reduced. In other words, these results 
indicate that although the threat appeal has generated intense fear, the action 
recommendation is deemed to be appropriate and therefore the message is not rejected. 
Thus, fear control processes are not engaged, rather that danger control processes are 
facilitated. In further support of the role of efficacy in facilitating danger control processes 
and specifically not fear control processes, Witte (1994) and Tay and Watson (2002) found 
no relationship between perceived efficacy and defensive avoidance measures, which was 
also supported by the meta-analysis conducted by Witte and Allen (2000).  
The extended parallel process model states that high perceptions of threat lead to cognitive 
appraisal responses, yet when the threat is perceived to be low the message is not 
processed. Results from Witte and Allen’s (2000) meta-analysis support the idea that 
perceptions of low threat do not lead to further message processing. Witte and Allen (2000) 
also identified that high threat perceptions (severity or susceptibility), combined with high 
efficacy perceptions (response efficacy and self-efficacy) had the most persuasive impact, 
which is as hypothesised. This finding is replicated across the literature (e.g. Roberto and 
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Goddall (2009); Wong and Cappella (2009). However, Witte and Allen (2000) found that 
perceptions of high threat and low efficacy were more persuasive than low threat, low 
efficacy perceptions. This would suggest that high perceptions of threat encourage 
processing due to severity and susceptibility and low efficacy does not influence message 
processing. In support of this, Allahverdipour et al (2007) found that cognitions about 
perceived severity were significantly correlated with antidrug attitudes and intentions to 
avoid drug abuse. 
In contrast, results from other research studies have identified efficacy to have an impact on 
persuasion but not severity. Witte (1994) found that perceptions of efficacy were 
significantly correlated with attitudes, intentions, and behaviour changes in use of condoms 
to prevent AIDS. In addition, Witte et al (1993) found individuals with high efficacy 
perceptions had higher attitudes, intentions, and behaviour regarding tractor safety. In 
another study, Witte (1994) found that for people with high perceived efficacy, neither fear 
nor perceived threat was related to attitude changes. However, fear both directly and 
indirectly affected behavioural intentions and only indirectly. In a similar result Lewis et al 
(2010) found a significant direct effect of fear on message acceptance. However, despite 
these evidently mixed results, it is claimed that the extended parallel process model is a 
good explanatory model because in a broad sense threat appeals produce both danger and 
fear control responses and the stronger the threat appeal, the more motivated individuals 
are to process the message (Witte and Allen, 2000). Indeed, Witte and Allen (2000, p604) 
concluded that threat appeals are “effective when they depict a significant and relevant 
threat, and when they outline effective responses that appear easy to accomplish.” 
Based on the explanatory power of the extended parallel process model, scholars have 
begun to examine the use of the model in different contexts (e.g. So, 2013). Basil et al 
(2008) used extended parallel process model constructs to examine responses to guilt 
(rather than threat) appeals. Specifically, Basil et al (2008) found that self-efficacy and 
empathy generated as a result of exposure to a guilt appeal increased intention to donate to 
charity and decreased maladaptive responses. Lewis et al (2013) employ a similar 
technique used by Passyn and Sujan (as described in section 2.1.4 and section 2.2.3) 
where emotions are ‘added’ to threat appeals. Lewis et al (2013) examine a fear appeal, an 
annoyance/agitation appeal, a pride appeal and a humour appeal using the extended 
parallel process model in the context of speeding. Lewis et al (2013) found that perceptions 
of threat and efficacy influenced message acceptance for the annoyance/ agitation, pride 
and humour appeals but not the fear appeal. Low perceived efficacy as a result of exposure 
to the fear appeal condition influenced message rejection, yet high perceived threat in this 
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condition decreased message rejection, which was an unexpected result. The annoyance/ 
agitation, pride and humour appeals generated message rejection when perceived efficacy 
was low, as expected. Lewis et al (2013) suggest that the explanatory power of the 
extended parallel process model is not restricted to a threat appeals context and can be 
widened to consider the relationship between other types of emotional appeals and 
persuasion.   
Whilst there are mixed findings regarding empirical testing of the extended parallel process 
model (Witte, 1992), which arguably could add to the confusion outlined in section 1.1, it 
appears to be generally accepted that the extended parallel process model has marked a 
positive shift in advancing understanding of responses to threat appeals (de Hoog et al, 
2007). Indeed, whereas marked criticism of prior theoretical approaches has been outlined 
in this chapter, contemporary scholars continue to use the extended parallel process model 
as a platform to explore improvements in the model (e.g. Basil et al, 2008; Lewis et al, 
2013). Stroebe et al (2000) and Das et al (2003) developed a theory to improve the 
extended parallel processing model named the stage model of processing of fear arousing 
communications. Whilst the empirical testing of this model is limited, section 2.2.5 will give a 
brief description of the model and relevant empirical results to outline the latest theoretical 
development of cognitive focused models and theories.  
2.2.5 The Stage Model of Processing of Fear-Arousing Communications 
The stage model of information processing (Stroebe, 2000; Das et al, 2003; de Hoog et al, 
2005) is largely based on the theoretical constructs of the extended parallel process model 
(Witte, 1992) and integrates constructs from dual process theories of persuasion (e.g. 
Chaiken et al, 1989) which have been developed as general theories about persuasion in 
an advertising context, not specifically in a threat appeals context.  As the stage model (de 
Hoog et al, 2005) is more recent than the others cited in this chapter, studies that test the 
model are few (Das et al, 2003 and de Hoog et al, 2005) and as such the field of research 
examining its theoretical proposition is in its infancy. The stage model proposes that the 
cognitive appraisals in response to exposure to a threat appeal occur in two distinct stages. 
The first stage is the cognitive processing of the ‘fear appeal’ and the second stage is the 
cognitive processing of the action recommendation.  
Stage one, or processing of the ‘fear appeal’, occurs as perceptions of severity and 
susceptibility. How the ‘fear appeal’ is processed determines the processing mode (depth of 
processing) and goal of processing (accuracy of information or defensive processing). This 
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approach moves away from the proposition in the extended parallel process model, that 
high perceptions of severity generate avoidance. The stage model by contrast posits that 
high perceptions of severity generate deep processing of the message (opposed to shallow 
processing). The impact of severity of susceptibility perceptions on processing mode and 
goal are show in figure 8.  
 Severity 
Susceptibility Low High 
Low 
Shallow processing 
Accuracy motivation 
Deep processing 
Accuracy motivation 
High 
Deep processing 
Accuracy motivation 
Deep processing 
Defence motivation 
 
Figure 8 - The impact of severity and susceptibility on processing mode and goal 
(adapted from de Hoog et al, 2005, p26) 
When individuals experience both high susceptibility and high severity, deep processing 
and defence motivation occurs. Prior research (e.g. Witte, 1992) has identified high 
perceptions of severity and high perceptions of efficacy to be effective in generating fear 
coping responses. Conversely, according to the stage model, these responses (high 
severity and susceptibility) represent a threat to an individual’s self –belief which will 
generate defensive processing, however, given the high severity and susceptibility an 
individual is also motivated to carefully scrutinise the information presented (de Hoog et al, 
2005).  The assumption is made (according to dual process theories of persuasion e.g. 
Chaiken et al, 1989) that processing will be systematic rather than heuristic. In other words, 
because the information makes an individual feel susceptible to a severe threat they will 
undertake a detailed cognitive examination rather than rely on rules on thumb.  
According to the stage model, defence motivation can be an avoidance reaction, as 
proposed by extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992) or alternatively part of biased 
systematic processing, where the bias is negative in the appraisal of a threat and positive in 
appraisal of coping strategies. When appraising the threat, defence motivated individuals 
will be motivated to reduce the threat through a thorough examination of the message. 
Information may be minimised (e.g. by downplaying the information) or inconsistencies or 
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errors of logic highlighted as evidence to criticise the message. Conclusions drawn will 
therefore be biased in the direction of an individual’s preferred conclusion. However, if this 
strategy is unsuccessful and biased processing is constrained by evidence, individuals will 
have to accept they are at risk from the threat presented.  If this occurs, subsequent 
cognitive processing of the information at the second stage will also be biased but in the 
opposite direction. Therefore if an individual is defence motivated and has identified 
themselves to be at risk in stage one, they will then maximise any action recommendation 
because the recommendation will offer a solution to the threat. This can then moderate 
negative emotional responses and cognitions generated as a result of exposure to the 
threat appeal (de Hoog et al, 2005). 
If the threat is perceived to be trivial and individuals feel they are not susceptible to the 
threat (low perceptions of severity and susceptibility) little effort will be invested in 
cognitions, and instead heuristic processing modes are adopted.  Alternatively, if an 
individual feels susceptible to the threat presented but perceives it to be a minor threat (i.e. 
high susceptibility and low severity perceptions) the heightened susceptibility should 
encourage systematic processing of the message. This is in line with the assumption from 
dual-process theories that personal relevance, which is a similar concept to perceived 
vulnerability, is an important motivator for systematic processing (e.g. Eagly and Chaiken, 
1993). Equally, if an individual does not perceive themselves to be susceptible to the threat 
but that the threat is severe (i.e. low perceptions of susceptibility and high perceptions of 
severity) individuals are likely to invest effort in processing the contents of the message 
because it is useful to be well informed about a serious health risk, even if the individual 
does not feel susceptible to the threat.  
As described in section 2.2.4 prior theories such as the extended parallel process model 
assume an interaction between perceptions of threat (susceptibility and severity) and 
perceptions of efficacy (self- efficacy and response efficacy) (Witte, 1992). The extended 
parallel process model proposes that high perceptions of threat will only lead to persuasion 
if the recommended action is effective. The stage model, however, assumes that defence 
motivated individuals will be motivated to perceive any recommendation as effective, as 
long as it is at least somewhat plausible, because engaging in a recommended action will 
reduce the threat. Two empirical studies have been conducted to test the propositions of the 
stage model. Das et al (2003) found a positive bias in the processing at the second stage 
(action recommendation processing) when individuals had perceived high susceptibility. 
Susceptibility was found to be the only determinant of engaging in the recommended action: 
susceptible respondents had higher behavioural intentions. In support of this, de Hoog et al 
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(2005) also found that susceptibility influenced behavioural intention. However, de Hoog et 
al (2005) found no evidence that perceptions of susceptibility modify the effect of argument 
quality on attitude, which had been identified by both Das et al (2003). 
As previously stated, the stage theory is relatively new and the purpose for its inclusion here 
is to demonstrate the continuation and development of thought concerning individuals’ 
responses to threat appeals. The stage model particularly looks at the properties of 
susceptibility which is a fresh approach. Whilst there is a need for more empirical research 
to test the theory, the initial insights regarding the importance of susceptibility are in line 
with those presented as part of the extended parallel process model. The stage model 
particularly introduces a temporal dimension with the consideration of different stages of 
individuals’ cognitive evaluation of threat appeals. This will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
2.2.6 Summary 
The previous five sections have outlined the theories and models which focus on cognitive 
responses in order to attempt to understand individuals’ reactions to threat appeals. There 
has been sustained interest in understanding the cognitions resulting from exposure to a 
threat appeal and how they drive persuasion and behaviour change. As theories have been 
developed, from the health belief model (section 2.2.2) onwards, the roles of perceived 
severity and susceptibility have remained as central appraisal cognitions. Protection 
motivation theory (Rogers, 1983; as discussed in section 2.2.3) added the variables of 
response efficacy and self-efficacy to the cognitive appraisal. These four variables have 
since served as the cornerstone of cognitive approaches. Yet, there is little consistency 
between research findings as evidenced throughout this chapter. There is little question that 
these are conceptually sound cognitive responses, however empirical testing of their role 
has generated mixed results. Whilst severity was previously assumed to be the cognitive 
variable that links a threat and the emotional response (e.g. protection motivation theory 
and extended parallel process model) results suggest that perceived susceptibility has more 
effect on persuasion. 
There are a number of examples of research that has a cognitive focus that has widened 
the consideration of the role of emotions. Passyn and Sujan (2006) build on appraisal based 
research and consider the effects of ‘adding’ emotions that are either high or low in self-
accountability to the appeal but in the main if cognition focussed theories have included an 
emotion (as the extended parallel process model does) it is assumed this emotion is fear.  
- 64 - 
2.3 Discussion and chapter summary 
This chapter has charted the course of theoretical development of responses to threat 
appeals, firstly examining theories with an emotion focus and then those with a cognitive 
focus. It can be seen that the origins of the field are firmly rooted in the emotion focused 
drive models which are based on the fear-persuasion relationship. Dillard (1992, p13) noted 
that in the drive models, "fear was at the centre of the theoretical stage". Whilst the 
curvilinear relationship was not empirically upheld, the assumption that fear is the inherent 
response to threat appeals has been generally upheld for six decades. As previously stated 
the rise in popularity of cognitive approaches in psychology also occurred in the threat 
appeals field and indeed heralded a decline in the role of fear. Dillard, (1992, p 13) stated 
"Fear was virtually excluded from the study of fear appeals. In the most recent 
investigations based strongly on the cognitive perspective, fear has been treated as a 
control variable, if it is measured at all (e.g., Rogers, 1985; Self & Rogers, 1990)". Arguably, 
it was precisely because the role of fear was neglected until Witte (1992) re-examined its 
role in the extended parallel process model that the fear-persuasion relationship has been 
upheld and the assumption continued.  
Whilst more recent studies (e.g. So, 2013) expand the cognitive focused extended parallel 
process model to include emotions other than fear, these emotions are conceptualised as 
part of the threat appeal, and not a response to it. This is an example of the conflation of 
message and response as outlined in section 1.1. Of course, the notion that fear is the only 
emotional response generated from exposure to a threat has been criticised, specifically by 
Tanner (2006, p414) who states “fear may be one of several emotional responses to a 
threat; others could include disgust, anger, or some combination of these and other 
emotions.” This idea has been built upon, and research has begun to expand beyond the 
consideration of fear as the only emotional response to threats in this context. Dickenson 
and Holmes (2008, p253) acknowledge that it is important to “determine the broader roles 
that emotions… play in eliciting a coping response.” However, in that study the authors limit 
their consideration and measurement of emotional responses to the discrete emotions of 
distress, anger, disgust, shame and guilt. Passyn and Sujan (2006), in contrast, study the 
emotions of fear, hope, regret, guilt and challenge. The authors categorise hope and 
challenge as positive emotions, which implicitly acknowledges that when considering 
consumer responses to threats positive emotions should be acknowledged as well as 
negative emotions. It thus seems important to widen this research arena and consider a 
broad spectrum of emotional responses to properly understand consumers’ emotional 
responses to threats. Prior research has been limited because it has remained wedded to 
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the assumptions that fear is the only response to a threat or that negative emotions are the 
only responses to threats.  
Nevertheless, it can be seen that the work cited above which has attempted to widen the 
scope of emotions considered as responses to threat appeals remains wedded to the idea 
of immediate emotional responses, as well as incorporating a somewhat arbitrary selection 
of which emotions to add to their models. There appears to be a lack of coherence in which 
specific emotions to add to the typical ‘fear’, and little strong theoretical base for the 
selection of different emotions to incorporate. However, a reliance on immediate emotional 
response misses the key fact that – typically – threat appeals are seen by respondents at a 
time prior to their engagement in the potentially-harmful behaviour. As such, and building 
upon the work by Passyn and Sujan (2006),  this research will explore a wider range of 
emotional responses to threats allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of 
emotional responses both positive and negative. The following two chapters will cover in 
depth the development of a theoretical model of consumer responses to threat appeals 
which is aimed specifically at the research gaps uncovered herein. Specifically, Chapter 3 
will examine intrinsic message characteristics and the problematic assumptions that have 
been uncovered in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 will then move on to examine emotional and 
cognitive variables to develop a coherent conceptual model of consumer responses to 
threat appeals, with the objective of moving beyond the tacit assumptions that have proven 
to be problematic in prior research (as discussed above), and presenting a path to resolving 
the confusion and contradiction that currently exists in the threat appeals literature. 
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Chapter 3 - A re-examination of threat appeals and 
identification of intrinsic message characteristics 
The previous chapter reviewed emotion focussed and cognitive focussed theories and 
models that have been developed to explain consumer responses to threat appeals. The 
assumption that threat appeals generate a fear response has been widely upheld 
throughout the literature (e.g. Witte, 1992). Indeed, not all theories developed have included 
an emotional component (e.g. de Hoog et al, 2007), and focus on a variety of emotional 
responses to threat appeals has only recently been a subject of attention (e.g. Passyn and 
Sujan, 2006; Morales et al, 2012; Basil et al, 2008). Building on the first two chapters of this 
thesis, the present chapter re-examines the intrinsic message components of threat appeals 
(as proposed in section 1.1) and consumer responses to threat appeals with a focus on the 
role of emotion alongside cognition. Building on prior research a new conceptual framework 
is developed in chapter 4  to explain consumer responses to threat appeals, which will be 
empirically tested (results are presented in Chapter 7). 
Empirical tests of theoretical models designed to explain consumer responses to threat 
appeals have produced equivocal results (e.g. Floyd et al, 2000; Milne et al, 2000), which is 
a reasonably consistent theme throughout the literature (as charted in Chapter 2). Indeed, 
Johnston et al (2015, p113) identify that “empirical assessments of the effectiveness of fear 
appeals have yielded mixed results”.  Scholars (e.g. Morales et al, 2012) interpret the mixed 
results to be a signifier of the long-standing confusion about consumer responses to threat 
appeals as first identified by Rotfeld (1997) and discussed in Chapter 1. However, 
theoretical developments have been significant, particularly the extended parallel process 
model (Witte 1992) which presents the most robust explanation of consumer responses to 
threat appeals to date (see section 2.2.4). This chapter builds upon prior research and 
addresses the two assumptions that have been uncovered in the previous chapters. First, 
the assumption that message characteristics can be conflated with responses, which is 
resolved by the examination of intrinsic message characteristics as discussed in Chapter 1 
and discussed in more detail in this chapter. Second, the assumption that threat appeals 
generate a fear response as identified in Chapter 2. Based on theoretical developments 
concerning the role of cognitions as responses to threat appeals (e.g. Witte, 1992) this 
thesis identifies the different roles of immediate, anticipatory and anticipated emotions that 
form consumer responses to threat appeals, alongside cognitions. This is examined in detail 
in chapter 4. 
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Whilst it is necessary to understand the antecedents to behaviour change, the end goal of 
threat appeals (for example, the viewer giving up smoking, or otherwise changing their 
behaviour in the intended way) is often neglected as a measured variable (Peters et al 
2013). Of course, empirical work on behaviour change is time consuming and costly and as 
such, having a body of work that has laid foundations for a rigorous understanding of the 
antecedents to behaviour change in this context is valuable. Peters et al (2013) conducted a 
meta-analysis with the inclusion criteria being the study had to contain manipulations of 
threat, and efficacy and measurement of behaviour as an outcome. Only thirteen studies 
satisfied the inclusion criteria dating from 1965 – a time span of almost half a century. Thus, 
if behaviour change is particularly difficult to study, then in order to move scholarly 
understanding of the field forward, relationships between stimuli features and cognitive and 
emotional responses that precede actual behaviour change must be understood in order to 
create foundations for understanding behaviour change.  Indeed the conceptual model 
presented in chapter 4 presents behaviour intention and expectation as dependent 
variables.  
Overall then, the literature review presented in Chapter 2 shows that the effectiveness of 
threat appeals has received intermittent research attention, relying on a number of 
assumptions that are re-examined in this present chapter. Focussing on such assumptions 
will allow for clearer identification of independent variables and clarify the fundamentals of 
the relationships between stimulus and response in this context. As such, the intention of 
this chapter is to build a platform for empirical work, which will in turn allow for better 
recommendations to be made to practitioners concerning the effectiveness of stimulus 
variables. Section 3.1 presents an overview of threat appeal variables, which are then 
examined in more detail in section 3.1.1 from the perspective of argumentation theory, and 
from the perspective of the psychology literature in section 3.1.2. From these discussions it 
is concluded that intrinsic message characteristics are required to allow for theoretical 
development, which are discussed in detail in section 3.2. More specifically, the variables of 
direction of message, use of graphic images, and message frame, are identified as the 
characteristics most appropriate for the present study. Finally section 3.3 presents a 
summary of the discussion before moving on the presentation of the conceptual model and 
hypotheses in chapter 4.  
3.1 Threat appeal variables 
Numerous scholars have examined the influence of threat appeal stimuli on cognitive 
processing (e.g. Witte, 1992; de Hoog et al, 2007) with the objective of understanding 
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generalisable relationships between threat appeals and consumer responses to those 
appeals. Achieving generalisable recommendations is difficult as the same stimulus can 
feasibly create different responses in individuals, which are also often confounded by 
individual differences and situational influences (Donovan and Henley, 1997). This is not a 
phenomenon unique to the threat appeals context; however, the body of threat appeals 
research is built upon studies that have utilised many different approaches and theoretical 
frameworks, with very little consistency between the variables tested. In order to develop 
this body of research there is a need, as identified in the previous chapter, to build solid 
foundations upon which the understanding of consumer responses to threat appeals can 
develop. In order to achieve this, this study examines and identifies independent variables 
contained in stimuli, which can be consistently used across studies and contexts in order to 
test relationships and compare results across studies. Cauberghe et al (2009, p272) reflect 
this point and state that “one of the least studied aspects of threat appeals is the question 
which message and context elements lead to higher or lower levels of perceived threat, 
efficacy and evoked fear.” Previously, threat appeal stimuli and variables that can be 
manipulated within those stimuli, have been subject to little scrutiny. From this perspective it 
is imperative to be clear about the definition of a threat appeal and generate a detailed 
understanding of its components, prior to examining the causal relationship between 
stimulus and response (Tao and Bucy, 2007). 
In order to clarify whether the assumption that a threat appeal generates a fear response is 
valid the threat component of a threat appeal is examined. First the argumentation literature 
is presented in section 3.2, which examines the type of argument presented as a threat 
appeal. Second, the psychology literature is presented in section 3.3 to further investigate 
whether the threat contained in a threat appeal is akin to a threat that creates a fear 
response. Third, section 3.4 identifies and examines intrinsic message characteristics that 
do not conflate the stimulus variables that can be manipulated, with responses to those 
variables.  
3.1.1 Threats from an argumentation perspective 
Because of the evident inconsistency in the threat appeals literature over exactly what 
constitutes a ‘threat’, it is logical to return to first principles, and examine the concept of a 
threat in light of the basic concepts of language and rhetoric. In this sense, the 
argumentation literature has much to offer. Argumentation is the interdisciplinary study of 
how conclusions are reached through logical reasoning and how claims are based, soundly 
or not, on premises. The field studies rules of inference, logic, reasoning and persuasion in 
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both artificial and real world settings, and here threat appeals have been treated as a type 
of argumentum ad baculum (argument to the club or stick), whereby a force, coercion or 
threat of force provides the justification for a conclusion (Walton, 1996). There are two types 
of argumentum ad baculum; traditional and non-fallacious. Traditional argumentum ad 
baculum are widely recognised as fallacies, where incorrect reasoning results in a 
misconception or a presumption. For example; 
 Employee: ‘I do not think the company should invest money into this project’ 
 Employer: ‘Be quiet or you will be fired’ 
This is considered a fallacy (and thus an invalid inference) because the employer ended the 
argument with a threat of force without refuting the employee’s contention, in other words, 
the punishment is not logically related to the conclusion being drawn. Conversely, in a non-
fallacious ad baculum, the inference made is valid because the mere existence of a 
punishment is not used to draw conclusions about the statement or activity. For example;  
 ‘If you drive whilst drunk, you will be put in jail.’ 
 ‘You want to avoid going to jail.’ 
 ‘Therefore you should not drive whilst drunk.’ 
It can be seen that existence of the punishment itself is not used to draw conclusions about 
the nature of drunk driving itself, but about people to whom the punishment applies. 
Although threat appeals have been classified as examples of argumentum ad baculum, this 
has been called into question as they do not meet the criteria that define a speech act of 
making a threat (Walton 1996; 2000). Despite a number of slightly differing definitions of 
argumentum ad baculum as demonstrated above, the commonality between them is that a 
threat is presented by the speaker (Walton, 1996) which can be malicious or not (Kimball, 
2006).  Walton (1996, p302) states that the speech act of making a threat has three 
essential conditions. First, the preparatory condition, where the recipient of the threat 
believes the speaker (i.e. the giver of the threat) themselves has the power to instigate the 
event in question (thus, without the intervention of the speaker it can be assumed by both 
that the event won’t occur). Second, the sincerity condition in which the occurrence of an 
event will not be in the recipient’s interests and as such, the recipient would want to avoid 
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its occurrence if possible. Third, the essential condition in which the speaker makes a 
commitment to ensure the event will occur, unless the recipient carries out a particular 
action designated by the speaker.  
When applying these conditions to a threat appeal as defined in section 1.1 (e.g. Witte, 
1992; 1994), the essential condition, and in many (if not most) applications the preparatory 
condition, are clearly not present. In a threat appeal “the advertiser is not making a threat to 
actually carry out the bad outcome” (Walton, 2000, p129). To use the previously stated 
example of drunk driving, the advertiser (speaker) clearly links the behaviour of drunk 
driving to going to jail, but it is not the advertiser or source specifically threatening to send 
the recipient of the message to jail (e.g. Donovan and Henley, 1997). Thus no commitment 
to ensure the event will occur (going to jail) is made by the speaker. In addition, the 
preparatory condition relies upon the recipient of the threat believing that the sender can 
instigate the event in question (going to jail for drunk driving) which is unlikely given the 
advertiser is in this case a remote entity. It is important to note that if the advertised 
message has been developed by the government or the police, these organisations do have 
the authority to send people to jail, however, the likelihood of a commitment to ensure the 
event (going to jail) will occur is unlikely as the context of a message in an advertisement. 
Therefore, most threat appeals – while they may be examples of argumentum ad baculum – 
do not actually make a threat. Whilst the issue of whether argumentum ad baculum should 
have a narrow definition, or a broader one to include threat appeals, is debated in the 
argumentation literature (Walton, 1996) it is not pertinent to this present study. Rather, the 
important issue is the notion that most threat appeals do not actually contain threats as 
defined by the conditions presented above.  
That said, whilst a threat may not actually be made in a threat appeal, a threatening 
situation is certainly presented. Walton distinguishes between a threat, as discussed above, 
and a threatening situation, which is “something that poses a danger or harm to safety or 
self-preservation” (Walton 1996, p306). This ties in with the definition of a threat presented 
by Witte (1994, p114) who indicates a threat is presented to the audience and this can be “a 
danger or harm that exists in the environment whether individuals know it or not”. In 
essence, to issue a threat of ‘I am going to send you to jail’ is different from something that 
is simply threatening, such as ‘drunk driving could send you to jail’. The key to this 
difference lies in the perception of the threatening situation. In this context, The conditions 
that Witte’s (1994) considers necessary for threat appeals to be effective are relevant, 
specifically; a) that the threatening situation is credible and the danger presented is 
perceived as relevant to the recipient, and b) that the recommended action to reduce the 
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danger must be feasible for the recipient. Interestingly, these conditions are similar to the 
sincerity and essential conditions identified earlier as fundamental to the act of making a 
threat. However, it is clear that individuals will perceive a given potentially-threatening 
message in different ways. Some may find it relevant and feasible therefore depicting a 
threatening situation, and some may not. The classification of the threatening situation in 
the message is therefore dependent upon the individual recipients’ response, and not on 
the message characteristics.  
Drawing from the above, threat appeals as used in advertising do not generally contain 
actual threats in argumentation terms, but they do present a situation that could potentially 
be perceived as threatening – depending on situational and individual differences. Thus, 
referring back to the argument that intrinsic message characteristics and responses to 
messages need to be conceptually distinct, this leads to the question of whether it can be 
considered that the typical threat appeals used in relevant research actually contain a 
genuine threat variable that is able to be consistently manipulated across subjects. More 
specifically, if a threat must be perceived as such by individuals then it is possible that a 
threat in the true sense of the word is not feasible as an intrinsic message characteristic. Or 
in other words, the ‘level of threat’ will be inconsistent across individuals. 
In line with this argument Walton (2000, p1, emphasis added) states that threat appeals do 
“not involve a threat, but instead have only the form of a warning that some bad or scary 
outcome will occur if the respondent does not carry out a recommended action.” A warning 
is characterised by an indirect speech act which may covertly imply a threat, but overtly is a 
warning and as such has plausible deniability.  Walton (1996, p303) thus moves away from 
considering threat appeals as examples of argumentum ad baculum and identifies that 
threat appeals are structured according to a type of argumentation called argumentum ad 
consequentiam (argument from consequences) which is defined as “the argument for 
accepting (or rejecting) the truth of a proposition by citing the consequences (for the 
respondent) of accepting (or rejecting) that proposition”. To use the drunk driving example, 
the consequence of going to jail if drunk driving behaviour occurs is clear. As a warning is 
not dependent upon personal relevance it can be recognised as such by recipients of the 
message even to whom it does not apply. A recipient may never drive drunk but will still see 
the message as a warning against drunk driving and the consequences of that action 
independent of personal relevance. Therefore, in this context, a so-called threat appeal, as 
defined in the relevant advertising literature to date, does not actually contain a direct threat. 
Instead, whether the situation in the appeal is threatening or not is down to the perception of 
the recipient, even though the warning in that appeal is universally acknowledged. The 
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specific features of the warning therefore may be considered to be intrinsic message 
characteristics, but not the individual perception of that warning as a threat.  
The assumption that threat appeals cause fear was developed as part of the early drive 
models (e.g. Hovland et al, 1953; see section 2.11) and has been widely upheld in the 
literature (e.g. Witte, 1992; Lewis et al, 2013). However, this review of the argumentation 
literature calls this assumption into question because the threat contained in a threat appeal 
is only a threat if an individual perceives it as such. Indeed, from this perspective there is no 
guarantee that individuals will find a threat appeal threatening. To further explore this 
notion, the next section examines the psychology literature to assist with identifying what 
constitutes a threat and whether these features are a component of the threat appeals 
typically used in relevant literature.  
3.1.2 The psychology of threats 
To further illuminate the exploration of whether threat appeals do contain actual threats, the 
definitions of threat, and distinctions between threat and response, are now considered from 
a psychological perspective.  As seen above, the argumentation literature suggests that 
threat appeals rarely if ever consist of actual threats. Rather, from the argumentation 
perspective, the threat must be perceived by each individual, and as such is not guaranteed 
to be experienced by every individual who sees a given advertisement. However, the 
psychology literature also has much to say on threats. Indeed, psychological research has 
indicated that there are in fact certain specific threats that are commonly perceived as 
threats by all individuals. If these threats were used in advertising stimuli, then it would be 
justifiable to consider the threat as an inherent stimuli feature.  
Evolutionary psychologists have identified that mammals have an innate need to protect 
themselves and to preserve their genealogy (Ohman and Mineka, 2001; Brosch et al, 
2010). This need leads to either approach behaviours, for example finding food sources and 
mates for procreation, or avoidance behaviours, for example adapting to environmental 
occurrences that may present a threat to survival (for example, floods, storms and falling 
objects) and the avoidance of predators (Brosch et al, 2010). The stimuli that inform of 
either a) opportunities for growth and expansion, or b) impending danger, are thus of great 
importance, since survival may depend on the gathering and processing of this information. 
Considering the large amount of stimulus information perceived in the environment, 
individuals rapidly integrate this into categories in order to simplify the information and help 
guide understanding of the world. The categories are groupings of similar objects or 
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concepts which create order and meaning (Brosch et al, 2010). Categories that are linked to 
survival and individual well-being require rapid adaptive responses, for example evading a 
predator or approaching food, and are given prioritised perceptual processing that allows for 
appraisal and appropriate behavioural response. In everyday terms; “smiling people, cute 
babies, erotic scenes, but also poisonous snakes or scenes of war and mutilations… catch 
one’s eye more easily than emotionally ‘neutral’ stimuli” (Brosch et al, 2010, p378). 
Threats have been assumed to be at the core of threat appeal stimuli, as identified 
previously, and as such it is important to understand what constitutes a threat on a 
psychological level, and also to consider the role of the perceptual processing of threats. At 
a basic level mammals “require a perceptual system to identify threats and a reflexively 
wired motor system to move the organism away from the danger.” (Ohman and Mineka, 
2001, p483) Central to this is the ability to identify threats and engage in a behavioural 
response to protect the organism. The central motive state, typically characterised by fight 
or flight mechanisms, is what is commonly identified as fear.  
Ohman (2010, p713) developed a theoretical perspective on the generation of emotion that 
argues that “many perceptual channels can be automatically and simultaneously monitored 
for potential threat. When stimulus events implying threat are located by the automatic 
system, attention is drawn to the stimulus, as the control for its further analysis is 
transferred to the strategic level of information processing.” This identifies a feature 
detection perceptual system (Ohman et al, 2001) which gives preference to stimulus 
features that are evolutionarily derived as threatening, for example snakes, spiders and 
angry faces. Once a threatening stimulus is perceived through this system, arousal 
(emotion) and further information processing of the stimulus occurs, and a threat is 
consciously perceived. In sum, unconscious systems identify threats and automatic 
processing occurs, leading to the conscious perception of threats. Underpinning this is the 
notion that there are certain types of stimuli that we are ‘hard-wired’ to perceive as threats. 
Such stimuli are those that have posed a consistent threat to survival and are therefore 
“biologically prepared” (Anderson 2006, p259). 
Research in this area has focussed on the detection and processing of such biologically 
prepared stimuli, also referred to as phylogenetically fear relevant stimuli, for example 
snakes, spiders and angry faces (Anderson, 2006). A number of scholars have 
distinguished between evolutionary threats such as these, and modern threats, the latter of 
which can also be referred to as ontogenetically fear relevant stimuli (Fox et al, 2007), for 
example guns or knives. Empirical work has demonstrated that rapid perceptual processing 
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occurs for evolutionary threat stimuli (Ohman and Mineka, 2001), an effect that has also 
been shown for modern threat stimuli (Blanchette, 2006; Fox et al, 2007). Given that rapid 
perceptual processing is not confined to evolutionary threat stimuli, it is possible to explore 
the idea that threats contained in threat appeal advertisements may also access rapid 
perceptual processing. However, the categories of phylogenetically and ontogenetically 
fear-relevant stimuli are very specific. If pictures of spiders, snakes, angry faces, guns and 
knives are included in advertising stimuli it is possible to hypothesise that they will 
automatically be perceived as threats and provoke an automatic fear response. However, 
the visual images typically used in threat appeal advertisements do not fall into these 
specific categories, (for example a picture of a diseased lung from smoking, or a car crash 
scene as a result of drunk driving) which do not fall into phylogenetically and ontogenetically 
fear relevant stimuli categories. Even though they may be unpleasant images, whether they 
are psychologically perceived as ‘threats’, specifically in terms of the perception of danger 
and experience of fear as a central motive state, remains in question.  
Studies have shown that individuals are quick to identify actual threats from a variety of 
stimuli. Experiments by Ohman et al (2001) showed an automatic shift of attention to stimuli 
involving a threat. Participants were consistently faster at finding threats (snakes or spiders) 
than non-threats (flowers or mushrooms). These results indicate that “humans share a 
predisposition to preferentially direct attention toward potentially threatening animal stimuli” 
(Ohman et al, 2001, p474).  Similar results are reported by Fox et al (2007) who found that 
the detection time for snakes did not differ to that of guns, indicating that the type of threat, 
evolutionary based or modern, did not influence the detection of threats. This pattern of 
results has also been established for the faster detection of angry faces compared to 
neutral or friendly faces (Hansen and Hansen, 1988). The preferential attention to threat 
stimuli has been widely characterised as a “threat superiority effect” (Fox et al 2007, p692). 
Given that attention is the mechanism where information is selected or rejected for further 
perceptual processing (Anderson, 2006) and there is an attentional bias towards processing 
threat stimuli (Mayer et al, 2006; Ohman et al , 2001) the use of threats in advertising 
appeals will direct attention toward that stimulus. This would allow threat appeals to “break 
through the clutter of competing ads” (Pieters et al, 2002, p765). Whilst attention itself is not 
the focus of the present study, attention is a gatekeeper to further processing. The focus of 
this study is to understand how individuals respond to threat appeals; specifically how 
emotional and cognitive responses mediate the relationship between stimulus and response 
and as such, further processing once attention has been paid to the stimulus is a key 
component.  
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Ohman and Mineka (2001) developed the theory of an evolved ‘fear module’ in the brain; a 
system specifically devoted to solving problems associated with threats to survival. The fear 
module is located in the amygdala and enables both the experience of fear for an individual 
and also the perception of fear in others (Fox et al, 2007). It is assumed that the fear 
module has been shaped by evolution and therefore is preferentially activated by 
evolutionary based threats, however the theory does not exclude modern threats and 
indicates that “threat-relevant stimuli with a strong ontogenetic history (e.g. guns) can also 
gain access to the fear module” (Fox et al, 2007, p691). The fear module can generate 
emotional feelings to threatening stimuli, psychophysiological responses, and activate 
defensive behaviour, for example fight or flight (See Ohman and Mineka (2001) for a 
review). The fear generated by the fear module cannot be controlled by conscious 
cognitions (Ohman and Mineka, 2001) and supports preparedness theory (Seligman, 1971). 
This identifies preferential associations between evolutionary threat stimuli and negative 
outcomes, associations which underpin the development of specific phobias. Such phobias 
are unable to be controlled by cognition (Ohman and Mineka, 2001). 
Conversely, Sander et al, (2003) view the amygdala and related structures as a more 
general system evolved to detect relevance. They link this to appraisal theories of emotion 
where “the specificity and the differentiation of an emotion mostly relies upon the cognitive 
evaluation of the meaning and the consequences of a relevant external event, within a 
specific context and relationship to one’s own goals. The detection of relevance can be 
considered as the essential phase of this evaluative process” (Sander et al, 2003, p310-
311). According to this perspective, stimuli with phylogenetic origins are likely to be 
appraised as relevant, but the appraisals for these would not be expected to be different for 
more contemporary stimuli. In a threat appeals context it would be logical, given the topics 
the appeals are designed to highlight, that contemporary stimuli (such as guns) may be 
more relevant than phylogenetic stimuli (such as snakes). An appraisal of a stimulus as 
highly relevant would increase the likelihood of attentional processing to that stimulus (Fox 
et al, 2007). If the fear module is better characterised by relevance, then any stimuli 
(threatening or not) that is relevant to an individual’s current goals will activate the 
processing system. If the latter is the case, then a negative consequence presented as part 
of a threat appeal may access the perceptual processing system as long as it is perceived 
to be relevant to the individual’s current goals.  
This theoretical perspective treats fear as a special emotional state, compatible with 
discrete theories of emotion (Fox et al, 2007). When exposed to an evolutionary threat, for 
example a snake or a spider, or a modern threat, for example a gun or a knife, individuals 
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have an automatic fear response and are motivated to take some action to remove, or move 
away from, the threat source (often referred to as the fight or flight response). Reflecting 
upon the four elements of threat appeal definitions as presented in section 1.1, it is possible 
to see a similarity between these elements and the process outlined here.  As alluded to 
above though, it is questionable as to whether the so-called ‘threats’ typically used in threat 
appeals (e.g. a diseased lung from smoking or a car crash scene caused by drunk driving) 
are equivalent to those that have been shown above to generate fear responses (i.e. 
spiders, guns, etc.). Specifically, if a threat appeal contained a picture of a gun or a spider 
then the application of psychological threat research to the threat appeals context is clear. 
However, the topic of threat appeal messages often concerns health issues such as 
smoking or obesity, or safety, for example deterring people from driving whilst under the 
influence of alcohol or wearing a seatbelt. In these examples a picture of a cigarette or a car 
crash is obviously more often used than a spider or a gun. Therefore, it is impossible to 
simply assume that the ‘threats’ presented by such campaigns will activate threat detection 
mechanisms, and consequently the fear module in the brain – or in other words to actually 
cause genuine ‘fear’, as understood from a psychological perspective. 
The International Affective Picture System (IAPS) is widely used in psychology research. 
This is a database of pictures that are designed to elicit the spectrum of emotional 
responses. The original authors (Lang et al, 1999) measured responses to pictures using 
the PAD measurement (pleasure, arousal, dominance) to categorise each picture. They 
characterise the emotional space according to these three dimensions and state that the 
pictures in IAPS cover all of the affective space. (A detailed discussion of the theoretical 
perspectives on emotion will be presented in chapter 4). Even so, whilst the PAD measure 
provides useful information, it does not show how people categorise such images in terms 
of discrete emotions, and the labels people attribute to them (e.g. ‘fear’, or ‘anger’ etc.). 
Mikels et al (2005) took a subset of IAPS and asked people to categorise them according to 
predetermined emotional terms – for the negative pictures these were fear, sadness, anger, 
disgust and undifferentiated. The pictures identified as eliciting fear (alone or with another 
emotion) were; snakes, angry faces, spiders, predatory animals, snarling dogs, dentists, 
tornadoes, masked attackers and sinking ships. These threats are generally in line with 
those identified as evolutionary or modern threats in the threat detection literature. 
However, concerning the aforementioned examples (typical to the threat appeals literature) 
of car accident and physical injury, Mikels et al’s (2005) results were particularly interesting. 
Specifically, all pictures of car crashes were categorised under sadness, while pictures of 
bloody bodies and extreme injuries were all categorised as disgust, or both disgust and 
sadness. Because disgust and sadness are distinct emotions from fear (e.g. Ekman, 1999), 
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these results would suggest that the kind of images used in threat appeal advertisements 
may not consistently (or perhaps at all) elicit fear responses. Again, the conclusion may be 
drawn that it could be misleading to consider fear as the only emotional response to threat 
appeals based on the type of image typically used in those appeals. Indeed, a number of 
more recent studies about responses to threat appeals have considered ‘disgust images’ 
(e.g. Leshner et al 2011; Morales et al 2012; Dens et al, 2008), arguing that disgust has 
been identified as a neglected emotion in the study of threat appeals and as such, and 
Dens et al (2008, p251) define a disgust appeal as “incongruent, unusual and distinctive.” 
However, in line with the previous discussion, it is clear that as with a ‘fear appeal’, a 
‘disgust appeal’ also conflates the intrinsic stimulus characteristics with the emotional 
response intended to occur as a result of exposure to those characteristics (which will be 
examined in more detail later in this chapter).   
Nevertheless, the concept of widening the considerations of emotional responses to such 
stimuli, beyond fear, is an important advancement to the field. Leshner et al (2011) 
specifically distinguish between disgust images (defined as negative graphic images) and 
‘fear appeals’ (defined as audio-visual information about a threat to one’s health, 
notwithstanding the aforementioned issues regarding threat definitions). They conduct a 
study that looks at the level of fear appeal and level of disgust image and the interactions of 
these on cognitive and emotional processes. In addition, Morales et al (2012) found that 
adding a ‘disgust image’ to a ‘fear appeal’ increased message persuasion and compliance. 
A complementary body of research specifically looks at the effectiveness of graphic 
warnings placed on cigarette packaging and how these influence persuasion and intention 
to stop smoking (e.g. Andrews et al, 2014; Erceg-Hurn and Steed, 2011; Schneider et al, 
2012). Whilst the addition of images that elicit disgust are found to be more persuasive 
(Dahl et al, 2003; Sabbane et al, 2009; Miller et al, 2009), in the context of the argument 
developed here, it is possible to question whether by definition, a message with a graphic 
image (as opposed to a message without a graphic image) will influence an individual’s 
perception of the severity of the consequence portrayed. For example, a drink driving advert 
showing a picture of a bloody face may be perceived to be more severe than the same 
advert showing a picture of a minor car accident. This suggests a possible confound 
between disgust and perceived severity of consequence in such research. In addition, the 
differentiation between types of pictures and the emotional responses they are likely to elicit 
(e.g. disgust and sadness) may mean that individuals’ responses are driven by the different 
properties of those emotions. This will be discussed in more detail later in chapter 4. 
Nevertheless, evidence suggests that the inclusion of images intended to cause disgust or 
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sadness responses are not the same as those that individuals are hard wired to recognise 
as a threat, and therefore the processing mechanism for the images will differ.   
To summarise the previous discussion; humans have evolved to detect certain stimuli as 
threats, however if the ‘threats’ used in threat appeals are not those that humans are hard 
wired to appreciate as such, then (similar to the issues arising from the argumentation 
literature) it is only the individual’s perception of the stimulus as threatening that determines 
whether a given stimulus contains a threat. The perception of the message as a warning 
may be more or less universal, however, the perception of a threat, including its severity 
and relevance to an individual (perceptions of severity and susceptibility as outlined in 
section 2.2.3 and section 2.2.4), is part of the cognitive response to stimuli rather than an 
inherent component of the stimuli itself. This means that it is likely that not all individuals 
would experience fear in response to a given stimulus, and instead a variety of responses 
could be elicited by the same stimulus across subjects.  In particular, the picture used in the 
stimuli, the context, and individual differences, are all factors that may influence the 
elicitation of an emotional response.  
Existing literature typically has a number of common features to what is called a ‘threat 
appeal’, a) something that is assumed to be a ‘threat’ is presented, b) the consequences of 
that so-called threat are identified, c) an implicit assumption that fear is experienced by the 
individual is made, and finally d) a recommendation to reduce or eliminate that threat is 
offered (see section 1.1). Importantly though, genuine threats that have been found by 
psychological research to activate threat detection mechanisms, and thus the fear module, 
are those that pose a general danger to survival (see e.g. Ohman and Mineka, 2001; Fox et 
al, 2007). However, threats used in threat appeals tend to be associated with a specific 
topic, for example the threat of physical injury from a drink driving accident or the threat of 
cancer from smoking (e.g. THINK campaigns and NHS campaigns). Whilst a car accident or 
cancer may also be seen as specific threats to the survival of a given individual, it is 
impossible to assume that such situations are perceived the same as the general 
evolutionary (phylogenetic) and modern (ontogenetic) threats identified and tested in the 
psychology literature for a number of reasons, each of which will be discussed below.  
Whilst cancer and injury from a car accident are threats to physical health, (a threat of 
damage to an individual’s body) similar to say, snakes and knives, they differ in terms of the 
control or choices associated with the threats. Specifically, an individual has no control over 
a snake or a knife once they are presented with the threat. Individuals may make a choice 
to avoid situations where snakes or knives are likely to be present, but a snake is an 
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independent entity, as is an attacker holding a knife, meaning that when in a threatening 
situation with a snake or a knife an individual has relatively little direct control over the 
threat. In contrast to this the threats used in threat appeals are such that – almost by 
definition – there is an element of choice or control over a situation. Indeed, the very point of 
such appeals is to somehow influence the individual to control the situation to reduce the 
likelihood of the undesirable outcome. To use the car crash example, whilst one cannot 
control the actions of another driver, individuals can account for their own actions and the 
decisions behind those actions. Individuals can make a decision not to drink and drive (as 
recommended in the threat appeal) therefore there is an element of choice associated with 
the threat, which translates into a decision. If an individual chooses or decides to drink and 
drive and they are aware of the threat, there is a choice associated with this. In both these 
examples the choice is highlighted emphasising that the onus is on the individual in terms of 
whether or not they expose themselves to the threat of physical injury.  
Findings suggest that perceived control is important in perceptions of threat severity and 
susceptibility. Rapee (1997, p460) found that fear of “physical danger situations” is caused 
by perceived threat and perceived likelihood of occurrence. The issue of control and 
personal responsibility highlights the need to investigate the direction of threat (towards self 
or other) which will be examined in more detail in section 3.4.2. Given that perceived control 
may be what differentiates the evolutionary or modern threats identified in the psychology 
literature that access the fear module in the brain (e.g. snakes or guns) from the threats 
presented in typical threat appeals (e.g. car crashes, smoking) it is possible that individuals 
will perceive threats differently if threats are directed towards the self or towards others. As 
previously stated, an individual has little control when presented with an evolutionary or 
modern threat as defined in the psychology literature, however, with the type of threats used 
in the relevant advertising literature (e.g. smoking, speeding etc.), there is an element of 
choice or control over a situation. Indeed, the very point of such appeals is to somehow 
influence the individual to control (i.e. change) the situation to reduce the likelihood of the 
undesirable outcome. Donovan and Henley (1997) take an even wider view of the degree of 
perceived control individuals may have over the negative outcomes occurrence by 
distinguishing between natural disasters and lifestyle diseases/injuries. Natural disasters 
(e.g. earthquakes and floods) will occur regardless of an individual’s actions, whereas 
lifestyle diseases and injuries (e.g. smoking and car accidents) are, at least, partially under 
an individual’s control. Messages that refer to natural disasters focus on minimising the 
consequences of an event, whereas messages that refer to lifestyle diseases or injuries 
attempt to minimise or prevent them occurring prior to the event through behaviour 
modifications, or by influencing an early intervention (e.g. screening programs).  
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This discussion leads to the notion of a re-framing of the conceptualisation of responses to 
threat appeals. Indeed, the distinction between threats that human beings are predisposed 
to acknowledge, compared to warnings that may be perceived as a threat, are conceptually 
distinct. In addition, the topics of threat appeals (e.g. stopping smoking, obeying the speed 
limit, or reducing binge drinking) are, by definition, not those that human beings are 
predisposed to consider as ‘danger’ and as such will not elicit a fear mechanism response. 
This is in direct contrast to the fundamental assumption that underpins the threat appeals 
field, which has been upheld since the first research in the area (e.g. Hovland et al, 1953 as 
discussed in chapter 2). It cannot be assumed that the ‘threats’ or warnings used in threat 
appeals are perceived as such and as such it equally cannot be assumed that they will 
generate fear as a motivating drive (Hovland et al, 1953; Witte, 1992). In line with this, 
whilst the models and theories developed to explain responses to threat appeals (as 
examined in chapter 2) consider the immediate response to threat appeals and as such rely 
on the ‘threat causes fear’ assumption, this is no longer an assumption that can be upheld 
without further investigation. The present thesis acknowledges that this assumption is not 
grounded in the extant literature and therefore re-frames individual responses to threat 
appeals as a decision based on the widely held, yet implicit, assumption that the objective 
of threat appeals is to influence the individual to control the situation to reduce the likelihood 
of the undesirable outcome. 
Drawing the stands of literature together and in the context of the development of the 
theoretical field as outlined in chapter 2, the present thesis is a logical step forward in 
clarifying the intrinsic message characteristics that comprise a threat appeal and the 
responses to those intrinsic message characteristics. In chapter 2 the theoretical 
advancements made by protection motivation theory (section 2.2.3), the extended parallel 
process model (section 2.2.4) and the fear pattern model (section 2.1.3) are discussed. 
These models and theories each contribute to understanding individuals responses to threat 
appeals, but focus on the immediate responses to those threat appeals. Given the 
evidence, as presented above, immediate or instinctive responses to threat appeals appear 
to be, in fact, redundant because it cannot be assumed that a direct threat is perceived, and 
as a consequence activates the fear response. Rather, as outlined above, the perception of 
threat in question forms a part of a decision making process about future behaviour. Indeed, 
as identified in section 1.1 often an individual is exposed to a threat appeal at a time when 
they are not engaging in the behaviour in question, which will be examined in more detail in 
chapter 4. 
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Given the different perspectives presented from argumentation and psychological 
perspectives above, and the argument that it cannot be assumed that threat appeals 
generate a fear response, the focus will now turn to the uncovered assumptions in the 
threat appeals field that underpin scholarly works. A discussion of these assumptions is 
necessary to better understand the inconsistencies in research results that have been 
identified continuously over the last six decades. More specifically, as Algie and Rossiter 
(2010, p265) state; “studies of fear appeals have produced conflicting results. Research 
papers examining fear appeals often begin with a discussion about the contradictory and 
paradoxical findings of past experimental results in this field of research.”  
While many of these inconsistencies have been examined in chapter 2, the present chapter 
focuses in on a number of critical issues of particular relevance. Importantly, a key 
inconsistency between existing findings regards whether such appeals are an effective form 
of communication. As summarised by Nestler and Egloff (2012, p94); “even though threat 
appeals are widely used, empirical evidence concerning their effectiveness has been 
inconsistent: Whereas some research has demonstrated that they are effective, other 
researchers found that they often fail to change an individual’s attitudes and intentions”. In 
the next section, this inconsistency will be explained in reference to the assumptions that 
have developed in the field, and arguments will be made regarding why it is important to 
move away from these assumptions. Of particular relevance herein is an examination of the 
intrinsic message characteristics that have been studied in prior work. That said, 
considering that Kay (1972) stated that that contradictions have occurred in research 
concerning ‘fear appeals’ due to a failure to explicitly define the nature of the specific factor, 
or intrinsic message features to be measured which has meant that researchers “whose 
findings were at variance with each other appeared to believe they were all measuring the 
same thing, but in likelihood were not.” (Kay 1972, p16), this is not a new issue. However, 
despite a number of notable studies referring to this and similar issues, it remains a key 
problem in extant literature, as demonstrated in the preceeding sections of this thesis.  
As stated above, the intention of this thesis is to re-conceptualise responses to threat 
appeals, and develop an approach that does not conflate message characteristics with 
response, or indeed, assume that threat appeals, in their common form, automatically 
generate a true fear response. That is not to say that prior research has necessarily been 
ineffective or flawed. Quite to the contrary, this research rather provides a different 
perspective that allows researchers to find more meaning in prior results and accordingly 
dispel the confusion identified herein, and by prior scholars. To this end, the following 
sections will examine research that has utilised intrinsic message characteristics in threat 
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appeals. This serves as the first stage in identifying how message characteristics generate 
specific responses.  
3.2 Identifying and examining intrinsic message characteristics 
of threat appeals 
Drawing from the above discussion, it can certainly be seen that the lack of consideration of 
intrinsic message characteristics, and inconsistencies in their definition, has at least in part 
caused the lack of clarity that has according to scholars’ hindered development in the field 
(e.g. Keller and Lehman 2008). The assumption that threat appeals and fear are the same, 
and that fear itself can be encoded into a stimulus, does not allow for the rigorous 
investigation of the relationships between intrinsic message features and cognitive and 
emotional responses to those features. In a move away from the assumption that appeals 
can be designed according to their effect, an examination of what constitutes a threat (see 
above) reveals that the information in threat appeals is more consistent with a warning than 
a threat, and that the perception of them as threats is in fact reliant on individual 
perceptions. Of course, if the warning is perceived as a threat then it is possible that fear 
will be an emotional response, as suggested in the fear module and threat detection 
literature. However, the assumption in the threat appeals literature that fear is the only 
possible emotional response elicited, and is experienced by every individual who views the 
stimulus, requires further examination (see Section 1.1). That said, as already alluded to, a 
number of researchers have made tentative steps toward identifying intrinsic message 
features for manipulation in threat-based stimuli, which will now be reviewed in more detail.  
3.2.1 Types of consequence 
As previously discussed, a threat appeal, as defined in sections 3.2 and 3.3 may not 
actually contain a direct threat, according to either the argumentation or the psychology 
literature. Instead, whether the situation in the appeal is threatening or not is down to the 
perception of the recipient, even though the warning in that appeal is universally 
acknowledged. The features of the warning therefore may be considered to be intrinsic 
message characteristics. Nevertheless, a negative outcome (Donovan and Henley, 1997) or 
negative consequence (Rapee, 1997) is a feature that is common in the threat appeals. 
Whilst the ‘level of threat’ has been used as a stimulus variable by numerous researchers 
(e.g. Nestler and Egloff, 2012; Cauberghe et al, 2009; Dillard and Anderson, 2004; Jones 
and Owen, 2006) this is problematic. The ‘level’ of threat is based on perception, which, by 
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definition, is an individual’s response to a stimulus. In essence, it seems common that 
researchers attempt to use the perception of severity of threat as an intrinsic message 
feature.  
A clear contrast is provided by other scholars have moved away from this approach, 
preferring to consider the type of threat presented (e.g. Dickenson et al, 2011), which is not 
open to interpretation. While a universal categorisation of types of threat in this context has 
not been developed, Donovan and Henley (1997, p59) identified four different types of 
negative outcomes, each of which can be presented individually or combined. The basic 
four outcomes are “physical (e.g., disease; disfigurement), social (e.g., ostracism; rejection), 
psychological (e.g., sense of failure; loss of self-esteem) and financial (e.g., property loss or 
damage; loss of job or income source)”. An example of a combination of these outcomes is 
the primary consequence of physical injury from a car crash which leads to loss of 
employment and depression.  
The most common distinction between types of consequences is between physical 
consequences, and social consequences (Dickenson et al, 2011). For example, Arthur and 
Quester (2004) used stimuli that either depicted the physical consequence of blindness 
from smoking accompanied by a picture of an eye or stimuli showing a social consequence 
illustrating the isolation caused by smoking demonstrated in a picture showing a small 
group of men and women being forced to smoke outside. Also, Dickenson and Holmes 
(2008) defined physical threats as those that relate to an individual’s body, health and life 
and social threats as those that relate to the intensity of social rejection. The findings of 
studies using physical and social threats have been mixed. For example, Schoenbachler 
and Whittler (1996) found drug prevention advertisements that highlighted social 
consequences to be more persuasive than advertisements portraying physical 
consequences of drug use. In contrast, LaTour and Pitts (1989) concluded that 
advertisements that place emphasis on the deadly consequences of AIDS generate both 
tension and energy elements of fear arousal, which generates persuasion. Smith and Stutts 
(2003) concluded that long-term health appeals were more effective than short term 
cosmetic appeals with regard to an overall decline in smoking among the experimental 
groups, and further that males responded more favourably to social threat messages, 
whereas females responded more favourably to physical threat messages. Similarly, 
Michaelidou et al (2007) developed an anti-smoking intervention programme using long 
term health messages and short term cosmetic messages, and found that for adolescents 
short term cosmetic (e.g. yellow teeth) and short term fitness (e.g. ability to play sports) 
messages were most effective in terms of impact on adolescents beliefs about smoking. 
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This result has been replicated by Dickenson-Delaporte and Holmes, 2011) who suggest 
that social threats are perceived to be more immediate and therefore relevant to 
adolescents than time delayed physical outcomes such as cancer from smoking.  
Whilst these results are interesting and have clear practical implications, particularly 
regarding how best to communicate with adolescents, there would appear to be a 
methodological issue that needs to be addressed. Specifically, the distinction between a 
physical threat and a social threat (as described above) is clear and meets the criteria for an 
intrinsic message characteristic which has  attributes that “nearly everyone ... describes … 
identically” (Rossiter, 2002, p. 310) as identified in section 1.1. However, the execution of 
the different type of threats in threat appeals does not lend itself to rigorous empirical testing 
as part of randomised experiments. As outlined in chapter 4 when examining consumer 
responses to intrinsic message characteristics of threat appeals, the variables of interest 
are manipulated, but all other message features are held constant. This is to ensure that 
differences in responses can be attributed to variations of a specific message characteristic 
or interaction between message characteristics. However, when presenting a physical or 
social threat there are actually many variables that are changed. To re-visit the study by 
Arthur and Quester (2004) the threat appeals used depicted either the physical 
consequence of blindness from smoking accompanied by a picture of an eye, or stimuli 
showing a social consequence illustrating the isolation caused by smoking, demonstrated in 
a picture showing a small group of men and women being forced to smoke outside. The 
images and text used were entirely different in these threat appeals. Whilst this may be 
closer to reality, in terms of the different types of threat appeals used in the public sphere, 
given the confusion in the literature an incremental approach is required to establish the 
relationships between threat appeal variables and responses. In other words, it is hard to 
determine whether any effect differences across the two stimuli were caused by the 
changed direction of threat, or the changes in other parts of the stimuli (e.g. picture of an 
eye versus people, changes in text, and so forth) The position taken in the present thesis is 
that a solid platform for understanding relationships between threat appeals variables and 
responses must be built by isolating key variables as much as possible, before embarking 
on examining a complex interaction of many intrinsic message characteristics (see Chapter 
5 for more details on stimuli design and testing).  
3.2.2 Direction of message 
A common distinction in the general advertising literature is that made between messages 
that are made with respect to the viewer of the advertisement (self-relevant), and those that 
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are not (other-relevant in general). A large body of empirical evidence suggests that 
advertising messages found to be self-relevant are more persuasive and generate higher 
recall than those that are not, and therefore that are unable to access individuals’ self-
schema (Hamami et al, 2011; Burnkrant and Unnava, 1995; Debevec and Iyer, 1988; 
Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker, 1977). According to Keller and Block (1996), information about 
the self includes a vast array of knowledge (e.g. physical appearance, past experiences, 
behaviour patterns, attitudinal likes and dislikes, and relationships towards others), and it is 
this knowledge that makes the self one of the most elaborate networks in memory. On this 
basis, many researchers have proposed that an individual’s knowledge about themselves is 
superior to their knowledge about others; therefore, elaboration is more likely to occur when 
events in an advertisement are encoded with respect to the self than events encoded with 
relevance to others, (e.g. Hamami et al, 2011; Burnkrant and Unnava 1995; Rogers et al 
1997). 
Given the empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of self-referencing in 
advertisements it is unsurprising that researchers have applied this theory to threat appeals. 
However, in a threat appeal context this effect can be questioned (Block, 2005) because 
when individuals are threatened, defence mechanisms have been found to activate in order 
to protect individuals’ sense of self (Sherman et al, 2000; Keller and Block, 1999; Liberman 
and Chaiken, 1992). This links to the fear control processes identified in the extended 
parallel process model (see section 2.2.4) which serve as a defensive response when an 
individual experiences fear. Indeed, as outlined in section 3.3, if fear is a response to a 
threat then fight or flight mechanisms will be activated in order to protect the individual and 
their sense of self. However, given that threat appeals may not contain a threat in the truest 
sense (as identified in sections 3.2 and 3.3) it cannot be assumed that the threat causes 
fear mechanism will operate accordingly.  
A small body of research has considered the influence of the direction of a threat towards 
the self (‘you’) or another person (‘other’) (e.g. Block, 2005; Block and Williams, 2000; 
Adams et al, 2011) as intrinsic message characteristics. Self-referencing “occurs when 
information is processed by relating it to aspects of oneself” (Burnkrant and Unnava, 1995, 
p17). Self-referencing enhances information processing because “the self is an extremely 
active and powerful agent in the organisation of the person’s world” (Rogers et al, 1977, 
p677). Block (2005, p2291) identifies the “unique properties” of self-referenced information, 
namely that it is “highly elaborative, highly organised and frequently accessed” and 
attributes these to increases in persuasion and recall, often referred to as the self-reference 
effect (SRE). The encoding of an advertisement with cues to encourage self-referencing 
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does not guarantee that the SRE will occur in all individuals. Debevec and Iyer (1988) found 
that individuals who engaged in low levels of self-referencing in response to stimulus 
materials had less positive attitudes and cognitive responses than those who had high 
levels of self-referencing. Indeed, Polman (2012) found that when individuals were asked to 
make choices for others in a gambling task, less loss aversion (the preference for avoiding 
losses as opposed to acquiring gains) occurred than when individuals were making choices 
for themselves.  
Self-referencing is encouraged by the use of internal and external requests as message 
cues (Chang, 2011). Internal requests use second-person pronouns in the written or verbal 
components of the message, for example addressing the audience directly using ‘you’. This 
increases audience attention to the message as the psychological distance between the 
message itself and the audience is reduced (Chang, 2011). External requests “are 
statements that explicitly or implicitly ask the audience to increase their attention” (Chang, 
2011, p148), for example ‘pay attention to what’s coming next’, or rhetorical questions such 
as ‘smoking causes lung cancer, who knew?’ Chang (2011) found that the use of internal 
and external request tactics increased self-referencing but only for people who were already 
concerned about the health issue (in their case hepatitis B). “Self-referencing prompts are 
implicit and more subtle than are other message tactics” (Chang 2011, p148) which may 
explain why these types of cue are motivating for people who already have an interest in the 
issue presented. Debevec and Romeo (1992) compared the use of second person 
pronouns (‘you’) with third person terms (‘most people’ or ‘they’) and found that the use of 
second person pronouns in advertising messages were more personally relevant to the 
audience and the product was perceived to be of more use to individuals than when third 
person terms were used. Chang (2006) also found that magazine articles written using 
second person pronouns rather than third person terms directed attention to the self and 
increased self-consciousness. Thus, as logic would suggest, the use of second person 
pronouns, as opposed to third person pronouns, is more likely to encourage self-
referencing.  
Self-referencing has been studied in a wide range of contexts and has been shown to 
increase the recall of messages (Hamami et al, 2011; Klein and Loftus, 1988; Rogers et al 
,1977), persuasion (Bull et al , 2001; Burnkrant and Unnava, 1995; Debevec and Iyer, 
1988), positive affect (Chang, 2005; Hull et al, 1988), attitudes and intentions (Ahn and 
Bailenson, 2011; Krishnamurthy and Sujan, 1999; Debevec and Romeo, 1992) and brand 
evaluations (Escalas, 2007). The use of second person terms and third person terms in 
advertising messages to generate self and other directed messages has also been used in 
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a threat appeals context.  In a study focussed on charity appeals and the role of guilt in 
shaping donation intentions, Basil et al (2008) used second person pronouns as a high 
empathy condition and third person terms as a low empathy condition. The results 
demonstrate that the high empathy condition (second person pronouns) increased 
anticipated guilt, reduced maladaptive responses and increased donation intention, 
demonstrating “an egoistic motivation for the empathy-prosocial behaviour relationship.” 
(Basil et al, 2008, p17) Keller and Block (1996) used second and third person wording to 
differentiate self and other conditions respectively, finding that self-referencing conditions 
enhanced the persuasiveness of a ‘low’ fear appeal by causing individuals to elaborate 
upon the negative consequences of smoking. Conversely, other-referenced conditions 
increased the persuasiveness of a ‘high’ fear appeal, by decreasing the extent to which 
individuals denied the harmful consequences portrayed. Unfortunately, Keller and Block’s 
(1996) study conflates the stimulus variable and response as discussed earlier (by 
assuming fear can be a message characteristic), even so the results do suggest to some 
extent that the direction of message underpins the persuasion and elaboration processes 
individuals experience in response to threat appeals.  
The manipulation of intrinsic message characteristics to create self or other directed 
messages is employed to encourage differential elaborative processing of the message. 
Elaborative processing, where conscious cognitive activities occur, has been shown to lead 
to increases in message persuasion (Keller and Block, 1996). More specifically when a 
message is related to an individual’s personal experience, self-referencing has been found 
to increase message persuasion (Burnkrant and Unnava, 1995). Whilst the focus of the 
present study is on understanding emotional and cognitive responses to threat appeals, it is 
important to recognise that these responses are linked. As Bagozzi et al (1999, p185) state 
“emotions arise in response to appraisals one makes for something of relevance to one's 
well-being.” An appraisal is a cognitive response and is defined as an evaluative judgement 
and its interpretation (Lerner and Keltner, 2010). The object being appraised must be found 
to be relevant to the individual before cognitive processing can occur, which in turn leads to 
emotional responses. According to this perspective, relevance is therefore a necessity to 
enable further processing.  In a threat appeals context, the messages are designed 
(according to the definitions of threat appeals presented in section 1.1) to persuade 
individuals that a threat is present, that the consequences of that threat are serious, and to 
encourage the adoption of the recommendation in the message. Therefore, elaborative 
processing of a threat appeal must occur in order for the message recommendation to be 
taken up by the audience.  
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Self-construal is an individual’s consideration of their sense of self in relation to others, 
which can be independent or interdependent (Block, 2005). Individuals with independent 
self-construal perceive the self to be stable and distinct from the social context, and value 
uniqueness and autonomy (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Individuals who have an 
interdependent self-construal perceive the self to be interconnected to the social context 
and social relationships within which they operate, and value group acceptance and 
harmony (Singelis, 1994; Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Block (2005) expanded on this in a 
threat appeals context and found that when the direction of the message meant the ‘self’ or 
‘other’ was the victim of a drink driving accident in a threat appeal, the SRE was reversed 
when individuals with an independent self-construal were exposed to the stimuli. In other 
words, individuals with independent self-construal had greater recall and more favourable 
attitudes to the ‘other’ appeal. For individuals with interdependent self-construal the SRE 
was neither confirmed nor reversed. A second study by Block (2005) found that when the 
‘self’ or ‘other’ was the driver of a car causing an accident in a guilt appeal, individuals with 
an independent self-construal reported greater recall and more favourable attitudes, as 
predicted by the SRE. These results are attributed to the nature of the emotion experienced; 
whereas guilt has an element of accountability and therefore the ‘self’ condition was most 
associated with the SRE, in the fear condition the SRE effect was reversed - suggesting the 
superiority of ‘other’ over ‘self’ in such cases. 
The positive relationship between self-referencing and persuasion has been shown to 
reverse when the direction of message in the advertisement is accompanied by other self-
referent message characteristics, for example pictures or rhetorical questions. Burnkrant 
and Unnava (1995, p23) found that more complex messages generated increased 
elaboration which “lead to more critical argumentation”, which in turn “undermine[s] or 
reverse[s] the positive effects of elaboration on persuasion.” These results suggest that 
increased elaboration and associated increased cognition can reduce the self-reference 
effect, because counter arguments to the relevance of the message are created by the 
audience. Whilst this research suggests that simple messages are more likely to generate 
the self-referencing effect, Meyers-Levy and Peracchio (1996) indicate that the subtle 
nature of internal or external request cues are attended to only by highly motivated 
individuals (i.e. those that have prior involvement with the message or product). The results 
from the study by Meyers-Levy and Peracchio (1996), indicate that when individuals have 
low motivation to elaborate on a message they do not respond to self-referent stimulus 
cues. Whilst more complex messages may reverse the self-reference effect, research 
suggests that simple messages will only receive elaboration when an individual has prior 
concerns or involvement with the subject of the message.  
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In a threat appeals context, second person pronouns have been found to increase 
elaboration. Chang (2011) identified an elaboration threshold that must be reached in order 
for elaboration to occur, caused by sufficient attention to be paid to message cues. The use 
of third person cues did not increase elaboration (regardless of individuals’ prior concern 
with the content of the message), and as such advertising effectiveness did not increase. 
The use of second person pronouns did however mean that the elaboration threshold was 
reached, and a corresponding increase in advertising effectiveness was observed. The use 
of rhetorical questions in the advertising copy was found to be more effective than 
statements (Chang, 2011), which is attributed to the notion that in order to respond to 
rhetorical questions, individuals must retrieve relevant personal experiences from their 
memory.  
The valence of the message has also been shown to influence the self-referencing effect 
(Sedikides and Green, 2000). Recall is higher for self-referenced positive messages (for 
example ‘I would help a friend in need’), than for self-referenced negative messages (for 
example ‘I don’t care about hurting people to get what I want’). Individuals are motivated to 
process positive information rather than negative information about themselves due to self 
enhancement goals. The emphasis on positive information and avoidance of negative 
information serves to protect individuals’ positive self-concept, particularly as individuals do 
not want to think badly of themselves (Sedikides and Green, 2000). Hence, the differences 
in elaboration or memory encoding for positive and negative self-referent information may 
be the reason for differences in recall (D’Argembeau, et al, 2005). This phenomenon was 
expanded on by Green et al (2008) who proposed that this effect could be explained by 
mnemic neglect. The mnemic neglect model rests on the idea that individuals are strongly 
motivated to believe they are ‘good’ and to protect this belief. The model makes three 
distinctions between types of feedback. Firstly, the valence of the feedback; either positive 
or negative. Second, the traits involved in feedback; either central or peripheral. Third, the 
direction of the feedback; towards the self or others. Therefore, feedback that is threatening 
to the self receives less processing and therefore elaboration, resulting in poorer recall. 
Self-affirming feedback on the other hand will receive deeper processing, resulting in more 
elaboration and better recall (Green et al, 2008). Positively valenced feedback that refers to 
central traits (e.g. trustworthiness or kindness) receives deeper processing and elaboration 
regardless of whether it is directed towards the self or other. In addition, feedback 
concerning peripheral traits (e.g. modesty or a tendency to complain) will receive shallow 
processing and elaboration regardless of valence or direction of the feedback (Green et al, 
2008). 
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As such, empirical evidence suggests that a message presenting a threat to an individual’s 
self-concept will receive low processing and elaboration which is a reversal of the self-
referencing effect. Indeed, as the mnemic neglect model (Green et al, 2008) suggests, 
threat appeals which by definition employ a negative valence, will generate less processing 
and therefore elaboration, resulting in poorer recall. The direction of message (towards self 
or other) has been shown to influence persuasiveness of a threat appeal (Keller and Block, 
1996) where the self-condition enhanced the persuasiveness of a ‘low’ fear appeal by 
causing individuals to elaborate upon the negative consequences of smoking. Conversely, 
other-referenced conditions increased the persuasiveness of a ‘high’ fear appeal, by 
decreasing the extent to which individuals denied the harmful consequences portrayed. 
Despite the fact this study conflates message characteristics with intended responses by 
using a low and a high fear appeal, the results suggest that when individuals experience 
less fear associated with a self-directed message, the cognitive processes associated with 
the severity of the consequence are dominant and when individuals experience a higher 
level of fear as a result of an other-directed message defensive processing is reduced 
(Keller and Block, 1996).  
Building on this, Block (2005) found that self-directed guilt messages which position the self 
as a driver of a car causing an accident, created greater recall and favourable attitudes 
among individuals with an independent self-construal. This is as predicted by the SRE. 
However other-directed fear messages, where a friend is the driver of a car causing an 
accident, created greater recall, which is a reversal of the SRE effect. Block (2005) 
attributes the results for self-directed guilt messages and other-directed fear messages to 
be explained by the type of emotion experienced. Guilt is an emotion with accountability 
characteristics which are proposed to drive the effectiveness of the self-direction of the 
message. Whilst this study conflates message characteristics and responses in terms of 
assuming the differences between a guilt appeal and a fear appeal, the direction of 
message is clearly an intrinsic message characteristic. In addition the idea that the direction 
of message will be more effective as a message characteristic when paired with different 
emotional responses is a significant development. Given that, as argued above, it cannot be 
assumed that the threat causes fear mechanism operates in its truest sense, the 
consideration of other emotional responses such as guilt is logical. This will be explored 
further in chapter 4. 
If messages that present a threat to an individual’s self-concept receive low processing and 
elaboration, and thus a reversal of the self-reference effect, the implication is that threat 
appeals may receive low processing and elaboration. Indeed, defence motivation, whereby 
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individuals are motivated to protect attitudes or beliefs that are a) related to a central self-
concept and b) reaching a preferred conclusion, overrides the motivation to form the more 
accurate attitude or belief (Giner-Sorolila and Chaiken, 1997). Threat appeals often address 
issues concerning individuals’ central self-concept, for example health, therefore individuals 
will be motivated to reach a preferred conclusion, thus selectively attending to and 
processing information to support their own beliefs or actions. For example, a smoker who 
views an anti-smoking message may selectively process and elaborate on the message in 
order to reduce the threat of smoking because continuing smoking is the preferred 
conclusion for that individual. As Chang (2011, p160) states “It is common for people 
exposed to health promotion messages to ignore them, in the belief that they themselves 
are not susceptible”. Based on this, if individuals avoid a message or do not process the 
message as relevant to the self, then other-directed messages that present threatening 
information may receive more elaboration and as a result be more effective. However, it is 
necessary to consider the properties of potential emotional responses in relation to the 
direction of message and build on the work by Block (2005) to further understand how the 
SRE and the reversal of SRE may operate in conjunction with the generation of different 
emotions. The constructs of emotion and associated cognitions to the SRE will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4. 
3.2.3 Vividness and graphic Images 
As part of the re-examination of threat appeals and the identification of intrinsic message 
characteristics, it is important to return to the definition of threat appeals as presented in 
section 1.1. The first common element of a threat appeal is the presentation of a threat 
using vivid or personalised language and pictures (Witte, 1992) that depict “a personally 
relevant and significant threat” (Witte, 1994, p114). Given the previously identified objective 
of identifying intrinsic message characteristics and questioning the assumption that a threat 
appeal will generate a fear response, the role of vivid pictures and language require further 
examination as they form an integral component of a threat appeal.  Generally speaking 
there is much, long-established empirical evidence that identifies the information processing 
of visual images, or pictures, as superior to that of verbal information, or words (e.g. 
MacInnis and Price, 1987; Cautela and McCullough, 1978). Indeed, vivid (also referred to 
as graphic) images are often used to capture attention (e.g. Dahl et al, 2003). As stated in 
section 3.1.2, “poisonous snakes or scenes of war and mutilations… catch one’s eye more 
easily than emotionally ‘neutral’ stimuli” (Brosch et al, 2010, p378). Whilst the examples 
given by Brosch et al (2010) of poisonous snakes, war and mutilations may not be entirely 
relevant to the threat appeals context, the use of vivid or graphic images is. Vivid or graphic 
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images are used to not only capture audience attention, but also present information 
concerning the severity of the threat in the threat appeal. 
As discussed in section 1.1, scholars who conflate message characteristics with the 
intended response (e.g. by examining levels of fear in an advertisement) often also conflate 
perceptions of threat, with the experienced emotion of fear. Perceptions of threat are a 
cognitive response to a threat appeal, and fear is one possible emotional response to a 
threat appeal, as outlined in the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992) presented in 
section 2.2.4. The intrinsic message characteristic that is intended to generate cognitions 
concerning severity of threat and susceptibility to threat in a threat appeal, is the use of a 
vivid or graphic pictures and/or language. Indeed, research has shown that the inclusion of 
vivid or graphic images with a threat appeal increases perceptions of threat (e.g. Cauberghe 
et al, 2009; Sabanne et al, 2009). 
The construct of vividness utilised in advertisements has been conceptualised as message 
characteristics that are “emotionally interesting, concrete, image-provoking and proximate in 
a sensory, temporal or spatial way.” (Nisbett and Ross, 1980, p45). While such a definition 
does tend to conflate a number of different specific ideas, it can be seen that vividness in 
advertisements is achieved through the use of concrete rather than abstract illustrations, 
and further that the effect of vividness is considered to be present when “pictures, specific 
examples, or TV presentations are more persuasive than text-only messages, abstract 
arguments, or print presentations” (Block and Keller, 1997, p32).While intuition suggests 
that vivid stimuli should be more persuasive than non-vivid stimuli (Fennis et al, 2012), 
previous research on the impact of vivid content of stimuli is actually somewhat equivocal 
(Taylor and Thompson, 1982). Results from various studies have shown that vivid stimuli 
can have a positive effect on persuasion (e.g. Fortin and Dholakia, 2005; Bone and Ellen, 
1992 Mitchell and Olson, 1981); no effect (e.g. Sullivan and Macklin, 1988); or even a 
negative effect (e.g. Kisielius and Sternthal, 1986). Nevertheless, in a threat appeals 
context, Potter et al (2006) and Sabanne et al (2009) found that adding relevant visual 
vividness to a threat appeal increased the perception of perceived threat. Block and Keller 
(1997) also demonstrated that individuals had a preference for vivid stimuli when they had 
high self-efficacy (the belief an individual can carry out the recommended action). While the 
exact role of vivid imagery remains somewhat unclear, these results at least demonstrate 
that a vivid or graphic picture plays a role in influencing the perception of a threat in a threat 
appeals context. 
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Perhaps because of the diverse results cited above, a differing perspective has more 
recently emerged in the threat appeals literature. This more recent work moves away from 
the apparently elusive vividness concept (Fennis et al, 2012) and focuses specifically on the 
role of images that are intended to elicit disgust. Of course, in relation to the prior discussion 
in this chapter, such literature perpetuates the problematic conflation of intrinsic message 
features and emotional response (in this case disgust). Nonetheless the findings of this 
stream of work do have some utility when considering the intrinsic message characteristics 
of such images. For example, Leshner et al (2011) demonstrated that a combination of a 
high disgust appeal and a high fear appeal caused respondents to engage in aversive 
motivational activation and defensive responses, which together are likely to reduce 
processing of the message. In other words, the combination of fear and disgust inducing 
elements of the stimuli were too much for individuals to cope with, and thus further 
processing is inhibited.  Conversely, Morales et al (2012) found that adding a ‘disgust 
image’ to a ‘fear appeal’ increased message persuasion and compliance in comparison to a 
‘fear only’ condition, and attribute the unique features of disgust as responsible for 
increasing message acceptance. This demonstrates that not all ‘disgusting images’ are 
created equal. Indeed, Pelsmacker et al (2011) found that including a graphic image in a 
fear appeal had a greater effect on the perceived severity of the threat for an unfamiliar 
rather than a familiar issue (demonstrating the habituation effect). Thus, whilst graphic 
images can vary, and therefore create differing responses, individuals can become 
desensitised to such images due to repeated exposure, which can reduce likelihood of 
intended emotional or cognitive response.  
Andrews et al (2014) have also examined the graphicness of a threat appeal which in this 
case specifically refers to the perceived level of intensity or vividness of the graphic image. 
Andrews et al (2014, p167) cite “it is important to study the graphic level of the warning to 
more fully understand the role of evoked fear and the underlying effects from the graphic 
visual exposure”(emphasis as original). Unfortunately this position conflates the intrinsic 
message characteristic with responses as a level is a subjective perception. As with levels 
of fear or threat, a level of graphicness is also defined by an individual’s perception, not an 
intrinsic message characteristic. This conflation is replicated in studies that examine the 
effectiveness of graphic images positioned on cigarette packaging. In this research stream, 
the graphic images are measured in terms of how they influence persuasion and intention to 
stop smoking (e.g. White et al (2008); Miller et al (2009); Gallopel-Morvan et al (2009); 
Schneider et al, 2012). Kees et al (2010) found that ‘highly’ graphic images strengthened 
smokers intention to stop smoking which was mediated by a fear response, however, recall 
of specific messages was lower than for ‘low’ or graphic absent conditions. In line with this, 
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Andrews et al (2014) found that graphic warnings and smoking frequency influenced fear, 
which in turn generated negative health beliefs about smoking and increased intentions to 
stop smoking. Studies have also considered execution variations in warning messages on 
cigarette packets, using text only and text with picture conditions. Veer and Rank (2012) 
and Schneider et al 2011 found that compared with text-only labels, graphic visual warning 
labels on cigarette packets are able to significantly increase the level of cognitive 
processing and increase the intentions to quit (or not start smoking). However, Erceg-Hurn 
and Steed (2011) found that smokers who were exposed to graphic warnings were more 
likely to experience elevated and extreme levels of reactance (maladaptive responses). 
In line with the arguments presented herein regarding the need to identify intrinsic message 
characteristics, a consideration of graphic or disgust inducing images beyond the simple 
concept of ‘high’ and ‘low’ is crucial.  Indeed, it is necessary to clearly define what 
constitutes a graphic image and what does not. Dens et al (2008) define a disgust appeal 
(conflating the emotion of disgust with the message characteristic) as “incongruent, unusual 
and distinctive” (Dens et al, 2008, p251). This is a broad definition, open to interpretation 
and difficult to operationalise. Indeed, an image that may be unusual or distinctive to one 
individual may be interpreted entirely differently by another individual (as an extreme 
example, a picture of open heart surgery is unlikely to be considered particularly disgusting 
to a cardiothoracic specialist). Kees et al (2010) take an equally broad approach and 
identify graphic images to be those which are perceived to be vivid, powerful and intense, 
which again, does not allow for the identification of precise intrinsic message characteristics 
that can be manipulated accordingly. However, Dahl et al (2003, p270) define graphic 
images as “references to blood, body parts or secretions, orifices, especially urinary/faecal, 
gases, odours, disease, parasites, bodily harm (e.g. dismemberment), death and decay” 
which is a useful categorisation of the types of image that are universally considered to be 
graphic. Nabi (2002) further reduces the categories of graphic images to blood, vomit, 
faeces, inappropriate sexual acts, rodents or bugs. Such a precise definition allows for the 
operationalisation of a graphic image, for example in order to contrast the effects of a 
graphic image and a non-graphic image that represent the consequences of a car accident, 
the graphic image would include blood and the non-graphic image would not.  
This is aligned with the findings by Mikels et al (2005) (as described in Section 3.3) who 
asked individuals to categorise subsets of the IAPS according to predetermined emotional 
terms – for the negative pictures these were fear, sadness, anger, disgust and 
undifferentiated. All pictures of car crashes (just showing the car wreckage) were 
categorised under sadness, while pictures of bloody bodies and extreme injuries were all 
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categorised as disgust inducing images, or both disgust and sadness inducing images. 
Because disgust and sadness are distinct emotions from fear (e.g. Ekman, 1999), these 
results would suggest that the kind of images used in threat appeal advertisements may not 
consistently (or perhaps at all) elicit fear responses. Indeed, whilst Mikels et al (2005) asked 
participants to categorise the images according to the emotion they generated, the images 
that were categorised as disgust inducing were those that meet the graphic image 
definitions presented above (e.g. Dahl et al, 2003; Nabi, 2002). As discussed in section 3.3 
the images that were categorised as fear inducing (Mikels et al, 2005) were in fact those 
that can be categorised as evolutionary or modern threats. This therefore calls into question 
the widely held assumption that the graphic images used in threat appeals will evoke the 
emotional response of fear, where higher levels of fear experienced increase persuasion 
(e.g. Witte and Allen, 2000). Again, the conclusion may be drawn that it could be misleading 
to consider fear as the only emotional response to threat appeals based on the type of 
image typically used in such appeals.  
Indeed, more recent studies that use ‘disgust images’ or graphic images (e.g. Leshner et al 
2011; Morales et al 2012; Dens et al, 2008), argue that disgust has been a neglected 
emotion in the study of threat appeals. Whilst the addition of images that elicit disgust are 
found to be more persuasive (Dahl et al, 2003; Sabbane et al, 2009; Miller et al, 2009), in 
the context of the argument developed here, it is possible to question whether by definition, 
a message with a graphic image (as opposed to a message with a non-graphic image) will 
influence an individual’s perception of the severity of the consequence portrayed. For 
example, a drink driving advert showing a picture of a bloody face may be perceived to be 
more severe than the same advert showing a picture of a minor car accident. This suggests 
a possible confound between disgust and perceived severity of consequence in such 
research. In addition, the differentiation between types of pictures and the emotional 
responses they are likely to elicit (e.g. disgust and sadness) may mean that individuals’ 
responses are driven by the different properties of those emotions. Indeed, evidence 
suggests that the inclusion of images intended to cause disgust or sadness responses are 
not the same as those that individuals are hard wired to recognise as a threat, and therefore 
the processing mechanism for the images will differ.   
That said, research has demonstrated that graphic images generate discrete emotional 
responses (e.g. disgust), which contribute to message effectiveness (e.g. Stephenson, 
2002, 2003; Niederdeppe et al, 2007). For instance, Biener et al. (2005) concluded that 
visual images that graphically depict death and disease caused by smoking increase 
emotional response to messages (in particular, fear, anger and sadness). Whilst the 
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position in this thesis is to question the assumption that graphic images create a fear 
response (Witte and Allen, 2000), it is also the intention to include a wider consideration of 
negative emotions alongside fear as the possible emotional responses to a graphic image in 
threat appeals. Indeed, (as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4) theories of emotion 
that consider emotions to have differing properties often examine basic fundamental human 
emotions (e.g. Izard 1977; Plutchik 1980) and often include at least fear, disgust and 
sadness. In order to advance understanding of cognitive and emotional responses to threat 
appeals, the influence of graphic or non-graphic images (as intrinsic message 
characteristics) on cognitions and a wider range of emotions will enable a more accurate 
identification of emotional responses, rather than assuming fear is the response and 
measuring only that emotion. The constructs of emotion and associated cognitions in 
response to graphic images will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4. 
3.2.4 Message frame  
The above discussion identifies two specific intrinsic message characteristics of threat 
appeals that do not conflate the stimulus with intended response, namely direction of threat 
and use (or not) of a graphic image. These message characteristics manipulate the threat in 
terms of the individual who is subject to the threat, and the type of image used to grab 
attention and communicate the threat (e.g. Witte, 1992), respectively. Re-examining the 
components of threat appeals as outlined in section 1.1, attention now turns to the 
remaining component of a threat appeal; the recommendation regarding how to reduce or 
eliminate the consequences of the threat. Whilst most definitions of threat appeals focus on 
the presentation of a negative consequence, which can be removed or reduced by 
engaging with the recommendation presented as part of the threat appeal (e.g. Dickenson 
and Holmes, 2008) the positioning and communication of the recommendation has 
important implications. Indeed, message framing techniques place either a positive or 
negative emphasis on the recommended behaviour whereby “the emphasis in the message 
[is] on the positive or negative consequences of adopting or failing to adopt a particular… 
behaviour” (Salovey et al, 2002, p 392). 
The positive or negative consequences included in threat appeals have been presented in 
terms of gain or loss framed messages (e.g. Edwards et al, 2001). Gain framed messages 
emphasise the advantages of adopting the recommendation (e.g. advantages, or the 
avoidance of disadvantages, are presented) whereas loss framed messages emphasise the 
disadvantages of failing to adopt the recommendation (e.g. disadvantages, or failure to 
benefit from advantages). The general tenet of message framing research is that individuals 
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exposed to a gain framed message will respond differently in terms of cognitive evaluations 
(e.g. persuasion) to individuals exposed to a loss framed message (Rothman et al, 1999). 
Whilst a number of studies have demonstrated that gain framed messages are more 
effective (e.g., Cox et al, 2006; Reinhart et al, 2007) these results have not been upheld 
across the literature. Indeed, empirical research has also shown that in some cases loss 
framed messages are more effective than gain framed messages (e.g. Rivers et al, 2005; 
Schneider et al, 2001). Equally, a number of research studies have reported no difference 
between gain framed and loss framed messages in terms of their effectiveness (e.g. Brug et 
al, 2003; Jones et al, 2004; O'Keefe and Jensen, 2006). Indeed, in line with the recurrent 
theme of the review of the pertinent literature, empirical results regarding message framing 
effects are, again, equivocal.  
To consider this in more detail, it is necessary to re-examine the origins of the message 
framing as a means of communication. Message framing techniques are grounded in 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 1984; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). 
Prospect theory states that individuals will make different decisions dependent on their 
cognitive evaluation of their perceptions of the risk associated with potential outcomes 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In other words, an individual will evaluate the potential 
outcomes as certain or uncertain and make a decision based upon this evaluation. In a 
seminal study, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) presented participants with information about 
a hypothetical disease that would kill 600 people. Participants were requested to select one 
of two plans in order to address the situation. Plan A was presented as a certainty in either 
a loss framed or a gain framed manner (e.g. if plan A is adopted, 400 people will die (loss 
framed) or 200 people will be saved (gain framed). Plan B on the other hand presented an 
uncertain outcome which was either loss framed or gain framed (e.g. if plan B is adopted, 
there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 
people will die (loss framed) or there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved 
and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved (gain framed). The ultimate 
outcome of the messages, whether gain or loss framed or with a certain or uncertain 
outcome, is exactly the same, i.e. 200 people will be saved but 400 people will not be 
saved. However, the manner in which the information was presented, generated different 
evaluations and therefore decisions. Indeed, in this study, participants preferred the gain 
framed message when the outcome is certain (plan A) but the loss framed option when the 
outcome is uncertain (plan B). 
The results from Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) study indicate that decision making 
depends on the perception of the risk associated with the presented outcomes. In other 
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words, if individuals predict gains from a decision, based on exposure to a gain framed 
message, risks will be avoided and a more certain outcome perceived to be more 
persuasive. However, when exposed to messages that outline a loss framed perspective, 
individuals are persuaded to decide to adopt uncertain, or risky behaviours to alleviate the 
loss (Steward et al, 2003). This finding has been replicated by Malenka et al (1993) who 
demonstrated a difference in risk perception dependent on the manner in which the same 
factual information was presented, and Schwartz (1997) who found that the same medical 
treatment is perceived to be more beneficial to respondents if subject to a gain frame (95% 
survive) rather than a loss frame (5% die). Whilst Tversky and Kahneman (1981) examine 
the use of gain and loss framed messages in a general decision making context, 
researchers have applied the theory to the broad area of health education messages (which 
also falls under the social marketing field, as outlined in chapter 1), and more specifically 
threat appeals.  
To be clear, health education messages fall under the general domain of social marketing 
(as outlined in Chapter 1) and can be used to attempt to persuade people to engage with a 
particular behaviour or avoid or reduce a behaviour. Whilst threat appeals specifically use a 
threat (or warning) to generate emotional and cognitive responses that will result in 
behaviour change; health education messages more broadly frame messages according to 
the specific health issue under consideration (e.g. Banks et al, 1995; Rothman and Salovey, 
1997; Rothman et al, 1993). In other words, in health education messages, the health issue 
itself determines how the message is presented, not the type of advertising appeal used, as 
with a threat appeal. In particular there is a distinction in the health education literature 
between behaviours that serve to prevent a health issue (e.g. using sunscreen, eating more 
vegetables, drinking more water or exercising) from behaviours that serve to detect a health 
problem (e.g. skin, breast or testicular self-examination, observations regarding stress or 
mental health issues or evidence of dehydration). In line with prospect theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981), prevention behaviours are presented as low risk because, by definition, 
they reduce the risk of illness. As such, gain framed messages are most appropriate, as 
gain framed information motivates individuals to adopt lower risk (or more certain) options 
(Gallagher and Updegraff, 2012). Conversely, detection behaviours have been identified to 
be associated with a higher perception of risk because engaging with those behaviours 
could lead to finding out an individual is unwell (Meyerowitz and Chaiken, 1987). Indeed, as 
individuals have been shown to be risk seeking when considering losses, as a result of 
exposure to loss framed information individuals are more likely to engage in uncertain or 
more risky behaviours (e.g. Rothman and Salovey, 1997; Rothman et al, 1993). 
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Whilst there is empirical support for prospect theory applied in a health education context 
(e.g. Rothman and Salovey, 1997; Banks et al, 1995; Meyerowitz and Chaiken, 1987) a 
number of scholars have criticised the application of prospect theory in this context. The 
assumption that detection behaviours are generally perceived as potentially risky because 
they may identify negative outcomes, in comparison to prevention behaviours, has been 
questioned (e.g. Cox et al, 2006; Kuhberger, 1998).  Cox et al, 2006 argue that whilst in the 
short term, individuals may perceive detection behaviours as potentially the cause of 
unfavourable outcomes (e.g. a diagnosis of an illness), the long term benefits (e.g. early 
diagnosis of an illness that may translate into increased chance of survival) should outweigh 
the short term unfavourable outcome. Meta-analysis findings (e.g. O'Keefe and Jensen, 
2006; 2007) support this and identify that gain and loss framed messages do not have a 
differential effect in the context of messages that promote detection of health issues.  
In an alternate line of study, Latimer et al, (2007) argue in support of the fundamental 
propositions of prospect theory. Latimer et al (2007) posit that the focus of research should 
shift away from the prevention or detection of illness, rather the perception of the 
recommended behaviour is of significance. Schneider et al, (2001) have suggested that, in 
the context of giving up smoking (which is a prevention behaviour), individuals may in fact 
perceive costs associated with the prevention behaviour opposed to benefits (e.g. weight 
gain, social acceptance or a lack of enjoyment).  In such a situation, where individuals 
attribute costs to the adoption of the recommended prevention behaviour, individuals may 
be more persuaded by loss framed messages as a mechanism by which to address the 
barriers or costs, opposed to gain framed messages. Empirical research has found that 
when individuals perceive the recommended behaviour (e.g. giving up smoking) to entail 
more risk or uncertainty (e.g. weight gain or lack of social acceptance) than continuing with 
the behaviour (e.g. smoking), loss framed messages are more effective (e.g. Apanovitch et 
al, 2003; Kiene et al, 2005).  
However, it is important to acknowledge that there is a divergence in thinking between the 
health education field and the threat appeals field. In a health education context, risk is an 
important concept and is associated with a danger or negative consequence (e.g. Cox et al, 
2006; O'Keefe and Jensen, 2006). This effectively translates to the perception of threat, in a 
threat appeals context (e.g. Witte, 1992). Whilst the onus on perception is similar, the 
distinction between the certainty and uncertainty of outcome (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1981) refers to the element of risk and indeed, conceptualises the colloquial understanding 
of risk, in different ways. Specifically, the threat appeals literature identifies that perceptions 
of threat and perceptions of susceptibility to threat are the cognitive evaluative processes 
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that identify perceptions of risk. This could be an explanation for the equivocal findings in 
the message framing literature as identified above. However, in the threat appeals field, the 
role of an individuals perceived efficacy (both self- efficacy and response efficacy) is also a 
cognitive evaluation specifically associated with the examination of the action 
recommendation presented as part of the threat appeal (e.g. Ruiter et al, 2001; Witte, 
1992).  
In the threat appeals context, response efficacy is an individual’s belief that the 
recommended action will avert or reduce the threat (Ruiter et al, 2001) and self-efficacy is 
the belief that an individuals is capable of adopting the recommended response (Witte, 
1992). Perceived efficacy has been shown to moderate the effects of gain and loss framed 
messages, where loss framed messages generate a greater perception of threat than gain 
framed messages (Cox and Cox, 2001; Shen and Dillard, 2007). According to the 
assumption that increased perception of threat translates into increased persuasion (e.g. 
Witte and Allen, 2000) this would indicate that loss framed messages are more effective in 
this context. However, empirical findings indicate there are other factors that influence this 
dynamic, and indeed as evidenced above, it cannot be assumed that the threat to 
persuasion relationship, mediated by a fear response, is upheld. 
Further, research has identified that the valence of language used (positive or negative) in 
message framing will influence emotional responses accordingly (positive or negative) and 
influence decision making (Nabi, 2003). Druckman and McDermott (2008) found that 
specific negative emotions have an influence on the effectiveness of message framing. 
When individuals experienced distress as a result of exposure to a message the effect of 
the gain or loss frame was enhanced, yet if an individual experienced anger the message 
framing effects were reduced. This suggests that emotional responses to messages interact 
with evaluative cognitions concerning the message content which drive decision making. 
This further suggests the need to re-examine emotional and cognitive responses to threat 
appeals, particularly in light of the effects of message framing. Indeed, Van T’Riet et al 
(2010) examined the effectiveness of message frame as mediated by generalised positive 
or negative affect. When exposed to a gain framed message, participants reported 
experiencing positive affect which correlated with increased acceptance of message and 
favourable attitude toward the behaviour. In addition, participants who were exposed to a 
loss framed message, reported increased negative affect and an increased intention to 
engage in the recommended behaviour. These results indicate that whilst gain framed 
messages and resultant positive affect influence cognitions, loss framed messages and 
resultant negative affect influence cognitions and behaviour intention. Van T’Riet et al 
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(2010) specify that the emotional mechanisms identified in their study (generalised positive 
or negative affect) are separate and as such gain framed messages can influence 
information acceptance and attitude, indicating persuasion; whereas loss framed messages 
effect persuasion and behavioural intention which indicates motivation.  
Whilst the general empirical evidence regarding the effects of loss and gain framed 
messages is equivocal, the latest research exploring the differing emotional and cognitive 
responses to message framing have a direct application in a threat appeals context. Indeed, 
evidence suggests that as an intrinsic message characteristic the manipulation of message 
frame will subsequently have differing effects on emotional and cognitive responses, which 
in turn will influence behaviour intention. In addition, research has included a consideration 
of a temporal dimension in terms of distinguishing between short term and long term 
consequences of engaging (or not) in the recommended behaviour (e.g. Gerrend and 
Cullen, 2008; Apanovitch et al, 2003; Kiene et al, 2005). This is particularly relevant to a 
threat appeal context because it firstly suggests that responses to threat appeals are not 
necessarily immediate spontaneous responses (as per the instinctive threat fear 
mechanism examined in section 3.1.2) but that instead the emotional and cognitive 
responses form an evaluation, which corresponds to a decision making process. This will be 
explored in more detail in chapter 4, but it is important to note that this conceptual shift 
allows for the consideration of a temporal dimension regarding exposure to a threat appeal 
and an individual using emotional and cognitive responses to make a decision about future 
behaviour. In practical terms the behaviour forming the action recommendation as part of 
the threat appeal is not usually immediately actionable. In other words, an individual may be 
exposed to a print advertisement about safe driving at a point in time where they will not 
drive a car in the immediate time period and therefore responses to the threat appeal form 
influence future behavioural intentions.  
3.3 Summary 
The re-examination of threat appeal variables presented above has argued for a 
questioning of a fundamental assumption made in threat appeals literature; namely that 
responses to threat appeals are underpinned by an instinctive mechanism whereby upon 
exposure to a threat, an individual experiences fear, which in turn, motivates action (e.g. 
Ohman and Mineka, 2001). The presented discussions based on the argumentation and 
psychology literature both call into question whether a threat contained in a threat appeal 
can even be considered to be a true threat in this sense. Both streams of literature 
acknowledge that a warning is certainly a component of a threat appeal (O’Keefe, 2003) but 
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it cannot be assumed that the warning in a threat appeal is a threat because it must be 
perceived as a threat by an individual. There is thus a clear distinction between threats that 
human beings are predisposed to acknowledge, compared to warnings that may be 
perceived as a threat, but are not necessarily. Thus, perception of threat is a response 
variable and not a message characteristic. Of course, that is not to say a threat appeal will 
never be perceived as a threat, rather that it cannot be assumed that all individuals at all 
times experience the same instinctive mechanism when presented with a threat appeal, i.e. 
that they experience fear, which motivates action. Unfortunately, it is this very assumption 
that underpins the threat appeals literature from the early theoretical developments in the 
field (e.g. Hovland et al, 1953) as discussed in section 2.1. It is the questioning of this 
assumption (undertaken in the prior sections of this thesis) which leads to a re-examination 
of the components of a threat appeal that influence cognitive and emotional responses, 
specifically with regard to intrinsic message characteristics. 
As argued in section 1.1 the equivocal empirical results that pervade the threat appeals 
literature (e.g. Floyd et al, 2000, Witte and Allen, 2000), which is charted in Chapter 2, are 
in part caused by the conflation of message characteristics and the intended response. This 
has historically occurred through the operationalisation of constructs such as ‘levels of fear’ 
as a message characteristic of a threat appeal. In a move away from this approach, section 
3.4 discusses intrinsic message characteristics, grounded in the extant literature and that 
can be manipulated, allowing for observations of correlations between message 
characteristics and emotional and cognitive responses. This approach does not conflate the 
message characteristic with individuals’ responses. Indeed, the discussion of the direction 
of message, use of graphic images and message frame, are linked directly to the defined 
common components of threat appeals as outlined in Chapter 2 (e.g. Witte, 1992). The 
identified intrinsic message characteristics (message direction, use of graphic image and 
message frame) and discussion presented above identify that these variables have 
empirically (in complementary streams of research) been shown to influence cognitive and 
emotional variables identified in prominent threat appeal models (e.g. extended parallel 
process model, Witte, 1992).  
The questioning of the fundamental assumption that a threat appeal causes an instinctive 
fear response, alongside the discussion of intrinsic message characteristics of threat 
appeals, leads to a new angle for consideration when examining individuals’ responses to 
threat appeals. As previously identified it cannot be assumed that responses to threat 
appeals are entirely based on an instinctive mechanism. Whilst a graphic image may cause 
an instinctive emotional reaction such as disgust or fear, the message frame and message 
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direction literature suggests that responses to these intrinsic message characteristics form 
part of an evaluative decision making process.  
This conceptual shift allows for the consideration of a temporal dimension regarding 
exposure to a threat appeal, and the incorporation of an understanding of an individual 
utilising emotional and cognitive responses as an evaluative process to make a decision 
about future behaviour. Indeed, as Algie and Rossiter (2010, p265) state “arousal of the 
emotion… is thought by many practitioners to be necessary to motivate and persuade 
people to undertake an activity from which they may not anticipate an immediate benefit.” In 
practical terms, the behaviour forming the action recommendation as part of the threat 
appeal is not usually immediately actionable. In other words, an individual may be exposed 
to a print advertisement about safe driving at a point in time where they will not drive a car 
in the immediate future and therefore responses to the threat appeal influence future 
behavioural intentions. In order to examine this further, a closer examination of emotional 
and cognitive responses to threat appeals is presented chapter 4, followed by the 
development of a set of theoretical hypotheses to be tested empirically.  
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Chapter 4 - Re-examining emotional and cognitive 
responses to threat appeals; the development of a 
literature based framework 
This chapter builds on chapters 2 and 3, in order to develop a conceptual model and an 
associated set of testable hypotheses, to be tested through the collection and analysis of 
quantitative data (as detailed in chapters 5 to 8). This present chapter integrates existing 
knowledge about threat appeals with the fields of psychology and judgement and decision 
making (among other fields) to generate a theoretical framework regarding the influence of 
intrinsic message characteristics on cognitive and emotional responses, and the influence 
of those cognitive and emotional responses upon behaviour intention and expectation. The 
conceptual framework is presented in section 4.3 and the hypotheses are presented in 
section 4.4. 
The conceptual framework outlines the role of anticipated and anticipatory emotions, 
alongside subjective probabilities, elaboration and immediate emotions resultant from 
manipulation of the intrinsic message characteristics of message direction, message frame 
and graphic image. The emotional and cognitive responses to the threat appeal 
manipulations are expected to influence behaviour intention and expectation. While further 
discussion is presented in section 4.3, the basic rationale for this approach is based on the 
review of the literature presented in chapters 2 and 3. Specifically, the re-examination of 
threat appeal variables presented in chapter 3 argues for a questioning of a fundamental 
assumption made in threat appeals literature, which is also identified in chapter 2. The 
assumption is that responses to threat appeals are underpinned by an instinctive 
mechanism whereby upon exposure to a threat, an individual experiences fear, which in 
turn, motivates action (e.g. Ohman and Mineka, 2001). As argued in section 1.1 the equivocal 
empirical results that pervade the threat appeals literature  charted in Chapter 2 (e.g. Floyd 
et al, 2000, Witte and Allen, 2000), are in part caused by the conflation of message 
characteristics with the intended response. This has historically occurred through the 
operationalisation of constructs such as ‘levels of fear’ as a message characteristic of a 
threat appeal. In a move away from this approach, section 3.4 discussed various intrinsic 
message characteristics, grounded in the extant literature, which can be manipulated, thus 
allowing for observations of correlations between message characteristics and emotional 
and cognitive responses.  This approach does not conflate the message characteristic with 
individuals’ responses.  
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The intrinsic message characteristics are the direction of message, use of graphic images 
and message frame, and they link directly to the defined common components of threat 
appeals as outlined in Chapter 2. The direction of message (towards self or other) relates to 
the positioning of the threat, the use of a graphic image is defined as a fundamental feature 
of a threat appeal (e.g. Witte, 1992) and the message frame (gain/loss avoidance or loss) 
relates to the presentation of the threat and the action recommendation. The intrinsic 
message characteristics (message direction, use of graphic image and message frame) and 
have empirically been shown to influence cognitive and emotional variables identified in 
prominent threat appeal models. More specifically, the variables of perceived severity of 
threat, perceived susceptibility, response efficacy, self-efficacy and the emotion of fear as 
proposed by the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992).  
Of particular importance is that this present research reframes responses to threat appeals 
as a decision about future behaviour. As such the extended parallel process model is re-
examined and pertinent constructs are retained as part of the new conceptual framework, 
which adopts a decision making approach. As such, the role of anticipated and anticipatory 
(future oriented emotions) are included to further explain the underlying appraisal 
mechanisms that influence behaviour intention and behaviour expectation. The wider 
consideration of immediate, anticipatory and anticipated emotions is important, because it 
cannot be assumed that responses to threat appeals are entirely based on a fear instinct 
mechanism. Indeed, as identified in chapter 3, whilst a graphic image may cause an 
instinctive emotional reaction such as disgust or fear, the message frame and message 
direction literature suggests that responses to these intrinsic message characteristics form 
part of an evaluative decision making process, which  involves making a decision about 
future behaviour.  
To build upon the discussion of theories and models developed to explain consumer 
responses to threat appeals as charted in chapter 2, and the re-examination of threat 
appeals as presented in chapter 3, focus will now turn to a detailed examination of cognitive 
responses and then emotional responses to threat appeals. This analysis will form the basis 
of hypothesised relationships between variables as presented in the new conceptual model 
in section 4.3, which is to be empirically tested (results are presented in chapter 7). In an 
examination of the chronological and thematic evolution of threat appeals research (as 
presented in chapter 2) the main focus of prior research has had a cognitive focus. That is 
not to say emotion focussed theories have not been presented. To the contrary, three 
specific areas of theoretical development are identified in Chapter 2, ranging from the drive 
models (e.g. Janis et al, 1967), the fear arousal model (e.g. LaTour and Pitts, 1989) and 
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most recently the fear pattern model (Rossiter and Thornton, 2004). All these emotion 
focussed theories assume that fear is the emotional response to a threat appeal. This 
crosses over to cognitive focused models, where, if emotion is considered at all, fear is also 
considered to be the only emotional response (e.g. extended parallel process model, Witte, 
1992) that is conceptualised and measured.  
In order to explore this further, the cognitive and emotional responses to threat appeals are 
reviewed in this chapter. First, consideration will be given to cognitive responses to threat 
appeals in section 4.1 through a re-examination of the extended parallel process model 
(Witte, 1992). The discussion will then move towards a wider consideration of emotional 
responses to threat appeals in section 4.2. An overview of prominent schools of thought 
regarding emotion theory are presented to acknowledge the different ways in which 
emotions can be conceptualised, and a discussion of the role of emotion in theories of 
judgement and decisions making is provided. This presents the justification for the re-
framing of responses to threat appeals to include a decision making approach. The new 
conceptual framework is presented in section 4.3 and the hypotheses developed to test the 
framework are presented in section 4.4. Finally, a summary of the chapter is presented in 
section 4.5. 
4.1 Re-examining the extended parallel process model and 
cognitive responses to threat appeals 
The case for questioning the assumption that threat appeals generate an instinctive fear 
response that motivates action has been made in chapters 2 and 3. Also, the need for 
manipulation of intrinsic message characteristics in threat appeal research has been 
identified and explored in chapters 2 and 3. As such, the development of a new conceptual 
framework is necessary to examine individuals’ responses to threat appeals. In the review 
of literature presented in chapter 2 the models and theories developed to explain responses 
to threat appeals were examined and equivocal empirical results identified, which look likely 
to be in some way at least a cause of the confusion in the threat appeals field as outlined in 
chapter 1. However, in order to develop a new conceptual framework it is necessary to 
ground development in the pertinent literature. Whilst empirical tests of the extended 
parallel process model (Witte, 1992) have produced some equivocal results (e.g. Witte and 
Allen, 2000; Lewis et al, 2010), as presented in chapter 2, this model has been evidenced to 
have the most robust explanation of responses to threat appeals to date (e.g. Lewis et al, 
2013; Witte, 1994; Witte and Morrison, 2000). The extended parallel process model (Witte, 
1992) draws on prior research to present a conceptualisation of individuals’ responses to 
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threat appeals including the parallel response model (Leventhal, 1970), protection 
motivation theory (Rogers, 1975; 1983), as well as the drive-reduction model (Hovland et al, 
1953). As such, the extended parallel process model will be used as a point of departure for 
the theoretical framework in the present thesis. 
To recap, according to the extended parallel process model, exposure to a threat appeal 
creates two appraisal processes; threat appraisal and coping appraisal (Witte, 1992). The 
more that individuals believe they are susceptible to a serious threat (i.e. high perceptions 
of susceptibility to threat), the more motivated those individuals are to engage in coping 
appraisal. However, if the threat is perceived as irrelevant or insignificant (i.e. low 
perceptions of susceptibility to threat), the extended parallel process model indicates there 
should be no motivation to process the threat appeal any further, and individuals will simply 
ignore the remainder of the message. In contrast, when a threat is believed to be severe 
and individuals feel susceptible, and response and self-efficacy are low, the extended 
parallel process model assumes that individuals will experience fear (Witte, 1992; 1994).  
The fear generated is caused by perceptions of severity and susceptibility. The efficacy 
responses serve to determine the magnitude of fear experienced. If efficacy is low (In other 
words the individual does not believe they can carry out the recommended action or that the 
recommended action would be effective) then fear increases. Increases in fear are 
suggested to increase defensive motivation responses, leading to maladaptive behaviours. 
However, if efficacy is high, it is proposed that threat and associated fear are perceived to 
be manageable and therefore the fear motivates individuals to take some action that is 
intended to reduce fear, such as a recommended course of action from an advertisement 
(e.g. reduce speeding or stop smoking; fear control). The perceived efficacy of the 
recommended action (a combination of the response efficacy and self-efficacy) will 
determine whether those individuals who believe that they are susceptible to a serious 
threat, will engage in either danger or fear control. 
More specifically, Witte (1992, 1994) assumes that individuals will mainly engage in danger 
control when they perceive the recommended action as effective in reducing the threat, and 
they will mainly engage in fear control when they perceive the recommended action as 
ineffective in reducing the threat, or when they feel unable to perform the recommended 
action. In the latter case (high perceived threat and low perceived efficacy), a defence 
motivation is elicited, which the extended parallel process model defines as an individual 
focusing on eliminating their fear through denial or defensive avoidance. Whereas 
perceived efficacy determines the direction of the response (danger or fear control), the 
extended parallel process model suggests that perceived threat determines the magnitude 
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of the response to a threat appeal. As such, the extended parallel process model integrates 
ideas of both protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1983) and the parallel response model 
(Leventhal, 1970), and extends these ideas by identifying how threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal relate to each other, as well as specifying the role of perceived fear in threat and 
coping appraisal.  
The extended parallel process model presents a synthesis of theoretical constructs to 
explain how, through danger processes, threat appeals can be effective in changing 
attitudes, intention and behaviours, and how, through fear control processes, they can 
instead, be ineffective. Whilst research that has empirically tested the extended parallel 
process model has been somewhat supportive (e.g. Lewis et al, 2013; Witte, 1994; Witte 
and Morrison, 2000), overall, findings have been mixed (e.g. Witte and Allen, 2000) as 
discussed in section 2.2.4. Unfortunately, the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992) 
falls prey to both the assumption that threat appeals generate an instinctive fear response 
and that message characteristics can be conflated with intended responses. To be more 
specific, the identified fear control process hinges on the assumption that threat appeals 
generate fear and this is an integral part of the overall appraisal process. In addition, as 
presented in figure 7 the threat appeals stimulus characteristics are identified as self-
efficacy, response efficacy, susceptibility and severity which precisely mirror the same 
response variables. This conflates message characteristics and intended responses which 
is further complicated by the operationalisation of the stimulus variables by researchers 
which are manipulated according to ‘levels of threat’ and/or ‘levels of efficacy’ (e.g. Smalec 
and Klingle; 2000; Lewis et al. 2010; Tay and Watson, 2002).  
Whilst, these two issues present a significant weaknesses of the extended parallel process 
model (Witte, 1992), a number of the proposed relationships between response variables in 
the model have been supported in the literature, as outlined in section 2.2.4. Whilst support 
for the specific fear control and danger control mechanisms is not concrete (e.g. Witte and 
Allen, 2000), the four cognitive appraisal variables of perceived severity, perceived 
susceptibility, response efficacy and self-efficacy have generated more consistent empirical 
results. Witte and Allen (2000) identified that high threat perceptions (severity and 
susceptibility), combined with high efficacy perceptions (response efficacy and self-efficacy) 
have the most persuasive impact. This finding is replicated across the literature (e.g. 
Roberto and Goddall, 2009; Wong and Cappella, 2009). Research studies have also found 
that perceptions of high threat and low efficacy were more persuasive than low threat, low 
efficacy perceptions (Witte and Allen, 2000). Also, Allahverdipour et al (2007) found that 
cognitions about perceived severity were significantly correlated with antidrug attitudes and 
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intentions to avoid drug abuse. In contrast, results from other research studies have 
identified efficacy to have an impact on persuasion but not perceptions of severity. Witte 
(1994) found that perceptions of efficacy were significantly correlated with attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviour changes in use of condoms to prevent AIDS.  
Despite these evidently mixed results, it is claimed that the extended parallel process model 
is a good explanatory model because in a broad sense threat appeals produce both danger 
and fear control responses and the stronger the threat appeal, the more motivated 
individuals are to process the message (Witte and Allen, 2000). Indeed, Witte and Allen 
(2000, p604) concluded that threat appeals are “effective when they depict a significant and 
relevant threat, and when they outline effective responses that appear easy to accomplish.” 
However, as per the argument presented above, threat appeals themselves cannot be 
considered to necessarily always depict a “significant and relevant threat” and “effective 
responses that appear easy to accomplish” (Witte and Allen, 2000, p604), because of the 
key role of individual perception in such circunmstances. Rather intrinsic message 
characteristics can be utilised to influence the perceptions of threat and efficacy, which are 
actually responses to the threat appeal, rather than features of it. Despite this, scholars 
continue to use the extended parallel process model as a platform to explore improvements 
to the model (e.g. Basil et al, 2008; Lewis et al, 2013), whilst Witte and Allen (2000) cite the 
fear control and danger control processes as central to the explanatory power of the model. 
The position taken in this thesis is that the explanatory power of the extended parallel 
process model (Witte, 1992), is in fact is derived from the inclusion of the cognitive 
appraisal variables (perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, response efficacy and self-
efficacy) and the acknowledgement of both cognitive and emotional response variables 
(despite the emotion being restricted to fear).  
As previously stated, the new conceptual framework under development will not limit the 
consideration of emotional responses to fear. This is due to the questioning of the 
assumption that threat appeals generate an instinctive fear response. In addition, as 
discussed in section 3.2.3, a fundamental component of threat appeals, the inclusion of a 
graphic image, has been empirically shown to generate disgust which is not a construct 
included in the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992). One way to address this 
would be to simply add the construct of disgust to the model. Indeed adding emotions has 
been an approach adopted by researchers (e.g. So, 2013). However, this does not address 
the fundamental assumptions concerning the threat appeals and fear relationship, or further 
examine the mechanisms of fear control and danger control processes. As such, this thesis 
employs a different approach. The consideration of emotional responses will be widened 
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(as is discussed in section 4.2) and intrinsic message characteristics will be manipulated as 
threat appeal variables.  The influence of the threat appeal variables on emotional 
responses and cognitive appraisals will be examined. Specifically the cognitive appraisals of 
perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, response efficacy and self-efficacy as identified 
in the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992) that have been empirically shown to 
influence behavioural intention (e.g. Allahverdipour et al, 2007; Witte, 1994; Witte and Allen, 
2000). Moving forward these variables will be included in the conceptual model presented in 
section 4.3 as subjective probabilities. They are reclassified as these due to the discussion 
presented in section 4.2 where judgment and decision making literature is used to re-frame 
the conceptual framework of responses to threat appeals as a decision. First, however, in 
line with the identified need to widen out consideration of relevant emotional responses in 
the new conceptual framework, a review of emotion theory is presented in section 4.2.  
4.2 Examining emotional responses to threat appeals 
In order to better understand individuals’ emotional responses to the intrinsic message 
characteristics contained in threat appeals (as discussed in chapter 3) it is important to 
generate a detailed understanding of the theoretical perspectives and debates surrounding 
emotions, and how these approaches have influenced the field. As previously discussed a 
number of problematic assumptions in the majority of existing literature have been 
identified, one of which is that threats are assumed to be contained in threat appeals, and 
further that these so-called threats can be designed so as that a given level of fear (e.g. 
high or low) is an inherent component. As identified in section 4.1 above and in chapter 2, 
fear is conceptualised as the only emotional response to threat appeals (if emotion is 
included at all) in the theories and models developed to explain responses to threat appeals 
(e.g. the extended parallel process model, Witte, 1992).  Additionally, numerous 
researchers have measured only fear in their research (e.g. Witte, 1992; Roberto and 
Goddall (2009); Wong and Cappella (2009), further reinforcing the assumption that fear is 
the only emotional response a threat appeal can generate.  
As such, it is not surprising that some researchers have identified the need to widen 
considerations of emotional responses. For example, Henley and Donovan (1999, p311) 
present an argument that when death is a negative consequence presented in stimuli it is 
qualitatively different to other negative outcomes, stating that “there is a need to identify and 
measure emotions other than fear or anxiety that are associated with death and threats of 
death. Guilt and remorse, sadness and anger are potentially relevant emotions.” Also, Algie 
and Rossiter (2010, p266) state that “fear appeals can evoke the emotion of fear, and also 
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perhaps the emotions of shock or disgust in the viewing audience with the aim of grabbing 
the audience’s attention and motivating them to act in a recommended way to avert the 
threat posed in the advertisement.” Other scholars have also started to move away from the 
view that fear is the only response to threat appeals and have explored different emotional 
responses, such as self-conscious emotions (Agrawal and Duhachek, 2010), and self-
accountability emotions (Passyn and Sujan, 2006). Based on the principle that not all 
individuals experience a fear response to threat appeals, it is therefore necessary to explore 
in more depth the emotional responses that can be generated by the intrinsic message 
features identified above.  
Emotional responses can be considered to act as mediating influences (alongside cognitive 
processes, discussed in section 4.3) in the decision making process towards an intention 
towards a future behaviour. Indeed, as Dillard and Nabi (2006, pS123) state, “the effective 
use of emotions as persuasive devices, however, requires an understanding of not only 
principles related to emotional arousal but also the processes that allow emotional arousal 
to be translated into an effective action.” As such, the different schools of thought on 
emotion are in need of consideration, which is presented below in section 4.2.2 before 
discussion moves towards a consideration of the role of emotions in decision making in 
section 4.2.3.  
4.2.1 Emotion and schools of thought 
No consensus has yet been reached in the field of psychology regarding the structure of 
emotion. As Forgas (2008, p94) states “even the definition of what is meant by affect and 
emotion remains problematic, and the relationship between affect and cognition continues 
to generate intense debate.” More specifically, emotions can be conceptualised according 
to discrete categories (e.g. Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980) dimensions or bipolar concepts 
(Clark and Tellegen, 1988; Watson and Tellegen, 1985; Havlena et al, 1989), or a 
circumplex (Russell, 1980). This is further complicated by the boundaries and definitions of 
emotion, which have been described as “blurry” (Russell and Barrett, 1999, p805). This has 
resulted in disagreement between researchers concerning what constitutes an emotion. 
Although it is not the purpose of this study to define emotion itself, it is necessary to explore 
the pertinent schools of thought in emotion theory in order to develop a working 
understanding of the emotional responses that may be generated by threat appeals, and 
further to define the constructs to be empirically measured in the present study.  
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The perspective that is perhaps closest to the common understanding of emotions is that 
emotions (for example, happiness, fear, sadness, hostility, guilt, surprise and interest) are 
discrete entities. That is, emotions are assumed to be unique experiential states that stem 
from distinct causes and are present from birth (Izard, 1977). The assumption behind this 
perspective is that individuals experience emotion because people have internal 
mechanisms for a small set of reactions (typically anger, fear, happiness, love, sadness; 
Fehr and Russell, 1985) that, once triggered, can be measured objectively. Emotions such 
as anger, sadness, and fear are treated as entities that researchers can make discoveries 
about and this assumption shapes the scientific treatment of emotions (Barrett, 2004). For 
example, it is assumed that people feel fear when their biological fear mechanism has been 
triggered as discussed in section 3.1.2), and that this feeling shapes perception and 
behaviour.  
One stream of research focuses on the identification of a basic set of universal discrete 
emotions. There are many conceptualisations of the basic emotions, a snapshot of which is 
presented in table 1 below. In all but one categorisation (Frijda, 1986), fear is considered to 
be a basic emotion, which may explain why historically the emotion has been given priority 
in the threat appeals literature. Not only did the threat appeals literature uphold the threat 
causes fear relationship based on the biological mechanisms associated with the 
presentation of a threat and fear response, but this was also supported in the psychology 
literature which takes fear to be a basic, discrete emotion with unique properties (e.g. Izard, 
1977). 
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Authors  Date Basic Emotions  
Desmet 2003 Desire, pleasant surprise, inspiration, amusement, admiration, 
satisfaction, fascination, indignation, contempt, disgust, unpleasant 
surprise, dissatisfaction, disappointment, boredom  
Ekman  1999  Amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, 
embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, 
sadness/distress, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame.  
Fehr and 
Russell  
1985  Anger, fear, happiness, love, sadness  
Frijda  1986  Desire, happiness, interest, surprise, wonder, sorrow  
Izard  1977  Distress-anguish, contempt, disgust, joy, sadness, fear, interest-
excitement, surprise, shame, guilt  
Plutchik  1980  Anger-rage, disgust-loathing, joy-ecstasy, fear-terror, sadness-grief, 
astonishment-surprise, acceptance-trust, expectancy-anticipation  
 
Table 1 - Examples of theorists who present categories of discrete, basic emotions 
Despite the variety of approaches to identification of a set of basic discrete emotions in 
terms of the emotional constructs that are included (as shown in table 1 above), research 
has begun to move away from the strict identification of a specific set of emotions. Rather, 
scholars focus on the common characteristics of discrete emotions. Nabi (2002) identifies 
five components that can be used to identify similarities and differences between the 
different discrete emotions. First, specific emotions provide a unique cognitive appraisal or 
evaluation of a context or situation. Secondly, there is a physiological component of arousal 
associated with each emotion. Third, motor expression of each emotion occurs, in other 
words there is a physical expression of the emotion e.g. a facial expression. Fourth, there is 
a motivational component unique to each emotion which drives action responses and fifth, 
each emotion has a unique subjective feeling state. This perceptive allows for the 
acknowledgement of the unique properties of discrete emotions but widens the perspective 
in the acknowledgement that emotional responses are not necessarily confined to the 
experience of one emotion. Indeed, messages such as threat appeals may generate 
multiple emotional responses rather than a single emotional response (e.g. Dillard and 
Peck, 2000; Dillard et al, 1996).  
This perspective also encourages consideration of emotions that are intended to be 
generated by a stimulus variable and those that are not. For example, emotions that are 
generated by a stimuli such as a threat appeal, can be intended (i.e. the structure and 
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content of the message achieves the intended emotional effect), however, collateral or 
unintended emotions can also occur (e.g. Dillard and Meijnders, 2002). Importantly, 
evidence suggests there may be a differential effect of the same emotion according to 
whether it is intended or collateral. For example, Dillard et al (1996) demonstrated that 
when anger was evoked as an intended emotional response, persuasive effects were 
observed, but when anger was generated as a collateral response, dissuasive effects were 
observed. A number of authors have argued that the discrete emotions perspective is 
allows for furthering the understanding of the persuasive impact of emotions in this context 
(e.g. DeSteno et al, 2000; Dillard and Meijnders, 2002). Indeed, when considering the 
restrictive approach taken in the threat appeals field regarding the conceptualisation and 
measurement of only fear, there may have been unintended or collateral emotional 
responses generated which influence emotional and cognitive processing which have not 
previously been accounted for. As such, this further supports the argument to widen 
consideration of emotional responses to threat appeals. 
Theories of discrete emotions have been challenged from various perspectives (for a review 
see Russell, 2003). One relatively well-known alternative perspective identifies emotion as a 
global feeling construct (Shapiro et al, 2002), where emotional states can be described by 
their position on two fundamental dimensions: arousal and valence, where valence is 
defined as pleasantness or hedonic value, and arousal as bodily activation (Barrett, 1998). 
Whilst there have been numerous applications of this theoretical perspective (e.g. Lang, 
1994; Fontaine et al, 2007) it does not allow for the examination of the specific properties of 
emotion and how these properties may interact with cognition to influence decision making. 
As such, this theoretical perspective has little application to the present study. 
While both the discrete and dimensional theories of emotion have long histories across 
various disciplines, the broader appraisal-based approach to the theory of emotions has 
become increasingly popular in recent years (Moors and Scherer, 2013; Williams and 
Aaker, 2000). This theoretical approach posits that emotional differences must necessarily 
involve differences in the way an individual appraises their environment and, and that these 
appraisals, in addition to emotion differences, guide judgements and choices (Raghunathan 
and Pham, 1999; Lerner and Keltner, 2000; 2001). Thus, emotions are differentiated by an 
evaluation or judgement made about an event or stimulus, such as a threat appeal (Moors 
and Scherer, 2013). 
Moors and Scherer (2013, p135) state that there are “two related criteria for a theory to 
count as an appraisal theory: 1. Appraisal theories consider appraisals as a typical cause of 
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emotion (or of emotional components), and because of this, 2, appraisal is the core 
determinant of the content of feelings.”  Indeed, appraisal theory is based on the notion that 
emotions serve an adaptive function, and that appraisals play a critical role in the 
generation and differentiation of emotions (Smith and Kirby, 2001). The main tenet of 
appraisal theory is that emotions are prompted by evaluations, or appraisals, of experiences 
in a specific context (Roseman and Smith, 2001). This implies that emotions do not arise 
automatically from particular events (as instinctive responses for example) but rather are 
based on individuals’ cognitive processing of those experiences. As Smith and Kirby (2001, 
p121) state “appraisal is an evaluative process that serves to ‘diagnose’ whether the 
situation confronting an individual has adaptation relevance…and [to] produce an 
appropriate emotional response”. 
Individual emotions and their accompanying appraisals involve their own innate action 
tendency (Smith and Lazarus, 1993; Roseman et al, 1994). For example, with regards to 
the emotion of fear, the accompanying appraisal is threat, and the corresponding action 
tendency is avoidance or flight. The emotion of guilt has the accompanying appraisals of 
regret or self-blame and the associated action tendency is a desire to engage in anticipatory 
preventative behaviours or retrospective corrective behaviours (for examples see Simson, 
1992). Thus, emotions and associated cognitions shape and guide actions. That said, most 
previous research in the area of emotions has not directly examined action response. In 
particular, research on emotions in advertising and persuasion has focussed primarily on 
attitudinal measures as consequences of emotions (Aaker and Williams, 1988; Edell and 
Burke, 1987; Burke and Edell, 1989, Pham, 1996; Williams and Aaker, 2000). Similarly 
much of the emotion research in decision making has focussed on using preferences and 
intentions as consequence variables, rather than choices that translate into behaviours 
(Simson 1992; Kahn and Isen, 1993; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999).  
However, Lerner and Keltner (2001) showed that two negative emotions, fear and anger, 
accompanied by appraisals of uncertainty and certainty respectively, differentially impact 
risk perception. This research found that individuals experiencing fear made pessimistic 
judgements whereas individuals experiencing anger made optimistic judgements about the 
future.  Similarly Raghunathan and Pham (1999) generated results that identified 
differences in risk seeking between participants who experienced sadness or fear, 
according to whether they differed on appraisals of loss and uncertainty. Bagozzi et al 
(2003) conducted a study in the context of effortful decision making and the goal selection 
process. These authors identify that the appraisal of goals includes the assessment of the 
prospects of attaining (failing to attain) that goal which elicits an emotional reaction – termed 
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a prefectual appraisal. These prefectual appraisals lead to the anticipation of discrete 
emotions, which can be thought of as anticipated emotions, because of their prospective 
orientation. From this perspective the interplay between cognitions and emotions is 
important and allows one to incorporate a consideration of the temporal element of 
emotions (in particular the concept of anticipated emotions, as will be discussed in section 
4.2.4).  
Whilst emotion and cognition were historically viewed as separate systems (e.g. Izard, 
1977) the two processes are now acknowledged to be dependent on each other (Damasio, 
2006; LeDoux, 1998). In particular, the prevailing contemporary view in psychology (e.g. 
Seymour and Dolan, 2008) holds that emotions are actually an integral component of 
rational behaviour in uncertain social environments, or in any environment where there are 
a number of options for response. In light of this, it therefore seems somewhat surprising 
that the role of emotion has been largely neglected in the threat appeals literature, as 
shown by the literature review in Chapter 2. That is not to say the principles of appraisal 
theory have never been applied to the threat appeals context. Indeed, Dillard (1994) and 
Dillard and Peck (2000; 2001) used appraisal theory to provide insight into the persuasive 
effects of emotion as a result of exposure to threat appeals. Whilst results have been 
inconclusive Dillard and Nabi (2006) examine the interplay between emotions and 
cognitions and the resultant influence on perceived effectiveness. Dillard and Nabi (2006) 
particularly examine the functions of differing emotions in the threat appeals context, for 
example manipulating fear to communicate the severity of threat, manipulating sadness in 
accordance with a sense of loss.  
In light of the discussion presented in section 4.1, it is important to reiterate that the notions 
of emotional responses and cognitive appraisals have not been neglected by threat appeal 
research. To the contrary, the extended parallel process model (as discussed in sections 
2.2.4 and 4.1) has developed and empirically tested a number of cognitive appraisals 
(perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, response efficacy and self-efficacy) along with 
the emotion of fear (Witte, 1992). Indeed, a strength of the extended parallel process model 
(Witte, 1992) is the consideration of the interplay between cognitions and emotional 
response (even though this is restricted to fear). However, given the questioning of the 
assumption that threat appeals generate an instinctive fear response and the differing 
properties of emotions and associated appraisals, as per appraisal theory (e.g. Lerner and 
Keltner, 2010; Bagozzi et al, 2003) the actual functions of emotions as responses to threat 
appeals require further examination. In order to assist with this line of enquiry the role of 
emotions in the judgement and decision making literature is presented in section 4.2.3. 
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4.2.2 The role of emotions in judgement and decision making 
As discussed in chapter 3, threat appeal research examining the impact of message frame 
has included a consideration of a temporal dimension in terms of distinguishing between 
short term and long term consequences of engaging (or not) in the recommended behaviour 
(e.g. Gerrend and Cullen, 2008; Apanovitch et al, 2003; Kiene et al, 2005). This is 
particularly relevant to a threat appeal context because it firstly suggests that responses to 
threat appeals are not necessarily immediate spontaneous responses (as per the instinctive 
threat fear mechanism examined in chapter 3) but that instead the emotional and cognitive 
responses form an evaluation which corresponds to decision making. It is important to note 
that this conceptual shift allows for the consideration of a temporal dimension regarding 
exposure to a threat appeal and an individual using emotional and cognitive responses to 
make a decision about future behaviour. In practical terms the behaviour forming the action 
recommendation as part of the threat appeal is not usually immediately actionable. In other 
words, an individual may be exposed to a print advertisement about safe driving at a point 
in time where they will not drive a car in the immediate time period and therefore responses 
to the threat appeal influence future behavioural intentions. That is not to suggest that 
individuals do not experience immediate emotions in response to exposure to a threat 
appeal. Indeed, in order to enhance understanding of the role of cognition and emotion 
responses to threat appeals and the impact of these responses on behaviour intention, 
different types of emotion are considered. In particular, alongside immediate emotional 
responses (the range of which may include fear and a number of other immediate 
emotions), future oriented emotions – termed here anticipatory and anticipated emotions – 
play a central role in the decision making literature (e.g. Vastfjall and Slovic, 2013), and 
must be considered relevant to the present study also.  
Emotions have played a key role in research on judgement and decision making field 
(JDM). Such research highlights the role of emotion in decision making, and has become 
increasingly focused on the role of emotions in the context of utility. In particular, JDM 
research has commonly utilised the concept of experienced utility; that is, the utility a 
decision maker experiences from the outcome of a chosen alternative (e.g. Khaneman, 
2003). Essentially, utility refers to the pleasure and pain that we experience from outcomes 
(Vastfjall and Slovic, 2013). Therefore, in this context utility can be considered to be 
fundamentally concerned with emotions and emotional experiences, and refers to the 
pleasure-displeasure or comfort-discomfort derived from outcomes. As such, at a basic 
level, emotions guide decision making because human beings seek pleasure and avoid 
pain (Knutson et al, 2008). However, experienced utility is only one type of utility that guides 
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choice. Kahneman (2011) identifies four different types of utility; instantaneous utility is the 
conscious experienced utility from sensory input, remembered utility influences post 
decision evaluations (e.g. regret and disappointment with a decision outcome), predicted 
utility is the decision makers’ anticipation or prediction of experienced utility, and finally 
decision utility is the utility that influences the actual decision. Of these four types of utility, 
predicted utility is most relevant to this discussion, as predicted utility influences future 
behaviour. 
It is well-accepted that utility has a cognitive and emotional component, which can be 
clearly seen in examples such as gambling (e.g. Webb et al, 2014; Mellers et al, 1999; 
Zeelenberg et al, 1996). This perspective is of particular importance in the context of threat 
appeals, since there is an obvious (and unavoidable) time difference between exposure to a 
stimulus that is intended to change some behaviour (such as a threat appeal) and the 
behaviour in question. For example, an individual might see a threat appeal in a magazine 
or on the television about drink driving, but the point at which they may have the opportunity 
to decide whether or not to engage in that activity is likely to be at some point in the future. 
Here, it is clear that the concept of predicted utility is important, because encouraging 
individuals to think about the future and make a prediction based on a presented scenario 
(as presented in the threat appeal) will encourage people to make a decision or judgement 
and therefore change their future behaviour (or not) accordingly. 
Indeed, Chang and Pham (2013) consider the role of emotions in judgement and decision 
making and purport that emotions are incorporated more into decision making when the 
outcome of the decision is closer to the present that in decisions where the outcome is more 
distant in time (which could be future or past). Chang and Pham (2013) demonstrate that 
outcome proximity to the present leads to preference for affectively superior options (e.g. 
the pleasure gained from renting an attractive apartment after graduating, when one is 
graduating in a few weeks versus a year). This increases the effect of incidental emotion on 
evaluations, and a greater perceived information value is placed on emotions. This is 
important because in practical terms, individuals are often exposed to threat appeal stimuli 
at a different time to the point at which they engage in the behaviour in question. 
Additionally because threat appeals are used to communicate the risks associated with a 
wide range of issues, ranging from speeding whilst driving, to binge drinking, to skin cancer, 
to sexually transmitted diseases, the “temporal distance or proximity” of exposure to the 
threat appeal appeal, to the actual potential outcome or incidence when the activity/ 
behaviour in question might occur, can vary substantially.  
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Vastfjall and Slovic (2013, p 259) state that “Predecisional affect is emotion that influences 
the decision before the decision is actually made. Current mood, anticipatory, and 
anticipated emotions are such influences. Anticipatory emotions are emotional reactions 
experienced in the present, bought about by thinking about the future. Anticipated emotions 
on the other hand, are primarily cognitive expectations about future emotions without 
actually experiencing them in the present” This perspective highlights the roles of different 
types of emotions, and the role that each type can play in a decision making process which 
is stimulated by exposure to a stimulus. Vastfjall and Slovic (2013) present a model (see 
Figure 9) which considers the dimensions of the time of decision (pre-post decisional), the 
time of affect (immediate – expected) and the emotion/affect – decision relationship itself 
(incidental – integral). This model enables the incorporation of a temporal gap between 
exposure to stimulus, the emotions generated by that stimulus, and the point of actual 
behaviour, and consideration of the interplay between cognition and types of emotion.  
 
 
Figure 9 - Different forms of emotion influencing decision making (Vastfjall and 
Slovic, 2013, p25) 
The distinction between immediate emotions and expected emotions, and their influence on 
decision making, is particularly relevant to a threat appeals context where individuals are 
responding to a threat appeal and using the cognitions and emotions to make a decision 
about future behaviour. As such, the different types of predecisional emotion are important. 
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However, prior research on threat appeals has not considered the role of anticipated or 
anticipatory emotions as responses to threat appeals.  
Another prominent theoretical model in the JDM literature that examines different types of 
emotions in decision making is the risk-as-feeling hypothesis (Loewenstein et al, 2001) 
which is presented in figure 10. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis suggests that immediate or 
anticipatory emotions (i.e. visceral and immediate reactions to risk) have a direct effect on 
behaviour (Loewenstein et al, 2001).  The-risk-as feelings hypothesis acknowledges that 
emotional responses to a risk may differ from cognitive appraisals of that risk, and reactions 
result “from emotional influences including feelings such as worry, fear, dread or anxiety” 
(Loewenstein et al, 2001, p270). The risk-as-feelings hypothesis conceptualises anticipated 
emotions, perceptions of subjective probabilities, and elaboration, as antecedents to 
cognitive appraisals and emotional responses that drive behaviour, as shown in figure 10.  
 
 
 
Figure 10 - Risk-as-feelings hypothesis (adapted from Loewenstein et al, 2001, p270) 
Whilst there is little empirical evidence to support the risk-as-feelings hypothesis (e.g. 
Tuokko et al, 2007) the model places emotions as integral part of decision making and 
particularly highlights the role of anticipated emotions as antecedents to cognitions and 
emotions that drive behaviour. Indeed, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis acknowledges the 
interaction between cognitions and emotions and the distinction between anticipated 
emotions and the effect these have on immediate emotions (i.e. those that are experienced 
at the time of appraisal). 
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Lerner and Keltner (2001) showed that two negative emotions, fear and anger, accompanied by 
appraisals of uncertainty and certainty respectively, differentially impact risk perception. This 
research found that individuals experiencing fear made pessimistic judgements whereas individuals 
experiencing anger made optimistic judgements about the future. Similarly Raghunathan and Pham 
(1999) generated results that identified a difference in risk seeking between participants who 
experienced sadness or fear, according to whether they differed on appraisals of loss and 
uncertainty. Bagozzi et al (2003) conducted a study in the context of effortful decision 
making and the goal selection process and identified that the appraisal of goals includes the 
assessment of the prospects of attaining (or failing to attain) that goal, which elicits an 
emotional reaction. These prefectual appraisals lead to the anticipation of discrete 
emotions, which can be thought of as anticipated emotions, because of their prospective 
orientation. From this perspective the interplay between cognitions and emotions is 
important and allows one to incorporate a consideration of the temporal element of 
emotions (in particular the concept of anticipated emotions, as will be discussed in section 
4.2.3).  
In a threat appeals context, perception of threat is an important cognitive evaluation (as 
discussed in section 4.1). Indeed, according to the risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Lowenstein 
et al, 2001) the immediate emotion experienced as a result of exposure to a graphic image 
(e.g. disgust) and the cognitive evaluation of threat severity and susceptibility, will drive 
behaviour. However, the anticipated emotions generated by exposure to a threat appeal 
may be different (i.e not disgust) as the intrinsic message characteristics that influence an 
anticipation of an event occurring, and the imagination of the associated feelings of that 
occurrence, are message frame issues which relate to the adoption of the recommended 
action and the direction of message.  Arguably, the immediate fight or flight mechanism that 
could be activated by a threat, if it is perceived as such, or avoidance mechanisms 
associated with disgust, may serve to be counterproductive to the overall goal of threat 
appeal advertisements, which is making decisions regarding future behaviour. Indeed, an 
application of the affect as information hypothesis (Schwartz, 2001; Schwarz and Clore, 
1983) demonstrates that the feelings aroused in the hypothetical situations presented in 
threat appeals (e.g. situations in the future) are not immediately relevant and therefore 
reduced or eliminated. As such, immediate instinctive emotional reactions such as fear or 
disgust appear likely to be less relevant to a future decision, or a decision about a future 
behaviour. However, the risk as feeling hypothesis (Loewenstein et al, 2001) and somatic 
marker theory (Damasio, 1994) posit that immediately experienced emotions remain 
important to risk assessment and choice. In support of this, studies (e.g. Katkin, 2001; Shiv 
and Huber, 2000; Carroll et al, 1982) have shown that there is a strong relationship between 
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imagery, emotion and decision making. Mental imagery and mental simulation of the 
scenario presented in a threat appeal which may be concerning the negative outcomes of a 
future behaviour are also important. Imagining an outcome encourages the elicitation of 
anticipatory and anticipated emotions and their influence on decisions. As such, the use of 
graphic images may facilitate elaboration and mental imagery which influence emotional 
and cognitive processes.  
Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) state that anticipated emotions are predictions about 
emotional consequences of decision outcomes. In line with this, expected utility theories 
(e.g. Rosenstock, 1974) assume people attempt to predict the emotional consequences 
from alternative courses of action and then select actions that maximise positive emotions 
and minimise negative emotions. As discussed in chapter 2, the health belief model 
(Rosenstock, 1974) is an example of expected utility theory and influenced the development 
of protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975) and subsequently the extended parallel 
process model (Witte, 1992). Expected utility theories state that behaviour is determined by 
an individual’s assessment of the severity and likelihood of possible outcomes. This 
information is used to make an appraisal, and arrive at a decision that in turn drives 
behaviour.  It can be seen that such models are primarily cognitive, and any emotions that 
are caused as a result of the decision, or the risk itself, are not considered as integral to the 
decision making process. Similar to the appraisal school of thought, emotions are 
considered in such models to be a product of the cognitive process.  However, whilst the 
risk-as-feelings hypothesis has received little empirical support, the introduction of 
immediate, anticipatory and anticipated emotions as central constructs in a model of the 
response to threat appeals clearly has merit. As such, focus will now turn to a discussion of 
anticipated and anticipatory emotions, presented in section 4.2.3. 
4.2.3 Anticipated and anticipatory emotions 
The distinction between anticipated and anticipatory emotions was introduced in the 
previous section within the context of models of decision making and judgment. The present 
section builds on the previous discussion to develop a more nuanced understanding of how 
these key concepts may influence individual responses to threat appeals. Anticipatory 
emotions are defined as emotions that are currently experienced due to the prospect of a 
future event (Baungartner et al, 2008). Conversely, anticipated emotions are defined as the 
predicted emotional experience relating to an imagined future event (Baumgartner et al, 
2008). As such, one can anticipate virtually any emotion (e.g. anticipated fear, anticipated 
joy, anticipated hope), while anticipatory emotions are a specific group with only some 
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overlap with immediate emotions (e.g. hope and fear are anticipatory emotions, but disgust 
is not). Baumgartner et al, (2008) suggest that anticipated emotions are distinct from 
anticipatory emotions (such as fear and hope) because anticipated emotions are the 
predicted emotions arising for a future event, whereas anticipatory emotions are those that 
are currently felt with respect to a future event.  
Although anticipated emotions have an emotion component, the intensity is less than that of 
an actually experienced emotion (e.g. such as anticipatory emotions and immediate 
emotions). Anticipated emotions are likely to be experienced when the interpretation of an 
imagined future event matches an emotional appraisal. However, the specific appraisals for 
actually experienced and anticipated emotions are identical; the only difference is whether 
or not an event has been realised. For example, believing that a behaviour one has already 
carried out violates an internalised moral standard may evoke guilt and shame (Tangney 
and Dearing, 2002). Similarly, believing that an imagined future behaviour will violate a 
moral standard may elicit anticipated guilt and shame (Manstead, 2000). 
Anticipated emotions facilitate self-regulation by signalling the emotional consequences of 
an action or omission / non-action (Baumeister et al, 2007). For example, Brown and 
McConnell (2011) found that the anticipation of negative emotions motivates people to 
undertake actions that may prevent an undesirable end-state. This study showed that when 
people anticipated negative emotions in the event that they would fail a future test, they 
were more likely to practice the task being tested. This is of course unsurprising, since 
humans prefer to experience positive arousal and to avoid negative arousal. As such, they 
should be motivated to undertake an action when they anticipate that it would result in 
positive emotions (such as pride and elation) and inhibit actions when they anticipate that 
they would result in negative emotions, such as guilt and shame. Indeed, research has 
found that including negative anticipated emotions in the theory of planned behaviour 
increases the predictive power of the model across various behaviours and contexts, such 
as binge drinking (Carrera et al, 2012; Ajzen and Sheikh, 2013) and blood donation (Conner 
et al, 2012).  Research has also found that directly manipulating the prominence of 
anticipated emotions can increase health-related behaviour such as condom use (Richard 
et al, 1996), as well as – interestingly – consumer purchasing (Simonson, 1992). 
Anticipated emotions have also been used in the model of goal directed behaviour (which is 
based on the theory of planned behaviour). Specifically, Fry et al (2014) studied the causes 
of desires to drink responsibly. However, these approaches do not acknowledge the 
underlying mechanisms of the processes underpinning the decision making individuals 
undergo in deciding courses of future behaviour.  
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Baumgartner et al (2008) examined the difference between anticipatory and anticipated 
emotions and their predictive validity, using the umbrella term ‘future-oriented emotions’ to 
categorise anticipatory and anticipated emotions. Because anticipatory emotions are 
defined as those currently experienced due to the prospect of a future event (e.g. hope or 
fear), uncertainty about what is going to happen constitutes part of the meaning of 
anticipatory emotions and in fact partially causes the emotion. For example anticipatory 
hope for desired events or anticipatory worry for undesired events. On the other hand, 
because anticipated emotions are those expected to be experienced in the future if certain 
events do or do not occur (e.g. anticipated joy or regret), there is no uncertainty associated 
with these emotions. Specifically, mental simulation means that the individual is able 
imagine how good or bad something would feel it the future event has occurred, and 
simulate how it would feel. Based on pre-factual thinking and imagined positive or negative 
consequences, anticipated emotions can be real emotional experiences based on vivid 
visualisations of possible futures, and are thus predictions or affective forecasts. Compared 
to anticipated emotions, the range of anticipatory emotions is necessarily smaller, because 
anticipatory emotions are a specific subset of all discrete emotions (i.e. those directly 
related to the prospect of future events). Conversely, an anticipated emotion can actually be 
any discrete emotion that is experienced in advance, based on mental simulation of future 
outcomes. 
In this light, anticipated and anticipatory emotions may be seen as at least peripherally 
similar to a cognitive process. The discussion presented in the present chapter so far clearly 
shows that exploring the interplay between cognitions and emotions is fundamental to any 
comprehensive understanding of how individuals process threat appeal stimuli. However, 
prior ‘fear appeal’ models are mainly grounded in the cognitive school of thought (e.g. 
Protection Motivation Theory, Extended Parallel Process Model, Stage Model as discussed 
in the previous chapter) and, whilst many do incorporate an emotional element, it is usually 
restricted to the immediate fear response itself. As discussed at length in chapter 2, such 
models appear at least somewhat misspecified, since it was shown that the stimuli may not 
have the features to automatically generate the instinctive fear mechanism, and thus the 
fight or flight response. However, it is clear that much prior research does indeed make the 
assumption that one can include some level of ‘fear’ into a typical threat appeal stimuli 
(such as a threat appeal warning against drunk driving, or smoking). 
Additionally it can also see that, through examining the typical scales employed by the field 
to measure fear, researchers have in fact been tapping into the construct of fear (and other 
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emotions) not as an immediate visceral response, but as a construct with future oriented 
properties. Unfortunately, at the same time, such research has not explicitly acknowledged 
the properties of the emotional construct under examination. For example, Passyn and 
Sujan (2006, p585) used two items to assess each emotion under investigation; “fear ("I felt 
afraid" and "I felt anxious that I might be at risk for developing skin cancer"), regret ("I felt 
regret" and "I felt blamable that because of my own doing, I might be at risk for developing 
skin cancer"), guilt ("I felt guilty" and "I felt ashamed that because of my own doing, I might 
be at risk for developing skin cancer hurting not only myself but loved ones as well"), 
challenge ("I felt challenged" and "I understood the problem and felt motivated to start 
protecting myself from UV rays"), and hope ("I felt hopeful" and "I felt wishful that everything 
would tum out well")”. This clearly demonstrates a conceptual blurring between immediate 
felt emotional responses and cognitive predictions about an emotional response dependent 
on a scenario occurring. Therefore, it is imperative that this distinction informs the current 
research study. In addition, prior models in the threat appeals field (for example protection 
motivation theory and the extended parallel process model as discussed in chapter 2) 
emphasise the importance of the evaluation of subjective probabilities in the processing of 
the message contained in threat appeals (e.g. perceptions of severity and susceptibility, 
response efficacy and self-efficacy). Such cognitive evaluations also are generated through 
the mental simulation of an event or scenario occurring, which as discussed above, is an 
important part of the decision making process. As such, the constructs of anticipated, 
anticipatory emotion and elaboration, alongside cognitive evaluations are considered to 
have explanatory power that enhances understanding of consumer responses to threat 
appeals. The new conceptual framework based on this discussion is presented in section 
4.3.   
4.3 Developing a new conceptual framework to explain 
responses to threat appeals  
Drawing together the above discussion, a new conceptual framework to explain consumer 
responses to threat appeals is presented in figure 11. The conceptual framework will be 
outlined in this section and the hypotheses will be presented in section 4.4. The conceptual 
framework outlines the role of anticipated emotions alongside subjective probabilities, 
elaboration, and immediate and anticipatory emotions, resultant from manipulation of the 
intrinsic message characteristics of message direction, message frame and graphic image. 
The emotional and cognitive responses to the threat appeal manipulations are expected to 
influence behaviour intention and expectation. The rationale for this approach is based on 
the review of the literature presented in chapters 2 and 3. Specifically, the re-examination of 
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threat appeal variables presented in chapter 3 argues for a questioning of a fundamental 
assumption made in threat appeals literature, which is also identified in chapter 2. The 
assumption is that responses to threat appeals are underpinned by an instinctive 
mechanism whereby upon exposure to a threat, an individual experiences fear, which in 
turn, motivates action (e.g. Ohman and Mineka, 2001). As argued in section 1.1 the 
equivocal empirical results that pervade the threat appeals literature (e.g. Floyd et al, 2000, 
Witte and Allen, 2000) which is charted in Chapter 2, are in part caused by the conflation of 
message characteristics and the intended response.  
The intrinsic message characteristics used as independent variables in the model are the 
direction of message, use of graphic images, and message frame, and they link directly to 
the defined common components of threat appeals as outlined in Chapter 2. The direction 
of message (towards self or other) relates to the positioning of the threat, the use of a 
graphic image is defined as a fundamental feature of a threat appeal (e.g. Witte, 1992) and 
the message frame (gain/loss avoidance or loss) relates to the presentation of the threat 
and the action recommendation. The intrinsic message characteristics (message direction, 
use of graphic image and message frame) and have empirically been shown to influence 
cognitive and emotional variables identified in prominent threat appeal models. More 
specifically, the variables of perceived severity of threat, perceived susceptibility, response 
efficacy, self-efficacy and the emotion of fear as proposed by the extended parallel process 
model (Witte, 1992).  
This research reframes responses to threat appeals as a decision about future behaviour. 
The pertinent cognitive appraisal constructs from the extended parallel process model are 
synthesised with cognitive and emotional appraisal constructs from judgement and decision 
making to redefine the cognitive and emotional responses to threat appeals, adopting a 
decision making approach. As such, the role of anticipated and anticipatory (future oriented) 
emotions are included to further explain the underlying appraisal mechanisms that influence 
behaviour intention and behaviour expectation. The wider consideration of immediate, 
anticipatory and anticipated emotions is important as it cannot be assumed that responses 
to threat appeals are entirely based on a fear instinct mechanism. Indeed, as identified in 
chapter 3, whilst a graphic image may cause an instinctive emotional reaction such as 
disgust or fear, the message frame and message direction literature suggests that 
responses to these intrinsic message characteristics form part of an evaluative decision 
making process, which involves making a decision about future behaviour.  
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The conceptual model and hypotheses presented as such address the fundamental 
assumption so common in existing relevant literature that threat appeals generate an 
instinctive fear response, and as such the model does not conflate intrinsic message 
characteristics with cognitive or emotional responses. The new conceptual framework re-
frames responses to threat appeals as a decision about future behaviour. Indeed, the 
cognitive appraisals of perceptions of severity, susceptibility, response efficacy and self-
efficacy derived from the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992) align with an 
assessment of subjective probabilities and cognitive appraisals as outlined in the JDM 
literature (see section 4.2.2). The model acknowledges the role of immediate emotions but 
also includes anticipatory and anticipated emotions as appraisals that will influence 
behavioural intention and behavioural expectation, which are generally accepted to strongly 
predict future behaviour (Vastfjall and Slovic, 2013). Elaboration is also presented as a 
variable that will be influenced by intrinsic message characteristics and in turn influence 
future behaviour intentions.  
 
 
Figure 11 - The new conceptual framework for the present study 
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To summarize, based on the discussion presented in the previous chapters, the present 
study attempts to make a significant and original contribution to knowledge in the threat 
appeals domain of literature by developing and testing a conceptual model (see figure 11), 
which includes: 
1. Intrinsic message characteristics associated with the core characteristics of threat 
appeals that have been demonstrated to influence emotional and cognitive 
appraisals, namely message direction, message frame and use of graphic image. 
2. Key cognitive appraisal variables that have been shown in the extant literature to 
be important responses to threat appeals and to influence decision making.  
3. The introduction of anticipated and anticipatory emotions alongside immediate 
emotional responses, to better understand the appraisal process and decision 
making about future behaviour 
4. A consideration of the cognitive process associated with elaboration as a variable 
that will influence behavioural intention and expectation 
5. Relevant outcome variables (i.e. behaviour intention and expectation), which 
represent a decision about future behaviour as a result of exposure to a threat 
appeal. 
The next section (4.4) outlines and justifies the hypotheses for the present study in more 
detail. 
4.4 Research hypotheses 
As presented in figure 11 a new conceptual framework has been developed based on the 
review of the literature presented in this thesis. The conceptual framework outlines the role 
of anticipated emotions alongside subjective probabilities, elaboration, and immediate and 
anticipatory emotions, resultant from manipulation of the intrinsic message characteristics of 
message direction, message frame and graphic image. The emotional and cognitive 
responses to the threat appeal manipulations are expected to influence behaviour intention 
and expectation.  Prior to the empirical test of the new conceptual framework (see Chapters 
5, 6, and 7) the research hypotheses will now be presented and justified. To enhance clarity 
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of discussion, the hypotheses have been split into sections, the first three of which 
correspond to one intrinsic message characteristic (i.e. independent variable) each. First, 
section 4.4.1 will examine the influence of message frame effects on anticipated emotions, 
cognitive evaluations and immediate emotional responses. Section 4.4.2 considers the 
influence of direction of message on anticipated emotions, cognitive appraisals, elaboration 
and immediate emotional responses. Section 4.4.3 moves on to examine the influence of 
graphic images on cognitive appraisal, elaboration and immediate emotions. Finally, the 
relationship between anticipated emotions, cognitive appraisals, elaboration and immediate 
emotions, with behaviour change and expectation are then presented in section 4.4.4. 
4.4.1 Message Frame effects 
The positive or negative consequences included in threat appeals can been discussed in 
terms of gain or loss framed messages (e.g. Edwards et al, 2001). Gain framed messages 
emphasise the advantages of adopting the recommendation (i.e. specific advantages, or the 
avoidance of disadvantages, are presented) whereas loss framed messages emphasise the 
disadvantages of failing to adopt the recommendation (i.e. specific disadvantages, or failure 
to benefit from advantages, are presented). The general principles of theory relating to 
message framing is that individuals exposed to a gain framed message will respond 
differently in terms of cognitive evaluations (e.g. persuasion) to individuals exposed to a 
loss framed message (Rothman et al, 1999). Whilst a number of studies have demonstrated 
that gain framed messages are more effective in a general sense (e.g. Cox et al, 2006; 
Reinhart et al, 2007) these results have not been consistently upheld across the literature. 
Indeed, empirical research has shown that in some cases loss framed messages are more 
effective than gain framed messages (e.g. Rivers et al, 2005; Schneider et al, 2001). 
Equally, a number of research studies have reported no difference between gain framed 
and loss framed messages in terms of their effectiveness (e.g. Brug et al, 2003; Jones et al, 
2004; O'Keefe and Jensen, 2006). That said, rather than adopting generalised measures of 
effectiveness, the approach taken in the present thesis is to examine the influence of 
message frame (namely loss and loss avoidance) on the cognitive and emotional constructs 
as identified in the new conceptual framework presented in figure 11. First the influence of 
message frame on anticipated emotions will be examined, second a consideration of the 
influence of message frame on cognitive appraisals and third, the influence of message 
frame on immediate emotions.  
To recap, anticipated emotions are cognitions about emotions that are expected to be 
experienced in the future if a certain event does or does not occur (Baumgartner et al, 
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2008). These evaluations are based on the assumption that an individual engages with 
mental simulation and therefore imagines how they would feel if the future event were to 
occur. Essentially anticipated emotions are emotional forecasts based on an imagining of 
positive or negative consequences. Van T’Riet et al (2010) examined the effectiveness of 
message frame as mediated by positive or negative emotions. When exposed to a gain 
framed message, participants reported experiencing positive emotions which correlated with 
increased acceptance of message and favourable attitude toward the behaviour. In addition, 
participants who were exposed to a loss framed message, reported increased negative 
emotions and an increased intention to engage in the recommended behaviour. As such, 
loss framed messages, where the consequence is by definition negative, will likely generate 
thoughts associated with the loss occurring, and thus negative anticipated emotions. For 
example, if the loss frame threat appeal is the threat of serious injury caused by a car crash 
resulting from speeding. An individual would anticipate the negative emotions they would 
feel associated with the loss (injuries), for example anticipated fear, shame, humiliation or 
depressed feelings. Alternatively loss avoidance message frames are positive as they 
encourage individuals to imagine the emotional experience associated with avoiding a loss. 
If a loss avoidance threat appeals depicts a scenario where an individual avoids an accident 
and severe injuries because they chose to obey the speed limit, an individual would likely 
anticipate the positive emotions associated with that, for example anticipated relief or hope. 
As such,  
H1: Loss framed messages will generate negative anticipated emotions. 
H2: Loss avoidance framed messages will generate positive anticipated emotions. 
There is strong empirical evidence that indicates message frame influences cognitive 
appraisals. For example, perceptions of severity and susceptibility are widely acknowledged 
to be generated by loss framed messages (Rothman et al, 2006; Bartels et al, 2010). 
Indeed, the perception of risk associated with perceived severity and susceptibility are 
fundamental to the persuasive mechanism that underpins loss framed messages (Block and 
Keller, 1995; O’Conner et al, 2005). Indeed, studies have demonstrated that loss framed 
messages generate perceptions of severity and susceptibility which subsequently created 
behavioural intentions to engage in behaviours such as flossing (Mann et al, 2004), HPV 
prevention measures (Block and Keller, 1995) and reduce alcohol consumption (Gerend 
and Cullen, 2008). However, there is little evidence to suggest that loss avoidance 
messages influence perceptions of severity and susceptibility, and it seems unlikely that 
such a causal mechanism would exist. As such it is hypothesised that use of a loss frame 
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increases perceptions of severity and susceptibility, but no specific hypothesis is drawn 
here regarding loss avoidance framed messages. To state this more formally: 
H3: Loss framed messages increase perceptions of a) severity and b) susceptibility. 
Similar to the appraisals discussed above, an individual’s perceived efficacy (both self- 
efficacy and response efficacy) is also a cognitive appraisal specifically associated with the 
examination of the action recommendation presented as part of the threat appeal (e.g. 
Ruiter et al, 2001; Witte, 1992).  In the threat appeals context, response efficacy is an 
individual’s belief that the recommended action will avert or reduce the threat (Ruiter et al, 
2001) and self-efficacy is the belief that an individual is capable of adopting the 
recommended response (Witte, 1992). When presented with loss avoidance messages in a 
threat appeals context, individuals are more likely to have higher self-efficacy and response 
efficacy, because the message presents the recommended action as an effective means by 
which to reduce the threat presented (Witte and Allen, 2000). In other words, the loss-
avoidance message implies the effectiveness of the recommended action (e.g. slow down 
when driving) in reducing the threat, meaning the viewer has a clearer path to reducing the 
threat that is presented. As such, 
H4: Loss avoidance messages increase perceptions of a) self-efficacy and b) response 
efficacy.  
Given that the message frame of loss, or loss avoidance, in the threat appeals context 
focuses on either the advantages of adopting the recommendation (e.g. avoiding a loss) or 
emphasise the disadvantages of failing to adopt the recommendation (e.g. suffering a loss) 
respectively, it is unlikely that the message frame will generate an immediate visceral 
emotional response in individuals (for example the fight or flight fear mechanisms resultant 
from an immediate threat as outlined in section 4.2.2 and 3.1.2.) Rather, the immediate 
emotions experienced as a result of message frame manipulations are far more likely to be 
anticipatory emotions (Baumgartner et al, 2008). Given that the threat is not immediately 
present when an individual is exposed to a threat appeal, the short term and long term 
consequences of engaging (or not) in the recommended behaviour (e.g. Gerrend and 
Cullen, 2008; Apanovitch et al, 2003; Kiene et al, 2005) are important. This is in line with the 
idea of anticipatory emotions, as these are emotions experienced in the present, but are 
caused by consideration of the prospect of a future event (Baumgartner et al, 2008). As 
already discussed in depth, anticipatory emotions are distinct from anticipated emotions, 
where an individual imagines how they would feel if the future event actually occurred. As 
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such, anticipatory emotions are based on the uncertainty of future events. For example, an 
individual may be exposed to a threat appeal and experience anticipatory hope at the time 
of exposure (i.e. hope for desired events in the future) or anticipatory worry at the time of 
exposure about undesired events in the future. Baumgartner et al (2008, p686) identify 
“hope and fear [as] the prototypical categories of positive and negative anticipatory 
emotions”. As argued in section 4.2.4 some researchers (e.g. Passyn and Sujan, 2006) 
have measured what appear to be anticipatory emotions (e.g. fear and hope) but have 
unfortunately not distinguished them from immediate visceral responses, despite their 
distinct conceptual nature. Research has shown that loss framed messages generate fear 
(Witte and Allen, 2000).  However, the distinction between anticipatory emotions and 
visceral immediate responses is not usually clearly determined. As such, it is expected that 
exposure to a loss framed message will evoke anticipatory fear at the prospect of 
experiencing the aversive outcomes integral to the presented loss, therefore; 
H5: Loss framed messages will generate fear 
Whilst gain framed messages are likely to generate anticipatory hope at the prospect of 
experiencing a gain as presented in the message (Connor et al, 2012), this is not directly 
applicable to a threat appeals context. As will be discussed in chapter 5, it is actually not 
possible to operationalise a truly gain framed threat appeal, and as such loss avoidance 
appeals are more appropriate. Carrera et al (2012) found that there was a clear increase in 
positive anticipatory emotions (in their case joy) evoked from a loss avoidance message 
concerning binge drinking behaviours. The present thesis follows this general logic that loss 
avoidance messages should generally result in an increase in positive anticipatory 
emotions, but in this case (due to the context of investigation discussed in Chapter 5 and 
elsewhere) it is considered the positive anticipatory emotion of relief is most appropriate 
(Bagozzi et al, 2003). Thus;  
H6: Loss avoidance messages will generate anticipatory relief.  
4.4.2 The influence of message direction 
As discussed in section 3.2.2 threat appeals can be directed towards the self (‘you’) or 
another person (‘other’, e.g. Block, 2005; Block and Williams, 2000; Adams et al, 2011) as 
intrinsic message characteristics. A large body of empirical evidence suggests that 
advertising messages found to be self-relevant are more persuasive and generate higher 
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recall than those that are not, because the latter are unable to access individuals’ self-
schema (Hamami et al, 2011; Burnkrant and Unnava, 1995; Debevec and Iyer, 1988; 
Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker, 1977). According to Keller and Block (1996), information about 
the self includes a vast array of knowledge (e.g. physical appearance, past experiences, 
behaviour patterns, attitudinal likes and dislikes, and relationships towards others), and it is 
this knowledge that makes the self, one of the most elaborate networks in memory. The 
self-reference effect (SRE) has been empirically shown to influence persuasion and 
elaboration (e.g. Hamami et al, 2011). However the application of the SRE is questionable 
in the threat appeals context because, by definition, individuals instinctively defend their 
sense of self when threatened (Keller and Block, 1999). As presented in chapter 3, whether 
a threat appeal consists of a threat that will evoke defence mechanisms (Sherman et al, 
2000) can be quite strongly questioned. Thus, whilst prior research has focussed on the 
influence of direction of message on variables such as persuasion (Keller and Block, 1996) 
and donation intention (Basil et al, 2008), the approach taken in this thesis is somewhat 
different (as outlined in the new conceptual framework in figure 4.3). Indeed, this thesis 
particularly examines the effect of manipulating the direction of a threat appeal (towards the 
self or other) on anticipated emotions, cognitive appraisals, elaboration and immediate 
emotions. These variables are distinct from the generalised persuasion variables commonly 
utilised in the literature, as they are conceptualised as elements of a decision making 
process in response to exposure to a threat appeal about an individuals intended future 
behaviour.  
As previously stated, anticipated emotions are cognitions about emotions expected to be 
experienced in the future if a certain event does or does not occur (Baumgartner et al, 
2008). In the context of message direction, it can be seen that the direction towards either 
self or other may evoke different anticipated emotions (Manstead, 2000). In particular, 
shame and guilt are distinct from other negative emotions, as they involve perceptions of 
self and therefore have strong personal implications (Boudewyns et al, 2013). In order for 
shame or guilt to be directly experienced or anticipated, an individual has to either have 
performed a negative act, or to imagine how they would feel if they actually engaged in a 
negative act (Agrawal and Duhachek, 2010). Shame is evoked when an individual violates a 
moral or social norm (Tangney, 1991) which leads to an individual believing their identity is 
somehow tarnished (Ferguson et al, 2007). Indeed, shame and humiliation have similar 
characteristics because there is an implicit acknowledgement that the negative behaviour 
that evokes shame or humiliation is viewed as such by other individuals, who evaluate the 
individual in question. Guilt, on the other hand, is generated when an individual (i.e. the self) 
engages in a negative behaviour that has a negative impact on others (Argrawal and 
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Duhachek, 2010). Indeed, whilst anticipated shame and humiliation are similar, anticipated 
guilt is distinct, and is revolves around and anticipation of feelings of responsibility for the 
negative event. By definition, if an individual is imagining a scenario where they may feel 
guilty, they would also have to imagine they were responsible for a negative action towards 
another individual. As such, the present research focuses on the effects of message 
direction on shame, humiliation, and feelings of responsibility, and it is hypothesised that 
H7: Self-directed messages will evoke anticipated a) shame, b) humiliation and c) feelings 
of responsibility 
Self-directed messages have also been shown to influence anticipated emotions with 
relevance to goal directed behaviour (Baumgartner et al, 2008). Anticipated emotions are 
experienced when an individual imagines a prediction about a desired or undesired future 
event and it is either confirmed or disconfirmed as likely to occur. For example, anticipated 
fear is evoked when an individual imagines a future event that is a) confirmed, b) 
undesirable and c) about the self. For example, if an individual imagines they will be in a car 
accident and sustain critical injuries they will anticipate fear as a response. In contrast, if an 
individual imagines a future event that is disconfirmed they will experience anticipated relief.  
To explain the idea of disconfirmation more clearly, disconfirmation could occur if an 
individual imagines avoiding having a car accident and sustaining critical injuries. Both 
anticipated fear and relief focus on the self, however the confirmation or disconfirmation of 
imagined events is likely to be triggered by the message frame (discussed in section 4.4.1 
above). Indeed, a loss frame represent confirmed future events and a loss avoidance frame 
represents disconfirmed future events. This suggest an interaction between message 
direction and message frame such that;  
H8: Self-directed messages will interact with loss frames to evoke anticipated fear  
H9: Self-directed messages will interact with loss avoidance frames to evoke anticipated 
relief  
Another emotion that is tightly bound to individuals’ sense of self is regret. Regret can only 
be experienced after an action or behaviour has occurred, unless an individual imagines the 
anticipated regret they would experience if they engage with a negative behaviour in the 
future. Indeed, generally speaking, empirical research has shown that regret is an aversive 
emotion that individuals are very motivated to avoid (Reb and Connolly, 2009). As 
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Zeelenberg and Peters (2007, p7) state “regret is distinct from related other specific 
emotions such as anger, disappointment, envy, guilt, sadness and shame, and from general 
negative affect, on the basis of its appraisals, experiential content, and behavioural 
consequences”. Indeed, Lechner et al, (1997) conducted a study in the context of 
communicating the potential threat of not engaging with breast cancer screening. 
Individuals who experienced anticipated regret were more likely to have a breast scan, than 
those who did not experience anticipated regret.  Importantly, the experience of anticipated 
regret is dependent on an individual feeling responsible for the outcome (Tsiros and Mittal, 
2000), and as such is far more likely to be evoked in self-directed messages. Therefore, 
H10: Self-directed messages will evoke anticipated regret 
As discussed in chapter 3, the influence of message frame on cognitive appraisals has 
received mixed support in the literature (e.g. Keller and Block, 1996; Green et al, 2008). 
That said, the mixed results are almost definitely a result the conflation of stimulus variables 
and expected responses. For example, Keller and Block (1996) found that a self-condition 
enhanced the persuasiveness of a ‘low’ fear appeal by causing individuals to elaborate 
upon the negative consequences of smoking. Conversely, other-referenced conditions 
increased the persuasiveness of a ‘high’ fear appeal, by decreasing the extent to which 
individuals denied the harmful consequences portrayed. In the context of the new 
conceptual framework developed for this study, in order to generate hypotheses concerning 
the direction of message and cognitive appraisals the rationale behind protection motivation 
theory (Rogers, 1983) and the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992) is utilised. 
These models are described in detail in chapter 2 and the discussion identifies that 
perceptions of severity and susceptibility represent a threat appraisal. Given that an 
individual must find a warning to be self-relevant in order to perceive a threat (as argued in 
chapter 3) it is therefore apparent that self-directed messages will influence perceptions of 
severity and susceptibility. Using the same logic, given that self-efficacy is an individual’s 
belief they have the capacity to carry out the action recommendation and reduce the threat, 
it is more likely that a self-directed message will achieve an increase in self-efficacy. 
Therefore,   
H11: Self-directed messages will increase perceptions of a) severity and b) susceptibility 
H12: Self-directed messages will increase perceptions of self-efficacy 
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To move to a consideration of the effect of direction of message on elaboration, it is 
necessary to return to the fundamental mechanism of the SRE. Self-referencing “occurs 
when information is processed by relating it to aspects of oneself” (Burnkrant and Unnava, 
1995, p17). Self-referencing enhances information processing because “the self is an 
extremely active and powerful agent in the organisation of the person’s world” (Rogers et al, 
1977, p677). Block (2005, p2291) identifies the “unique properties” of self-referenced 
information, namely that it is “highly elaborative, highly organised and frequently accessed”, 
and attributes these features to increases in persuasion and recall. Elaborative processing, 
where conscious cognitive activities occur, has been shown to lead to increases in message 
persuasion (Keller and Block, 1996). More specifically when a message is related to an 
individual’s personal experience, self-referencing has been found to increase message 
persuasion (Burnkrant and Unnava, 1995). Taken together, these lines of argument suggest 
the hypothesis that; 
H13: Self-directed messages will increase mental imagery elaboration 
The anticipatory emotion of guilt, and its relationship with message direction, has been 
examined in a threat appeals context (e.g. Basil et al, 2008; Boudewyns et al 2013; 
Duhacheck et al 2010). As Bagozzi et al (1999, p185) state “emotions arise in response to 
appraisals one makes for something of relevance to one's well-being.” Indeed, as evidenced 
above, guilt is an emotion with accountability characteristics, which are proposed to drive 
the effectiveness of the self-direction of the message. More specifically anticipatory guilt is 
experienced when an individual deviates from what they consider to be correct behaviour. 
As Hibbert et al (2007, p 725) state “anticipatory guilt refers to guilt that is experienced 
when one considers going against one’s own standards of acceptable behaviour (e.g. 
planning to call in to work sick when one is in full health).” Whilst this example is not 
pertinent to the threat appeals context, it highlights how anticipatory guilt differs from 
anticipated guilt. As outlined above, anticipated guilt translates to a feeling of responsibility 
towards others because it is evoked on the basis of an imagined confirmed event. 
Anticipatory guilt, however has more focus on the self. On the other hand, anticipatory worry 
has a locus directed towards other individuals. Indeed, worry is fundamentally underpinned 
by empathy. Whereas guilt is an emotion with accountability characteristics, which are 
proposed to drive the effectiveness of the self-direction of the message, worry is an emotion 
with empathy characteristics (Basil et al, 2008). As such the following is hypothesised 
H14: Self-directed messages will evoke anticipatory guilt 
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H15: Other-directed messages will evoke anticipatory worry 
4.4.3 The use of graphic images 
As discussed in section 3.2.3 the use of graphic images in threat appeals to grab attention 
is widespread (Dahl et al, 2003). However, as previously discussed the conflation of 
message characteristics and responses has often used ‘levels’ of threat or fear erroneously 
as message characteristics (e.g. Carey et al, 2013; Ruiter et al, 2014). However it is clearly 
shown in the present thesis that fear is more correctly considered as an emotional 
response, and a more accurate understanding of threat shows that it is dependent upon 
perceptions of severity and susceptibility. As such, threat and fear are conceptualized as 
response constructs in the new conceptual framework presented in figure 11. Presently, 
graphic images are presented as the intrinsic message characteristic that manipulates 
these responses.  
The first common element of a threat appeal is the presentation of a graphic image (Witte, 
1992) that depicts “a personally relevant and significant threat” (Witte, 1994, p114). 
Generally speaking there is much, empirical evidence that identifies the information 
processing of visual images, or pictures, as superior to that of verbal information, or words 
(e.g. MacInnis and Price, 1987; Cautela and McCullough, 1978). Perceptions of threat are a 
cognitive response to a threat appeal, and fear is one possible emotional response to a 
threat appeal, as outlined in the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992). The intrinsic 
message characteristic that is intended to generate cognitions concerning severity of threat 
and susceptibility to threat in a threat appeal, is the use of a graphic picture. Indeed, 
research has shown that the inclusion of vivid or graphic images with a threat appeal 
increases perceptions of threat (e.g. Cauberghe et al, 2009; Sabanne et al, 2009). As such, 
H16: Graphic images will generate increased perceptions of a) severity and b) susceptibility 
Whilst there is some empirical evidence which identifies that information processing of 
visual images is superior to that of words (e.g. MacInnis and Price, 1987; Cautela and 
McCullough, 1978), it is not clear that this effect will necessarily translate into increased 
elaboration. Indeed, individuals instinctively avoid graphic images (cite), and therefore 
elaboration cannot be assumed. When high levels of elaboration are evoked, central or 
systematic processing occurs. (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981) This involves the careful 
consideration of, and critical attention paid to, the arguments central to the message. 
- 138 - 
Alternatively, when low elaboration is evoked, a peripheral or heuristic route is prompted, 
where shallow cues serve to persuade (Green and Brock 2000). Arguably, the presence of 
graphic features (e.g. blood) in a threat appeal may be a shallow cue (instinctively 
recognised as something to avoid) and as such low elaborative processing seems more 
likely to occur. Low and high levels of elaboration can be distinguished in terms of the 
response elicited, with the former evoking only a recognition response, and the latter 
constructing a connection between encoded information and prior knowledge, involving the 
integration of data from multiple knowledge structures (MacInnis and Price 1987). When low 
elaboration occurs, individuals will protect their cognitive resources and filter information 
believed to be irrelevant, or devote available cognitive resources to another task (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1981). Given that graphic images may facilitate low elaboration and heuristic 
processing it is hypothesised that non graphic images will encourage higher levels of 
elaboration when compared to a high graphic image of the same situation. Therefore, 
H17: Non graphic images will encourage increased mental imagery elaboration 
Whilst the addition of graphic images to threat appeals has been found to make them be 
more persuasive (Dahl et al, 2003; Sabbane et al, 2009; Miller et al, 2009), research has 
identified a number of immediate, visceral emotional responses to graphic images that are 
not limited to fear. That is not to say fear is not a response. Indeed, Kees et al (2010) found 
that ‘highly’ graphic images strengthened smokers’ intention to stop smoking, which was 
mediated by a fear response. However, recall of specific messages was lower than for ‘low’ 
or graphic absent conditions. In line with this, Andrews et al (2014) found that graphic 
warnings and smoking frequency influenced fear, which in turn generated negative health 
beliefs about smoking and increased intentions to stop smoking. That said, research has 
demonstrated that graphic images generate other discrete emotional responses (e.g. 
disgust), which appear to contribute to message effectiveness (e.g. Stephenson, 2002, 
2003; Niederdeppe et al, 2007). For instance, Biener et al. (2005) concluded that visual 
images that graphically depict disease caused by smoking increase emotional response to 
messages (in particular, fear, anger and sadness). The position in this thesis is to question 
the assumption that graphic images automatically create only a fear response (cf. Witte and 
Allen, 2000), and it is the intention to include a wider consideration of negative emotions 
alongside fear as the possible emotional responses to a graphic image in threat appeals. As 
such, drawing from existing evidence and argument above, the following is hypothesised 
H18: Graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of a) disgust, b) fear, c) anger and d) 
uncomfortable feelings 
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4.4.4 Influences on behaviour intention and expectation 
As outlined in figure 11 and the ensuing discussion, threat appeals are hypothesised to 
generate emotional and cognitive responses that influence decisions about future 
behaviour. Indeed, examining the mechanisms behind this decision making process is the 
focus of this study. Specifically, a core purpose of the present study is to examine how the 
intrinsic message characteristics of threat appeals can be manipulated to evoke emotional 
and cognitive processes that change behaviour in accordance with the recommended 
behaviour in the threat appeal (e.g. don’t drink and drive). Whilst research has intermittently 
considered the emotional responses to threat appeals (albeit with a primary focus on 
cognitive processes, as outlined in chapter 2) a key assumption pervading the literature is 
that threat appeals evoke an instinctive fear response (e.g. Witte, 1992), which in turn 
activates a fight or flight mechanism. However, the position taken in the present thesis is 
that it is necessary to widen the consideration of emotional and cognitive responses to 
threat appeals in order to acknowledge that threat appeals do not present a threat in the 
true sense. As such, responses to threat appeals are conceptualised within a decision 
making framework, which influences future behaviour through decisions regarding 
intentions and expectations.  
In sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 above, the identified intrinsic message characteristics were 
examined, and hypotheses generated based on the extant literature. At this point, focus 
now turns to the variables that influence behaviour intention and expectation. Indeed, as is 
outlined in the conceptual framework presented in figure 11, it is not expected that intrinsic 
message characteristics will have a direct effect on behaviour intention or expectation. 
Rather, in accordance with prominent JDM theories (e.g. Vastfjall and Slovic, 2013; 
Loewenstein et al, 2001) the cognitive appraisals and emotional responses mediate the 
relationship between message characteristics and behavioural intention and expectation. In 
support of this, Banerjee et al (2011, p2) state that “numerous studies have previously 
examined the impact of emotions and emotional appeals on attitude and behaviour change 
(e.g. Dillard and Peck, 2001; Dillard et al, 2007; Rains and Turner, 2007), and their findings 
suggest that emotions may serve a number of key functions in persuasion processes”. As 
outlined throughout this thesis, a number of fundamental assumptions that this statement 
rests upon have been questioned, however, it is important to recognise that behaviour 
change is the dependent/ outcome variable of interest. Many studies in the threat appeals 
field examine persuasion or attitude to advert as the dependent variable and yet, as outlined 
in chapter 1, this would seem to have little practical relevance to the ultimate goal of 
behaviour change (Carey et al, 2013). Indeed, persuasion can be an indicator of increased 
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likelihood of behaviour intention but this correlation is not upheld in the literature (Algie and 
Rossiter, 2010). To be clear, behavioural intention refers to the amount of effort or 
motivation an individual has to perform a behaviour, and behavioural expectation is an 
estimate or subjective probability concerning whether the behaviour will actually be 
performed, considering situational factors such as past experience (Carrera et al, 2012). 
Essentially, behaviour intention can be seen as the formulation of a decision, and behaviour 
expectation is the likelihood that the decision will be carried out (Carrera et al, 2012).   
Anticipated emotions, which by definition are cognitions about future emotions, are a novel 
consideration in the threat appeals field. However, other streams of empirical research 
show that anticipated emotions influence goal directed behaviour (Baumgartner et al, 2008) 
and as such would appear relevant to any comprehensive theory regarding the response to 
threat appeals. Indeed, as previously discussed (see Chapter 1), researchers in threat 
appeals contexts appear to have often unintentionally amalgamated immediate visceral 
response and anticipatory emotions in their measurement of various emotional responses. 
For example, detailed examination of the instruments used to measure the general fear 
response used in many prior studies shows that it may have tapped not only the immediate 
visceral response of fear (as intended), but also perhaps anticipatory fear, or even 
anticipated fear (e.g. Passyn and Sujan, 2006). These distinctions have not been made 
clear in the past. Importantly, it could be argued that there is in fact little evidence for the 
presence of the instinctive fear mechanism in this context. Further, it should also be clear 
that anticipatory or anticipated fear actually bears no relation to the intrinsic fear response 
that constitutes the origins of the field (e.g. Hovland et al, 1953). 
Brown and McConnell (2011) found that the anticipation of negative emotions motivated 
people to undertake actions that may prevent an undesirable end-state. Brown and 
McConnell (2011) specifically examined student examination practise and found that when 
individuals anticipated negative emotions for failing a test they were more likely to practice 
the task. Even so, this has relevance to the threat appeals context. Indeed, it seems that 
even the anticipation of negative outcomes that would be self-relevant, and result in 
negative emotions about self-concept, are avoided by individuals. As such, individuals are 
motivated to undertake action to reduce negative emotions, which is presented as part of 
the threat appeal.  
Generally speaking, evoking anticipated emotions have been shown to influence 
behavioural responses. For example, directly manipulating anticipated emotions increases 
condom use (Richard, et al, 1996) and other behaviours, according to extant literature (e.g. 
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Baumeister et al, 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2003). The core of anticipated 
emotions is linked to behaviour because the cognitive appraisal is based on the assumption 
that a particular outcome will occur. As such, anticipated emotions are closely linked to 
behaviour intention and behaviour expectation (Carrera et al, 2012). Whilst the assumption 
has been made that fear is necessary for behaviour change in a threat appeals context, this 
assumption has been questioned herin, and it is instead proposed that anticipated fear is 
more likely to be an influence on behaviour change in a threat appeals context. Indeed, if an 
individual imagines they will be in a car accident and sustain critical injuries they will likely 
anticipate fear as a response. In contrast, if an individual imagines a future event that is 
disconfirmed they will anticipate relief as a response. In addition, anticipated regret is also 
particularly bound to behaviour intention and expectation because regret is an emotion 
generated in response to the assumption that an action or behaviour has occurred (Reb and 
Connolly, 2009). As discussed above, shame and humiliation have similar characteristics 
because there is an implicit acknowledgement that the negative behaviour that evokes 
shame or humiliation is viewed as such by other individuals, who evaluate the individual in 
question. Guilt, on the other hand, is generated when an individual (i.e. the self) engages in 
a negative behaviour that has a negative impact on others (Argrawal and Duhachek, 2010). 
Indeed, whilst anticipated shame and humiliation are similar, anticipated guilt is distinct, and 
is revolves around the anticipation of feelings of responsibility for the negative event. By 
definition, if an individual is imagining a scenario where they may feel guilty, they would also 
have to imagine they were responsible for a negative action towards another individual. As 
such, the present research focuses on the influences of shame, humiliation, and feelings of 
responsibility on behaviour intention and expectation. Research has also shown that 
anticipated hope and anticipated delight have an influence on behavioural intention (Spears 
et al, 2012; Chadwick, 2015; Bagozzi et al, 2003). Passyn and Sujan (2006) identified that 
both positive and negative emotional constructs are motivators for action in a threat appeals 
context, and purport that the consideration of both positive and negative emotions is 
important. Therefore, it is hypothesised that 
H19: Anticipated emotions, and specifically, a) fear, b) shame, c) regret, d) relief, e) 
humiliation f), depressed feeling, g) responsible feelings, h) hope and i) delight will influence 
behavioural intention 
H20: Anticipated emotions, and specifically, a) fear, b) shame, c) regret, d) relief, e) 
humiliation f), depressed feeling, g) responsible feelings, h) hope and i) delight, will 
influence behavioural expectation 
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Cognitive appraisals, specifically perceptions of severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy and 
response-efficacy, have been widely shown to influence behaviour intention and 
expectation (e.g. Lloyd et al 2000; Milne et al, 2000; Lewis et al, 2013; Basil et al, 2013). 
Witte and Allen (2000) state that perceptions of severity and susceptibility have a strong 
effect on behaviour intention, and also that self-efficacy and response efficacy have a 
strong effect on behaviour intention and constructs associated with behaviour expectation. 
Indeed, Milne et al (2000) indicate that self-efficacy perceptions have twice as much 
influence as severity perceptions on behaviour outcome measures. Whilst Pechmann et al, 
(2003) found perceptions of severity to most strongly influence behaviour intention, Brewer 
et al (2005) found perceptions of susceptibility to most strongly influence behaviour 
intention, and Tay and Watson (2002) found self-efficacy and response efficacy to strongly 
influence behaviour intention. Whilst, results across the literature vary in identifying which of 
the cognitive appraisal variables have the most influence on behaviour intention and 
expectation, the variables of perceived severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy and response-
efficacy have all been widely shown to influence behaviour intention and expectation. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that 
H21: Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, a) severity, b) susceptibility, c) response 
efficacy, and d) self-efficacy, will influence behavioural intention 
H22: Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, a) severity, b) susceptibility, c) response 
efficacy, and d) self-efficacy, will influence behavioural expectation 
Research has examined the role of elaboration in response to threat appeals and 
demonstrated that elaboration serves as a mechanism to influence behaviour intention 
outcomes (Block and Williams, 2000; Keller and Block, 1996). Whilst there is only a small 
bank of evidence to suggest that elaboration influences behaviour intention and 
expectation, the role of elaboration as a mediating variable between message 
characteristics and behaviour intention and expectation is key in the conceptual model 
presented in figure 11. Behaviour intention and expectation represent cognitions about 
future behaviour. As such, individuals have to imagine the future in order to decide how they 
intend to act and appraise how likely it is they will act in this way. It is proposed that mental 
imagery elaboration will facilitate this process. Indeed, as presented in the discussion of the 
JDM literature in section 4.2, this is the role that elaboration has in decision making. It is a 
somewhat novel approach to examine the influence of elaboration on the specific variables 
of behaviour intention and behaviour expectation in a threat appeals context, nonetheless, it 
is hypothesised that 
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H23: Elaboration will influence behavioural intention 
H24: Elaboration will influence behavioural expectation 
Whilst existing threat appeals research has focused on the roles of immediate visceral 
responses such as fear and disgust (e.g. Morales et al, 2012; Argrawal and Duhachek, 
2010) and anger and sadness (e.g. Biener et al, 2005), there is scant empirical evidence to 
suggest that immediate visceral responses drive behaviour intention or expectation in a 
threat appeals context. As such, no hypotheses are drawn regarding the immediate visceral 
emotional responses measured in the present study as responses to the threat appeal 
messages (specifically, fear and disgust). Conversely, anticipatory emotions have been 
clearly shown to motivate individuals to take appropriate action to achieve goals and avoid 
negative outcomes (Carrera et al, 2012). As such, research has repeatedly demonstrated 
the influence of anticipatory emotions on behaviour intention and expectation. In particular, 
the anticipatory emotion of guilt has been examined in a threat appeals context (e.g. Basil et al, 
2008; Boudewyns et al 2013; Duhacheck et al 2010) and has been shown to influence 
behaviour intention (e.g. Hibbert et al, 2007; Passyn and Sujan, 2006). As discussed above, 
whilst guilt, worry and relief have a different direction, accountability and empathy foci, the 
nature of anticipatory emotions (akin to anticipated emotions) is that they are future oriented 
(Baumgartner et al, 2008) and as such are inherently linked to behaviour intention and 
expectation. Indeed, anticipatory emotions are evoked through considerations of outcome 
and behaviour (Bagozzi et al, 2003). However, Therefore, it is hypothesised that 
H25: Anticipatory emotions, and specifically a) worry b) relief and c) guilt, will influence 
behavioural intention 
H26: Anticipatory emotions, and specifically a) worry b) relief and c) guilt, will influence 
behavioural expectation 
4.5 Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to develop a new conceptual focus on the cognitive and 
emotional responses to threat appeals, namely anticipated, anticipatory and immediate 
emotions alongside elaboration and cognitive appraisal. These variables serve to influence 
decision about future behaviour. This conceptual framework is novel within the threat 
appeals context in that it conceptualises the influence of threat appeal messages as a 
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decision-making process regarding a future behaviour, taking in constructs such as 
anticipated and anticipatory emotion which are new to this context (despite them being 
reasonably well-established in other relevant streams of research). This is in contrast to 
much existing threat appeals research which focuses primarily on cognitions, with the 
addition of immediate visceral emotional responses such as fear. Drawing from conceptual 
argument and existing empirical support, a number of formal hypotheses were advanced 
which are outlined in table 2. 
Label Hypothesis 
H1 Loss framed messages will generate negative anticipated emotions. 
H2 Loss avoidance framed messages will generate positive anticipated emotions. 
H3a Loss framed messages increase perceptions of severity  
H3b Loss framed messages increase perceptions of susceptibility 
H4a Loss avoidance messages increase perceptions of self-efficacy  
H4b Loss avoidance messages increase perceptions of response efficacy 
H5 Loss framed messages will generate fear 
H6 Loss avoidance messages will generate anticipatory relief 
H7a Self-directed messages will evoke anticipated shame 
H7b Self-directed messages will evoke anticipated humiliation  
H7c Self-directed messages will evoke anticipated feelings of responsibility 
H8 Self-directed messages will interact with loss frames to evoke anticipated fear 
H9 Self-directed messages will interact with loss avoidance frames to evoke 
anticipated relief 
H10 Self-directed messages will evoke anticipated regret 
H11a Self-directed messages will increase perceptions of severity  
H11b Self-directed messages will increase perceptions of susceptibility 
H12 Self-directed messages will increase perceptions of self-efficacy 
H13 Self-directed messages will increase mental imagery elaboration 
H14 Self-directed messages will evoke anticipatory guilt 
H15 Other-directed messages will evoke anticipatory worry 
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H16a Graphic images will generate increased perceptions of severity  
H16b Graphic images will generate increased perceptions of susceptibility 
H17 Non graphic images will encourage increased mental imagery elaboration 
H18a Graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of disgust 
H18b Graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of fear 
H18c Graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of anger 
H18d Graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of uncomfortable feelings 
H19a Anticipated emotions, and specifically fear influence behavioural intention 
H19b Anticipated emotions, and specifically shame will influence behavioural intention 
H19c Anticipated emotions, and specifically regret will influence behavioural intention 
H19d Anticipated emotions, and specifically relief will influence behavioural intention 
H19e Anticipated emotions, and specifically humiliation will influence behavioural 
intention 
H19f Anticipated emotions, and specifically depressed feelings will influence 
behavioural intention 
H19g Anticipated emotions, and specifically, responsible feelings will influence 
behavioural intention 
H19h Anticipated emotions, and specifically, hope will influence behavioural intention 
H19i Anticipated emotions, and specifically, delight will influence behavioural intention 
H20a Anticipated emotions, and specifically fear influence behavioural expectation 
H20b Anticipated emotions, and specifically shame will influence behavioural 
expectation 
H20c Anticipated emotions, and specifically regret will influence behavioural 
expectation 
H20d Anticipated emotions, and specifically relief will influence behavioural 
expectation 
H20e Anticipated emotions, and specifically humiliation will influence behavioural 
expectation 
H20f Anticipated emotions, and specifically depressed feelings will influence 
behavioural expectation 
H20g Anticipated emotions, and specifically, responsible feelings will influence 
behavioural expectation 
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H20h Anticipated emotions, and specifically, hope will influence behavioural 
expectation 
H20i Anticipated emotions, and specifically, delight will influence behavioural 
expectation 
H21a Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, severity will influence behavioural 
intention 
H21b Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, susceptibility will influence behavioural 
intention 
H21c Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, response efficacy will influence 
behavioural intention 
H21d Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, self-efficacy will influence behavioural 
intention 
H22a Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, severity will influence behavioural 
expectation 
H22b Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, susceptibility will influence behavioural 
expectation 
H22c Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, response efficacy will influence 
behavioural expectation 
H22d Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, self-efficacy will influence behavioural 
expectation 
H23 Elaboration will influence behavioural intention 
H24 Elaboration will influence behavioural expectation 
H25a Anticipatory emotions, and specifically worry will influence behavioural intention 
H25b Anticipatory emotions, and specifically relief will influence behavioural intention 
H25c Anticipatory emotions, and specifically guilt, will influence behavioural intention 
H26a Anticipatory emotions, and specifically worry will influence behavioural 
expectation 
H26b Anticipatory emotions, and specifically relief will influence behavioural 
expectation 
H26c Anticipatory emotions, and specifically guilt, will influence behavioural 
expectation 
 
Table 2 - A summary of the research hypotheses 
The conceptual model and hypotheses presented in this chapter are based on a thorough 
review of the literature and the hypotheses address important priorities for theory 
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development in the threat appeals domain of literature. Indeed, the key assumptions that 
have been identified in the literature are addressed.  Having reviewed the pertinent 
literature and stated a series of hypotheses together with a conceptual model, chapter 5, 
addresses the methodological considerations of the present study. In doing so chapter 5 
describes in detail the research design and methodology utilised to test the hypotheses 
presented in this chapter and in table 2.  
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Chapter 5 - Research Methodology 
In the previous chapter a conceptual framework was developed. The focus now moves to 
the process used to generate data to test the theoretical model. The overall approach is 
based around an experimental methodology to gain some insight into the relationships 
between the key variables as discussed in prior chapters. While the nature of causality itself 
is often the subject of some debate, experimental methods are generally seen as something 
of a ‘gold standard’ in this regard (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2004). As such, a web 
experiment is developed in accordance with the objectives of the research, i.e. to 
investigate the various hypotheses which together comprise the conceptual framework. In 
this chapter, the critical decisions taken in designing the experimental method are 
discussed. First, the methodological and experimental design is explained and justified. 
Subsequently, the steps undertaken to a) select the manipulations in the advertisements for 
each of the experimental conditions, and b) ascertain the validity of the stimuli and 
measuring instruments to be used are presented. Decisions related to the sample size are 
then presented and justified using a-priori power analysis. Finally, a discussion regarding 
the strategies used to improve the response rate for the web experiment, along with a 
description of the pre-tests and pilot study undertaken before the main data collection, is 
provided.  
According to Burns and Bush, (2000, p120) a research design is a “set of advance 
decisions that make up the master plan specifying the methods and procedures for 
collecting and analysing the needed information.” The research design process to be 
followed in this study is outlined in Figure 12 (overleaf). Whilst some authors advocate 
fewer stages (e.g. Churchill and Iacobuuci, 2004) and others outline an increased number 
of stages of the research process (e.g. Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011), the slight variances in 
approach are well encapsulated by the process outlined in figure 12 (Burns and Bush, 
2000). 
The structure of the overall study follows the seven sequential steps outlined in figure 12.  
Step one has been addressed in chapters 1-4. The current chapter addresses steps 2-5 as 
steps 6 and 7 are addressed in subsequent chapters. Section 5.1 provides an overview of 
the scientific philosophy behind the study and the research approach undertaken. Section 
5.2 discusses the experimental design employed, and section 5.3 outlines the design of the 
advertisements for the experimental conditions. Section 5.4 details the measures of 
dependent variables, and section 5.5 the design of the data instrument. Section 5.6 details 
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the pretest processes and result, section 5.7 outlines the main data collection process and 
sample, and section 5.8 discusses ethical considerations and validity. Finally, section 5.9 
provides a summary of the chapter. In each section it will be demonstrated that the research 
method adopted by this study is the most appropriate in order to meet the objectives of the 
study, test the research hypotheses and present valid and reliable results.  It is important to 
note that the structure of the chapter follows the sequential steps outlined in figure 12. 
Section 5.6 particularly details the stimuli pre-tests and associated results and the pre-
testing of the web experiment which is considered to be part of step 3, choice of method of 
research. Indeed, the selection of sampling procedure (step 4) and collection of data for the 
web experiment (step 5) were contingent on rigorous pre-testing and as such the pre-tests 
formed part of stage 3, essentially to ensure that the choice of method of research was valid 
and reliable prior to moving through the process as outlined in figure 12. 
 
Figure 12 - The research design process (adapted from Burns and Bush, 2000, p27) 
Step 1: Problem/Opportunity identification and formulation 
Step 2: Creation of the research design 
Step 3: Choice of method of research 
Step 4: Selection of the sampling procedure 
Step 5: Collection of data 
Step 6: Analysis of data 
Step 7: Preparation of the research report 
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5.1 Philosophy of science and general approach 
The first consideration for step 3 in figure 12, the choice of research method, is a 
consideration of the philosophy of science and philosophical position of the researcher. 
Indeed, it is important to acknowledge the importance of philosophy of science upon the 
methodological approach to any study. Carson et al (2001) highlight the distinction between 
epistemology and methodology. Specifically, epistemology is the relationship between 
reality and the researcher, and methodology is the technique used by the researcher to 
discover that reality. An examination of epistemological influences on this present study 
reveals the philosophy that underpins the choices and decisions made throughout the 
research design process. On this basis, the different sides of the epistemological debate will 
be considered in this section, in order to define the philosophical position taken here, and 
the subsequent effects that this inevitably has on the design and implementation of the 
study. That said, in accordance with Seale (1999), the philosophical positions outlined are 
best considered as resources for thinking about research, rather than taken as problems to 
be solved before research can proceed. 
Literature concerning research philosophy generally identifies positivism and interpretivism 
as two distinct paradigms in an epistemological debate concerning the best method for 
conducting research (Patton, 1990). A paradigm is defined as “a worldview, a general 
perspective and a way of breaking down complexity in the real world.” (Patton, 1990, p37).  
Therefore, as paradigms aid researchers’ understanding and thought processes it is 
necessary to draw out the distinctive features of different paradigms.  It must be noted that 
“the search for research approaches other than those guided by pure positivism has led to a 
number of competing perspectives in the philosophy and sociology of science.” (Carson et 
al 2001, p7).  Therefore, although at a basic level positivism and interpretivism are identified 
as polar paradigms, in reality the philosophical debate is not as simple or clear cut as some 
definitions lead us to believe. Indeed, Carson et al (2001) identify positivism and 
interpretivism at either end of a continuum, which encompasses a number of philosophies 
and approaches. This diagram (Figure 13) indicates that although positivism and 
interpretivism can be considered as opposites, the characteristics of each paradigm are not 
restricted to those specific constructs and are used in a variety of other philosophies. 
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Figure 13 - Continuum of research philosophies (Carson et al, 2001, p8) 
In addition to this notion of a continuum, Carson et al (2001) present a “combination 
approach” which merges elements of both the positivist and interpretivist philosophies. To 
illustrate this point, an example will be used concerning the implementation of qualitative or 
quantitative study designs by researchers. According to the traditional definitions of 
research philosophy, positivist researchers use quantitative methods and interpretivist 
researchers use qualitative methods (Lee and Lings, 2008). However, a common example 
of the “combination approach” is the use of qualitative research methods to generate key 
phenomena that can then be quantitatively researched to produce results that can be 
generalised. Therefore, the “combination approach” demonstrates that researchers are not 
restricted to certain research methods as a result of the research philosophy to which they 
adhere. In support of this, Saunders et al (2003) posit that researchers can fall into a trap in 
thinking that one research approach is ‘better’ than another. This is viewed as significant 
because research rarely falls neatly into one philosophical domain, as demonstrated by the 
continuum of research philosophies outlined above. Also, Saunders et al (2003) identify that 
it is common in business and management research to adopt the ‘combination approach’ 
using a mixture of positivist and interpretivist influences. 
Positivism is regarded as the ‘received view’ that has dominated formal discourse in social 
and physical science for over four hundred years (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Lee and Lings 
(2008) discuss the historical roots of positivism, identifying its origins from the views of 
practising scientists who were part of the Vienna Circle and empiricism and its principles, 
which were founded by 17th Century philosophers such as John Locke (1632-1704). 
Empiricism is based on the principle that the only knowledge individuals can possess is that 
which has come from their observations. The link between empiricism and positivism, or 
logical positivism as it is also known (Lee and Lings, 2008), is apparent when considering 
that the positivist paradigm argues that concepts are only meaningful if they can be verified 
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or empirically tested. This extends to the concept that knowledge of any idea or concept 
that is not directly observable is considered impossible. Positivist researchers prefer 
quantitative data, and adopt the position of an objective observer. As such, reality is 
considered external to the disinterested scientific observer.  
In the 1960s logical positivism declined in popularity as, among other things, it was 
considered flawed by its insistence on observability (Lee and Lings, 2008). The accepted 
scientific paradigm shifted to realism, or post-positivism (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Healey 
and Perry, 2000) which had been developed by another member of the Vienna Circle, 
Herbert Feigl (1902 – 1988). According to the realist paradigm, one does not have to 
directly observe something in order to gain knowledge of it, and as such researchers 
attempt to capture reality as closely as possible, with truth becoming a goal of science, even 
though absolute truth may very well be unobtainable (Peter, 1992). 
Under the realist paradigm, researchers use theory as the basis of investigation, from which 
unobservable concepts can be deduced, including causality (which itself is unobservable). 
The intention is to explain a phenomenon and ultimately to predict and control it. 
Importantly, the realist focus shifts from the positivist emphasis on confirmation of 
hypotheses through observation, to the attempt to falsify hypotheses. Knowledge in the 
realist sense is thus built on non-falsified hypotheses that can be regarded as probable 
facts or laws (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Accordingly, the realist paradigm focuses on efforts 
to falsify a-priori hypotheses or mathematical propositions that can be easily converted into 
precise mathematical formulas expressing functional relationships (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). A key difference between positivism and realism is that, in contrast to positivism, 
realism holds that while many things scientists are interested in, such as internal human 
processes, cannot be directly observed; researchers can measure them and study them in 
the context of theoretical explanations (Lee and Lings, 2008). Neuman (2000, p66) states 
that realism “sees social science as an organised method for combining deductive logic with 
precise empirical observations of individual behaviour in order to discover and confirm a set 
of probabilistic causal laws that can be used to predict general patterns of human activity.” 
In contrast to this, interpretivist researchers hold that the social world is too complex to 
enable law-like generalities to be created. Objectivity (so fundamental to the realist and 
positivist views of science) is questioned, whilst subjectivity is examined and brought into 
focus. Interpretivism is most closely related to qualitative methods of research, where a 
researcher is more likely to engage or interact with respondents. Neuman (2000, p71) 
suggests that the interpretive approach is “the systematic analysis of socially meaningful 
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action through the direct detailed observation of people in natural settings in order to arrive 
at understandings and interpretations of how people create and maintain their social 
worlds.”  
Critical theory and its offshoots such as postmodernism, offer a similarly broad scope of 
investigation, but emphasize the notion that research is embedded in historical, cultural and 
social contexts. The critical theory paradigm emphasises how knowledge has grown and 
changed through a dialectic process of historical revision (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
However, conducting research under this paradigm makes it impossible to generalise the 
findings, as post-modern analyses of (for example) marketing communications only 
represent the particular views of the participants. This highly relativist paradigm argues that 
realities are understood in the form of multiple, intangible mental constructions. These 
constructions are socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature and 
dependent for their form and content on the individuals or groups holding them (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994).  
In drawing direct comparisons between paradigms it can be seen that in the positivist and 
realist paradigms, the aim of inquiry is explanation, generalisation and the creation of 
possible cause-effect linkages. Alternatively, the aim of critical theory is critique and 
transformation, and the aims of interpretivism and relativism are understanding and 
reconstruction. In addition, the nature of knowledge also differs between paradigms. 
Specifically, knowledge in the positivist paradigm refers to verified hypotheses established 
as facts or laws. In the realist paradigm, knowledge rests on non-falsified hypotheses that 
are probable facts or laws. In the critical theory paradigm, knowledge emerges from 
structural and historical insights. Finally, under the relativist and interpretive paradigms, 
knowledge rests on individual reconstructions (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).  
In light of such comparisons, the positivist and realist paradigms which aim to discover, 
explain, and generalize cause-effect linkages are best suited to the present research.  As 
this study focuses on testing phenomena which cannot be directly observed, for example 
consumer emotional responses to threat appeals, this research is anchored in the realist 
paradigm. Whilst positivists indicate that only associations can be truly observed, and thus 
that causality is an irrelevant concept; realists consider the purpose of science to be an 
attempt (however difficult) to uncover the complexity of causal relations (Lee and Lings, 
2008). Indeed, the development of the conceptual model and hypotheses of this study are 
based on the logic of causal relationships between the variables of interest.   
- 154 - 
5.1.1 Research approach and strategy 
Although the methods used to falsify/disconfirm hypotheses are not themselves 
epistemologically bound, certain approaches are indeed more appropriate for a realist 
project such as this. Indeed, to move the discussion of the choice of method of research 
(step 3 in figure 12) forward it is necessary to consider the research approach to be 
undertaken based on the philosophical position of the researcher and the hypotheses 
generated in chapter 4.  The distinction between a deductive and inductive research 
approach is clear (Lee and Lings, 2008). A deductive approach is characterised by the 
consideration of theory which is used to develop hypotheses. The hypotheses are then 
tested and results are used to further deduce an explanation for phenomena or behaviour 
(Robson, 1993). In contrast to this, an inductive approach begins with the collection of data, 
usually observations. As a result of the subsequent data analysis a theory is developed 
(Saunders et al, 2003). 
Bearing in mind the research initiative and objectives of this study outlined in chapter 1 and 
the research hypotheses developed in chapter 4, a deductive approach has been adopted.  
The review of pertinent literature in chapter 2-4 highlighted fundamental assumptions that 
have pervaded the threat appeals field, which are called into question. It is argued that 
these assumptions have contributed to the apparent confusion in the threat appeals filed 
(Rotfeld, 1997). As theory formed the basis of investigation leading to the development of 
research hypotheses, a deductive approach is appropriate, in accordance with the realist 
position of the researcher.  
Based on the deductive approach taken there are three research strategies are available to 
the researcher as a shaping component of the research design, namely causal, descriptive 
and exploratory. An exploratory research design is often used to gain background 
information, define terms, clarify problems and establish research priorities. This strategy is 
often regarded as flexible and informal by researchers but as McDaniel and Gates (1998) 
indicate, it is a useful strategy which can define the exact nature of a ‘problem’ and provide 
an understanding of the context in which this ‘problem’ occurs. Exploratory research is most 
appropriate when researchers are faced with a large or vague research issue and assists 
the distilling of information into specific research ‘problems’ and the development of 
hypotheses (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2005). 
In contrast, a descriptive research design is used to present an “accurate profile” of 
phenomena or behaviour (Robson 1993, p53). Burns and Bush (2000, p125) assert that this 
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research strategy is most useful when a researcher wishes to answer questions such as 
“who, what, when, where and how”. It is important to note that this research strategy does 
not include the explanatory element of why phenomena or behaviour occur; it only analyses 
an occurrence in descriptive terms. Descriptive research is generally used to establish the 
frequency of occurrences of an event or phenomenon, or the relationship between two 
variables. As such, descriptive research is more rigid and systematic in comparison to the 
flexible nature of exploratory research (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2005) and can be used to 
build upon the foundations set by the findings of exploratory research. Descriptive research 
designs are either longitudinal or cross-sectional, where longitudinal studies use fixed 
samples of respondents and collect data at multiple points in time, and cross-sectional 
studies collect data at one point in time from a sample considered to be representative of 
the population (Lee and Lings, 2008). 
A causal research design is used to establish a cause and effect relationship between 
variables and as such, addresses the main weakness of descriptive research by illuminating 
the explanatory element of why phenomena or behaviour occur. Burns and Bush (2000, 
p132) illustrate this research design with the use of conditional statements, for example “if x 
then y”. It is important to note that, despite it’s name, casual research does not prove that x 
has caused y but demonstrates that x made the occurrence of y more probable (Churchill 
and Iacobucci, 2005). Causal research typically employs experimental designs where 
independent variables (the causes) are manipulated and controlled for, whilst dependent 
variables (the effects) are observed (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2005). In order to claim 
causality, Mooi and Sarstedt (2011) identify four conditions that must be met. First, the two 
(or more) variables under examination but be related to one another (correlation). Second, 
the cause must occur before the effect. Third, other factors must be controlled for. Finally, 
there must be a strong explanatory theory. Thus, if these four conditions are met, a causal 
design is most appropriate when a researcher wishes to manipulate variables in order to 
identify and evaluate both the factors that influence an effect, and the relationships and 
interactions between those variables. 
Whilst exploratory research is flexible and usually employs small samples to provide insight 
and understanding using qualitative techniques (Malhotra and Birks, 2000), the more rigid 
nature of descriptive and causal research, using larger samples to test specific hypotheses 
and relationships (Malhotra, 1993) is more suited the meet the objectives of this research 
study. Given the research objectives, the extent of the confusion generated from prior 
research (as outlined in Chapters 2, 3 and 4) and the hypotheses developed for this study 
(in Chapter 4) a causal research design is most appropriate to examine the specific 
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advertisement variables manipulated in threat appeals, and the effect these have on 
emotions, cognitions and behaviour. 
In line with the decision to adopt a causal research design for this study the research 
techniques employed to collect data for analysis must also be decided upon. A key 
distinction between types of research technique can be categorised in terms of qualitative or 
quantitative methods. Table 3 outlines the key differences between the two research 
techniques.  On one hand, qualitative methods regard human behaviour as the 
consequence of how individuals interpret their world and therefore use techniques to 
attempt to capture this process of interpretation. Qualitative research requires ‘Verstehen’1, 
the empathic understanding or the capacity to produce in the mind the feelings and motives 
behind the actions of others (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). Generally, qualitative techniques 
are best suited to exploratory research and the inductive generation of hypotheses and as 
such are not appropriate to meet the research objectives of this study.  
In contrast, quantitative research requires the use of structured questions in which the 
response options have been predetermined and involves a large number of respondents 
(Burns and Bush, 2000). The quantitative paradigm seeks to identify ‘causes’ and ‘facts’ 
pertaining to phenomena and generally speaking, it is objective (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). 
The research techniques employed emphasise the reliability of numbers, in order to 
produce statistical evidence to test hypotheses, which is most suitable for the present study. 
Indeed, only quantitative research can provide enough data for generalisation purposes 
(Churchill and Iacobucci, 2005). That is not to say, quantitative techniques are without 
limitations. Indeed, quantitative research does not allow for a deep exploration of the 
subjective feelings and attitudes held by individuals (Wright and Crimp, 2000; Bogdan and 
Taylor, 1975). 
Given the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4, quantitative research is most appropriate to 
test these. Although qualitative data is not appropriate for theory testing (as explained 
above), it is important to note that qualitative techniques were employed in this study, 
alongside quantitative techniques, for the purposes of stimuli development This is to ensure 
triangulation and reliability and validity of stimuli.  
 
                                               
1 “Verstehen” is the opposite of “Erklaren” or process of objectivist clarification 
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 Qualitative Quantitative 
Conceptual 1. Concerned with 
understanding human 
behaviour from the 
individuals perspective 
2. Assumes dynamic and 
negotiated reality 
1. Concerned with discovering 
measurable facts about social 
phenomena 
2. Assumes a fixed and 
measured reality 
Methodological 1. Data collected through 
observations 
2. Thematic analysis 
3. Informal structure 
4. Data collected through the 
measurement of variables 
3. Analysis uses numerical 
comparisons and statistical 
inferences 
4. Statistical analysis used to 
report data 
 
Table 3 - Comparison of qualitative and quantitative research techniques (adapted 
from Minichiello et al, 1992) 
The quantitative data collection methods available to test the hypotheses are bound by the 
nature of the research. Lee and Lings (2008) differentiate between interactive methods 
which involves the questioning of participants in some way and recording the answers, and 
non-interactive methods where a researcher records information about participants, usually 
through observation.  Given the hypotheses developed and the causal research design 
undertaken, an interactive method is best suited to collect the data required to test the 
hypotheses. As the research objective is to investigate the effect specific stimulus variables 
in threat appeals advertisements have on emotions, cognitions and behaviour an 
experimental design is best suited to control for appropriate factors and examine the 
relationship between cause and effect. Discussion will now move to a consideration of 
experimental design and the most appropriate design for the study at hand, in order to 
select the most appropriate method of research as outlined in step 3 of figure 12. 
5.2 Experimental design 
Experiments are causal designs and the key strengths of this technique are the 
identification of causal connections and the capacity to distinguish between causes and the 
observed and measurable effects (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2005). This technique lends 
itself to the rigorous testing of hypotheses and in addition, enables the use of pictures or 
advertisements, which help make tasks more meaningful, or closer to “reality”. This is 
- 158 - 
hugely advantageous to the present research as the hypothesis testing necessitates a 
controlled exposure of participants to advertisements that manipulate specific variables.  
They key advantage of an experiment is that it has a greater ability to supply evidence of 
causality because of the control it affords researchers. Because researchers are able to 
control at least some manipulations of the presumed causal factor, they can be more 
confident that the relationships discovered are “true” relationships (Churchill and Iacobucci, 
2005). Given that an experiment is capable of providing evidence of causal relationships 
and enables the use of advertising stimuli in its procedure, it is deemed the most 
appropriate method for the research at hand.  
Shadish et al (2002) identify four different types of causal methods which range from the 
“gold standard” (Shadish et al, 2002, p13) of a randomized experiment, to quasi-
experiments, natural experiments and correlations. The key differences between these are 
presented in table 4 below. An experiment is a type of study where a treatment is 
deliberately introduced in order to observe it’s effects. By definition they are orthogonal as 
the treatments are varied independently from one another which makes it easier to isolate 
the effect of the treatment on the observed responses, therefore avoiding multicollinearity 
between treatments. In order to conduct an experiment the hypotheses must be testable 
and three conditions must be met. First, that there are procedures for manipulating the 
setting. Second, the predicted outcome must be observable, and finally the predicted 
outcome must be measurable (Myers and Hansen, 2012). 
Type  Definition 
Randomised 
experiment  
An experiment in which units are assigned to receive the 
treatment or the alternative condition by a random process 
such as the toss of a coin or a table of random numbers.  
Quasi- experiment An experiment in which units are not assigned to 
conditions randomly 
Natural experiment Adaption of an experiment as the cause cannot be 
manipulated e.g. a study that contrasts a naturally 
occurring event such as an earthquake with a comparison 
condition 
Correlational study Usually synonymous with non-experimental or 
observational study, a study that simply observes the size 
and direction of a relationship between variables 
 
Table 4 - Adapted from Shadish et al (2002, p12) 
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Randomised experiments are where the experimental unit (e.g. people, time period or 
institution) are assigned to a treatment by chance (Shadish et al, 2002). A minimum of two 
groups are created which are probabilistically similar to each other on average, which 
means that the outcomes of observed differences between the groups are likely to be an 
effect of the treatment, as opposed to individual differences between units. Quasi- 
experiments are similar to randomized experiments but are lacking one of the essential 
elements (e.g. manipulation of antecedents or random assignment of units to treatments) 
(Myers and Hansen, 2012). Indeed, the differences between randomized experiments and 
quasi-experiments can be subtle (Field and Hole, 2003). Often quasi- experimental groups 
are based on the event, characteristic or behavior whose influence is under investigation 
and units either self-select the treatment they are assigned to or an administrator to the 
process assigns units to treatments (Shadish et al, 2002). This is a key distinction because 
this means that the differences between groups may be systematic (i.e. non-random) and 
therefore researchers must rule out plausible alternative explanations of any observed and 
measured effect. 
Natural experiments are defined by the research context within which the causal 
relationship under examination occurs. These methods observe a “naturally-occurring 
contrast between a treatment and a comparison condition” (Shadish et al, 2002, p17). The 
treatments themselves are not malleable and often are events or phenomena such as 
earthquakes or terrorist attacks. When experiments are not possible due to practical or 
ethical reasons, correlation studies can be employed to compare relationships or 
associations between variables (Myers and Hansen, 2012). Such methods differ from 
experiments where the objective is to identify differences between treatments, as the 
associations between variables are examined to identify cause and effect relationships. 
Thus, whilst cause and effects are measures the structural elements of experiments (e.g. 
pre-tests, random assignment to treatments) are absent. Generally speaking, this leads to 
problematic issues for researchers, for example in a cross sectional study because the data 
is collected at one point in time it is difficult to assure that cause precedes effect (Shadish et 
al, 2002).  
Given the research hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4 and the objectives of the present 
study, natural experiments and correlation studies are not suitable methods to observe the 
cause and effect relationship between threat advertisement manipulations/ treatments and 
emotional, cognitive and behavioural effects of those treatments. The most appropriate 
method is a randomised experiment where participants are allocated to treatments by 
chance. This allows for a confident attribution of differences in observed effects to the 
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treatment variables, which is not possible with quasi-experiments. Indeed, the use of 
randomised experiments allows for “control by design” (Keppel and Wickens, 2004, p7) 
whereby the design of the experiment naturally controls for individual differences and 
nuisance factors.  
5.2.1 Factorial experimental design 
As outlined in the conceptualisation and hypothesised relationships between variables in 
Chapter 4, this research examines the effects of three independent variables manipulated in 
threat advertisement treatments on emotion, cognition and behavior variables. A 
randomised experiment is the most appropriate method to collect data to measure the 
differences between treatments. Research designs where two or more independent 
variables are studied at the same time are factorial designs (Myers and Hansen, 2012) 
where every level of one factor is combined with every level of the other(s). Indeed, factorial 
designs are rich with information because they involve the variation of multiple independent 
variables within a single study (Keppel and Wickens, 2004).  
There are three general factorial designs (Hair et al, 2006). First is the between-subjects 
factorial design, in which every treatment is assigned to a different sample of units. 
Alternatively there is the within-subject factorial design, in which a single sample of units is 
assigned to every experimental treatment. Mixed designs adopt some within-subjects 
factors and some between-subjects factors. This type of design combines the advantages 
(and, it must be said, disadvantages) of between-subjects and within-subjects designs 
(Keppel and Wickens, 2004). There are distinct advantages and disadvantages associated 
with the three different types of factorial design which are outlined in table 5 below.  
Whilst between-subjects designs have practical benefits, such as ease of design and 
analysis, they are less sensitive and therefore require a large number of units. However, 
whilst within-subjects designs allow for direct comparison between treatments among the 
same sample, nuisance variables such as order effects must be accounted for. Equally 
when a large number of variables are to be examined, a within-subjects design becomes 
cumbersome and inefficient. (Keppel and Wickens, 2004). A mixed design can be utlilised 
to simplify overly complex designs which necessitate a large number of between-subjects 
treatments or reduce the likelihood of respondent fatigue prompted by a lengthy within-
subjects design.  
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Between subjects 
factorial design 
Mixed factorial 
design 
Within-subjects 
factorial design 
Description Every condition 
contains a unique 
sample of subjects. 
Factorial design with 
some within-subjects 
factors (the same 
subjects serve at all 
levels) and some 
between-subjects 
factors (different 
samples are used at 
each level). 
A single sample of 
subjects is used in 
every condition. 
Advantages 1. Simple to 
understand. 
2. Easy to design.  
3. Easy to analyse. 
4. Require the 
smallest number 
of statistical 
assumptions. 
Advantages of 
between subjects and 
within subjects design. 
 
1. The groups are 
more 
comparable. 
2. The statistical 
tests more 
sensitive as the 
same subjects 
serve at each 
level.  
 
Disadvantages 1. Samples are less 
sensitive. 
2. Large number of 
subjects required.  
Disadvantages of 
between subjects and 
within subjects design. 
 
1. Order effects are 
a nuisance 
variable 
introduced with 
this design. 
2. Subject fatigue is 
more likely. 
 
Table 5 - Comparison of factorial designs 
As there are three independent variables for this study, a between subjects factorial design 
is most appropriate because of the efficiency of the design and the requirement of the 
smallest number of statistical assumptions. Thus, a 2x2x2 between subjects factorial design 
is employed, with the graphic nature of the image (graphic and no graphic), the message 
frame (loss or loss avoidance) and the direction of threat (self or other) manipulated 
between-subjects. This leads to eight experimental treatment conditions. Whilst there are 
advantages to a within-subject design, this approach would have been too demanding for 
the respondents who would have been required to evaluate a large number of 
advertisement stimuli containing the experimental manipulations, almost certainly triggering 
respondent fatigue. A between subjects design enables the researcher to keep the 
complexity of the experimental design at a manageable level with eight sub groups of 
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respondents and to minimise respondent fatigue, while being able to test all the hypotheses 
of the conceptual framework. Furthermore, a large number of subjects were recruited (as 
outlined in section 5.7) in order to counterbalance the lack of sensitivity that characterises 
between-subject designs (Keppel and Wickens, 2004). The eight between-subjects 
treatments are outlined in table 6 below. 
Experimental 
Condition 
Between-subjects factors 
 Message Frame Message Direction Graphic Image 
 
1 Loss Avoidance Other Graphic 
2 Loss Avoidance Other No Graphic 
3 Loss Avoidance Self Graphic 
4 Loss Avoidance Self No Graphic 
5 Loss Other Graphic 
6 Loss Other No Graphic 
7 Loss Self Graphic 
8 Loss Self No Graphic 
 
Table 6 - Factorial design of experimental treatments 
5.3 Stimuli design  
As the experimental design for the study has been determined, focus now turns to the 
development of threat appeal advertisements that are used as experimental stimuli. The 
manipulations within the stimuli create the eight treatments defined as experimental 
conditions identified in table 6 above. The successful implementation of the experimental 
stimuli treatments is key, as the validity of the data collected, hinges on the stimuli being 
received as intended by participants. Shadish et al (2012) acknowledge that in an ideal 
world treatments would be properly received, however in reality, issues concerning 
treatment implementation and attrition can occur. However, the early recognition of potential 
pitfalls in the process of designing stimuli, combined with rigorous pre-testing ensures the 
robustness of the experimental manipulations.  
- 163 - 
There are two main approaches to stimulus design in the extant literature. The first is the 
development of advertisements for testing as a whole entity (e.g. Morales et al, 2012; Block, 
2005; Agrawal and Duhacheck, 2010; Passyn and Sujan, 2006). That is, the elements of an 
advertisement or stimulus (e.g. strap line, copy and picture) are designed as a whole and 
manipulations implemented to create the different treatments. An alternative approach, as 
advocated by Dillard and Meijnders (2002) is the message component research design. 
This is where stimuli are broken down into constituent elements (e.g. strap line, copy and 
picture) and responses to each of those elements are measured. Whilst the detailed 
approach of examining the different stimulus elements individually is appealing, this 
approach is arguably removed from ‘reality’. Stimuli are generally presented as a whole and 
therefore the interaction of the constituent elements is an important factor for consideration. 
In light of this, a blended approach is taken where the different elements of the stimuli are 
developed and tested individually, and then tested as a whole entity.  
Given the research objectives of the study, it is hugely important to control for factors that 
may influence the relationships between variables. As such, the stimulus medium is a key 
consideration. In the main, research on threat appeals utilise print advertisements (e.g. 
Argrawal and Duhacheck, 2010). However, there are cases where leaflets (Passyn and 
Sujan, 2006) and television advertisements (Rossiter and Thornton, 2004; Potter et al, 
2006) are used. It is recognised that print advertisements are a simple form of 
communication (compared to television advertising, for example) the advantage of this 
stimulus type is that the independent variables can be tightly controlled. Prior research has 
predominantly used print advertisements as the stimulus in studies (e.g. Janssens and De 
Pelsmacker, 2007; Dillard and Anderson, 2004; Wauters and Brengman, 2013) and given 
that the purpose of this research is to develop understanding of the cause and effect 
relationship between message variables and responses, it is prudent to test the hypotheses 
of this study on print stimuli before considering other forms of marketing communication.  
As outlined in chapter 3 and above in table 6 the stimulus variables for manipulation are 
message frame, message direction and graphicness. The following sections will outline how 
these variables are manipulated in the experimental stimuli, whilst tightly controlling for 
confounds and ensuring validity using a series of pre-tests. 
5.3.1 Selection of stimulus topic 
As previously stated, the conceptualisation and hypothesised relationships between 
variables (see Chapter 4) are not context specific and are aimed at a generalised 
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understanding of the effect of stimulus variable manipulations on emotional, cognitive and 
behavioural responses. However, it is necessary to select a topic that is addressed as part 
of the inherent message of the stimuli. Prior research has been conducted using a wide 
variety of topics from obesity (Chan et al, 2009), to anti-smoking (Adams et al, 2011), to 
cancer prevention (Harris and Napper, 2005) to climate change (O’Neill and Nicholson-
Cole, 2009). A summary of examples of the wide variety of topics enlisted for research 
concerning threat appeals is presented in Appendix 5.1. Given this large pool of topics, a 
set of criteria were developed to guide the selection process.  
Based on the objective for generalisable results, firstly, topics had to be deemed relevant to 
the general public and not specific to certain work or niche environments. Secondly, the 
topics have to be perceived by participants as realistic, in other words that it is a threat that 
they or someone close to them may encounter. Third, as the stimulus must contain visual 
and written elements, the consequences of the threat must be able to be depicted visually. 
This issue greatly reduces the pool of topics considered for inclusion in the experiment as 
the consequences of some threats cannot be represented visually in an ethically sound 
manner. Fourth, the chosen topic for the threat must be applicable to both individuals’ sense 
of self and to others, as per the direction of message independent variable identified in this 
study.  
The application of the identified criteria significantly reduced the number of topics that could 
be successfully employed. In line Appendix 5.1 the most suitable topics are those that are 
most often used in the extant research. The short listed topics were anti-smoking, 
dangerous driving, safe sex and cancer prevention. Cancer prevention was removed from 
the consideration set. Whilst there are lifestyle choices that can increase the likelihood of 
developing different types of cancers; defensive processing2 (in other words “it won’t 
happen to me”) is prevalent with this particular topic (e.g Witte, 1992). On this basis, this 
topic does not meet the relevance and realistic criteria as outlined above.  
The safe sex topic was also removed from the consideration set. The visual element of the 
stimulus is a manipulation of the graphic independent variable. Given the nature of the 
topic, and intention to encourage a large sample to participate, it was decided that the 
balance between ethical considerations and stimulus manipulation for this topic would not 
be satisfactory. In order to decide between the two remaining topics the criteria of general 
relevance was re-examined. Statistics indicate that whilst approximately 10 million 
                                               
2 In the field of medicine this is referred to as ‘optimistic bias’ which is the mistaken belief that one’s chances of 
experiencing a negative event are lower than that of one’s peers 
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individuals smoke in the UK in 2015, approximately 32 million people hold a full car driving 
license in England in 20133. Based on this evidence it is more likely that a sample of the 
population would find a message concerning driving safety as more relevant. There are a 
large number of studies that employ driving related topics (e.g. Lewis et al, 2013; Carey and 
Sarma, 2011); Algie and Rossiter, 2010); Taubman Ben-Ari et al, 2000); Block, 2005). 
Specifically, Janssens and De Pesmacker (2007) identify that the increased number of 
speeding campaigns means that whilst non-drivers may have less involvement with the 
subject, they serve as a reason to expect that effects would be seen among non-drivers. In 
addition, given the message direction variable and the statistics regarding driving license 
qualifications; it would seem reasonable that non-drivers are likely to be passengers in cars 
or be close to another person (other) who does hold a driving license. On this basis, the 
topic of safe driving with (not) speeding as the focus is selected.   
5.3.2 Development of stimuli 
Eight stimuli were developed, as per the previously identified factorial design in table 6. As 
previously discussed in section 5.2.1 it is imperative that the experimental treatments 
(advertisement stimuli) only manipulate the variables of interest and no other factors. The 
following section will outline the manipulations, the nuisance factors that are controlled for in 
the design of the advertisements, and the qualitative testing of the manipulations.  
The independent variable of graphicness is manipulated with the use of the pictorial 
element of the stimuli. This is a common method of manipulation for this variable (e.g. 
Morales et al, 2012, Leshner et al, 2010, Boer et al, 2006; Dens et al, 2008). A detailed 
review of the extant literature is presented Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The operationalisation of 
this variable, in the context of the speeding topic, determined the consequence to be 
portrayed in the stimuli as physical injury. This is consistent across all conditions. As such, 
the graphic condition portrays an injury with blood and the non-graphic condition portrays an 
                                               
3 According to ASH (http://www.ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH_93.pdf) 10 million adults smoke in Great Britain in 
2015. This equates to approximately one sixth of the population.  
According to the Department of Transport National Travel Survey for England in 2013 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/342160/nts2013-01.pdf it is estimated 
that 74% of all adults aged over 17 in England hold a full car driving license, which is approximately 32 million people. 
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injury with no blood, but bruising to denote injury. This is in line with the operationalization 
employed by Janssens and De Pelsmacker (2007).   
A special effects make-up artist was commissioned to create a bank of pictures for testing, 
to ensure that the correct variables are manipulated in the pictures selected for the 
experimental stimuli. Indeed, given the argument presented in chapters 1-4 that the 
manipulation of intrinsic message characteristics is of importance, this novel approach was 
undertaken to ensure that the elements of the picture not intended for manipulation remain 
constant. Therefore, there is confidence that the variable of interest is the only variable 
being manipulated (which will be subject to rigorous pre-testing). Indeed, a criticism of prior 
research is the use of a variety or inconsistent images across treatment conditions (e.g. 
Dahl, 2003) and this procedure addresses this criticism directly. 
The make-up artist was briefed to keep the pictures identical, but to vary the type of injury 
(i.e. blood or bruising) and to create three different ‘levels’ of injury from mild, to moderate to 
severe. It was important to make sure that the severe condition was realistic and believable 
whilst not being overly severe. More specifically, due to ethical considerations (which will be 
discussed in section 5.8) it was important to create the different types and ‘levels’ of injury 
to ensure the most appropriate image is selected. However, in order to ensure that 
perceptions of severity of injury are broadly similar across the ‘levels’ of injury, and the 
manipulation is focused on the graphic (or non-graphic) features of the picture itself (i.e. not 
on severity of the injury being different), a prop to denote severity in the form of an oxygen 
face mask was included for consideration in the non-graphic condition. The bank of pictures 
created can be viewed in Appendix 5.2. 
To assist with the selection process, six academic experts from the fields of marketing and 
consumer behavior were recruited to conduct a free sorting task. The free sorting method is 
beneficial as any preconceptions or biases held by the researcher are ruled out (Rosenberg 
and Kim, 1975). The sorting task was designed to simply categorise the different images 
according to perceptions of graphicness and perceptions of injury severity, and therefore 
was conducted in two simple stages. The categorisation of the images into groups will refine 
the set of images put forward for further qualitative and quantitative pre-tests, thus recording 
differences between and similarities between perceptions is entirely appropriate as an initial 
screening of the images (Fincher and Tenenberg, 2005; Rugg and McGeorge, 2005). 
The experts were presented with copies of the sixteen pictures that had been 
commissioned and were asked to put the cards in order of how graphic each picture is 
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perceived to be to each of them.  Each participant ranked the pictures with blood as more 
graphic than the pictures with no blood. The experts were then asked to re-sort the pictures 
according to severity of injury and asked to create groups where the severity is similar per 
group. Interestingly, whilst the ‘graphic severe injury’ condition performed as expected, the 
‘no graphic severe injury’ and ‘no graphic moderate injury’ image were perceived to be 
equally as severe as the ‘graphic severe injury’ image by four of the six participants. In 
addition, five of the six participants, independently of one another, identified that the 
pictures where the individual has her eyes open, are not believable or realistic. Based on 
these results, the pictures with eyes open were eliminated. Whilst the graphicness variable 
is manipulated as intended, further information is required regarding the perceptions of 
severity of injury. It is possible that the inclusion of an oxygen mask denotes severity and 
confounds this variable slightly. On this basis three pictures were selected to be tested 
further in conjunction with the advertisement copy, which is outlined in section 5.3.3. The 
three images were the graphic severe injury condition and the no graphic severe injury and 
the moderate injury condition, all with the eyes shut format.  
The message frame and message direction manipulations are conducted using the text 
(copy) in the stimuli. In order to keep the text constant, aside from the manipulated 
variables, a text format was constructed where words could be changed according to the 
manipulation. According to the definitions of threat appeals, as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, 
it is important to present a warning or threat, the consequences and then a recommended 
action. As such the following format was adopted (where blanks signify manipulations): 
____ driving on a winding road. ____ are late. But ___ decide to ____ the speed limit 
____ could ____ an accident and serious injuries 
Obeying the speed limit significantly reduces accidents, drive responsibly. 
The scenario is simple and involves the pressure of being late, the severity of consequence 
is kept constant and the action recommendation is constant. The direction of message 
manipulation is operationalised as towards the self ‘you’ or an ‘other’. For the purposes of 
this study, to avoid ambiguity or defensive processing, the operationalisation of this variable 
is in accordance with that employed by Block (2005) where the ‘other’ condition is an 
individual’s best friend. Therefore the manipulation for direction of message is presented as 
follows: 
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You are/Your best friend is driving on a winding road. You/ They are late. But You/ They 
decide to ____ the speed limit 
You /Your best friend could ____ an accident and serious injuries 
Obeying the speed limit significantly reduces accidents, drive responsibly. 
As outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, the message frame manipulation focuses on loss or 
avoidance of loss. Given the topic (speeding) and the consequences (accident and serious 
injuries) it would be incongruous to utilise a gain frame in this context. As Donovan and 
Henley (2003) identify, credibility of the message is very important and can only be 
achieved with appropriate themes which are not incongruous. The theoretical justification if 
presented in Chapter 3, However, the loss and avoidance of loss are operationalised 
according to Gerend and Cullen (2008) where loss avoidance is manipulated by stating the 
individual in question could obey the speed limit and avoid an accident, and loss is 
manipulated by stating the individual could break the speed limit and have an accident. 
Therefore the manipulation for message frame is as follows: 
___ is driving on a winding road. ___ are late. But ___ decide to obey/break the speed limit 
____ could avoid/have an accident and serious injuries 
Obeying the speed limit significantly reduces accidents, drive responsibly. 
In order to perform an initial test of the manipulations, another six expert judges from the 
fields of marketing and psychology were recruited to perform another two stage sorting task, 
using the same rationale as presented above. The experts were presented with four 
statements (a combination of self and loss avoidance, other and loss avoidance, self and 
loss, other and loss) as presented using the alternatives in bold in the statement below: 
You are/Your best friend is driving on a winding road. You/ They are late. But You/ They 
decide to obey/break the speed limit 
You /Your best friend could avoid/have an accident and serious injuries 
Obeying the speed limit significantly reduces accidents, drive responsibly. 
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The experts were first asked to sort the statements according the direction of the message, 
which was successfully completed by all six participants. Second, the experts were asked to 
sort the statements according to the message frame and again, all six participants sorted 
the statements as intended. Thus, the message direction and message frame manipulations 
are confidently upheld at this point. 
Subsequent to the initial developmental stages and associated qualitative initial tests, the 
advertisement stimuli were constructed for further testing and development. Whilst the 
pictorial and written elements to the stimuli were initially tested separately, in order to 
ensure the initial manipulations are appropriate, it is necessary to combine the elements to 
generate a more detailed understanding of how the stimuli as an entity are perceived. 
Additionally, given the results for the first sorting task with the graphicness condition, whilst 
graphicness was successfully manipulated, it is important to ensure a similar perception of 
severity of injury so that this variable does not overly interfere with the manipulation. 
Given the manipulations and need to identify the most appropriate images for the 
advertisements twelve mock advertisements were created for further testing. The 
manipulations for these advertisements is as follows: 
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Pre-test Condition Between-subjects factors 
 Message 
Frame 
Message 
Direction 
Graphic Image 
1 Loss Avoidance Other Graphic 
2 Loss Avoidance Other No Graphic, moderate injury 
3 Loss Avoidance Other No Graphic, severe injury 
4 Loss Avoidance Self Graphic 
5 Loss Avoidance Self No Graphic, moderate injury 
6 Loss Avoidance Self No Graphic, severe injury 
7 Loss Other Graphic 
8 Loss Other No Graphic, moderate injury 
9 Loss Other No Graphic, severe injury 
10 Loss Self Graphic 
11 Loss Self No Graphic, moderate injury 
12 Loss Self No Graphic, severe injury 
 
Table 7 - Pre-test stimulus conditions 
When constructing experimental stimuli it is crucial to hold all other factors constant apart 
from the variables under manipulation. As such, the construction of the advertisement 
stimuli developed in stages. First, the layout of the stimuli was held constant across all 
conditions. The picture is located in the middle of the stimulus, which is a standard format in 
advertising.  As per stimuli employed in similar research (e.g. Dens et al, 2008) the text is 
located above and below the picture. The scenario above, and the consequences and 
action recommendation below. In addition, the researcher controlled for a range of potential 
nuisance factors, for example the size of the components of the stimuli. The pictures used 
in the all conditions were the same size. In addition, the text varied according to section, but 
is consistent in size across all conditions.  Furthermore, the differences in terms of 
paragraph length and number of words were kept to a minimum. It was necessary to include 
slightly more words in the avoidance of loss condition than the loss condition in order to 
present the message effectively, but as this is a between subjects study (each participant is 
only exposed to one condition) any variation in response this may have caused was 
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controlled. Accordingly, twelve stimuli were developed for further testing, which will be 
discussed in the subsequent section.  
5.3.3 Qualitative pre-test of stimuli 
As an integral part of the choice of method of research as identified in step 3 of figure 12. It 
is necessary to ascertain the validity of the developed stimuli (as described above) in order 
for the research process to move forward. First, qualitative initial pre-tests are conducted 
which are presented here. Pre-testing moves to a quantitative phase in section 5.6. This is 
dependent on the identification of measurement strategy for the variables of interest 
(presented in section 5.4 and the design of the data collection instrument (presented in 
section 5.5). As such, the qualitative pre-test of stimuli presented here was conducted at the 
stimuli design stage and subject to further testing later in the process.  
In order to test the validity of the experimental manipulations and ascertain which graphic 
(severe or moderate) condition is most appropriate, a qualitative pre-test was undertaken to 
verify the validity and appropriateness of the advertisement stimuli. A sample of thirty four 
undergraduate students from Aston University, enrolled in the consumer behaviour module4, 
were recruited to participate in this study. Given that the earlier developmental qualitative 
procedure utilised the expertise of relevant academics, the recruitment of a student 
convenience sample in this case would provide further, and valid, evidence of any effects 
recorded. As previously outlined, twelve pre-test conditions were developed according to 
the experimental conditions identified. Participants were individually asked to perform a 
sorting task (based on the previous justification) of the twelve stimuli that were presented. 
This was a three stage sorting task where participants were asked to firstly, identify stimuli 
that are graphic or non-graphic. All thirty four individual’s perceived the manipulations to be 
successful.  Second, participants were asked to categorise whether the images were 
directed to the self or others and then whether the message was concerning loss or 
avoidance of loss. Again, all thirty four participants perceived the manipulations as they are 
intended. The third stage of the pre-test required participants to rank the stimuli in order of 
severity of injury. It was found that for 28 participants (82.3% of the sample) the inclusion of 
the oxygen mask with severe bruising was perceived to be more severe than the graphic 
image, yet the severity of the moderate bruising and the oxygen mask was closer in severity 
                                               
4 Module code at Aston, BM2258. 278 students enrolled in the module.   
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to the graphic image. As such, the stimuli with the severe bruising were removed and the 
remaining eight stimuli (see Appendix 5.3) which correspond to the eight experimental 
conditions were retained for further quantitative pre-testing which is presented in section 
5.6.                                                                                                                                                  
5.4 Measurements of mediating variables, control variables and 
dependent variables 
The constructs identified in Chapter 4 that serve as the variables of interest in the 
conceptualisation, are now discussed in terms of their operationalisation. A summary of the 
measures utilised in this study, and item lists are presented in Appendix 5.4. Given the 
proliferation of research in the various fields as outlined in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and the 
robust and reliable measures already available and tested extensively in the literature, their 
use in this study was justified. As such, all measures have been previously used in research 
studies, and as such are valid and reliable.  The main consideration in the selection of 
measures to operationalise the relevant constructs, is whether to employ multi-item or 
single item measures.  
Whilst Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) and Spector (1992) provide comprehensive 
arguments for using multi-item measures instead of single-item measures, it is of 
paramount importance that the most appropriate and reliable measures for this study are 
selected. Given the complexity and large number of the constructs under investigation, 
single item measures may be more appropriate and a pertinent method to reduce the 
possibility of participant fatigue. It is important to acknowledge that whilst the benefits of 
multi-item measures (for example, capturing potential measurement error) are compelling, 
the approach taken is to select the most appropriate measure. A preference for multi-item 
measures is adopted, however due consideration will be given to single-item measures.  
As existing measures are utilised they were adapted at a minimum level to retain the 
constructs’ reliability and face validity. In all cases, adaptation merely involved changes in 
the wording of items to match the specific research context. Closed-ended questions were 
adopted in order to reduce participant fatigue and likert scales were adopted as is the case 
in the majority of web experiments. Most constructs were measured either by 7-point Likert 
scales or by 7-point bipolar adjective scales. However, in order to preserve the reliability 
and face validity of the scales, a number of scales were used with the original smaller or 
larger point scales. 
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5.4.1 Mediating variables 
As outlined in Chapter 4 a number of variables have been hypothesised to mediate the 
relationship between the independent stimulus variables and dependent behavior variables. 
These can be categorised as immediate emotions, anticipatory emotions, cognitions and 
anticipated emotions. These will be considered in turn, in the following sections.  
5.4.1.1 Immediate emotions 
As discussed in the review of the extant literature (in chapter 4) there are a number of 
different conceptualisations of emotional constructs. Therefore, unsurprisingly there are a 
number of valid and reliable methods to collect self-reported emotion data, according to the 
different theoretical paradigms. As previously justified, one focus of the study is to examine 
the elicitation of immediate emotions generated as a result of exposure the advertisement 
stimulus. A discrete approach is adopted, whereby all emotional constructs are assumed to 
have differing properties (see Chapter 4) Given the range of theoretical approaches and 
variables of interest, a large number of immediate emotion measures are utilised in the 
extant literature.  To give just one example, using the construct of, what is termed in this 
study as ‘immediate fear’, a number of scales are utilised in studies in the field. For 
example, Dillard et al (2007) use a measure of immediate fear with the items ‘scared, afraid, 
and fearful’. Yet, Power (2006) uses the items ‘anxiety, nervousness, tense, worried and 
shy’ to tap into immediate fear. Alternatively, Richins (1997) uses the items ‘scared, afraid 
and panicky’ to measure fear. Alternatively, the perceived fear index (Block, 2005) uses 
‘scared and afraid’ to measure fear. Additionally, Laros and Steenkamp (2005) use ‘scared, 
afraid, panicky, nervous, worried, and tense’ to measure fear. A comparison of the 
examples of fear items used by the different authors identified is presented in table 8 below. 
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Authors Block 
(2005) 
Richins 
(1997) 
Dillard et 
al (2007) 
Laros and Steenkamp 
(2005) 
Power (2006) 
Items 
used 
Scared Scared Scared Scared  
Afraid Afraid Afraid Afraid  
 Panicky  Panicky  
   Nervous Nervousness 
   Worried Worried 
   Tense Tense 
  Fearful   
    Shy 
    Anxiety 
 
Table 8 - Examples of variations in measures of fear from the extant literature 
As identified, there are clear similarities between the scales ustilised (for example, scared 
and afraid are items used by four of the five examples presented above). However, given 
the plethora of available measures, there is a conundrum as there is no ‘rule of thumb’ for 
measurement in the field. As such, it was necessary to analyse emotion scales to identify 
the best measures for the constructs under observation.  
A number of authors (for example, Bagozzi et al, 2003; Edell and Burke, 1987) use single 
item measures of emotions. Whilst this is an acceptable approach, it was deemed 
necessary to utilise multi item measures, where possible, given that immediate emotions 
are a core construct of interest and the benefits of this measurement technique as 
explained in section 5.4. As a starting point for analysis, Richins (1997) CES measure was 
examined. This measure specifically links to consumption related emotions and has been 
successfully used in many studies (e.g. Pollai et al, 2010; Christodoulides, et al 2013) As 
such, the range of constructs and items identified makes it a good starting point for 
consideration. The core constructs of the CES (Richins, 1997) measure are examined. 
These are anger, discontent, worry, sadness, fear, shame, envy, loneliness, romantic love, 
love, peacefulness, contentment, optimism, joy, excitement, surprise, guilt, pride, eagerness 
and relief.  Of these, it is possible to identify variables of interest for the pertinent study, 
namely, anger, worry, fear, guilt and relief as listed in table 9 below. 
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Richins (1997) CES 
Selected Constructs Items 
Anger 
Frustrated 
Angry 
Irritated 
Worried 
Nervous 
Worried 
Tense 
Fear 
Scared 
Afraid 
Panicky 
Guilt Guilty 
Relief Relieved 
 
Table 9 - CES constructs and items from Richins (1997) 
Given worry, guilt and relief are conceptualised as anticipatory emotions (as identified in 
chapter 4) and therefore are conceptually distinct from immediate emotions, these will be 
addressed in the next section of this chapter. The three items for anger and three items for 
fear are retained. In a comparison of these items with commonly used fear scales it was 
noted that the item ‘fearful is often added to fear scales (e.g. Dillard et al, 2007 and Block 
and Keller, 1995) and therefore this item was added to the item pool. It was also noted that 
‘uncomfortable’ is an item in Witte (1992) fear scale, which is often used in the extant 
literature (e.g. So et al, 2013). As discussed in chapter 4 this is a conceptually distinct 
construct to fear and therefore is retained as a single item measure of this construct. Other 
authors (e.g. Baumgartner et al, 2008) measure uncomfortable as a single item and 
therefore this was deemed to be acceptable.  
To examine the construct of disgust, the scale utilised by Nabi et al (2001) was first 
considered. The items in this scale are anger, disgust, repulsion, revulsion and grossed out. 
Given that anger is not disgust and is conceptually different (as discussed in section x) this 
item was not deemed to be appropriate. Equally the phrase ‘grossed out’ is firstly an 
Americanism (not appropriate for a study conducted in the UK) and very colloquial. As such, 
it may not be an accessible term to individuals of older generations. As such, anger and 
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grossed out were rejected. An alternative item to grossed out is nauseated (as used by 
Keller and Block, 1995) and as such this item was replaced.  
5.4.1.2 Anticipatory emotions 
As identified in the previous section, the CES scale (Richins, 1997) includes three items that 
tap the construct of worry (nervous, worried and tense) and use single item measures to 
measure relief and guilt.  The three worry items were retained and the single item measure 
of relief was retained as there are few other ways to measure this construct in a self-report 
measure. However, a single item measure of guilt was not considered to be substantially 
robust and as such alternative guilt scales were considered. The scale used by Hibbert et al 
(2007) consists of the items ashamed, guilty, accountable, bad, irresponsible, uneasy and 
upset. Many authors (e.g. Richins, 1997, Bagozzi et al 2003, Dillard et al, 2007) use the 
item guilt, however the addition of accountable and bad complement the guilt item. It was 
identified that the items ashamed, uneasy and upset are not appropriate items for this study 
given the conceptual definitions as presented in chapter 4. The item irresponsible is reverse 
scored by Hibbert et al, (2007), however, given the focus of this study the logical step is to 
change the focus of the item to responsible. As such the items guilty, accountable bad and 
responsible were retained to measure the construct of guilt. 
5.4.1.3 Mental imagery 
The measure used to capture elaboration is a modified version of the mental imagery scale 
by Babin and Burns (1998). The original scale consists of 14 items designed to assess 
vividness, quantity and elaboration. The individual items were assessed for relevance. The 
three elaboration items (I fantasised about the product in the ad, I imagined what it would be 
like to use the product advertised and I imagined the feel of the product) were identified as 
not relevant for this study. In addition, the 8 vividness items are an unnecessary number of 
items to tap into the construct. Therefore, the items weak, fuzzy, vague, sharp and well-
defined were removed. As such, the 7 items as listed in Appendix 5.4 were retained.  
5.4.1.4 Cognitions 
As identified in chapters 3 and 4, the cognition constructs from the extended parallel 
process model (Witte, 1992) are applied to the conceptual framework. As such, the items 
developed by Witte et al (1995) as part of the Risk Behaviour Diagnosis Scale for defensive 
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avoidance, susceptibility, severity, response efficacy and self-efficacy are retained as 
shown in appendix 5.4. These items have been successfully used in many other research 
studies (e.g. Wauters and Brengman, 2013) and therefore were deemed to be acceptable 
measures of the cognition constructs.  
5.4.1.5 Anticipated emotions 
As previously stated, studies concerning ‘threat’ or ‘fear’ appeals have not previously 
considered the role of anticipated emotions (see section chapter 4). As such, an 
examination of the measures utilised to measure anticipated emotions across the wider field 
of consumer behavior was necessary. It is common practice to measure anticipated 
emotions as single item constructs (see Baumgartner et al, 2008; Bagozzi et al, 2003; 
Bagozzi et al, 1998). Given this the anticipated emotions of interest were measured using 
single items as shown in Appendix 5.4. The wording of the anticipated emotion question 
was adapted to the context. In the study by Bagozzi et al (2003, p282), which focuses on 
health and fitness goals, participants were asked “If I succeed to achieve the personal goal I 
mentioned on page one of this questionnaire, I will feel” and “Please take a moment to 
consider how you would feel if you were not to achieve the personal goal you mentioned on 
page one of this questionnaire”. Based on this example, similar context relevant questions 
were developed. This is shown in appendix 5.4.  The three positive emotions were hope, 
relief and delight. The six negative emotions measured were fear, shame, regret, 
humiliation, responsible feelings and depressed feelings, as hypothesised in chapter 4.  
5.4.2 Control variables 
As identified in chapter 4 a number of control variables must be accounted for and as such 
will act as covariates. The measures used for this purpose are outlined below, along with 
the manipulation checks used to verify the stimuli were perceived as intended.  
5.4.2.1 Attitude to speeding 
Attitude to speeding was measured using the six item bipolar scale developed by Lewis et 
al (2007). The wording of the question was adjusted slightly to reflect the content of the 
stimulus message which was concerning ‘breaking the speed limit whilst driving’. 
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5.4.2.2 Anxiety sensitivity 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index was measured using the scale presented by Peterson and 
Heilbronner (1987). This is based on the Reiss-Epstein-Gursky Anxiety Sensitivity index 
and is a 16 item measure developed to assess a person’s beliefs about the social and 
somatic consequence of anxiety symptoms. (Reiss and MacNally, 1985; Reiss, Peterson, 
Gursky and McNally, 1986). 
5.4.2.3 Style of processing 
Style of processing was measured using the scale developed by Childers et al (1985). This 
22 item scale measures individuals preference for a visual or verbal processing modality 
and the original four point response scale format was retained.  
5.4.2.4 Construal 
Self-construal was measured using the 24 item scale developed by Singelis (1994), 
question items were altered to move the focus away from students specifically to make the 
questions relevant to a wider set of participants. These items are presented in appendix 5.4.  
5.4.2.5 Empathy 
The perspective taking items and empathetic concern items form the larger empathy scale 
(Davis, Date?) were reviewed and 14 relevant items were retained from the pool of 23, 
which are presented in appendix 5.4.  
5.4.2.6 Confound, perceived manipulation and message derogation 
The items developed by Witte et al (1995) as part of the Risk Behaviour Diagnosis Scale for 
confound, perceived manipulation and message derogation are used to ensure the validity 
of the experimental treatments and as a control covariate.    
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5.4.2.7 Social desirability 
Social Desirability was measured using the scale developed by Hays, Hayashi and Stewart 
(1989). This scale is a five item measure of socially desirable response set which is based 
on the longer (33 item) and hence more cumbersome Marlowe –Crowne scale (Crowne and 
Marlowe, 1960). 
5.4.3 Dependent variables 
In order to measure behaviour anticipations in this context three measures are employed. 
The single item behaviour intention and behaviour expectation measures developed by 
Carrera et al (2013) are used. These are distinct as behaviour intention is the amount of 
motivation an individual has to perform a behaviour whereas behaviour expectation is an 
estimate of the likelihood an individual will perform the behaviour. Single items of self-
reported behavioural intention and expectation are widely used across the literature (e.g. 
Hibbert et al, 2007; Carrera et al, 2013) and therefore it was deemed appropriate to 
measure these constructs using single items which would also reduce the possibility of 
participant fatigue.  
The third measure of behaviour of behaviour prediction is a decision task (operationalised 
as a slider in the online questionnaire, see Beck, 1984 and Appendix 5). Decision tasks 
have been developed in the consumer behaviour field as a reliable predictor of future 
behaviour (e.g. Bergh et al, 2007, Bergh et al, 2011). As such participants were presented 
with a hypothetical scenario which was intended to activate an individual’s decision process 
regarding the potential to break the speed limit. Participants were asked to move a slider on 
a scale to identify how fast they would travel for the journey. The slider showed the speeds 
and the number of minutes late or early that participants would be if they selected that 
speed (see Appendix 5.5). Therefore, participants were given all the required information to 
make a decision concerning what they would do if they were in that position and as such 
data acts as a predictor of behaviour.  
5.4.4 Manipulation checks and pre-test variables 
The manipulations checks (presented appendix 5.4) were adopted from prior studies. The 
graphicness manipulation check is that used by Kees et al, (2010) and Dahl et al (2012). 
The message direction measure was adopted from Block (2005) and the message direction 
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(loss/ loss avoidance) measure was developed by Gerrend and Cullen (2008). Seveiiry of 
injury used in the pre-tests was developed from Lewis et al (2013). The items developed by 
Witte et al (1995) as part of the Risk Behaviour Diagnosis Scale for confound, perceived 
manipulation and message derogation are used to ensure the validity of the experimental 
treatments in the pre-tests.    
5.5 Design of data collection instrument 
Once the stimuli were developed and qualitatively pre-tested (as outlined in section 5.3 
above), and the appropriate measures were identified (as outlined in section 5.4 above) the 
construction of the data collection instrument, in terms of the most appropriate physical 
design, is considered. Given the decision to undertake a randomised 2x2x2 between 
subjects experiment, the first consideration is the method of administration. In line with the 
sample size considerations and expected response rates (addressed in section 5.7 below) 
ease of access to the study is of primary importance.  
Whilst there are benefits of a laboratory experiment, for example increased internal validity 
(Lee and Lings, 2008), the number of variables to be examined and practicalities of running 
a laboratory experiment mean that this method is much more cumbersome in comparison to 
a web experiment. Web experimentation is not applicable in situations that require the 
experimenter to be physically present, such as when manipulations or measurements 
involve physiological reactions. However, web experiments have substituted successfully 
for a variety of classic cognitive experiments (see Birnbaum 2004 for a review). Indeed, 
many laboratory experiments use a computer to collect the data (in a variety of ways) and 
as such, there is little difference in information loss, whether the data is collected using a 
laboratory computer or using the Internet (Reips, 2002). The use of web experimentation 
also removes the influence of ‘experimenter bias’ as the researcher is not present and 
participants are able to complete the experiment in a setting of their choice, in their own 
time (Birnbaum 2001). 
In addition, compared to traditional field experiments, web experiments have the benefit of 
lowering costs, being more efficient and allowing for time differences as it is available for 
completion 24 hours a day, which is particularly relevant if conducting research using an 
international sample (Birnbaum 2004; Reips 2002). The automation of the Internet allows 
the researcher to control the experimental environment, and crucially for the present study, 
enables exposure to advertising stimuli. This is beneficial because the researcher has 
options to control the length of exposure, or equally give participants the option to choose 
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how long they spend viewing the experimental treatment. In such cases, if the software 
utilised allows for it, it is possible to record the time spent on the web page where the 
participant is exposed to the experimental stimulus. Additionally, web experimentation 
allows researchers to collect information immediately after exposure to an experimental 
stimulus, or build in distraction tasks, which in some contexts are appropriate. Participants 
are able to complete web experiments at their own convenience and therefore the results 
are generated from a more realistic (and thus externally valid) experimental setting, 
compared to those obtained in a laboratory. Following these considerations, web 
experimentation was chosen as the most suitable administration method for this study.  
Birnbaum (2004) identifies three web-experimentation techniques: client-side programming, 
server-side programming and running one’s own server. Given the lack of facility to run an 
experiment specific server, this technique was ruled out. Client-side programs such as 
JavaScript run on the participant’s computer. A potential problem with running a program on 
the client’s computer is that the researcher relies on the participant to have the proper 
software installed. Software incompatibilities can result in significant dropout rates, as there 
is no guarantee that all participants will be able to participate in the experiment. Conversely, 
server-side programs run on the server and do not require the participant to have any 
special hardware or software (beyond the basic ability to read HTML Web pages). Schwarz 
and Reips (2001) find considerably lower participant dropout rates in server-side than client-
side programs and as such, a server-side method was adopted. Specifically, the web 
experiment was created using Qualtrics (http://www.qualtrics.com) as this program was 
available to the researcher and has many features that are appropriate for collection of data 
for the present study. 
Subsequent to the selection of the appropriate tool for administration, focus now turns to the 
design of the instrument, using the measures identified in section 5.4 above. As a general 
‘rule of thumb’ the primary consideration when designing a data collection instrument is the 
order in which questions are presented to participants (Malhotra and Birks, 2000). It is 
usually (but not always) an objective to retain as many participants as possible to the end of 
the experiment. Admittedly, a weakness of web experiments can be due to the inherent lack 
of physical presence of a researcher during the experimental procedure. As such, 
participants can simply walk away from their computer or be distracted during the study 
which may mean they fail to complete the experiment. It is impossible to account for 
environmental factors at the point of experimentation using this method, however, it is 
possible to employ techniques in the data collection tool to encourage participant 
engagement.  
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The introduction to the experiment and introductory questions are largely defined by ethical 
considerations (as outlined in section 5.8), however it is important to recognise that these 
must not be off-putting to participants. Whilst ethical considerations for the present study 
must be implemented (particularly due to the topic of the study and the graphicness variable 
as an experimental treatment), these must be balanced with simplicity of information and 
ease of answering questions. This is to reduce the possibility of participant boredom or 
miscomprehension (Churchill, 1999). To aid the impression of ease of completion a 
progress bar is utlilsed throughout the experiment so participants are aware of how much of 
the experiment is left to complete. Use of a progress bar allows participants to make 
decisions during the experiment process. For example, if a distraction may potentially 
interfere with the process that can be delayed, the participant is able to make an informed 
decision to continue with the experiment based on the information on the progress bar.  The 
progress bar also allows for a reduction of the appearance of length of the questionnaire as 
it corresponds to number of web pages, not the number of questions, and therefore 
participants’ perception of progress through the experiment is not influenced by the large 
number of items and constructs measured. 
It is widely considered appropriate (e.g. Malhotra and Birks, 2000) for researchers to divide 
questions into logical sub-sets which allows for participants to easily answer the questions 
as they are perceived to be clear and logical. It is not desirable to suddenly change topic or 
indeed return to an earlier topic at a later point in the questionnaire. In addition, it is 
important to ‘signpost’ participants through the questionnaire with explanations and 
instructions where appropriate. As such, sub-sets of questions were developed alongside 
detailed and user friendly explanations and instructions (see Appendix 5.6 for a copy of the 
questionnaire). 
As previously stated, section 5.8 discusses the ethical considerations for this study in detail. 
The first section of the questionnaire concerns experiment instructions, participant consent 
and two screening questions (please refer to section 5.8). The second section of the 
questionnaire concerns the collection of demographic information and individual difference 
data, collected using the measures for the experimental covariates identified in section 5.4. 
Given the instructions for the study had to provide information about the topic of the study it 
was deemed appropriate to collect information about the topic of interest at the beginning of 
the second section of the questionnaire, for example pre-exposure attitude to speeding. Any 
priming effect of the position of these questions in the order of questioning is reduced as the 
bank of questions subsequent to these are those pertaining to demographic information and 
individual difference control covariates. The positioning of these questions acts as a buffer, 
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so in essence participants are forced to think about themselves and not the topic prior to 
exposure to the experimental treatment.  
The third element of the experiment is exposure to one of the eight experimental 
treatments. Using the randomisation function alongside the survey flow function in Qualtrics 
it was possible to design the experiment so that participants were randomly allocated to one 
of the eight treatment conditions by the software program and therefore would be exposed 
to only one of the eight treatments accordingly. Participants were presented with an 
instruction page detailing that they were about to view a mock advertisement alongside 
instructions with viewing the advertisement and progressing with the study. The time frame  
of exposure was not limited (although this function is available in Qualtrics) as controlling for 
this variable is not relevant to the research objectives and allowing participants to proceed 
at their own pace creates a more natural environment.  
Post exposure, participants were asked questions with a series of items to capture 
immediate and anticipatory emotions experienced as a result of exposure to the 
experimental treatment. This data is crucial to the research objectives of the study. In 
particular, the very nature of the emotional constructs in question means they will 
deteriorate relatively quickly. Therefore in order to best capture these responses in a self-
report format, these questions were asked whilst the responses were most likely to be ‘top 
of mind’.  Following this, the next set of questions included the manipulation checks to 
ensure the treatment had been perceived as intended and then the two single item 
behaviour intention and behaviour expectation measures. Participants were then asked the 
bank of questions pertaining to cognitions about the treatment and then anticipated emotion 
items. The last section of the questionnaire is the behaviour predictor decision task 
measure,  before participants were thanked for their time and given an opportunity to enter 
a prize draw (see section 5.? concerning improvement of response rate). 
Once the order of the sub-set of question items was developed they were entered into 
corresponding question ‘blocks’ in the Qualtrics program. Using the survey flow, randomiser 
and branches functions it was possible to set conditions where all participants were 
exposed to the same banks of questions, in the same order, yet at the point of exposure to 
the experimental treatment, participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight 
possible treatments. In addition, the structure of the overall survey allowed for participants 
to be directed to a thankyou and debrief page if the screening questions at the beginning of 
the study deemed a participant as not eligible to continue with the study. It is important to 
note that given the rapid advances in technology and that participants will select a device of 
- 184 - 
choice to conduct the experiment these factors had to be considered. Given the nature of 
the questionnaire in terms of length and type of experimental treatment it was deemed that 
smartphones or tablet devices are not appropriate for the completion of this study (due to 
limitations in the display format for this questionnaire, inherent to the Qualtrics system at the 
time, as discovered through pretesting). As such, the ‘mobile phone’ function was not 
activated in Qualtrics for the questionnaire and clear instructions for appropriate devices 
were presented on the information page on the first page of the study.  
5.6 Pre-tests and results 
As outlined previously, the quantitative pre-tests and results are now presented to ensure 
that the process of choosing the most appropriate method of research (as outlined in stage 
3 of figure 12) has occurred before moving on to the selection of sampling procedure 
outlined in step 4 of figure 12 (presented in section 5.7) and the step 5, the collection of 
data (presented in sections 5.7 and 5.8). 
Prior to distribution of the web-experiment, two crucial pre-tests were conducted. Pre-testing 
is an essential component to the collection of data (Reynolds et al, 1993). Firstly, a 
quantitative pre-test of the eight advertisement stimuli developed as discussed in section 
5.3 is undertaken. The objective of this pre-test is to provide evidence that the treatment 
manipulations are likely to be perceived by participants as intended. Prior qualitative pre-
tests were adopted to assist the development of the stimuli, as outlined in section 5.3. A 
rigorous quantitative pre-test of the experimental stimuli will enhance the validity and 
reliability of the manipulation of the independent variables, and the experimental design as 
a whole. This pre-test also serves as an initial pre-test of the design and layout of the 
questionnaire, using a reduced number of questions and also serves as a test of the 
behaviour prediction measure.  
A second pre-test to examine the validity of the measurement instrument developed as 
described in Section 5.5 is also administered in the form of a pilot study. The questionnaire, 
in the format intended for the main data collection, is administered to a small sample in 
order to identify both positive and negative aspects of the design and functionality of the 
questionnaire. Additionally, the pre-test will allow for an estimation of response rate for the 
main web experiment which will assists with sample size selection. The following sections 
will first outline the quantitative pre-test of the experimental stimuli (section 5.6.1) and 
results from that pre-test in section 5.6.2. Discussion will then move on to the pre-test of the 
main measurement instrument and the results generated from this pre-test in section 5.6.3.  
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5.6.1 Stimuli pre-test  
A pre-test of the experimental stimuli using manipulation check measures and a reduced 
number of questions to generate data for the mediating and dependent variable of interest 
was developed in Qualtrics. The same formatting procedures as outline in section 5.5 were 
applied. The pre-test questionnaire designed to test the experimental stimuli is in Appendix 
5.6. This quantitative pre-test was conducted among 175 respondents drawn from the 
population of staff at Aston University. The aim of this pre-test was to ensure the validity of 
the stimuli developed and to ascertain that the manipulations were perceived as intended. 
Eight stimuli were developed (per the operational definitions defined in section 5.3.2) and a 
between subjects experimental design was utilised. Respondents were contacted by e mail 
with a link to the questionnaire. The Qualtrics software randomly assigned participants to 
one of the eight conditions as described in section 5.5. The experimental conditions and 
sample size per condition are outlined in table 10 below. 
Experimental 
Condition 
Between-subjects factors Sample Size 
 Message Frame Message 
Direction 
Graphic Image  
1 Loss Avoidance Other Graphic 23 
2 Loss Avoidance Other No Graphic 16 
3 Loss Avoidance Self Graphic 23 
4 Loss Avoidance Self No Graphic 23 
5 Loss Other Graphic 25 
6 Loss Other No Graphic 22 
7 Loss Self Graphic 20 
8 Loss Self No Graphic 23 
Total 175 
 
Table 10 - Pretest experimental conditions and sample size 
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5.6.1.1 Demographic profile of respondents 
Respondents were asked a series of questions to generate demographic information used 
to profile the sample. The graphical representations of these results are in Appendix 5.7.  Of 
the 175 participants, 58 were male and 117 were female. Participants were asked to give 
their age with regard to one of seven age categories.  0  participants were 16-19 years old 
(as per the ethical considerations outlined in section 5.8), 7 participants were 20-24 years 
old, 80 participants were 25-34 years old, 46 participants were 35-44 years old, 26 
participants were 45-54 years old, 13 participants were 55-64 years old, and 3 participants 
were  65 or over. Appendix 5.7 shows the frequencies of this item. There were no missing 
values for this variable. The distribution is positively skewed with the frequent scores 
clustered at the lower end of the age ranges (skewness = .867). The distribution has a peak 
as most of the participants are aged between 25-34 years old. As the questionnaire was 
targeted at staff of Aston University, this distribution can be explained. In addition, age 
served as a screening variable. Due to ethical considerations the study was only available 
to respondents over the age of 18 and participants under 18 were screened out accordingly 
(details in the section 5.8). The age question in the study was also set to screen out 
respondents under the age of 18. If a respondent clicked the 16 – 19 category they were 
directed to a screen that explained the study was only eligible to participants over the age of 
18 and requested participants to enter their year of birth in order to filter out any participants 
under the age of 18.  
Ethnicity was recorded to profile participants. 124 respondents were White British, 2 
respondents were White Irish, and 29 respondents were from any other white background. 
Thus, 155 respondents identified themselves as white ethnicity. 20 respondents in total 
identified themselves to be of a non-white ethnicity which ranges from mixed, black British, 
Asian British, Asian, Black Caribbean, any other black background or other. There were no 
missing values for this variable. Respondents were also asked whether they have a driving 
license, if they drive a car and if they own a car, in order to identify if there is a difference 
between responses of drivers and non-drivers. Of the sample, 164 respondents have a 
driving license and 11 do not. 146 consider themselves to be drivers and 29 do not and 134 
participants own a car and 41 do not. The graphical representations of these results are in 
Appendix 5.7. 
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5.6.1.2 Exploratory factor analysis 
In order to examine the characteristics of the experimental stimuli, a number of important 
measures had to be taken (e.g. a measure of graphicness). Before use, each measure was 
analysed for internal consistency using Cronbach’s alpha, and entered into an exploratory 
factor analysis. Since the scales being analysed were pre-existing, and therefore had been 
subjected to significant amounts of prior analysis, a lower bound of .7 was used when 
evaluating internal consistency scores (Churchill, 1979; Nunnally, 1978).  Exploratory factor 
analysis was conducted upon each scale individually and they were purified as a result. For 
more detail regarding Exploratory Factor Analysis please refer to Chapter 6. The results and 
detail for the factor analyses conducted for the pre-tests can be found in Appendix 5.8. A 
summary of the results from the Exploratory Factor Analysis is presented in table 11 below.  
Scale Items retained Cronbach’s KMO Bartlett’s 
Graphicness Shocking, Scary, Frightening, Vivid, Intense, 
Powerful, Graphic, Unpleasant, Gruesome 
.985 .900 1727.442 
df=36 
p= 0.000 
Mental 
Imagery 
Clarity 
The imagery which occurred was clear, The 
imagery that occurred was detailed, The 
imagery that occurred was vivid 
.934 .769 877.159 
df: 15 
p= 0.000 
Mental 
Imagery 
Imagination 
The advert made me imagine or picture 
something in my mind, I imagined a number 
of things, Many images came to mind 
.881 .769 877.159 
df: 15 
p= 0.000 
Message 
confound 
The message was clearly written, I clearly 
understood this message, I learned a lot 
about speeding from this message, The 
quality of arguments in this message were 
good 
.839 .718 323.088 
df: 6 
p= 0.000 
Perceived 
Manipulation 
The message was manipulative, The message 
was misleading, The message tried to 
manipulate me, The message was 
exploitative 
.821 .752 288.268 
df: 6 
p= 0.000 
Message 
Derogation 
This message was exaggerated, This message 
was distorted, This message was overblown, 
This message was overstated 
.916 .810 585.295 
df: 6 
p= 0.000 
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Table 11 - Pre-test Exploratory Factor Analysis of existing scales 
5.6.2 Pre-test results  
A series of factorial analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to confirm the 
effectiveness of the manipulations in the advertisement stimuli across the experimental 
conditions. The measures used are outlined in sections 5.4 and 5.5. 
5.6.2.1 Graphicness 
A one way analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of the experimental 
conditions of graphic and non-graphic images on perceptions of graphicness. Participants 
were randomly assigned to either one of four treatments that used the graphic image or one 
of four treatments that used the non-graphic image. The results show a statistically 
significant effect of experimental condition on perception of graphicness F (7,167) = 6.350, 
p = .000. As shown in the table below, (table 12) the mean statistics demonstrate that 
graphic images were perceived to have increased perceptions of graphicness and non-
graphic images caused lower perceptions of graphicness. These results confirm that the 
graphicness manipulations were perceived by respondents as intended.  
Experimental Conditions Graphicness mean Graphicness Standard 
Deviation 
3 (Graphic) 4.34 1.68 
1 (Graphic) 3.89 1.95 
7 (Graphic) 4.63 1.53 
5 (Graphic) 4.01 1.38 
4 (No Graphic) 2.94 1.65 
2 (No Graphic) 2.50 1.38 
8 (No Graphic) 2.56 1.30 
6 (No Graphic) 2.76 1.35 
 
Table 12 – Means for graphic and non-graphic experimental conditions 
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5.6.2.2 Message Frame  
A one way analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of the experimental 
conditions of loss avoidance and loss frame messages on perceptions of loss. Participants 
were randomly assigned to either one of four treatments that used the loss frame or one of 
four treatments that used the loss frame. The results show a statistically significant effect of 
experimental condition on perception of message frame F (7,167)= 2.914, p =  .007. As 
shown in the table 13, the mean statistics demonstrate that loss avoidance frames have 
decreased perceptions of loss and the loss frame messages caused higher perceptions of 
loss. These results confirm that the message frame manipulations were perceived by 
respondents as intended.  
Experimental Conditions Framing mean Framing Standard Deviation 
3 (Loss Avoidance) 3.09 1.64 
1 (Loss Avoidance) 3.30 2.22 
4 (Loss Avoidance) 3.09 2.21 
2 (Loss Avoidance) 2.75 1.84 
7 (Loss) 5.75 1.83 
5 (Loss) 6.28 1.40 
8 (Loss) 4.91 1.99 
6 (Loss) 5.55 1.87 
 
Table 13 - Means for loss avoidance and loss frame experimental conditions 
5.6.2.3 Direction of message 
A one way analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of the experimental 
conditions of self or other direction of message on perceptions of direction of message. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either one of four treatments that used the self-
frame or one of four treatments that used the other frame. The results show a statistically 
significant effect of experimental condition on perception of direction of message F (7,167) = 
5.573, p = .000. As shown in the table 14 the mean statistics demonstrate that other 
directed messages were perceived to be concerning others (as per the bipolar scale) and 
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the self-directed messages perceived to be about the self. These results confirm that the 
message frame manipulations were perceived by respondents as intended.  
Experimental Conditions Direction mean Direction Standard 
Deviation 
3 (Self) 4.04 1.89 
4 (Self) 4.04 2.24 
7 (Self) 3.20 1.73 
8 (Self) 3.74 1.68 
1 (Other) 5.61 1.99 
2 (Other) 5.75 1.52 
5 (Other) 5.92 1.84 
6 (Other) 5.50 1.76 
 
Table 14 - Means for self and other directed experimental conditions 
5.6.2.4 Severity of injury 
A one way analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of all the experimental 
conditions on perceptions of severity of injury. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the eight experimental treatments. The results show a statistically significant effect of 
experimental condition on severity of injury F (7,167) = 2.087, p = .048. However, this effect 
is only marginally significant. As shown in the table 15, the mean statistics demonstrate that 
there appears to be a marginal increase in perceptions of severity of injury in the graphic 
conditions in comparison to the no graphic conditions. As discussed in section 5.3.2 it is 
important that perceptions of severity are similar to ensure that graphicness is not 
significantly confounded as a key independent variable. In this case, the strength of the 
manipulation of  graphicness reported in section 5.6.2.1 indicate that the stimuli do 
manipulate graphicness as intended, with only a small influence on the severity of injury as 
perceived by respondents. Indeed, such an influence may be impossible to avoid in such 
designs, and in that light it is heartening to see such a small effect here. 
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Experimental Conditions Severity of injury 
mean 
Severity of injury 
Standard Deviation 
1 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 4.26 1.91 
2 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 3.63 1.70 
3 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 4.96 1.58 
4 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 4.00 1.47 
5 (Graphic, Loss, Other) 4.28 1.37 
6 (No Graphic, Loss, Other) 4.55 1.37 
7 (Graphic, Loss, Self) 5.15 1.72 
8 (No Graphic, Loss, Self) 4.00 1.47 
 
Table 15 – Means for perceptions of severity of injury 
5.6.2.5 Mental imagery (clarity) 
A one way analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of all the experimental 
conditions on mental imagery clarity. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
eight experimental treatments. The results show a statistically non-significant effect of F 
(7,167)= 1.789, p = .092. As shown in the table 16 the mean statistics demonstrate there 
were no differences between conditions.  These results confirm that the messages were 
perceived by respondents as intended.  
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Experimental Conditions Mental Imagery Clarity 
mean 
Mental Imagery Clarity 
Standard Deviation 
1 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 4.30 2.07 
2 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, 
Other) 
3.87 1.43 
3 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 3.91 1.81 
4 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 3.46 1.70 
5 (Graphic, Loss, Other) 4.16 1.39 
6 (No Graphic, Loss, Other) 3.81 1.46 
7 (Graphic, Loss, Self) 4.50 1.67 
8 (No Graphic, Loss, Self) 3.00 1.76 
 
Table 16 – Means for mental Image clarity 
5.6.2.6 Mental imagery (imagination) 
A one way analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of the eight 
experimental conditions on mental imagery imagination. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of eight experimental conditions. The results show a statistically non-
significant effect of F (7,167) =  .856, p = .543. As shown in the table 17 the mean statistics 
demonstrate there were no differences between conditions.  These results confirm that the 
messages were perceived by respondents as intended.  
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Experimental Conditions Mental Imagery 
Imagination mean 
Mental Imagery 
Imagination Standard 
Deviation 
1 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 2.75 2.11 
2 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 2.68 1.56 
3 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 3.46 1.98 
4 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 2.55 1.43 
5 (Graphic, Loss, Other) 3.06 1.69 
6 (No Graphic, Loss, Other) 2.80 1.67 
7 (Graphic, Loss, Self) 2.63 1.70 
8 (No Graphic, Loss, Self) 3.36 1.68 
 
Table 17 – Means for mental imagery imagination 
5.6.2.7 Confound 
A one way analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of the eight 
experimental conditions on message confound. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of eight experimental conditions. The results show a statistically non-significant effect of F 
(7,167) = 1.836, p = .083. As shown in the table 18 the mean statistics demonstrate there 
were no differences between conditions.  These results confirm that the messages were 
perceived by respondents as intended.  
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Experimental Conditions Confound mean Confound Standard 
Deviation 
1 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 3.50 1.65 
2 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 3.70 1.22 
3 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 3.70 1.56 
4 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 3.71 1.43 
5 (Graphic, Loss, Other) 4.66 1.16 
6 (No Graphic, Loss, Other) 4.28 1.21 
7 (Graphic, Loss, Self) 4.20 1.36 
8 (No Graphic, Loss, Self) 4.18 1.45 
 
Table 18 – Means for confound 
5.6.2.8 Perceived manipulation 
A one way analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of the eight 
experimental conditions on perceived manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of eight experimental conditions. The results show a statistically non-significant effect of 
F (7,167) = 1.153, p = .333. As shown in the table 19 the mean statistics demonstrate there 
were no differences between conditions.  These results confirm that the messages were 
perceived by respondents as intended.  
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Experimental Conditions Perceived 
manipulation mean 
Perceived manipulation 
Standard Deviation 
1 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 3.22 1.60 
2 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 2.87 1.34 
3 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 2.89 1.29 
4 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 2.84 1.62 
5 (Graphic, Loss, Other) 3.16 1.57 
6 (No Graphic, Loss, Other) 2.90 1.35 
7 (Graphic, Loss, Self) 3.15 1.60 
8 (No Graphic, Loss, Self) 2.20 0.86 
 
Table 19 – Means for perceived manipulation 
5.6.2.9 Message derogation 
A one way analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of the eight 
experimental conditions on message derogation. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of eight experimental conditions. The results show a statistically non-significant effect of 
F (7,167) =  1.276, p = .265. As shown in the table 20 the mean statistics demonstrate there 
were no differences between conditions.  These results confirm that the messages were 
perceived by respondents as intended.  
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Experimental Conditions Message derogation 
mean 
Message derogation 
Standard Deviation 
1 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 2.50 1.38 
2 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 1.93 0.75 
3 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 2.39 1.18 
4 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 2.36 1.28 
5 (Graphic, Loss, Other) 2.27 1.52 
6 (No Graphic, Loss, Other) 2.42 1.65 
7 (Graphic, Loss, Self) 2.61 1.30 
8 (No Graphic, Loss, Self) 1.66 0.81 
 
Table 20 – Means for message derogation 
The results of this quantitative pre-test of the eight stimuli developed for the web experiment 
confirm that the stimuli are perceived as intended and the manipulations are successful in 
creating the experimental treatments. Focus will now shift to the pre-test of the web 
experiment as a whole.  
5.6.3 Pre-testing the web experiment (pilot study) 
Pre-testing of the web experiment occurred in two stages. First, ‘protocols’ were carried out 
(Diamantopoulos et al, 1994) which entails watching participants complete the 
questionnaire and receive feedback on any pertinent issues that arise as a result. This is a 
useful check as a large amount of detailed feedback, on small issues that may have been 
missed by the researcher, can be highlighted. Whilst the presence of the researcher and the 
intellectual exercise itself, may bias this procedure, it is a useful ‘first check’ of the 
experiment. Two experienced academic experts in the field of marketing, performed the 
protocol check. Both participants stated that the procedure was longer than average but this 
should not pose a problem to response rate. In order to maintain data quality the feedback 
was acknowledged but the length of the procedure was not changed.  
The technical presentation of the questionnaire and randomised presentation of stimuli was 
successful. Participants noted that it was difficult to differentiate between response options 
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for some of the blocks of questions. As a result, the highlight function in Qualtrics was 
utilised to clearly highlight alternating lines of response options, so participants can more 
easily respond to the questions and corresponding items. No issues pertaining to the 
questions or items used were identified, although a small number of typographical errors 
were identified and subsequently corrected. This procedure was also useful to serve as 
another check that the stimuli were perceived as intended and the behaviour prediction 
measure was successful. Feedback on both of these elements was positive.  
Following the protocol checking by academic experts, a small-scale web experiment was 
administered in order to further anticipate any issues in the final experimental design. (See 
appendix 5.6 for a copy of the questionnaire and Appendix 5.9 for the experimental 
treatments.) A small sample of 42 staff from Aston University were recruited using the staff 
newsletter to participate in the web experiment pre-test. One positive aspect of the pre-test 
was that no modifications to the questionnaire instrument itself or to the stimuli were 
deemed necessary. Indeed, the report from Qualtrics identified that all 42 participants who 
attempted to participate in the pre-test did so successfully. All the scales were filled in 
correctly by the respondents. Also, given the small time frame within which the respondents 
engaged with the pre-test, initial indications were that the recruitment of participants would 
be as successful as anticipated. The pre-test suggested that once participants engaged with 
the study, they completed it. As such, it was appropriate to proceed as no concerns were 
identified. Therefore the focus turned to recruitment of willing participants (to be detailed in 
the following sections) as per stage 4 of figure 12. 
5.7 Main data collection procedure and sample 
As described in the previous section (section 5.6) the quantitative pre-tests identified some 
small improvements to the questionnaire were necessary, and as such were implemented. 
However, the stimuli, data collection method and instrument performed as anticipated. It 
was seen that administration of the pre-tests was successful through a web link and as such 
this posed no issue. Focus now turns to the sampling plan and considerations associated 
with improving response rate, which will be addressed in turn. 
The sample of respondents should be consistent with the key objectives of the study.  
Previous studies have primarily used student samples (for example, Schmitt and Blass, 
2008; Potter et al, 2006; Passyn and Sujan, 2006; Smith and Stutts, 2003).  In order to 
select the sampling procedure two types of general procedure (probability and non-
probability sampling) must be considered (Burns and Bush, 2000; Wright and Crimp, 2000; 
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Malhotra and Birks, 2000 and Hair et al, 2006). The probability sampling procedure is 
characterised by a situation where each element of the population has a fixed probability of 
being selected as part of the sample, but this does not mean that there is an equal chance 
of selection (Malhotra and Birks, 2000). On the other hand, non-probability sampling 
procedure does not involve chance selection but has reliance upon the personal judgement 
of the researcher (Malhotra and Birks, 2000). The use of non-probability sampling 
necessitates that the probability of an element of the population being selected for the 
sample is unknown.  
Both sampling orientations consist of four separate techniques (Wright and Crimp, 2000). In 
the case of probability sampling these are simple random sampling, systematic sampling, 
stratified sampling and cluster sampling. These are presented in table 21 below. Non 
probability sampling techniques consist of convenience sampling, judgmental sampling, 
quota sampling and snowball or referral sampling, presented in table 22 below. Each of 
these techniques has strengths and weaknesses, which are outlined in Tables 21 and 22, 
accompanied by a brief description of each technique (adapted from Malhotra and Birks, 
2000). 
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Name of 
Technique 
Brief Description Strengths Weaknesses 
Simple 
Random 
Sampling 
Each element has a 
known and equal 
chance of selection.  
Each element is 
selected 
independently of the 
other and the sample 
is drawn by random 
procedure from a 
random sampling 
frame (similar to the 
lottery system) 
+ Sample results may 
be projected to a large 
population 
+ Easily understood 
- Difficult to construct a 
sampling frame  
- Time consuming and 
expensive 
- Results are generally 
lower in precision with 
large standard errors 
- May not result in a 
representative sample 
Stratified 
Sampling  
 
Two–step process 
utilised to split the 
population into 
subsections. Elements 
are then selected 
using the simple 
random sampling 
technique. 
+ Ensures that all 
important sub 
populations are 
included 
+ Increased precision is 
achieved 
- Numerous criteria can 
be used to select 
stratification variables 
- Expensive  
Systematic 
Sampling  
Elements are chosen 
through the selection 
of a random starting 
point and then 
selecting every nth 
element from the 
sampling frame. 
+ Easier to administer 
compared to Simple 
random sampling 
+ Less expensive to 
administer than Simple 
random sampling 
+ Can increase 
representativeness of 
the population if the 
elements are ordered in 
relation to the 
characteristic of interest 
+ A sampling frame is 
not always necessary. 
- Assumption that the 
sample frame is in a 
pre-existing order 
- Can decrease 
representativeness of 
population and may 
yield similar results to 
simple random sampling 
techniques. 
Cluster 
Sampling 
Two step technique 
whereby the 
population is divided 
into mutually exclusive 
and collectively 
exhaustive sub 
populations (clusters). 
A random sample of 
the clusters is then 
selected using a 
probability technique 
such as simple 
random sampling.  
+ Decreased costs as 
sampling efficiency is 
increased 
+ Easy to implement 
- Not as precise as 
stratified sampling 
techniques 
- Results can be difficult 
to analyse and interpret. 
 
Table 21 - Comparison of available probability sampling techniques 
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Name of 
Technique 
Brief Description Strengths Weaknesses 
Convenience 
Sampling  
Convenient elements are 
selected by the 
researcher as they are in 
the same place at the 
same time. 
+ Least time consuming 
+ Least expensive 
+ Convenient 
+ Sample are 
accessible, cooperative 
and easy to measure 
- A lot of selection 
bias 
- Not 
representative of 
any definable 
population 
Judgemental 
Sampling  
Similar techniques to 
convenience sampling 
however, elements are 
purposely selected 
based upon researchers’ 
judgement and/ or study 
objectives. 
+ Convenient 
+ Time efficient 
+ Inexpensive 
- Subjective 
- Generalisability 
is limited 
Quota 
Sampling 
Two step restricted 
judgemental sampling 
technique. Control 
categories (quotas) are 
developed then sample 
elements are selected 
based upon convenience 
or judgement.  
+ Sample can be 
controlled for certain 
characteristics, for 
example, demographics 
- Potential for 
overlooking 
characteristics 
that are relevant 
to the issue under 
investigation 
- Selection bias 
Snowball or 
referral 
Sampling 
Elements are initially 
selected using probability 
techniques and 
subsequent elements are 
chosen based on 
information provided by 
initial elements. 
+ Increased likelihood 
of locating desired 
characteristic in the 
population 
+ low sampling variance 
+ Inexpensive 
- Time consuming 
- Potential for 
sample bias due 
to dependence on 
respondent 
judgements. 
 
Table 22 - Comparison of available non-probability sampling techniques 
For the pre-test studies staff from Aston University were used as the sample. This is a non-
probabilistic, judgment sample (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2004). For the main study staff and 
students were approached alongside a snowball sample of the general population.  One 
goal in research is to generalise a set of findings beyond the participants to the experiment. 
Researchers are not specifically interested in the behaviour of the people who actually 
participate in the experiment, but in their behaviour as representative of the population 
(Keppel and Wickens 2004). A non-probabilistic sample composed of students and staff at 
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Aston University, and snowball/ referral sampling methods to engage respondents outside 
of Aston University were used due to the convenience and efficiency strengths of this 
method.  
Whilst a purely student sample would have been a more homogenous sample, given the 
nature of the topic at hand and type of data collected this was not of paramount importance. 
Indeed, the design of the randomized web experiment rules out the issues associated with a 
non-homogenous sample and therefore serves as further justification for utilising this 
sampling method.   
Another, and arguably more important, decision regarding the sample of the experimental 
study is the size required to estimate the desired effects. A priori power analysis facilitates 
the choice of adequate sample size (Cohen 1988). Power analysis essentially involves the 
specification of Type I and Type II errors with respect to null hypothesis testing. 
Experimenters often stipulate the power instead of Type II error rate (Keppel and Wickens, 
2004), and define power of the test as the probability to reject the null hypothesis when the 
null hypothesis is false - in other words, the probability to find an effect provided that it 
exists. Table 23 summarises type I and type II errors along with the power of the statistical 
test.  
Statistical Decision True state of null hypothesis 
 H0 True H0 False 
Reject H0 Type 1 Error (α)          Power of the test (1-β) 
Do not reject H0 Correct Type II Error (β) 
 
Table 23 - Summary of type I and type II errors 
The power of the experiment depends on a number of factors, including the significance 
level α, the sample size n, and the magnitude or size of the treatment effects (Keppel and 
Wickens, 2004). The most direct way to increase the prospective power of a test is to 
increase the sample size n. A priori power calculations help determine an adequate sample 
size for the estimation of experimental treatment effects and are therefore very important at 
the planning stage. Researchers can pre-define the desired significance level, the size of 
the effects that they wish to detect, and the desired power of the test, and calculate the 
appropriate sample size. When many factors and interactions are involved, as in the 
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present case, power calculations can be difficult, thus the use of power charts or software 
packages (Erdfelder, et al 1996) is imperative. Computer software has the potential to make 
power analysis more accurate, interactive, and easy to perform. For the purpose of a priori 
power analysis in this study, GPOWER was used. GPOWER is a software application (Faul 
et al 2007) that performs various types of power analyses including a priori F-tests for multi-
factor experimental designs and multiple regression analyses.  
For an a priori power analysis for multi-factor experiments with a mixed subjects design in 
GPOWER, the researcher needs to set the α level, the desired effect size measure (f ), the 
desired power level, the number of groups and the number of repetitions in the design. 
According to Cohen (1988), there are small, medium, and large effect sizes (Keppel and 
Wickens, 2004). For an a priori power analysis of a multi-factor F-test in ANOVA, GPOWER 
uses the following f effect size conventions: small: f=0.10, medium: f=0.25 and large: f=0.40.  
In order to have a good chance of detecting medium effects, the standard was set to an 
effect size of f=0.25. The significance level alpha was set at 0.05 and the desired power 
level at 0.95. For simplicity reasons, the researcher assumes all factors and interactions 
equally important for the analysis. As previously mentioned, the design of the experiment is 
a 2x2x2 between-subjects design. Hence, the number of groups in the experiment is eight. 
Based on this, the a priori power analysis in GPOWER suggests that the study requires a 
minimum of 400 participants in order to estimate the factorial effects with a power of 0.9510. 
This implies a minimum of 50 respondents in each cell (see table 24). As such, the target 
sample is a minimum of four hundred participants and any sample larger than this will 
increase power accordingly.  
Parameters Effects 
Effect size f                                                            0.25 
α error probability                                                  0.05 
Power (1-β error probability)                                 0.95 
Number of groups                                                  8 
Non-centrality parameter λ                                    25.0 
Critical F                                                                1.854 
Minimum sample size   400 
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Minimum cell size                                                 50 
Actual power                                                         0.9510 
 
Table 24 - GPOWER analysis results 
A potential issue in the use of web experiments is that of non-response bias. Non-response 
bias occurs when the characteristics of the respondents who choose to complete the web 
experiment differ in a substantive manner from those who did not complete it (Churchill and 
Iacobucci, 2004). This bias can compromise the external validity and generalisability of a 
study’s results, Armstrong and Overton (1977) among others, recommend that all feasible 
efforts be made to increase response rates, which were undertaken as part of this study. A 
variety of techniques were used to try and increase participation to the web experiment 
(Churchill and Iacobucci, 2004). These techniques were crucial to reach a minimum sample 
size of 400 as identified in the a priori power analysis. Monetary incentives were not used 
as they would have proved too expensive, and there is some doubt over their utility in 
increasing response rates (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch, 1996). Instead, a more 
cost-effective option was chosen, which was to enter respondents in a prize draw. The 
details of the prize draw are presented in Appendix 5.10 and were granted full ethical 
approval by Aston Business School ethics committee. 
To recruit the participants to the Web experiment, an e-mail was sent to all students, staff 
and alumni of Aston University and staff and students at Loughborough University. The e-
mail gave an indication of the approximate time it would take to complete the experiment, 
details about the prize draw and stressed the contribution of the study to the area of 
consumer response. A shorter version of this e mail was prepared for posting on social 
media sites. This correspondence is presented in Appendix 5.11. In addition a request on 
the thank you page at the end of the experiment to forward the link to the questionnaire on 
to other potential participants was included. The web-experiment was e-mailed to potential 
respondents in three waves, each two weeks apart thus resulting in a six week data 
collection period. In the last email sent, a return deadline to be included in the prize draw 
was mentioned in an attempt to increase the response rate. A total of 1511 responses to the 
web experiment were started, however due to the screening questions (see section 5.8) and 
incomplete responses, 681 were usable responses.  
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5.8 Validity of the design and ethical issues 
Consideration will now turn to the validity of the research design, which is described below 
and then the ethical considerations appropriate for this study will be addressed in section 
5.8.1. Mariampolski (2001) presents a useful concept for researchers called ‘the critical 
eye.’ This concept advocates the continuous critical scrutiny of all aspects of the research 
project, for example respondent definitions, data gathering strategies, analysis procedures 
and interpretation of results. In addition to this, the researcher should be critical of 
themselves and the impact of their behaviour on the different aspects of the research 
process.  This level of awareness adopted by the researcher is intended to ensure higher 
levels of reliability and validity and will be employed in this study. It is important to note that 
quantitative studies, emphasising causality and generalisability, frequently overlook validity 
issues in their pursuit of reliability (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2004).  
Reliability refers to the extent to which the research procedure adopted is replicable and a 
measurement procedure yields the same answer (Minichiello et al, 1992). Thus, for a data 
collection to be reliable it must be shown that research can be repeated or replicated, which 
is test/retest reliability (Minichiello et al, 1992). Thus, if the questionnaire for this web-
experiment were to be re-tested, using the same experimental stimuli, the data would 
remain the same. Reliability is distinguished from validity in that validity is represented in the 
agreement between two attempts to measure the same trait through different methods, 
whereas reliability is the agreement between two efforts to measure the same trait through 
similar methods (Campbell and Fiske, 1959).  
Issues specific to measure reliability and validity are covered in more depth in Chapter 6, 
however, in brief, evaluating the reliability of any measuring instrument consists of 
determining how much of the variation in scores is due to inconsistencies in measurement 
(Peter, 1979). One of the main issues to do with reliability is internal consistency.  This is 
where the reliability of a measure is associated with the extent to which a single 
respondent’s score for a set of items measuring a single construct is the same as another 
set of items measuring the same construct. Four methods may be used to evaluate 
reliability. These include test-retest, where the same questionnaire is distributed twice to the 
same respondents; alternative forms, where different questions that have an equivalent 
meaning are used in a questionnaire; the split-half reliability which involves comparing the 
answers of two identical sample groups; and the coefficient alpha or Cronbach’s alpha, 
which is the average of all possible split-half coefficients resulting from different ways of 
splitting the scale items (Malhotra and Birks, 2000). In the present research, this last 
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method is used with the SPSS software. Furthermore, all the constructs are measured 
using existing scales previously tested for reliability by their authors.  
A measure could be reliable but still not be valid. A valid measure is one that is truthful and 
which is accurate in measuring what it is trying to measure (Burns and Bush, 2000). The 
researcher distinguishes between internal and external validity. Internal validity increases 
when the researcher controls for a range of potential confounding factors, while external 
validity is enhanced when the experimental setting is more naturalistic and less controlled 
(Churchill and Iacobucci, 2004). Thus, these two types of validity are often at odds. 
Marketing researchers have typically sacrificed external validity for internal validity, under 
the assumption that theory application research does not need to be externally valid (Calder 
et al, 1982). Nevertheless, when an experiment lacks external validity the theoretical 
constructs also lack validity (Lynch 1982). Hence, the researcher should strive to achieve 
both internal and external validity.  
In the present research, internal validity was achieved by controlling for a variety of potential 
confounding factors related to the design of the stimuli. These factors are discussed in the 
section 5.3. External validity focuses on the problem of collecting data that demonstrate that 
the changes in the dependent variables observed in the experiment as a result of changes 
in the independent variables can be expected to occur in other situations. The prerequisites 
for external validity include ecological validity, statistical generalisability and robustness 
(Lynch, 1982). Ecological validity was enhanced in two ways. First, the design of the stimuli 
was realistic, as all the stimuli used contained both text and pictorials. A web experiment 
was conducted, therefore ensuring that respondents viewed the stimuli in relatively more 
natural conditions (for example, at home or at work when one may often be exposed to 
advertising stimuli) than a laboratory experiment. The statistical generalisability and 
robustness of the findings were increased by using the random assignment technique 
where participants self-allocated an experimental condition. 
5.8.1 Ethical considerations 
The experimental stimuli, pre-tests and web experiment were submitted to the Aston 
Business School ethics committee. The researcher adhered to the four main principles of 
beneficence (do positive good), non-malfeasance (do no harm), informed consent, and 
confidentiality/anonymity. The ethics application identified how these principles were applied 
throughout the development of the research methodology. A detailed procedure was put in 
place for participants to raise any issues, make complaints or withdraw from the study if 
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they should wish. The ethical guidelines outlined at the beginning of the experiment 
intended to circumvent possible concerns over confidentiality. The experiment was not 
anonymous as respondents were required to provide their email address if they wanted to 
be considered for the prize draw connected to the experiment. However, participants were 
reassured that the prize draw entry details would be kept separate from their answers to the 
questionnaire and that the data would be related to their participant number, not to their 
name.  
Given the sensitive nature of the topic and desire to cause no unnecessary distress, the 
committee ensured that the screening questions would rule out individuals with prior 
experiences (either themselves or loved ones) of serious car accidents. Due to the graphic 
manipulation in some of the images it was appropriate to screen out any potential 
participants under the age of 18.  In addition the wording at the beginning of the study was 
specifically designed to make participants aware of the topic of the study, that they may be 
exposed to shocking images and actions to take if they experienced distress during the 
study. No participants contacted the researcher to complain of distress caused. As such, all 
participants were presented with a high level of detail and asked for consent prior to 
conducting the study.  
5.9 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the methodology chosen to address the research questions and 
hypotheses specified in chapter 4. Following the development of stimuli, measurement 
instrument and pre-tests, a web experiment was administered and received 681 usable 
responses. This data is analysed in the following two chapters (chapter 6 and 7) to first, 
describe the data set and then test the hypotheses. 
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Chapter 6 - Descriptive Analysis Results 
The previous chapter outlines the details of the methodology utilised for data collection for 
this study and explicitly articulates the procedure followed. The following two chapters are 
ordered to present the analysis of the obtained data; firstly the descriptive analysis which is 
presented in Chapter 6 and then, hypothesis testing which is presented in Chapter 7.  
This chapter presents the descriptive analysis (essential to enable hypothesis testing) which 
has four main components. First, an analysis of the demographic profile variables of 
participants was conducted, using tables to assist clarity of presentation in section 6.1. 
Secondly, sections 6.2 and 6.3 outline the measures used in the study, the exploratory 
factor analysis of those measures, the distribution of measures with focus on a search for 
outliers and statistical testing. In order to be confident in the properties and 
operationalisation of measures employed in the study, this analysis was conducted to 
ensure that the measures used, have necessary levels of statistical robustness to make 
them valid for inclusion in the testing of the hypotheses. Third, as outlined in section 6.4, the 
measures were tested for potential contamination with social desirability bias. Those that 
presented significant correlations were transformed to remove the social desirability bias 
from the measure. Section 6.5 presents the descriptive analysis of the individual scales to 
be utilised in the testing of hypotheses. Section 6.6 identifies correlations between 
measures and finally section 6.7 provides a summary of the chapter 
The hypothesis testing presented in Chapter 7 uses univariate analyses of covariance 
(ANCOVAs), and as such, in order to identify and minimise any violations of test 
assumptions, the identification of patterns in, and characteristics of the variables is 
necessary. This descriptive analysis of the measures is crucial to ensure a robust 
interpretation of results. 
6.1 Demographic profile of participants 
This section profiles experimental participants according to demographic variables, as the 
participants are the units of analysis. As outlined in the previous chapter, participants were 
randomly allocated to one of eight experimental conditions. The sample size of participants 
per experimental condition is described in table 25 below. 
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Experimental 
Condition 
Message 
Frame 
Message 
Direction 
Graphic Image Sample Size  
1 Loss Avoidance Other Graphic 85 
2 Loss Avoidance Other No Graphic 87 
3 Loss Avoidance Self Graphic 91 
4 Loss Avoidance Self No Graphic 83 
5 Loss Other Graphic 86 
6 Loss Other No Graphic 83 
7 Loss Self Graphic 84 
8 Loss Self No Graphic 82 
Total 681 
 
Table 25 - Experimental conditions and corresponding sample sizes 
 
Table 26 shows the distribution of gender among the participants of the research study 
across all eight experimental conditions. There were no missing values and it can be seen 
that females outnumber males in the sample, with 37.4% and 62.6% respectively. Given the 
randomised experimental design, as described in chapter 5 this data is therefore 
acceptable.  
Participant Gender 
Frequency Percentage 
Male 
225 37.4% 
Female 
426 62.6% 
TOTAL 
681 100% 
 
Table 26 - Frequencies of participant gender 
Participants were requested to give their age with regard to one of the seven age categories 
(0-18 years old, 19-24 years old, 25-34 years old, 35-44 years old, 45-54 years old, 55-64 
years old, 65 years old and above). Table 27 outlines the frequencies for this variable and 
there were no missing values. Participants under the age of 18 were screened out of the 
study at the beginning of the procedure due to ethical considerations as outlined in section 
5.8.1 in Chapter 5. Whilst it was expected that this screening would be successful, the 
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category 0-18 was still included in the data collection instrument as a second screening 
measure.5 No participants reported to be below the age of 18 and therefore all participants 
were able to continue with the study. The relative asymmetry in the distribution is reflected 
by the cumulative percentage which shows that 63.3% of the sample are aged between 19 
and 34. As the experiment was primarily targeted at University staff and students this 
asymmetry can be explained.  
Participant Age Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percent 
18-24 267 39.2% 
39.2% 
25-34 164 24.1% 
63.3% 
35-44 93 13.7% 
76.9% 
45-54 65 9.5% 
86.5% 
55-64 50 7.3% 
93.8% 
65 or over 42 6.2% 
100% 
TOTAL 681 100% 
 
 
Table 27 - Frequencies of participant age 
The majority of the participants identified themselves to be of White ethnicity (cumulative 
percentage 76.9%), which consists of 58.7%  of the sample identifying as White British, 
2.3% of the sample identifying as White Irish and 15.9% of the sample identifying as any 
other white background. The remaining 23.1% of the sample identify as a range of 
ethnicities including Mixed, Asian British, Asian, Black British, Black Caribbean, Black 
African, Any other black background, Chinese and other. There were no missing values for 
this variable and frequencies for each ethnicity category are shown in table 28. As the 
experiment was primarily targeted at staff and students at UK Universities with a 
subsequent snowball sample, the range of respondent ethnicities is not surprising.  
  
                                               
5 As with the screening questions at the beginning of the study, if participants stated their age to be below 18 they were 
redirected to an end of study page explaining why they could not continue and thanking them for their time. 
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Ethnicity Frequency Percentage 
White British 400 58.7% 
White Irish 16 2.3% 
Any other white 
background 
108 15.9% 
Mixed 12 1.8% 
Asian British 47 6.9% 
Asian 29 4.3% 
Black British 6 0.9% 
Black Caribbean 2 0.3% 
Black African 8 1.2% 
Any other black 
background 
4 0.6% 
Chinese 30 4.4% 
Other 19 2.8% 
Total 681 100% 
 
 
Table 28 - Frequencies of participant ethnicity 
A large proportion of the sample identified themselves to be single (34.1%) and a similar 
percentage identified themselves as married (32.7%).  The other 33.3% of the sample 
identified themselves as in a relationship but not living together, living with partner, civil 
partnership, separated, divorced or widowed. Overall, 62.4% of participants identify 
themselves as being in a relationship (in a relationship but not living together, living with 
partner, civil partnership or married) and 37.6% of participants identify themselves to be 
without a partner (single, separated, divorced or widowed). There were no missing items for 
this variable and the frequencies are presented in table 29. 
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Relationship Status Frequency Percentage 
Single 232 34.1% 
In a relationship but not living together 116 17% 
Living with partner 85 12.6% 
Civil partnership 1 0.1% 
Married 223 32.7% 
Separated 2 0.3% 
Divorced 20 2.9% 
Widowed 2 0.3% 
Total 681 100% 
 
Table 29 - Frequencies of participant relationship status 
Participants were asked to identify whether or not they have children and are therefore 
inherently responsible for other human beings. 31.6% of the sample do have children and 
68.4% of the sample do not have children. Given the sampling techniques employed in this 
study it is to be expected that a higher number of participants do not have children 
compared to the frequency of those who do have a child or children. There was no missing 
data for this variable and the frequencies are presented in table 30 below.  
Child or Children Frequency Percentage 
Yes 215 31.6% 
No 466 68.4% 
Total 681 100% 
 
Table 30 - Frequencies of participants with or without a child or children 
Participants were asked to report whether they own a valid driving license or not. The 
frequencies for this item are presented in table 31. There were no missing items for this 
variable. Overall, 84% of participants declared themselves to have a valid driving license 
and 16% identified themselves as having no driving license.  
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Driving License 
Ownership 
Frequency Percentage 
Yes 572 84% 
No 109 16% 
Total 681 100% 
 
Table 31 - Frequencies of participants who do and do not own a driving license 
This section has presented an analysis of the demographic profile variables of experimental 
participants, specifically examining gender, age, ethnicity, relationship and family status, 
and driving license ownership. No major issues were identified and due to the randomised 
experimental design employed, confidence was high in the sample as a basis for further 
analysis. As outlined in chapter 5, randomised experiments are where the experimental unit 
(in this case, experimental participants) are assigned to a treatment by chance (Shadish et 
al, 2002). A minimum of two groups are created which are probabilistically similar to each 
other on average, which means that the outcomes of observed differences between the 
groups are likely to be an effect of the treatment, as opposed to individual differences 
between units. 
6.2 Construct measurement approach 
As outlined in the previous chapter, existing measures were employed to collect data 
regarding participants cognitive, emotional and behavioural responses to the 
advertisements presented in each experimental condition. Additionally data regarding trait 
and individual differences was obtained using existing measures. All scales used have been 
previously developed and published in peer-reviewed academic journals as detailed in 
section 5.4 in Chapter 5. A small number of existing and recognised single item measures 
are used in the study (as outlined and justified in Chapter 5) yet the majority of scales are 
multi item measures. In light of this, the objective of the following analysis is to verify 
measure properties for the current study, conduct exploratory factor analysis and 
correlations with social desirability bias.  
The objective for this study is to provide empirical evidence of the impact of intrinsic 
message characteristics of threat appeals on consumer emotional, cognitive and conative 
response variables. In doing so, it is necessary to – in essence - identify relationships 
among what are theorised as unobserved (latent) constructs (e.g. emotions, behavioural 
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intentions). Doing so requires the development of measures of these unobserved 
constructs, using observed variables or indicators (Borsboom et al, 2003; 2004). The 
measurement model for the present study is reflective, where in theoretical terms “causality 
flows from the latent construct to the indicator” (Coltman et al, 2008, p1250).  
6.2.1 Single item measures: Analysis strategy 
Theoretically speaking, the latent constructs exist (in an absolute sense) independent of the 
measures as “observable indicators are reflective effects” of latent variables (Howell et al., 
2007, p 205). As such, the indicators used to measure the latent constructs are 
interchangeable, as change in the latent variable must precede variation in the indicators. 
This flexibility enables researchers to measure the construct by sampling a few relevant 
indicators underlying the construct (Churchill, 1979). It is important to note that inclusion or 
exclusion of one or more indicators from the construct does not necessarily alter the content 
validity. However, some constructs are measured using single-item measures which is 
appropriate when constructs are unambiguous (Bergkvist and Rossiter, 2007; Loo, 2002). 
As identified in section 5.4, based on scales utilised in the relevant literature, single item 
measures are used to measure behavioural intention, behavioural expectation and 
anticipated emotions – which are all constructs which have been captured with single-item 
measures successfully in past research (e.g. Carrera et al, 2012; Baumgartner et al, 2008; 
Bagozzi et al, 2003).  
6.2.2 Multi item measures: Analysis strategy 
While single-item measures were used for some constructs, where appropriate, multi-item 
scales were used wherever possible, and indeed were used to measure the majority of 
constructs in this study. Certainly, multi-item measures have some advantages over single-
item measures (Churchill, 1979), although they also increase length and complexity of an 
instrument. According to Gerbing and Anderson (1988) an important assumption in 
reflective measurement theory is that there is a single construct underlying any set of items 
intended to measure a construct. Thus, questionnaire items are indicators of the measured 
construct, or in other words are “caused by” the construct, and overlap in meaning so that 
they correlate moderately strongly (Baxter, 2009). It is important to note that the implication 
of this is that a multi-item measure of a construct, for example immediate emotion, should 
examine immediate emotion only and no other construct. Hence, the variation in each 
emotion item should only be influenced by the respondent’s true emotion score and random 
error, and no other latent construct or error.   
- 214 - 
This existence of a single trait or construct underlying a set of items intended to measure 
that construct is referred to as unidimensionality (Hattie, 1985; Hair et al 2008).  A 
composite score, defined by the respondents’ scores on these measures, gives an estimate 
of the corresponding underlying construct. However, the computation of this composite 
score is meaningful only if each of the measures is unidimensional (Gerbing and Anderson, 
1988). Unidimensionality is only one indicator of the validity of a measure. Indeed 
acceptable unidimensionality does not guarantee the validity of a measure (Peter, 1981). 
For example, the measure may be unidimensional, but in fact reflect another construct than 
that intended by the researcher. In other words, a lack of unidimensionality demonstrates a 
lack of construct validity, however unideimensionality by itself does not guarantee the 
validity of a measure.  
This does not detract from the fact that unidimensionality is a necessary, although not 
sufficient, condition to ensure validity, where validity is whether a multi-item measure of a 
construct actually measures the intended construct. Correlation of items with social 
desirability bias can present information regarding the validity of a scale (Spector, 1992). 
Social desirability bias is an individual trait which examines whether respondents are likely 
to respond to measures in a manner that is not “true”, but biased towards making 
themselves appear favourable according to social standards. If a measure is influenced by 
respondent’s social desirability bias then it cannot be a unidimensional or valid measure of 
the intended construct. As such, the measures are examined for the potential presence of 
social desirability bias in section 6.4 below. 
To provide evidence of validity and unidimensionality, existing scales were subject to 
exploratory factor analysis and internal consistency analysis. Internal consistency examines 
whether scale items have high intercorrelations, not only with each other but also with the 
total of items (DeVellis, 1991). If a scale has high internal consistency, then a high quantity 
of the scale variance is believed to come from a common source (DeVellis 1991). This 
common source is assumed to be the latent construct under investigation. Internal 
consistency is often measured with Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Churchill 1979). 
Cronbach’s alpha assesses the reliability of the scale which is the extent to which 
independent but comparable measures of the same construct agree (Churchill, 1979).  For 
a scale to be valid and possess practical utility, it must be reliable. Conceptually, reliability is 
defined as the degree to which measures are free from error and therefore yield consistent 
results (Peter, 1979). Peterson (1994) provides a meta-analysis of magnitudes of coefficient 
alpha obtained in behavioural research and identifies the minimum   requisite is .7 for the 
research design employed in this study. Exploratory factor analysis directly addresses the 
- 215 - 
unidimensionality issue by using the inter-item correlations to determine whether there is an 
underlying latent variable responsible for the pattern of correlations observed in the data 
(Sharma, 1996). Such results reveal whether there is a single factor underlying the measure 
(unidimensional) or multiple factors (multidimensional and thus invalid).  
6.3 Analysis of measures: Exploratory factor analysis and 
internal consistency 
Exploratory factor analysis directly addresses the unidimensionality issue by using the inter-
item correlations to determine whether there is an underlying latent variable responsible for 
the pattern of correlations observed in the data (Sharma, 1996). Such results reveal 
whether there is a single factor underlying the measure (unidimensional) or multiple factors 
(multidimensional and thus invalid). Exploratory factor analysis is therefore appropriate for 
the multi-item measures employed in this study. 
Each measure was analysed for internal consistency using Cronbach’s alpha, and entered 
into an exploratory factor analysis. Since the scales being analysed were pre-existing, and 
therefore had been subjected to significant amounts of prior analysis, a lower bound of .7 
was used when evaluating internal consistency scores (Churchill, 1979; Nunnally, 1978).  
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted upon each scale individually and they were 
purified as a result. To provide a statistical measure of item homogeneity, the Bartlett’s test 
for sphericity was used. This check provides a statistical test for the presence of 
correlations amongst the variables (Hair et al., 2006). A significant Bartlett’s test result 
suggests that the correlation matrix is not orthogonal (the variables are intercorrelated) 
(Sharma 1996).  
Given that this analysis is intended to identify groups of variables that measure specific 
constructs, it should be obvious that some variables should correlate to have an appropriate 
dataset for factoring (Field, 2005). Therefore the Bartlett’s test should be significant (Field, 
2005). However, this test is sensitive to sample size (Hair et al, 2008; Sharma 1996), and 
thus it should not be used solely to assess appropriateness of the data for the exploratory 
factor analysis when the sample for this study n=681. As a result, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was also used. This index (ranging from 0 to 1) 
determines the extent to which variables are homogenous (Sharma 1996). A value of 0 
indicates that the sum of partial correlations is large, relative to the sum of correlations, 
indicating diffusion in the pattern of correlations (hence, factor analysis is likely to be 
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inappropriate). A value close to 1 indicates that patterns of correlations are relatively 
compact and so factor analysis should yield distinct and reliable factors (Field, 2005). While 
there are no statistical tests for the KMO measure, it is generally considered that values 
above .5 imply that the data is appropriate for factor analysis (Hair et al, 2008; Sharma 
1996). Furthermore, values between .6 and .7 are considered as mediocre, values between 
.7 and .8 are good, values between .8 and .9 are great and values above .9 are superb 
(Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999). When examining the loadings of each item on the 
extracted factors, a minimal loading of .3 was used as the lower bound to indicate a 
significant factor loading, commonly considered a threshold level (Spector, 1992).  
The exploratory factor analysis procedure used in all analyses was principal axis factoring 
with an Oblimin oblique rotation. As the dataset for this study has an underlying structure 
due to the experimental design, the measures are analysed using traditional principal axis 
factoring. The use of oblique rotation is in contrast to the original development process of 
many of the measures, where orthogonal rotations were used. An oblique factor rotation 
was used here for a number of theoretical reasons. It is recognised that orthogonal rotations 
such as Varimax are the rule, rather than the exception, particularly within marketing (Hair 
et al, 2008). However, the popularity of orthogonal rotation methods may originate mainly 
from non-theoretical reasons, such as convenience (as Varimax is the default procedure 
within most statistical packages such as SPSS) and tradition (Lee and Hooley 2005). 
However, orthogonal rotations assume that the factors are uncorrelated (Sharma, 1996), 
which is an unlikely event when one is considering psychological variables as in this study. 
As Cattell (1978, p104) states “it makes sense for factors to be correlated rather than 
represented artificially in rigid orthogonality, because influences in the real world do get 
correlated”. In the present case, there was no theoretical reason to suggest uncorrelated 
factors in any situation in which factor analysis was used, thus oblique rotations were 
implemented.  
When an oblique rotation is conducted, the factor matrix is split into two matrices: the 
pattern matrix and the structure matrix. The pattern matrix contains the factor loadings and 
is comparable to the factor matrix that is interpreted in an orthogonal rotation. The structure 
matrix takes into account the relationship between factors. In fact, it is a product of the 
pattern matrix and the matrix containing the correlation coefficients between factors. The 
pattern matrix is preferable for interpretative reasons because it contains information about 
the unique contribution of a variable to a factor (Field, 2005). Therefore, the pattern 
matrices are reported in the exploratory factor analyses presented in the next sections.  
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The following section provides the results of the development of the existing measures, 
where each measure is discussed individually. An iterative process of exploratory factor 
analysis and internal consistency analysis was used to eliminate any items that appear to 
detract from the unidimensionality of the scale.  
6.3.1 Mediating variables 
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the multi-item measures of the mediating 
variables in the model, which is presented by each variable in turn below. 
6.3.1.1 Immediate emotions 
Immediate emotions were measured using scales as detailed in section 5.4.1.1 of Chapter 
5. The EFA results indicated that the items loaded onto four factors as presented in table 32 
below. 
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Frustrated    .797 
Angry    .804 
Irritated    .794 
Scared .941    
Afraid .963    
Panicky .773    
Fearful .956    
Depressed .550   .302 
Sad .655    
Miserable .567    
Happy  .905   
Pleased  .939   
Joyful  .977   
Delighted  .963   
Glad  .762   
Disgusted   -.815  
Repulsed   -1.021  
Revolted   -.945  
Nauseated   -.731  
Rotation converged in 6 iterations 
KMO = .920 
Bartlett’s test = 14881.571 
df: 171 
P= .000 
 
Table 32 - EFA Immediate emotions iteration 1 
Analysis of this pattern matrix suggested that Factor 4 represented anger items, factor 3 
represented disgust items, factor 2 represented happy items and factor 1 represented both 
fear and sadness items. The fear items loaded far more strongly onto factor 1 in comparison 
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to the sadness items and additionally, the depressed item loaded onto both factors 1 and 4. 
Given the theoretical underpinnings of the study, the fear items were identified as most 
important and therefore the depressed, sad and miserable items were removed from the 
analysis, to leave a purified measure of fear (rather than what appeared to be a confounded 
mixture of fear and sadness). The pattern matrix of the EFA with those items removed is 
presented in table 33 below. 
Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Frustrated    .837 
Angry    .827 
Irritated    .829 
Scared   -.936  
Afraid   -.988  
Panicky   -.764  
Fearful   -.928  
Happy  .904   
Pleased  .938   
Joyful  .978   
Delighted  .964   
Glad  .761   
Disgusted .823    
Repulsed 1.019    
Revolted .942    
Nauseated .740    
Rotation converged in 7 iterations 
KMO = .905 
Bartlett’s test = 12877.021 
df: 120 
P= .000 
 
Table 33 - EFA Immediate emotions iteration 2 
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Analysis of the pattern matrix suggests that factor 4 represents the anger items, factor 3 
represents the fear items, factor 2 represents the happy items and factor 1 represents the 
disgust items. However, the repulsed item loaded onto factor 1 over the value of 1. Given 
the slight variations in loadings of the factor items and the fact that disgust is measured as 
part of the manipulation check (as outlined in Chapter 5) the disgust item was removed and 
the EFA recalculated, as presented in table 34 below. 
Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Frustrated   .838  
Angry   .830  
Irritated   .832  
Scared .939    
Afraid .990    
Panicky .763    
Fearful .927    
Happy  .903   
Pleased  .938   
Joyful  .978   
Delighted  .963   
Glad  .763   
Repulsed    -.965 
Revolted    -.958 
Nauseated    -.729 
Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
KMO = .893 
Bartlett’s test = 11775.679 
df: 105 
P= .000 
 
Table 34 - EFA Immediate emotions iteration 3 
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Analysis of the pattern matrix suggests that factor 1 represents fear items, factor 2 
represents happy items, factor 3 represents anger items and factor 4 disgust items. As the 
correlation matrix obtained displayed all coefficients above 0.3 and the KMO and Bartlett’s 
test were both indicative of an appropriate data set the items were split according to the four 
factors identified. The Cronbach’s alpha for the four fear items is .959, for the five happy 
items is .957, for the three anger items is .882 and for the three disgust items is .936. All of 
these are above the threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). Overall 82% of variance is explained 
by these factor loadings.  
6.3.1.2 Anticipatory emotions 
Anticipatory emotions were measured using the scales identified and justified in section 
5.4.1.2. The initial results from this analysis are presented in table 35. 
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Unfulfilled .484   
Discontented .674   
Nervous .913   
Worried .920   
Tense .956   
Embarrassed .310   
Ashamed   -.535 
Optimistic  .829  
Encouraged  .824  
Hopeful  .912  
Excited  .661  
Guilty   -.783 
Accountable   -.895 
Bad .388  -.442 
Responsible   -.725 
Upset .669  -.358 
Rotation converged in 6 iterations 
KMO = .901 
Bartlett’s test = 7318.114 
df: 120 
P= .000 
 
Table 35 - EFA anticipatory emotions iteration 1 
The items loaded onto three different factors. Both bad and upset loaded onto two factors 
and were therefore removed from the next stage of analysis. A further review of these items 
identified unfulfilled and discontented are not central to the core anticipatory emotions under 
examination (as outlined in chapter 4)  and therefore these items were removed from the 
next stage of analysis. The results of the second iteration are presented in table 36.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Nervous   .890 
Worried   .902 
Tense   .911 
Embarrassed .433   
Ashamed .596   
Optimistic  .835  
Encouraged  .849  
Hopeful  .918  
Excited  .642  
Guilty .789   
Accountable .907   
Responsible .712   
Rotation converged in 7 iterations 
KMO = .854 
Bartlett’s test = 5491.688 
df: 66 
P= .000 
 
Table 36 - EFA anticipatory emotions iteration 2 
Analysis of the pattern matrix identifies that five items load onto the first factor which 
represents the guilt construct. Four items load onto the second factor which represents the 
optimism construct and three items load on the third factor that represent the worry 
construct. Overall, 66.74% of variance is explained by these factor loadings. Whilst the 
embarrassed and shame items had weaker loadings than the other items on this factor 
these items were retained. These results display all coefficients as above 0.3 and as the 
KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set, the items were split 
according to the three factors identified. The Cronbach’s alpha for the five guilt items is 
.858, the four optimism items is .883 and the five guilt items .931. These results are all 
above the threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). 
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6.3.1.3 Mental imagery 
Mental imagery is measured using the scale by Babin and Burns (1998). The exploratory 
factor analysis results for the whole scale are presented in table 37.  
Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
The advert made me imagine or picture something in my 
mind 
.432 -.490 
The imagery which occurred was clear .909  
The imagery that occurred was detailed .919  
The imagery that occurred was vivid .893  
I really only experienced one image  .571 
I imagined a number of things  -.872 
Many images came to my mind  -.836 
Rotation converged in 9 iterations 
KMO = .812 
Bartlett’s test = 3974.347 
df: 21 
P= .000 
 
Table 37 - Mental imagery EFA iteration 1 
As indicated, the items loaded onto two different factors. However, the first item “The advert 
made me imagine or picture something in my mind” loaded onto both factors and as such 
this item was removed and the analysis run again. The results from the second iteration of 
exploratory factor analysis are presented in table 38 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
The imagery which occurred was clear .898  
The imagery that occurred was 
detailed 
.924  
The imagery that occurred was vivid .896  
I really only experienced one image  .561 
I imagined a number of things .326 -.858 
Many images came to my mind .325 -.838 
Rotation converged in 6 iterations 
KMO = .760 
Bartlett’s test = 3478.284 
df: 15 
P= .000 
 
Table 38 - Mental imagery EFA iteration 2 
The second iteration of analysis presented maintains the presence of two distinct factors. 
However, the items “I imagined a number of things” and “Many images came to mind” 
loaded onto both factors. As such, these items were identified for removal. Given this would 
leave one item “I really only experienced on image” concerns the concept of generating 
multiple images along with the two factors identified for removal, this item was also 
removed.  
Scale Items Factor 1 
The imagery which occurred was clear .884 
The imagery that occurred was detailed .940 
The imagery that occurred was vivid .906 
1 factor extracted. 7 iterations required 
KMO = .762 
Bartlett’s test = 1742.492 
df: 3 
P= .000 
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Table 39 - Mental imagery EFA iteration 3 
Analysis of the pattern matrix identifies that three items load onto one factor which 
represents the mental imagery construct. Overall, 82.81% of variance is explained by these 
factor loadings. These results display all coefficients as above 0.3 and as the KMO and 
Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. The Cronbach’s alpha for the 
mental imagery items retained is .935 and above threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). The 
remaining items represent the core construct of mental imagery elaboration and as such, 
these three items capture the meaning of the construct as presented in chapter 4.  
6.3.1.4 Defensive avoidance 
Defensive avoidance was measured using the two item scale developed by Witte et al 
(1995). Cronbach’s alpha was above the .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978) at .727. The 
correlation matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed several coefficients above 0.3. 
In addition the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. 
Exploratory factor analysis extracted one factor explaining 57.04% of variance, thus both 
items were retained.  This analysis is shown in Table 40 below. 
Scale Items Factor 1 
When I drive I tend to avoid thoughts of speeding 
accidents 
.755 
When I speed I tend to avoid thoughts of speeding 
accidents 
.755 
1 factor extracted.8 iterations required 
KMO = .500 
Bartlett’s test = 268.151 
df: 1 
P= .000 
 
Table 40 - Defensive avoidance EFA 
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6.3.1.5 Susceptibility 
Susceptibility was measured using the three item scale developed by Witte et al (1995). 
Cronbach’s alpha was above the .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978) at .849. The correlation 
matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed several coefficients above 0.3. In addition 
the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. Exploratory 
factor analysis extracted one factor explaining 66.16% of variance, thus all three items were 
retained.  This analysis is shown in Table 41 below. 
Scale Items Factor 1 
I am at risk of having an accident from speeding .895 
It is likely that I will have an accident from 
speeding 
.792 
It is possible that I will have an accident from 
speeding 
.747 
1 factor extracted. 12 iterations required 
KMO = .715 
Bartlett’s test = 909.542 
df: 3 
P= .000 
 
Table 41 - Susceptibility EFA 
6.3.1.6 Severity 
Severity was measured using the three item scale developed by Witte et al (1995). 
Cronbach’s alpha was above the .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978) at .862. The correlation 
matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed several coefficients above 0.3. In addition 
the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. Exploratory 
factor analysis extracted one factor explaining 71.75% of variance, thus all three items were 
retained.  This analysis is shown in Table 42 below. 
  
- 228 - 
Scale Items Factor 1 
I believe that having an accident from speeding is severe .678 
I believe that having an accident from speeding has serious negative 
consequences 
.952 
I believe that having an accident from speeding is extremely harmful .880 
1 factor extracted. 13 iterations required 
KMO = .689 
Bartlett’s test = 1213.650 
df: 3 
P= .000 
 
Table 42 - Severity EFA 
6.3.1.7 Response efficacy 
Response efficacy was measured using the three item scale developed by Witte et al 
(1995). Cronbach’s alpha was above the .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978) at .899. The 
correlation matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed several coefficients above 0.3. 
In addition the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. 
Exploratory factor analysis extracted one factor explaining 75.65% of variance, thus all 
three items were retained. This analysis is shown in Table 43 below. 
Scale Items Factor 1 
Obeying the speed limit is effective in preventing accidents .916 
Obeying the speed limit works in preventing  accidents .926 
If I obey the speed limit I am less likely to have an accident .758 
1 factor extracted. 8 iterations required 
KMO = .722 
Bartlett’s test = 1369.710 
df: 3 
P= .000 
 
Table 43 - Response efficacy EFA 
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6.3.1.8 Self-efficacy 
Self-efficacy was measured using the three item scale developed by Witte et al (1995). 
Cronbach’s alpha was above the .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978) at .893. The correlation 
matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed several coefficients above 0.3. In addition 
the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. Exploratory 
factor analysis extracted one factor explaining 74.03% of variance, thus all three items were 
retained.  This analysis is shown in Table 44 below. 
Scale Items Factor 1 
I am able to obey the speed limit to prevent getting having an accident .823 
I have the ability to obey the speed limit to prevent having an accident .884 
I can easily obey the speed limit to prevent having an accident .873 
1 factor extracted. 7 iterations required 
KMO = .747 
Bartlett’s test = 1220.151 
df: 3 
P= .000 
 
Table 44 - Self-efficacy EFA 
6.3.2 Control variables 
6.3.2.1 Attitude to speeding 
Attitude to Speeding was measured using the six item scale developed by Lewis et al (2007). 
Cronbach’s alpha was above the .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978) at .938. The correlation 
matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed several coefficients above 0.3. In addition 
the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. Exploratory 
factor analysis extracted one factor explaining 75.52% of variance, thus all six items were 
retained.  This analysis is shown in Table 45 below. 
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Scale Items Factor 1 
Unacceptable – Acceptable .871 
Foolish- wise .864 
Wrong – right .866 
Unfavourable – favourable .857 
Bad – Good .899 
Risky – safe .745 
1 factor extracted. 4 iterations required 
KMO = .929 
Bartlett’s test = 3458.694 
df: 15 
P= .000 
 
Table 45 - Attitude to speeding EFA 
6.3.2.2 Anxiety sensitivity 
Anxiety Sensitivity was measured using the Anxiety Sensitivity Index scale by Peterson and 
Heilbronner (1987). The results from the initial analysis in the pattern matrix are shown in 
table 46 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
It is important to me not to appear 
nervous 
  .620  
When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I 
worry that I might be going crazy 
   -.589 
It scares me when I feel “shaky” 
(trembling) 
 .668   
It scares me when I feel faint  .786   
It is important to me to stay in control of 
my emotions 
  .542  
It scares me when my heart beats rapidly .335  .542  
It embarrasses me when my stomach 
growls 
.363    
It scares me when I am nauseous .432    
When I notice my heart is beating rapidly, 
I worry I might have had a heart attack 
.601    
It scares me when I become short of 
breath 
.498    
When my stomach is upset I worry that I 
might be seriously ill 
.681    
It scares me when I am unable to keep 
my mind on a task 
   -.627 
Other people notice when I feel shaky    -.349 
Unusual body sensations scare me .360    
When I am nervous I worry that I might 
be mentally i'll 
   -.778 
It scares me when I am nervous    -.771 
Rotation converged in 13 iterations 
KMO = .885 
Bartlett’s test = 3641.060 
df: 120 
P= .000 
 
Table 46 - Anxiety sensitivity EFA iteration 1 
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The pattern matrix reveals that the items loaded onto four factors. The item ‘It scares me 
when my heart beats rapidly’ loaded onto two factors and therefore was removed from the 
analysis. The analysis was then re-run and the results are shown in table 47 below.  
Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
It is important to me not to appear 
nervous 
  .610  
When I cannot keep my mind on a task, 
I worry that I might be going crazy 
.597    
It scares me when I feel “shaky” 
(trembling) 
 .649   
It scares me when I feel faint  .759   
It is important to me to stay in control of 
my emotions 
  546  
It embarrasses me when my stomach 
growls 
   .402 
It scares me when I am nauseous    .493 
When I notice my heart is beating 
rapidly, I worry I might have had a heart 
attack 
   .557 
It scares me when I become short of 
breath 
   .507 
When my stomach is upset I worry that I 
might be seriously i'll 
   .725 
It scares me when I am unable to keep 
my mind on a task 
.616    
Other people notice when I feel shaky .317    
Unusual body sensations scare me    .380 
When I am nervous I worry that I might 
be mentally i'll 
.807    
It scares me when I am nervous .738    
Rotation converged in 11 iterations 
KMO = .874 
Bartlett’s test 3195.772 
df: 105 
P= .000 
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Table 47 - Anxiety sensitivity EFA iteration 2 
All items loaded onto four factors. Two items loaded onto the third factor; ‘It is important to 
me not to appear nervous’ and ‘It is important to me to stay in control of my emotions’. 
These factors tap into the need for individuals to appear in control which isn’t theoretically 
relevant and as such these items were removed. The exploratory factor analysis was then 
re-run with the retained items and is shown in table 48 below.  
Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I worry that 
I might be going crazy 
.634   
It scares me when I feel “shaky” (trembling)  .672  
It scares me when I feel faint  .706  
It embarrasses me when my stomach growls   .351 
It scares me when I am nauseous   .488 
When I notice my heart is beating rapidly, I worry I 
might have had a heart attack 
  .598 
It scares me when I become short of breath   .536 
When my stomach is upset I worry that I might be 
seriously i'll 
  .771 
It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on 
a task 
.654   
Other people notice when I feel shaky .330   
Unusual body sensations scare me   .410 
When I am nervous I worry that I might be mentally 
i'll 
.779   
It scares me when I am nervous .773   
Rotation converged in 12 iterations 
KMO = .884 
Bartlett’s test 3046.249 
df: 78 
P= .000 
 
Table 48 - Anxiety sensitivity EFA iteration 3 
- 234 - 
Analysis of the pattern matrix shows that the item ‘Other people notice when I feel shaky’ 
has a low loading at .330. Whilst this is above the threshold of .3, given the other items 
loading onto this factor are concerning mental anxiety and the need to have an efficient 
number of items this item was removed and the exploratory factor analysis was re-run as 
shown in table 49 below. 
Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I worry that I might 
be going crazy 
.557  
It scares me when I feel “shaky” (trembling)  .659 
It scares me when I feel faint  .829 
It embarrasses me when my stomach growls  .378 
It scares me when I am nauseous  .591 
When I notice my heart is beating rapidly, I worry I might 
have had a heart attack 
.325 .319 
It scares me when I become short of breath  .514 
When my stomach is upset I worry that I might be seriously 
i'll 
.430  
It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on a task .660  
Unusual body sensations scare me .344 .339 
When I am nervous I worry that I might be mentally i'll .858  
It scares me when I am nervous .695  
Rotation converged in 12 iterations 
KMO = .879 
Bartlett’s test 2892.036 
df: 66 
P= .000 
 
Table 49 - Anxiety sensitivity EFA iteration 4 
The pattern matrix shows that the items loaded onto two factors, however ‘When I notice my 
heart is beating rapidly, I worry I might have had a heart attack’ and ‘Unusual body 
sensations scare me’ loaded onto both factors and as such were removed and the 
exploratory factor analysis was re-run as shown in table 50 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I worry that I might 
be going crazy 
.589  
It scares me when I feel “shaky” (trembling)  .720 
It scares me when I feel faint  .832 
It embarrasses me when my stomach growls  .368 
It scares me when I am nauseous  .570 
It scares me when I become short of breath  .485 
When my stomach is upset I worry that I might be seriously ill .414  
It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on a task .671  
When I am nervous I worry that I might be mentally i'll .828  
It scares me when I am nervous .710  
Rotation converged in 8 iterations 
KMO = .849 
Bartlett’s test 2309.705 
df: 45 
P= .000 
 
Table 50 - Anxiety sensitivity EFA iteration 5 
Analysis of the pattern matrix shows that the items loaded onto two factors. The following 
items loaded onto factor one and relate to the construct of cognitive anxiety; ‘When I cannot 
keep my mind on a task, I worry that I might be going crazy’, ‘When my stomach is upset I 
worry that I might be seriously ill’, ‘It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on a 
task’, ‘When I am nervous I worry that I might be mentally ill’ and ‘It scares me when I am 
nervous’. The items that loaded onto the second factor relate to psychical manifestations of 
anxiety and are ‘It scares me when I feel “shaky” (trembling)’, ‘It scares me when I feel 
faint’, ‘It embarrasses me when my stomach growls’, ‘It scares me when I become short of 
breath’. As such, these two factors and associated items are retained and named anxiety 
sensitivity (mental) and anxiety sensitivity (physical) for efficiency purposes. These items 
explain 44.86% of variance. The Cronbach’s alpha for anxiety sensitivity (mental) is .802 
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and the Cronbach’s alpha for anxiety sensitivity (physical) is .765, both above the threshold 
of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). 
6.3.2.3 Style of processing 
Style of processing was measured using the scale by Childers et al (1985). As per the 
instructions of this scale the visual processing items and the verbal processing items were 
analysed separately. The visual style of processing items were analysed first and the results 
from the exploratory factor analysis of all the items is shown in table 51 below.  
Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
There are some special times in my life that I like to 
revive by mentally “picturing” just how everything 
looked. 
.589   
When I’m trying to learn something new, I’d rather 
watch a demonstration than read how to do it. 
  .511 
When I’m trying to learn something new, I’d rather 
watch a demonstration than read how to do it. 
   
I like to daydream.  .899  
I generally prefer to use a diagram rather than a 
written set of instructions. 
  .473 
I like to “doodle”.  .377  
I find it helps to think in terms of mental pictures 
when doing many things. 
.548   
After I meet someone for the first time I can usually 
remember what they look like but not much about 
them 
   
When I have forgotten something I frequently try to 
form a mental “picture” to remember it. 
.689   
I prefer activities that don’t require a lot of reading.   .579 
I seldom daydream.  .686  
My thinking often consists of mental “pictures” or 
images. 
.673   
Rotation converged in 8 iterations 
KMO = .793 
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Bartlett’s test = 1847.552 
df: 66 
P= .000 
 
Table 51 - Visual processing EFA iteration 1 
The pattern matrix shows that two items did not load in the pattern matrix. These were 
‘When I’m trying to learn something new, I’d rather watch a demonstration than read how to 
do it’ and  ‘After I meet someone for the first time I can usually remember what they look like 
but not much about them’. As these items did not load they were removed and the 
exploratory factor analysis was re-run. The results are shown in table 52 below.  
Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
There are some special times in my life that I like to 
revive by mentally “picturing” just how everything 
looked. 
.582   
When I’m trying to learn something new, I’d rather 
watch a demonstration than read how to do it. 
  .561 
I like to daydream.  .798  
I generally prefer to use a diagram rather than a 
written set of instructions. 
  .566 
I like to “doodle”.  .373  
I find it helps to think in terms of mental pictures 
when doing many things. 
.529   
When I have forgotten something I frequently try to 
form a mental “picture” to remember it. 
.716   
I prefer activities that don’t require a lot of reading.   .439 
I seldom daydream.  .746  
My thinking often consists of mental “pictures” or 
images. 
.660   
Rotation converged in 7 iterations 
KMO = .775 
Bartlett’s test = 1618.472 
df: 45 
P= .000 
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Table 52 - Visual processing EFA iteration 2 
Analysis of the pattern matrix shows that the items loaded onto three factors. The first factor 
relates to items that capture the visual processing construct, in other words, the core ability 
to use mental pictures to aid memory recall and organise activities. The second factor 
consists of items that relate to daydreaming and doodling. The capacity to daydream is not 
relevant to present study and doodling loaded weakly onto this factor, so there is no strong 
theoretical justification underpinning for these items and as such they are identified for 
removal. The third factor concerns extracting information from visual methods (e.g. diagram 
or demonstration) and is retained. The exploratory factor analysis was re-run without the 
items that loaded onto factor two and the results are shown in table 53 below.  
Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
There are some special times in my life that I like to revive by 
mentally “picturing” just how everything looked. 
.589  
When I’m trying to learn something new, I’d rather watch a 
demonstration than read how to do it. 
 .660 
I generally prefer to use a diagram rather than a written set of 
instructions. 
 .458 
I find it helps to think in terms of mental pictures when doing 
many things. 
.628  
When I have forgotten something I frequently try to form a 
mental “picture” to remember it. 
.679  
I prefer activities that don’t require a lot of reading.  .417 
My thinking often consists of mental “pictures” or images. .665  
Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
KMO = .816 
Bartlett’s test = 1070.657 
df: 21 
P= .000 
 
Table 53 - Visual processing EFA iteration 3 
The retained items loaded onto two factors which explain 41.03% of variance. However 
whilst Cronbach’s alpha for the items associated with mental pictures was .769 and above 
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the .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978), the items associated with visual information had a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .537 and therefore did not meet the appropriate criteria. As such the 
four mental picture items were retained and the exploratory factor analysis was re-run which 
is shown in table 54 below.   
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Scale Items Factor 1 
There are some special times in my life that I like to revive by mentally 
“picturing” just how everything looked. 
.507 
I find it helps to think in terms of mental pictures when doing many things. .719 
When I have forgotten something I frequently try to form a mental “picture” 
to remember it. 
.706 
My thinking often consists of mental “pictures” or images. .762 
1 Factor Extracted. 7 iterations 
KMO = .768 
Bartlett’s test = 694.097 
df: 6 
P= .000 
 
Table 54 - Visual processing EFA iteration 4 
Analysis of the pattern matrix shows that all four items loaded onto one factor. These items 
associate with the construct of mental pictures. These results display all coefficients as 
above 0.3 and as the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data 
set. The Cronbach’s alpha for the four visual style of processing items is .769 and above the 
threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). These items explain 43.37% of variance.   
Next the verbal style of processing items were analysed using exploratory factor analysis 
and the initial results are presented in table 55 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
I enjoy doing work that requires the use of words   .464 
I can never seem to find the right word when I need it  .612  
I do a lot of reading   .671 
I think I often use words in the wrong way  .833  
I enjoy learning new words .929   
I often make written notes to myself    
I like to think of synonyms for words .424   
I like learning new words .968   
I prefer to read instructions about how to do 
something rather than have someone show me 
   
I spend very little time attempting to increase my 
vocabulary 
.300   
Rotation converged in 6 iterations 
KMO = .774 
Bartlett’s test = 1958.159 
df: 45 
P= .000 
 
Table 55 - Verbal processing EFA iteration 1 
The items loaded onto three factors. However, ‘I often make written notes to myself’ and ‘I 
prefer to read instructions about how to do something rather than have someone show me’ 
did not load onto either factor and as such, were removed from the next iteration of 
analysis. These results are shown in table 56 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
I enjoy doing work that requires the use of words .434  
I can never seem to find the right word when I need it  .720 
I do a lot of reading .359  
I think I often use words in the wrong way  .669 
I enjoy learning new words .953  
I like to think of synonyms for words .530  
I like learning new words .945  
I spend very little time attempting to increase my vocabulary .453  
Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
KMO = .776 
Bartlett’s test = 1893.751 
df: 28 
P= .000 
 
Table 56 - Verbal processing EFA iteration 2 
Analysis of the pattern matric shows that the items load on to two factors. The five items 
that load onto the first factor items are specifically to do with the use of words, yet, the items 
loading onto factor two are related to not being able to use words correctly, which is not 
theoretically relevant to this study. As such, these items were removed and the exploratory 
factor analysis was re-run, which is shown in table 57 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 
I enjoy doing work that requires the use of words .546 
I do a lot of reading .469 
I enjoy learning new words .882 
I like to think of synonyms for words .528 
I like learning new words .867 
I spend very little time attempting to increase my vocabulary .522 
1 factor extracted. 6 iterations required. 
KMO = .769 
Bartlett’s test = 1549.249 
df: 15 
P= .000 
 
Table 57 - Verbal processing EFA iteration 3 
Analysis of the pattern matrix shows that the items loaded onto one factor. The following 
items loaded onto factor one which were; ‘I enjoy learning new words’, ‘I like to think of 
synonyms for words’, ‘I like learning new words’ and ‘I spend very little time attempting to 
increase my vocabulary’. As such, these items are retained and named verbal style of 
processing. These items explain 43.28 % of variance. The Cronbach’s alpha for anxiety 
sensitivity mental is .791, above the threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). 
6.3.2.4 Construal  
Construal was measured using the scale by Singelis (1994). As per the instructions of this 
scale the independent items and the interdependent items were analysed separately. The 
independent items were analysed first and the results from the exploratory factor analysis of 
all the items is shown in table 58 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
My personal identity, independent of 
others is very important to me 
.690    
I enjoy being unique and different from 
others 
.676    
Being able to take care of myself is a 
primary concern for me 
   .543 
I take responsibility for my own actions .310    
Speaking up at work/ task group/ class is 
not a problem for me 
  .496  
Having a lively imagination is important to 
me 
.443    
I’d rather say “no” directly then risk being 
misunderstood 
  .385  
I am comfortable being singled out for 
praise or rewards 
  .337  
I am the same person at home that I am 
at work/ university 
 -.917   
I act the same way no matter who I am 
with 
 -.779   
I feel comfortable using someone’s first 
name soon after I meet them, even when 
they are much older than I am 
  .477  
I prefer to be direct and forthright when 
dealing with people I have just met 
  .686  
I value being in good health above 
everything 
   .665 
Rotation converged in 9 iterations 
KMO = .766 
Bartlett’s test = 1979.780 
df: 78 
P= .000 
 
Table 58 - Independent items EFA iteration 1 
The factor analysis demonstrates that the items loaded onto four factors. Considering the 
constructs, factor two is concerned with consistency in context or setting, which is not 
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theoretically relevant to this study. Factor three includes items that concern being direct in 
communication which is also not theoretically relevant for this study. However, the items 
that loaded onto factor one concern the central construct of internal abilities, thoughts and 
feelings and as such these items were retained. The items that loaded onto factor four 
concern self-protection which is theoretically relevant and therefore these items were also 
retained. The exploratory factor analysis was then re-run which is presented in table 59 
below.  
Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
My personal identity, independent of others is very important 
to me 
.644  
I enjoy being unique and different from others 
.760  
Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me  .505 
I take responsibility for my own actions .397  
Having a lively imagination is important to me .510  
I value being in good health above everything  .701 
Rotation converged in 6 iterations 
KMO = .771 
Bartlett’s test = 742.522 
df: 15 
P= .000 
 
Table 59 - Independent items EFA iteration 2 
The results from the pattern matrix show that the items loaded onto two factors. Factor one 
concerns the core construct of individuals internal abilities and had a Cronbachs alpha of 
.704 which is above the .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978). However, the second factor which 
concerns self-protection had a Cronbach’s alpha of .555 which does not reach the .7 
(Nunnally, 1978) threshold. Therefore these items were removed and the exploratory factor 
analysis was re-run. The results are shown in table 60 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 
My personal identity, independent of others is very important to me .731 
I enjoy being unique and different from others 
.642 
I take responsibility for my own actions .544 
Having a lively imagination is important to me .539 
1 factor extracted. Converged in 9 iterations 
KMO = .730 
Bartlett’s test = 474.012 
df: 6 
P= .000 
 
Table 60 - Independent items EFA iteration 3 
Analysis of the pattern matrix identifies that four items load onto one factor. Overall, 38.30% 
of variance is explained by these factor loadings. These results display all coefficients as 
above 0.3 and as the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data 
set.  The Cronbach’s alpha is .704, above the threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). The 
interdependent items were then subject to exploratory factor analysis which is presented in 
table 61 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
My relationships with those in my group are more important 
than my personal accomplishments 
.611  
My happiness depends on the happiness of those in my group 
.721  
I am careful to maintain harmony in my group .502  
I would sacrifice my self-interests for the benefit of the group .634  
I will stay in a group I they need me, even if I’m not happy with 
the group 
.500  
I respect the decisions made by my group  .517 
If my brother or sisters fail, I feel responsible   
I have respect for authority figures with whom I interact  .750 
I respect people who are modest about themselves  .527 
Even when I strongly disagree with group members I avoid an 
argument 
  
Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
KMO = .780 
Bartlett’s test = 1272.523 
df: 45 
P= .000 
 
Table 61 - Interdependent items EFA Iteration 1 
Analysis of the pattern matrix shows that ‘If my brother or sisters fail, I feel responsible’ and 
‘Even when I strongly disagree with group members I avoid an argument’ did not load onto 
either of the two factors and therefore these items were removed and the analysis was re-
run. The results are shown in table 62 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
My relationships with those in my group are more important 
than my personal accomplishments 
.604  
My happiness depends on the happiness of those in my group 
.727  
I am careful to maintain harmony in my group .464  
I would sacrifice my self-interests for the benefit of the group .626  
I will stay in a group I they need me, even if I’m not happy with 
the group 
.458  
I respect the decisions made by my group  .533 
I have respect for authority figures with whom I interact  .743 
I respect people who are modest about themselves  .538 
Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
KMO = .776 
Bartlett’s test = 1124.380 
df: 28 
P= .000 
 
Table 62 - Interdependent items EFA iteration 2 
The items that load onto factor one all concern group belonging, fitting in and relationships 
which are core to the interdependent construct. The three items that load onto the second 
factor concern occupying ones proper place and engaging in appropriate action.  The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the first factor is .735 and above the .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978). 
However, the Cronbach’s alpha for the second factor is .639 which does not reach the 
required .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978). The items that loaded onto the second factor were 
removed and the analysis was re-run. The results are shown in table 63 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 
My relationships with those in my group are more important than my 
personal accomplishments 
.555 
My happiness depends on the happiness of those in my group 
.666 
I am careful to maintain harmony in my group .575 
I would sacrifice my self-interests for the benefit of the group .688 
I will stay in a group I they need me, even if I’m not happy with the group .512 
1 Factor extracted. 6 iterations required 
KMO = .759 
Bartlett’s test = 684.995 
df: 10 
P= .000 
 
Table 63 - Interdependent items EFA iteration 3 
Analysis of the pattern matrix identifies that five items load onto one factor. Overall, 36.35% 
of variance is explained by these factor loadings. These results display all coefficients as 
above 0.3 and as the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data 
set.  The Cronbach’s alpha is .735 above the threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). 
6.3.2.5 Perspective taking 
Perspective taking was measured using the scale by Davis (date). All the items for the 
scale were entered into exploratory factor analysis and the results are presented in table 64 
below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
Before criticising somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel 
in their place 
.733  
If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time 
listening to other peoples arguments 
 .500 
I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining 
how things look from their perspective 
.780  
I believe there are two sides to every question and ty to look 
at them both 
.606  
I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" 
point of view 
 .429 
I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I 
make a decision 
.652  
When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his 
shoes" for a while 
.704  
Rotation converged in 4 iterations 
KMO = .843 
Bartlett’s test = 1338.049 
df: 21 
P= .000 
 
Table 64 - Perspective taking items EFA iteration 1 
The perspective taking items loaded onto two factors. ‘If I’m sure I’m right about something, 
I don’t waste much time listening to other peoples arguments’ and ‘I sometimes find it 
difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view’ both loaded onto the second factor 
and concern other individuals points of view. These items are not theoretically relevant and 
as such were removed and the analysis was run again. The results are presented in table 
65 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 
Before criticising somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel in their 
place 
.713 
I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things 
look from their perspective 
.759 
I believe there are two sides to every question and ty to look at them both .677 
I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a 
decision 
.722 
When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for 
a while 
.660 
1 Factor extracted. 6 iterations required 
KMO = .832 
Bartlett’s test = 1190.059 
df: 10 
P= .000 
 
Table 65 - Perspective taking items EFA iteration 2 
Analysis of the pattern matrix identifies that five items load onto one factor. Overall, 49.99% 
of variance is explained by these factor loadings. These results display all coefficients as 
above 0.3 and as the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data 
set.  The Cronbach’s alpha is .829 above the threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). 
6.3.2.6 Empathetic concern 
Empathetic concern was measured using the scale by Davis (1980). All the items for the 
scale were entered into exploratory factor analysis and the results are presented in table 66 
below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of 
protective toward them 
.499  
When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't 
feel very much pity for them 
-.775  
I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less 
fortunate than me 
.758  
I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person  -.615 
Sometimes I don't feel sorry for other people when they are 
having problems 
 .666 
Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great 
deal 
 .603 
I am often quite touched by things that I see happen .671  
Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
KMO = .818 
Bartlett’s test = 1445.304 
df: 21 
P= .000 
 
Table 66 - Empathetic concern items EFA iteration 1 
Analysis of the pattern matrix shows that the items ‘When I see someone being treated 
unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them’ and ‘I would describe myself as a 
pretty soft-hearted person’ had negative loadings. As such, these two items were removed 
and the analysis was repeated. The results are shown in table 67 below.  
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Scale Items Factor 1 
When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective 
toward them 
.629 
I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me .721 
Sometimes I don't feel sorry for other people when they are having 
problems 
.483 
Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal .640 
I am often quite touched by things that I see happen .671 
1 factor extracted. 6 iterations required 
KMO = .772 
Bartlett’s test = 841.586 
df: 10 
P= .000 
 
Table 67 - Empathetic concern items EFA iteration 2 
Analysis of the pattern matrix identifies that five items load onto one factor. Overall, 40.19% 
of variance is explained by these factor loadings. These results display all coefficients as 
above 0.3 and as the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data 
set.  The Cronbach’s alpha is .756 above the threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). 
6.3.2.7 Message confound 
Message confound was measured using the four item scale developed by Witte et al 
(1995). Cronbach’s alpha was above the .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978) at .814. The 
correlation matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed several coefficients above 0.3. 
In addition the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. 
Exploratory factor analysis extracted one factor explaining 53.01% of variance, thus all four 
items were retained.  This analysis is shown in Table 68 below. 
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Scale Items Factor 1 
The message was clearly written .749 
I clearly understood this message .721 
I learned a lot about speeding from this message .624 
The quality of the arguments in the message were good .763 
1 factor extracted. 6 iterations required 
KMO = .669 
Bartlett’s test = 1213.747 
df: 6 
P= .000 
 
Table 68 - Message confound EFA 
6.3.2.8 Perceived manipulation  
Perceived manipulation was measured using the four item scale developed by Witte et al 
(1995). Cronbach’s alpha was above the .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978) at .825. The 
correlation matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed several coefficients above 0.3. 
In addition the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. 
Exploratory factor analysis extracted one factor explaining 54.77% of variance, thus all four 
items were retained.  This analysis is shown in Table 69 below. 
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Scale Items Factor 1 
The message was manipulative .762 
The message was misleading .612 
The message tried to manipulate me .835 
This message was exploitative .734 
1 factor extracted. 8 iterations required 
KMO = .782 
Bartlett’s test = 1003.803 
df: 6 
P= .000 
 
Table 69 - Perceived manipulation EFA 
6.3.2.9 Message derogation 
Message derogation was measured using the four item scale developed by Witte et al 
(1995). Cronbach’s alpha was above the .7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978) at .933. The 
correlation matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed several coefficients above 0.3. 
In addition the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. 
Exploratory factor analysis extracted one factor explaining 78.35% of variance, thus all four 
items were retained.  This analysis is shown in Table 70 below. 
Scale Items Factor 1 
This message was exaggerated .849 
This message was distorted .785 
This message was overblown .948 
This message was overstated .947 
1 factor extracted. 5 iterations required 
KMO = .834 
Bartlett’s test = 2543.192 
df: 6 
P= .000 
 
Table 70 - Message derogation EFA 
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6.4 Analysing social desirability bias 
In order to provide one indication of validity, each item of the existing multi-item scales 
employed in the study was examined for the effects of social desirability bias. Social 
desirability can influence results as respondents may select items of high social desirability 
and not select items of low social desirability regardless of whether the item describes their 
actual behaviour (Edwards, 1990). Strong correlations between social desirability bias and 
another variable are likely to indicate either self-deception about, or deliberate 
misrepresentation of respondent’s thoughts, feelings and behaviours (Borkenau and 
Ostendorf, 1989). 
Social desirability bias was measured using a five item social desirability bias measure 
developed by Hays, Hayashi and Stewart (1989) as a reliable short version of the longer 
thirty three item (and hence more cumbersome) Marlowe –Crowne scale (Crowne and 
Marlowe, 1960). In order to detect the potential presence of social desirability bias, each 
scale was correlated with the social desirability bias measure, with large and significant 
correlations taken as indications that the scale was influenced by social desirability bias. 
According to the guidelines developed by Cohen (1988), for a small correlation, the 
correlation coefficients range from .10 to .29; for a medium correlation from .30 to .49; and 
for a strong correlation from .50 to 1. If scales are found to be correlated with social 
desirability, the recommended procedure is to transform the scales against social 
desirability bias using the unstandardised regression residual (as discussed in section 6.3.6. 
The mediating, control and dependent variables were analysed in turn and the results are 
presented in the following three sections.  
6.4.1 Mediating variables 
The mediating emotion and cognition variables were analysed using Pearson correlation 
with the social desirability bias measure. The results are presented in table 71 below.  
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Construct Pearson Correlation Sig. (two tailed) 
Anger -.20 .600 
Fear -.097* .011 
Disgust -.087* .024 
Uncomfortable -.061 .114 
Worry -.074 .054 
Guilt -.008 .831 
Relief -.082* .032 
Mental Imagery -.011 .772 
Defensive Avoidance -.090* .018 
Susceptibility .003 .930 
Severity .098* .010 
Response Efficacy .145** .000 
Self-Efficacy .107** .005 
Anticipated Hope .083* .030 
Anticipated Delight .074 .052 
Anticipated Relief .018 .642 
Anticipated Depressed -.016 .684 
Anticipated Fear .029 .452 
Anticipated Ashamed -.003 .928 
Anticipated Humiliation .019 .619 
Anticipated Responsible .095* .013 
Anticipated Regret .096* .012 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
Table 71 - Correlations between mediating variables and social desirability bias 
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As can be seen from these results, no scales reached a medium or strong correlation with 
social desirability bias. However the scales for fear, disgust, relief, defensive avoidance, 
severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy and anticipated responsible and anticipated regret 
all exhibited a small significant correlation with social desirability bias. 
6.4.2 Control variables 
The control variables were analysed using Pearson correlation with the social desirability 
bias measure. The results are presented in table 72 below.  
Construct Pearson Correlation Sig. (two tailed) 
Graphicness -.044 .247 
Attitude to Speeding  -.173** .000 
Anxiety Sensitivity Mental -.106** .006 
Anxiety Sensitivity Physical -.105** .006 
Style of Processing Visual .046 .234 
Style of Processing Verbal -.059 .125 
Independent Construal .091* .018 
Interdependent Construal .104** .007 
Perspective Taking .174** .000 
Empathetic Concern .159** .000 
Confound .084* .029 
Perceived Manipulation -.119** .002 
Message Derogation -.139** .000 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
Table 72 - Correlations between control variables and social desirability bias 
As can be seen from these results, no scales reached a medium or strong correlation with 
social desirability bias. However the scales for attitude to speeding, anxiety sensitivity 
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mental, anxiety sensitivity physical, independent construal, interdependent construal, 
perspective taking, empathetic concern, message confound, perceived manipulation, 
message derogation all exhibited a small significant correlation with social desirability bias. 
6.4.3 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables were analysed using Pearson correlation with the social 
desirability bias measure. The results are presented in table 73 below.  
Construct Pearson Correlation Sig. (two tailed) 
Behavioural Intention -.120** .002 
Behavioural Expectation -.124** .001 
Behaviour Prediction -.113** .003 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
Table 73 - Correlations between dependent variables and social desirability bias 
As can be seen from these results, no scales reached a medium or strong correlation with 
social desirability bias. However, all the dependent variable measures, behaviour intention, 
behaviour expectation and behaviour prediction all exhibited a small significant correlation 
with social desirability bias. 
6.3.4 Dealing with social desirability bias through transformation 
One method of removing the contamination of social desirability bias in the measures is to 
delete entirely the specific items contaminated by social desirability bias and therefore 
remove the social desirability bias present in the scale (Spector, 1992). This method is 
disadvantageous because it reduces the number of items available to measure the 
construct. When evaluating existing scales this has the potential to be problematic given 
that item numbers are already low due to the purification procedures undertaken by the 
original scale developers. The measures of attention to message and attention to visual, for 
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example, each only have three items. The reduction of item numbers can lead to lower 
reliability and an overall lowering of variance captured by measures (Kline, 2000). 
In order to avoid such issues, when evaluating existing measures, scales / items6 correlated 
with social desirability bias were not deleted outright. Instead they were transformed by 
regressing them against social desirability bias and using the unstandardised regression 
residual, rather than the raw scale / item score (Ganster, Henessey and Luthans, 1983). 
This procedure enabled the removal of variance in the measures that was attributable to 
contamination by social desirability bias. 
Descriptive analysis of individual scales 
Following the construction of the measures based on existing scales, it was also necessary 
to examine the characteristics of the final scales. This was necessary to determine whether 
the measures were appropriate for further use in hypothesis testing. The descriptive 
analysis focused on the distribution of the measures, including a search for outliers and 
statistical testing of the distribution.  
Given the large sample size for this study (681) the Kolgomorov-Smirnoff (KS) test was not 
used to assess the normality of the distribution. The KS statistic is a test of the hypothesis 
that the distribution differs from a normal distribution. A non-significant KS test indicates that 
the observed distribution approximates normality (Hair et al, 2006). However, for large 
samples (200 or more), it is more important to look at the value of the skewness and 
kurtosis statistics rather than examine the significance of the KS test (Field, 2005, p 72) as 
the KS test is extremely sensitive to minor departures from normality (Sharma, 1996) and 
slight violating of the assumption of normality is quite common in larger samples (Pallant, 
2005, p57).  
The skewness value provides an indication of the symmetry of the distribution. Kurtosis, on 
the other hand, provides information about the “peakedness” of the distribution. If the 
distribution is perfectly normal the values of the skewness and kurtosis would be zero 
(Pallant, 2005, p51-52). Positive skewness values indicate positive skew (scores clustered 
to the left at the low values). Negative skewness values indicate a clustering of scores at 
                                               
6 Single items were transformed where they were the measurement method for a given construct 
(e.g. behavioural intention). Otherwise, the scale as a whole was transformed rather than individual 
items. 
- 261 - 
the high end (right hand-side of a graph) (Pallant, 2005, p51-52). Positive kurtosis values 
indicate that the distribution is rather peaked or “leptokurtic” (clustered in the centre). 
Kurtosis values below 0 indicate a distribution that is relatively flat or “platykurtic” (too many 
cases in the extremes). Kurtosis can result in an underestimate of the variance but this risk 
is reduced with a large sample (which is again defined as a sample of 200 or more; see 
Tabachnick and Fidell, p 75).  The skewness and kurtosis for each of the scales tapping into 
the constructs are presented in table 74 below. 
Scale Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
Anger .661 
-.599 
Fear .541 
-.816 
Disgust .927 
-.184 
Uncomfortable -.109 
-1.276 
Worry .656 
-.725 
Guilt 1.455 
1.735 
Relief 2.887 
8.258 
Mental Imagery -.160 
-.941 
Defensive avoidance -.192 
-.622 
Susceptibility .064 
-.813 
Severity -1.187 
1.555 
Response efficacy -.859 
.209 
Self-efficacy -1.080 
.922 
Anticipated Hope -.360 
-.897 
Anticipated delighted -.270 
-1.008 
Anticipated relieved -.734 
-.608 
Anticipated depressed -.885 
-.240 
Anticipated fearful -.910 
-.292 
Anticipated ashamed -1.353 
.862 
Anticipated humiliated -.723 
-.596 
Anticipated responsible -1.732 
2.758 
Anticipated regret -1.771 
2.513 
Attitude to Speeding .695 
.554 
Anxiety Sensitivity Mental .559 
-.157 
Anxiety Sensitivity physical -.183 
-.411 
Style of Processing visual -.191 
.062 
Style of Processing verbal .189 
-.298 
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Scale Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
Independent -1.042 
2.543 
Interdependent -.365 
.346 
Perspective Taking -.763 
1.396 
Empathetic Concern -.586 
.901 
Message confound -.102 
-.296 
Perceived Manipulation  .187 
-.429 
Message derogation .582 
-.111 
Behavioural Intention 1.106 
.423 
Behavioural Expectation .574 
-.787 
Behaviour Prediction 1.050 
1.262 
 
Table 74 - Skewness and Kurtosis for the scales 
It can be seen that skewness and kurtosis are present, however given the large sample size 
none of these values are cause for concern and there are no significant concerns about the 
normality of the variables and the scales are retained for future analysis.  The correlation 
coefficients for the present study are presented in appendix 6.1. As expected, the table 
reveals a number of significantly correlated variables, although there is no evidence of 
correlations high enough to be concerned about multi-collinearity at this point (Field, 2005). 
6.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter provided a descriptive analysis of the key variables of interest in the study. 
First the data obtained about the sample was described in terms of the characteristics of the 
sample. This chapter has also described the rigorous statistical analysis which was 
undertaken in order to evaluate the reliability and validity of the existing measures utilised in 
the present study. These statistical tests included assessments of internal consistency and 
exploratory factor analysis.  
These tests were performed using the IBM SPSS Statistics 20 software package. From the 
procedures undertaken all item and factor structures provided statistically acceptable 
values. As such, there were no concerns regarding the use of the data collected for the 
purpose of testing the theoretical model hypothesised in the present study. The following 
chapter (7) presents the process and results of the hypothesis testing. 
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Chapter 7 – Results 
Having developed a conceptual model and hypotheses in chapter 4, explained the 
methodology in chapter 5 and described the data in chapter 6; this chapter presents the 
results of the hypothesis testing. To be more specific, the characteristics of the sample of 
participants and responses to variables of interest have been described and examined in 
the previous chapter (chapter 6). The focus of this chapter is the analysis methods 
employed to examine the conceptual model and associated hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 4. To test the present study’s hypotheses, the data generated from the web 
experiment is used. As specified in Chapter 5, a 2 X 2 X 2 between subjects randomised 
experiment was conducted to generate the data for hypothesis testing. The sample size for 
each of the eight experimental conditions is summarised in table 75 below. 
Experimental 
Condition 
Message 
Frame 
Message 
Direction 
Graphic Image Sample Size  
1 Loss Avoidance Other Graphic 85 
2 Loss Avoidance Other No Graphic 87 
3 Loss Avoidance Self Graphic 91 
4 Loss Avoidance Self No Graphic 83 
5 Loss Other Graphic 86 
6 Loss Other No Graphic 83 
7 Loss Self Graphic 84 
8 Loss Self No Graphic 82 
Total 681 
 
Table 75 - Sample size for each experimental group 
This chapter comprises several sub-sections. Section 7.1 examines the results of the 
manipulation checks employed to verify the suitability of the experimental stimuli and the 
manipulation of the independent variables. Section 7.2 details the method for analysis, 
namely three way analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs). Section 7.3 is a detailed 
presentation of the results of the hypothesis testing. For purposes of clarity, the results are 
presented in subsections arranged according to the dependent variable under consideration 
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(e.g. immediate emotions, anticipated emotions, cognitive appraisals and elaboration) and it 
is clearly stated which hypotheses are tested in each sub section. Section 7.4 summarises 
and presents a brief discussion of the results, in anticipation of a fuller discussion in Chapter 
8.  
7.1 Manipulation checks 
Prior to conducting the required analysis to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4, a 
series of manipulation checks were carried out. To assess the effectiveness of the threat 
appeal intrinsic message characteristic manipulations (i.e. message frame, message 
direction and use of graphic image), a series of one-way ANOVAs of the eight experimental 
conditions (as outlined in table 7.1) and manipulation check measures as identified in 
section 5.4 and 5.5. 
First, a one way ANOVA was conducted to examine the impact of the experimental 
conditions of loss versus loss avoidance framed messages on subjects’ perceptions of loss. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either one of four treatments that used the loss 
frame or one of four treatments that used the loss avoidance frame as per the experimental 
conditions presented in table 7.1. Although Levene’s test was significant and thus the 
homogeneity assumption was violated, the Welch’s robust test of equality of means showed 
a significant difference across the frames (F= 7.648, p<.000)7.  The results show a 
statistically significant effect of the loss versus avoidance of loss experimental condition on 
perception of message frame in the expected direction. Specifically, as shown in table 76, 
the mean statistics demonstrate that loss avoidance frames have increased perceptions of 
loss avoidance and the loss framed messages caused lower perceptions of loss avoidance. 
These results confirm that the message frame manipulations were perceived by 
respondents as intended.  
  
                                               
7 According to Field (2009) Welch’s robust test should be reported when the assumption for 
homogeneity of an ANOVA is violated.  
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Experimental Conditions Perception of loss 
avoidance mean 
Perception of loss 
avoidance standard 
deviation 
1 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 4.26 2.28 
2 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 4.57 1.99 
3 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 4.38 2.41 
4 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 4.83 1.97 
5 (Graphic, Loss, Other) 3.01 2.06 
6 (No Graphic, Loss, Other) 3.52 1.96 
7 (Graphic, Loss, Self) 3.56 2.46 
8 (No Graphic, Loss, Self) 3.68 2.26 
 
Table 76 - Perception of loss means 
A one way ANOVA was also conducted to explore the impact of the experimental conditions 
of self versus other direction of message on subjects’ perceptions of the message direction. 
Again, participants were randomly assigned to either one of four treatments that used the 
self-frame or one of four treatments that used the other frame, as presented in table 7.1. In 
this case, the homogeneity assumption was met (p>.05 for Levene’s test).  The results 
show a statistically significant effect of the self versus other experimental condition on 
subjects’ perception of direction of message (F (7,673) = 22.557, p = .000), in the expected 
direction.  As shown in the table 77, the mean statistics demonstrate that other directed 
messages were perceived to be concerning others (as per the bipolar scale) and the self-
directed messages perceived to be about the self. These results confirm that the message 
frame manipulations were perceived by respondents as intended.  
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Experimental Conditions Direction mean Direction standard 
deviation 
1 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 5.15 2.00 
2 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 5.26 1.62 
3 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 3.49 1.96 
4 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 3.39 1.83 
5 (Graphic, Loss, Other) 5.15 1.85 
6 (No Graphic, Loss, Other) 5.23 1.77 
7(Graphic, Loss, Self) 3.39 1.97 
8 (No Graphic, Loss, Self) 3.30 1.94 
 
Table 77 - Message direction means 
As a final manipulation check, a one way ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact of 
the experimental conditions of graphic versus non-graphic images on subjects’ perceptions 
of graphicness. Participants were randomly assigned to either one of four treatments that 
used the graphic image or one of four treatments that used the non-graphic image as 
presented in table 7.1. The homogeneity assumption was met (p>.05 for Levene’s test). The 
results of the manipulation check show a statistically significant effect of the graphic versus 
non-graphic experimental condition on subjects’ perception of graphicness (F (7,673) = 
24.152, p = .000), in the expected direction. As shown in table 78, the means demonstrate 
that graphic images were perceived to have increased perceptions of graphicness, and non-
graphic images caused lower perceptions of graphicness, across the sample. These results 
confirm that the graphicness manipulations were perceived by respondents as intended.   
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Experimental Conditions Graphicness 
mean 
Graphicness Standard 
Deviation 
1 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 4.80 1.65 
2 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Other) 3.20 1.46 
3 (Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 4.44 1.64 
4 (No Graphic, Loss Avoidance, Self) 2.88 1.24 
5 (Graphic, Loss, Other) 4.36 1.47 
6 (No Graphic, Loss, Other) 3.31 1.40 
7(Graphic, Loss, Self) 4.29 1.38 
8 (No Graphic, Loss, Self) 2.69 1.38 
 
Table 78 - Use of graphic image means 
The results of the manipulation checks above (as well as the pre-testing process reported in 
Chapter 5) indicate that the manipulations of the intrinsic message characteristics contained 
in the threat appeal stimuli act as intended, and were perceived as such by the sample used 
to test the hypothesized theoretical model. As such, the stimuli were deemed to be 
appropriate and focus now moves on to testing of the research hypotheses. Prior to 
presenting the results of the hypothesis testing (in section 7.3) a justification for the method 
of data analysis utilised is presented in section 7.2 below.  
7.2 ANCOVA 
In chapter 4, a comprehensive set of research hypotheses was developed to test the novel 
conceptual framework developed in the present thesis, which examines emotional, cognitive 
and behavioural responses to threat appeals. Given the research design (i.e. a randomised 
experiment), the hypothesised relationships contained in the model, and the large number 
of variables under examination, the most appropriate statistical technique is a series of 
three way factorial ANCOVAs. Importantly, given the 2x2x2 between subjects design (as 
described in chapter 5), ANCOVA allows for an examination of the effects of a) individual 
intrinsic message characteristics (message frame, message direction and use of graphic 
image), as well as b) the interactions between these independent variables, upon the 
hypothesised dependent variables of interest. This is important, because a number of 
hypotheses specifically concern interactions between the treatments, and coupled with an 
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experimental design such as that used herein, ANCOVA is a powerful tool to test such 
hypotheses. Further, covariate analysis is particularly appropriate because it allows for a) 
the statistical control of covariates as control variables, and in the same way b) the 
incorporation of the mediating variables in the proposed conceptual model (Pallant, 2007). 
Indeed, given the large number of variables and hypothesised relationships, and the large 
sample size of the present study, other methods of statistical analysis are generally 
precluded. Interestingly, Iacobucci (2008 p. 5) suggests that in cases where an experiment 
has been conducted (such as the present case), that specific analyses predicated on 
uncovering mediation are unnecessary, due to their reliance on correlational data. Certainly, 
this is the case in a general sense, and the ANCOVA approach taken here follows from 
Iacobucci’s (2008) recommendations, in that the key independent variables are 
manipulated, and the specific hypotheses regarding their effects on subjects’ response 
variables (i.e. immediate emotion, anticipated emotion and cognition) are tested by 
ANCOVA. However, it remains relevant to explore the pattern of how those key response 
variables appear to influence key behaviour change variables, and in doing so, ANCOVA’s 
are also conducted, using the response variables as covariates, and the intrinsic message 
characteristics as independent variables. This approach strengthens the ability of the 
present study to determine how the intrinsic message characteristics that can be 
manipulated in a threat appeal may feed through to ultimate behaviour change – even 
though no direct relationships between those intrinsic message characteristics and 
behavioural variables are hypothesised in this study. In fact, as shall be seen, the analysis 
in this way uncovers a number of key issues that future research into threat appeals must 
take into account, and provides very strong support to the contentions made in the present 
thesis that many of the assumptions inherent to existing threat appeals work are unsound.   
The use of ANCOVA (and its simpler cousin ANOVA) is common across the threat appeals 
literature (e.g. Passyn and Sujan, 2006; Lewis et al, 2013; Block, 2005; Argrawal and 
Duhachek, 2010). However, before it can be confidently used, it requires the satisfaction of 
a number of assumptions about the data. These assumptions are summarised below (Field, 
2009; Pallant, 2007), along with the specific section of the thesis where they are discussed. 
Indeed, many of them have been covered in earlier chapters of the present thesis, but a 
number of key assumptions remain in need of assessment. Specifically, the assumptions 
necessary for an ANCOVA are; 
1. Measurement of the covariates as part of the research design (as presented in 
chapters 4 and 5) 
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2. Selection of the most reliable measures of the covariates (which are presented in 
chapter 5) 
 
3. Establishment of correlations between covariates (as undertaken in chapter 6) 
 
4. Identification of a linear relationship between variables and distribution of scores 
(as presented in chapter 6) 
  
5. Ascertaining there is no interaction between the covariate(s) and the experimental 
manipulation (i.e. in this case the threat appeal message characteristics). This is 
achieved through a check of the homogeneity of regression slopes (see below).  
For reasons of clarity, a full analysis of the homogeneity of regression slopes is presented in 
appendix 7.1. In brief however, all significance values for the relevant tests are greater than 
.05, and as such the assumption of the homogeneity of regression slopes has not been 
violated. As such, the ANCOVA analysis can proceed.  
7.3 Hypothesis testing 
This section of chapter 7 presents the results of the hypotheses testing, commencing with 
the results of the factorial ANCOVAs concerning the effects of threat appeal intrinsic 
message characteristics on immediate emotions, with control covariates (presented in 
section 7.3.1). Section 7.3.2 then presents the results of factorial ANCOVAs that identify the 
effects of threat appeal intrinsic message characteristics on anticipated emotions, with 
control covariates. Section 7.3.3 presents the results of factorial ANCOVAs concerning the 
effects of threat appeal intrinsic message characteristics on cognitive appraisals, with 
control covariates. Section 7.3.4 presents the results of factorial ANCOVAs demonstrating 
the effects of intrinsic message characteristics on elaboration, with control covariates. Given 
the design of the theoretical model as shown in chapter 4, it could be said that these three 
sections present the most critical hypotheses tests from the perspective of Iacobucci (2008). 
However, as previously discussed, additional insight can be gained from exploring the 
influences of the response variables explored in sections 7.3.1 – 7.3.4 on key behavioural 
variables. As such, Section 7.3.5 presents the results of factorial ANCOVAs that examine 
the influence of threat appeal intrinsic message characteristics on behavioural intention, 
with the covariates of anticipatory and anticipated emotions, cognitive appraisals and 
elaboration and controls.  Section 7.3.6 presents the results of factorial ANCOVAs that 
examine the influence of threat appeal intrinsic message characteristics on behavioural 
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expectation, with the covariates of anticipatory and anticipated emotions, cognitive 
appraisals and elaboration and controls. Finally, Section 7.3.7 presents the results of 
factorial ANCOVAs that examine the influence of threat appeal intrinsic message 
characteristics on behavioural decision, with the covariates of anticipatory and anticipated 
emotions, cognitive appraisals and elaboration and controls. 
A key point to note in the design of the ANCOVA analysis is the coding for the independent 
variables. Specifically, there were 8 individual treatments, in a 2x2x2 factorial design, which 
was intended to allow the exploration of interactions between the specific independent 
variables, as well as their individual effects. As such, each specific treatment group was 
coded as either a 0 or 1 on three new variables created in the data file, depending on the 
level of each treatment for that condition. The coding scheme is shown in table 79, and as 
such, it can be seen that any given experimental group can score either a 0 or 1 on each 
treatment.  For example, the ‘low graphic’, ‘loss’, ‘self’ treatment group scores an 0 on the 
graphicness variable, a 0 on the frame variable, and a 0 on the direction variable. This 
method of treatment coding allows the individual treatment effects, as well as interactions, 
to be explored. However, it does result in the creation of a large set of results for each 
ANCOVA analysis, which can prove difficult to extract key points from, and this is discussed 
subsequently. 
Experimental 
Conditions 
Message 
Frame 
Message 
Frame 
Code 
Message 
Direction 
Message 
Direction 
Code 
Graphic 
Image 
Graphic 
Image 
Code 
1 Loss 
Avoidance 
1 Other 1 Graphic 1 
2 Loss 
Avoidance 
1 Other 1 No Graphic 0 
3 Loss 
Avoidance 
1 Self 0 Graphic 1 
4 Loss 
Avoidance 
1 Self 0 No Graphic 0 
5 Loss 0 Other 1 Graphic 1 
6 Loss 0 Other 1 No Graphic 0 
7 Loss 0 Self 0 Graphic 1 
8 Loss 0 Self 0 No Graphic 0 
 
Table 79 - Coding of the independent variables 
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The relevant hypotheses regarding the dependent variable of interest for each ANCOVA are 
examined in each section.  It is important to note that because of this structure, the 
hypotheses therefore do not appear in numerical order (as they were presented in Chapter 
4). The hypotheses were developed from a conceptual perspective with focus on the effects 
of the intrinsic message characteristics. However, the use of ANCOVA analysis 
necessitates that the clearest structure for presenting results is one arranged according to 
the dependent variables. Because of this, the chapter summary will provide a summary of 
the results in their original numerical order.  The key statistical hypothesis test results can 
be found in the following sections. However, for clarity, more detailed results tables can be 
found in appendix 7.2.  More specifically, as discussed above, the treatment coding method 
used – while useful in a hypothesis testing sense – results in the creation of a very large set 
of results for each ANCOVA, incorporating many marginal means for individual treatments 
and combinations. For the sake of clarity, in the present chapter, only the key statistical test 
results, and the relevant marginal means are reported, and the full results are reported in 
Appendix 7.2 for reference. A number of variables were consistently controlled for as 
covariates in the ANCOVA analyses. These are operationalised in chapter 5 and presented 
in Appendix 7.3. Given the number of covariates, these are not listed throughout the 
chapter, but summarised for ease in appendix 7.3. It is important to note that the ANCOVA 
covariates increased for the analyses where behaviour intention, expectation and decision 
task are the dependent variables as the cognitive appraisal, elaboration, anticipated 
emotion and immediate emotion variables are treated as covariates. This is also detailed in 
appendix 7.3. 
Before moving to the specific results discussion, it is important to note that it was not 
possible to use Levene’s test as the sample size and number of variables is too large. As 
such, in order to ascertain the homogeneity of variance for each ANCOVA, the highest and 
lowest variances for each ANCOVA were examined as proposed by Field (2009, p405). The 
detailed results of this analysis are presented in appendix 7.1. However, in sum, the results 
for all the ANCOVA analyses do not violate the assumption of homogeneity of variance.  
7.3.1 Immediate emotions 
7.3.1.1 Fear 
Two hypotheses relating to the immediate emotion of fear were originally hypothesised in 
chapter 4. However, only one of these was supported by the analysis. The supported 
hypothesis was H18b, that graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of fear. The use 
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of a graphic image had a significant effect on fear (F (14,56)=11.96, p=.001), in the 
expected direction. The mean for the graphic condition was .21 whereas the mean for the 
non-graphic condition was -.21, which is shown in table 80. 
Treatment Graphic Mean Std. Error 
No graphic - 0.21 .087 
Graphic 0.21 .085 
 
Table 80 - Graphic treatment means for fear ANCOVA 
Conversely H5, that loss framed messages will evoke fear, did not yield a significant result 
(F (14,56)=3.107, p=.078). The results herein suggest that graphic images generate the 
immediate visceral response of fear, but that loss framed messages do not. Of course, 
given the underlying mechanism of instinctive fear responses to threatening stimuli, it 
seems logical that the presence of a graphic image creates a fear response. The result is 
an important indication that this intrinsic message characteristic does indeed generate a 
fear response. However, no other message characteristics, or interactions between the 
message characteristics, generated a fear response. This indicates that an immediate fear 
response is dependent on the presence of a graphic image as a component of a threat 
appeal, but that this effect is not dependent on any other intrinsic message characteristic. 
To summarise; 
H5 Loss framed messages will generate fear Not supported 
H18b Graphic images will evoke immediate 
emotions of fear 
Supported 
7.3.1.2 Anger 
One hypothesis was generated in chapter 4 concerning the effects of intrinsic message 
characteristics on the immediate emotion of anger. Namely, H18c states that graphic 
images will evoke immediate emotions of anger. Unfortunately this hypothesis was not 
supported as the results were not statistically significant, (F (3,984)=.776, p=.379). This 
result indicates that anger is not a response to graphic images. Given that anger is 
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conceptually distinct from fear and has different properties (as outlined in appraisal theory) 
this indicates that the mechanism that generates a fear response does not generate an 
anger response.  
This analysis did, however, suggest the potential for effects of intrinsic message 
characteristics on anger that were not specifically hypothesised. Indeed, an interaction 
between message frame and direction of message (namely loss frame and other direction) 
had a significant effect on anger (F (3,984)=3.985, p=.046). The means are presented in 
table 81, with the result of interest highlighted.  
Treatment Message Frame Treatment Direction Mean Std. Error 
Loss Self 2.57 .123 
Other 2.86 .121 
Gain Self 2.69 .120 
Other 2.50 .121 
 
Table 81 - Message frame means for anger ANCOVA 
In addition, the analysis suggested another effect of intrinsic message characteristics on 
anger that was not hypothesised. Indeed, a three-way interaction between message frame, 
direction of message and use of graphic image (namely loss frame, other direction and no 
graphic image) had a significant effect on anger (F (3,984)=4.575, p=.033). The means are 
presented in table 82, with a highlight showing the specific result of interest.  
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Treatment Message 
Frame 
Treatment 
Direction 
Treatment 
Graphicness 
Mean Std. 
Error 
Loss Self No graphic 2.29 .176 
Graphic 2.84 .172 
Other No graphic 3.00 .174 
Graphic 2.73 .171 
Gain 
 
 
 
Self No graphic 2.70 .174 
Graphic 2.68 .166 
Other No graphic 2.41 .169 
Graphic 2.59 .172 
 
Table 82 - Message frame and message direction means for anger ANCOVA 
The results that were not hypothesised will be examined in more detail in chapter 8, in order 
to avoid confusion regarding hypothesis testing versus unexpected results. Therefore, to 
summarise these results in the context of hypothesis testing: 
7.3.1.3 Disgust 
One hypothesis was generated in chapter 4 concerning the effects of intrinsic message 
characteristics on the immediate emotion of disgust. Namely, H18a states that graphic 
images will generate immediate disgust, and this was supported by way of a statistically 
significant test (F (12,878)=59.188 p= .000). The means are presented in table 83. This 
result supports the argument made throughout the present thesis that emotional responses 
to threat appeals are not limited to fear. Of course, given the variable of graphic image and 
its operationalisation (as outlined in chapter 5) it is not surprising that a disgust response 
was elicited in the graphic condition. 
H18c Graphic images will evoke immediate 
emotions of anger 
Not supported 
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Treatment Graphic Mean Std. Error 
No graphic -.46 .084 
Graphic .45 .083 
 
Table 83 - Graphic treatment means for disgust ANCOVA 
In addition, the analysis suggested another effect of intrinsic message characteristics on 
disgust that was not explicitly hypothesised. Specifically, an interaction between message 
frame, direction of message and use of graphic image (namely loss frame, self-direction 
and graphic image) had a significant effect on disgust (F (12,878)= 13.379 p= .017). The 
means are presented in table 84, with the interaction highlighted. 
Treatment Message 
Frame 
Treatment 
Direction 
Treatment Graphic Mean Std. 
Error 
Loss Self No graphic -.41 .170 
Graphic .65 .168 
Other No graphic -.26 .168 
Graphic .37 .166 
Gain Self No graphic -.45 .169 
Graphic .18 .161 
Other No graphic -.72 .164 
Graphic .60 .167 
 
Table 84 - Message frame, message direction and graphic treatment means for 
disgust ANCOVA 
As already mentions, any results that were not hypothesised will be examined in more detail 
in chapter 8, in order to avoid confusion. Therefore, to summarise in the context of 
hypothesis testing: 
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H18a Graphic images will evoke immediate 
emotions of disgust 
Supported 
7.3.1.4 Uncomfortable feelings 
One hypothesis was developed concerning the effects of intrinsic message characteristics 
on immediate uncomfortable feelings (see Chapter 4). Specifically, H18d states that graphic 
images will generate immediate uncomfortable feelings, and the test of this hypothesis was 
found to be statistically significant (F (11,777)=36.217 p= .000). The means are presented 
in table 85, showing the direction of the effect to be as hypothesized, and that therefore this 
result also supports the contention that emotional responses to threat appeals are not 
limited to fear. That said, again given the variable of graphic image and its 
operationalisation (as outlined in chapter 5) it is not surprising that the uncomfortable 
feelings were elicited for respondents in the graphic condition. 
Treatment Graphic Mean Std. Error 
No graphic 3.53 .103 
Graphic 4.41 .102 
 
Table 85 - Graphic treatment means for uncomfortable feelings ANCOVA 
To summarise; 
H18d Graphic images will evoke immediate 
emotions of uncomfortable feelings 
Supported 
7.3.1.5 Guilt 
H14 (see Chapter 4) states that Self-directed messages will evoke anticipatory guilt. 
However, statistical results do not provide support with F(3,790)=.177 (p=.674). This 
suggests that a self-accountability focus is not relevant in the context of threat appeals. 
However, the ANCOVA analysis did suggest an effect of intrinsic message characteristics 
on guilt that was not hypothesised; specifically, the use of a loss framed message had a 
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statistically significant effect on worry (F(3.790)=4.289 p=.039). The means are presented in 
table 86. 
Treatment Message Frame Mean Std. Error 
Loss 2.07 .067 
Gain 1.88 .065 
 
Table 86 - Message frame means for guilt ANCOVA 
This non-hypothesized result will be examined in more detail in chapter 8. To summarise in 
the context of hypothesis testing: 
H14 Self-directed messages will evoke 
anticipatory guilt 
Not supported 
7.3.1.6 Relief 
Chapter 4 argued that (see H6) that loss avoidance framed messages will generate 
anticipatory relief. However, statistical results for this hypothesis test were not significant 
(F(5,718) = 2.260 p=.113). This suggests that the key positive anticipatory emotion is not 
generated by changes in the message frame. That said, the analysis did suggest a number 
of other effects of intrinsic message characteristics on anticipatory relief that were not 
hypothesised. First, the use of a other framed message had a significant effect on relief 
(F(5,718) = 8.400 p=.004). The means are presented in table 87.  
Treatment Direction Mean Std. Error 
Self -.11 .056 
Other .11 .055 
 
Table 87 - Message direction means for relief ANCOVA 
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In addition, graphicness appeared to have an influence on anticipatory relief that was not 
hypothesised. Specifically, the use of a non-graphic image had a significant effect on 
anticipatory relief F(5,718) = 18.229 p=.000. The means are presented in table 88.  
Treatment Graphic Mean Std. Error 
No graphic .17 .056 
Graphic -.17 .056 
 
Table 88 - Graphic treatment means for relief ANCOVA 
The results that were not hypothesised will be examined in more detail in chapter 8, and to 
summarise in the context of hypothesis testing: 
H6 Loss avoidance messages will generate 
anticipatory relief 
Not supported 
7.1.3.7 Worry 
One hypothesis was generated in chapter 4 concerning the effects of intrinsic message 
characteristics on the anticipatory emotion of worry. Namely, H15 states that other-directed 
messages will evoke worry, and this test was statistically significant at F(9,671)= 5.224 
(p=.023). The means are presented in table 89. This result supports the idea that worry has 
a locus towards others, and not towards an individual’s sense of self. 
Treatment Direction Mean Std. Error 
Self 2.60 .088 
Other 2.88 .088 
 
Table 89 - Message direction means for worry ANCOVA 
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In addition, the analysis produced another interesting effect of intrinsic message 
characteristics on worry that was not hypothesised. Indeed, the use of graphic image had a 
significant effect on worry (F(9.671)= 11.808 p=.001). The means are presented in table 90.  
Treatment Graphic Mean Std. Error 
No graphic 2.52 .089 
Graphic 2.95 .088 
 
Table 90 - Graphic treatment means for worry ANCOVA 
The results that were not hypothesised will be examined in more detail in chapter 8, in order 
to avoid confusion regarding hypothesis testing and unexpected results. Therefore, to 
summarise in the context of hypothesis testing: 
H15 Other-directed messages will evoke 
anticipatory worry 
Supported 
7.3.2 Anticipated emotions 
7.3.2.1 Anticipated fear 
Two hypotheses relating to anticipated fear were originally hypothesised in chapter 4. 
However, only one of these was supported by the analysis. The supported hypothesis was 
H8, that self-directed messages will interact with loss frames to evoke anticipated fear. 
Indeed, self-directed messages did interact with loss frame messages to have a statistically 
significant effect on anticipated fear (F(9,232)=4.373 p=.037). The means are shown in 
table 91. This result suggests that the self-referencing effect is enhanced by a loss frame. In 
fact, further supporting this, the direction of threat alone had no significant effect on 
anticipated emotion.  
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Treatment Message Frame Treatment Direction Mean Std. Error 
Loss Self 6.87 .177 
Other 6.65 .175 
Gain Self 6.27 .173 
Other 6.78 .174 
 
Table 91 - Message frame means for anticipated fear ANCOVA 
However H1, that loss framed messages will generate negative anticipated emotions, did 
not generate a statistically significant effect in the context of anticipated fear 
(F(9,232)=1.776 p=.183). These results indicate that message frame as an intrinsic 
characteristic and direction of message are not effective unless they are paired with each 
other, as a loss framed self-directed message. Interestingly no effect was attributed to the 
use (or not) of a graphic image on anticipated fear (even though there was an effect as 
seen in Section 7.3.1.1 on immediate fear), either as a single variable or in interaction with 
other intrinsic message characteristics. As such, to summarise; 
H1 Loss framed messages will generate 
negative anticipated emotions. 
Not supported 
H8 Self-directed messages will interact with 
loss frames to evoke anticipated fear 
Supported 
7.3.2.2 Anticipated shame 
Chapter 4 presented two hypotheses relating to anticipated shame. However, neither were 
supported by the analysis.  Specifically, H1 stated that loss framed messages will generate 
negative anticipated emotions, and this did not return a statistically significant result 
(F(5,537)= 3.045 p=.081). Additionally H7a, which stated that self-directed messages will 
evoke anticipated shame, was not supported either, with F(5,537)= .006 (p=.936).  
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However, an interesting result that was not hypothesised was suggested by ANOVA results. 
When loss frame interacted with a self-framed message, there was a significant effect on 
anticipated shame (F(5,537)= 5.258 p=.022). It is particularly noteworthy that this is the 
same effect that was observed for anticipated fear, which indicates that self-referencing and 
a loss frame may impact the anticipation of these negative emotions. The means are 
presented in table 92, with the mean of particular interest highlighted. 
Treatment Message Frame Treatment Direction Mean Std. Error 
Loss Self 7.47 .172 
Other 7.10 .170 
Gain Self 6.79 .167 
Other 7.19 .168 
 
Table 92 - Message frame and message direction means for anticipated shame 
ANCOVA 
The results that were not hypothesised will be examined in more detail in chapter 8, 
Therefore, to summarise the hypothesis tests: 
H1 Loss framed messages will generate 
negative anticipated emotions. 
Not supported 
H7a Self-directed messages will evoke 
anticipated shame 
Not supported 
7.3.2.3 Anticipated regret 
Two hypotheses relating to anticipated regret were originally hypothesised in chapter 4, with 
neither fully supported by the analysis. H1, stated that loss framed messages will generate 
negative anticipated emotions which (like for anticipated fear and shame above) did not 
reach significance for anticipated regret (F(7,870) = .548 p=.459). On the other hand, the 
results did demonstrate an effect of message direction on anticipated regret, with a 
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statistically significant result (F(7,870) = 3.896 p=.049). However, the direction of this result 
was not as hypothesised. Specifically, H10 stated that self-directed messages will evoke 
anticipated regret. Yet, an examination of the means presented in table 93 indicate that 
other-framed messages influenced anticipated regret. The reversal of the self-reference 
effect is surprising, as regret is conceptualised as a self-oriented emotion (as discussed in 
chapter 4). This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8. 
Treatment Direction Mean Std. Error 
Self -.14 .103 
Other .14 .103 
 
Table 93 - Message direction for anticipated regret ANCOVA 
To summarise the hypotheses tested: 
H1 Loss framed messages will generate 
negative anticipated emotions. 
Not supported 
H10 Self-directed messages will evoke 
anticipated regret 
Not supported 
7.3.2.4 Anticipated humiliation 
Two hypotheses relating to anticipated humiliation were originally hypothesised in chapter 
4. However, neither were fully supported by the analysis. H1, stated that loss framed 
messages will generate negative anticipated emotions (which includes anticipated 
humiliation), and this did not reach significance (F(6,179)=1.593 p=.207). Equally, H7b 
stated that self-directed messages will evoke anticipated humiliation, and this did not 
achieve statistical significance either with F(6,179)=.007 (p=.933). However, as a result of 
the analysis, two relationships between intrinsic message characteristics and anticipated 
humiliation were suggested that had not been hypothesised in Chapter 4. Indeed, when 
message frame and message direction interacted, to generate a loss framed self-directed 
message, a significant effect on anticipated humiliation was observed. (F(6,179)=5.636 
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p=.018) . Specifically, results indicate that loss framed messages directed toward the self, 
have an effect on anticipated humiliation. This is an indication that the self-reference effect 
occurs in a loss framed context to evoke anticipated humiliation, but that direction of 
message alone does not generate the self-reference effect in this context. The means for 
this finding is shown in table 94, with the mean of particular note highlighted. 
Treatment Message Frame Treatment Direction Mean Std. Error 
Loss Self 6.68 .189 
Other 6.22 .187 
Gain Self 6.00 .184 
Other 6.43 .185 
 
Table 94 - Message frame and message direction means for anticipated humiliation 
ANCOVA 
In addition the use of graphic images increased anticipated humiliation (F(6.179)=7.763 
p=.005), which was not a hypothesised relationship. The means are presented in table 95. 
This suggests there is an effect of the graphic image on anticipated humiliation. It is 
possible in the present case that this is due to the nature of the injury presented in the 
stimuli (e.g. a facial injury), which is linked to one’s appearance. This will be explored further 
in chapter 8. 
Treatment Graphic Mean Std. Error 
No graphic 6.07 .134 
Graphic 6.60 .132 
 
Table 95 - Graphic treatment means for anticipated humiliation ANCOVA 
To avoid confusion, the results that were not hypothesised will be examined in more detail 
in chapter 8. Therefore, to summarise in the context of hypothesis testing: 
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H1 Loss framed messages will generate 
negative anticipated emotions. 
Not supported 
H7b Self-directed messages will evoke 
anticipated humiliation  
Not supported 
7.3.2.5 Anticipated depressed feelings 
One hypothesised relationship regarding anticipated depressed feelings was generated in 
chapter 4; H1, Loss framed messages will generate negative anticipated emotions. The 
analysis is not fully supportive of this hypothesis, as the effect of message frame on 
anticipated depressed feelings was non-significant (F(6,958)=1.458 p=.228). However, 
results indicate that when message frame interacts with direction, that this influences 
anticipated depressed feelings (F(6,958)=5.067 p=.025). Indeed, the means presented in 
table x (with the mean of interest highlighted) identify that loss framed messages directed 
toward the self, have an effect on anticipated depressed feelings. This is an indication that 
the self-reference effect occurs in a loss framed context to evoke anticipated depressed 
feelings, but that direction of message alone does not generate the self-reference effect in 
this context.  
Treatment Message Frame Treatment Direction Mean Std. Error 
Loss Self 6.96 .180 
Other 6.46 .177 
Gain Self 6.35 .175 
Other 6.65 .176 
 
Table 96 - Message frame and message direction means for anticipated depressed 
feelings ANCOVA 
The results that were not hypothesised will be discussed in chapter 8. Therefore, to 
summarise in the context of hypothesis testing: 
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H1 Loss framed messages will generate 
negative anticipated emotions. 
Not Supported 
7.3.2.6 Anticipated responsible feelings 
Two hypotheses were developed in Chapter 4 regarding intrinsic message characteristics 
and their effect on anticipated responsible feelings. To recap, responsible feelings represent 
the accountability element of anticipated guilt. H1 states that loss framed messages will 
generate negative anticipated emotions, which in the case of anticipated responsible 
feelings was not statistically significant (F(5,710)=1.479=p.224). In addition, H7c proposed 
that self-directed messages will evoke anticipated feelings of responsibility. This was also 
not supported, with F(5,710)=1.166 (p=.281). Indeed, there were no significant effects of 
any of the intrinsic message characteristics on anticipated feelings of responsibility. As 
such, whilst it was argued that in the self-directed condition an individual is more likely to 
feel responsible for their own behaviour, this was not supported. However, it could be the 
case that if the locus of control changes, and an individual was presented as responsible for 
the well-being of someone else (i.e. ‘other’) this may increase anticipated responsibility (e.g. 
injuring a passenger in a car that ‘you’ are driving). Whilst the literature regarding guilt 
focuses on the self, it is arguable that the responsible construct of guilt is more likely to be 
anticipated if the victim of a message was ‘other’. This will be explored in more detail in 
chapter 8. To summarise the hypothesis tests for anticipated feelings of responsibility,  
H1 Loss framed messages will generate 
negative anticipated emotions. 
Not Supported 
H7c Self-directed messages will evoke 
anticipated feelings of responsibility 
Not Supported 
7.3.2.7 Anticipated relief 
Two hypothesised relationships regarding anticipated relief were generated in chapter 4.  
H2 stated that loss avoidance framed messages will generate positive anticipated emotions. 
However, this is not supported by the analysis, as a non significant result between message 
frame and anticipated relief was observed (F(3,266) =.125 p=.724). In addition, H9 stated 
that Self-directed messages will interact with loss avoidance frames to evoke anticipated 
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relief, which was also not supported by the results with a non-significant F(3,266) =.001 
(p=.982).  
It was anticipated that the message frame of loss avoidance would be more likely to 
generate anticipated relief, either as a single variable or through an interaction with direction 
of message which would include the self-reference effect. However, while these 
propositions were not supported, the results identified a relationship between direction of 
message and anticipated relief that had not been hypothesised. Specifically, direction of 
message had a significant effect on anticipated relief (F(3,266) =4.718 p=.030), which the 
means (in table 97) show to be associated with the self-condition. This suggests that the 
self-reference effect does link to anticipated relief, but is not related to loss avoidance.  
Treatment Direction Mean Std. Error 
Self 6.50 .140 
Other 6.07 .140 
 
Table 97 - Message direction means for anticipated relief ANCOVA 
The results that were not hypothesised will be examined in more detail in chapter 8, in order 
to avoid confusion regarding hypothesis testing and unexpected results. Therefore, to 
summarise in the context of hypothesis testing: 
H2 Loss avoidance framed messages will 
generate positive anticipated emotions. 
Not Supported 
H9 Self-directed messages will interact with 
loss avoidance frames to evoke anticipated 
relief 
Not Supported 
7.3.2.8 Anticipated hope  
One hypothesised relationship regarding anticipated hope was generated in chapter 4, 
which was H2, that loss avoidance framed messages will generate positive anticipated 
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emotions The analysis did not find support for this hypothesis with a non-significant result 
being returned (F(2,985)=.617 p=.617). Indeed, there were no effects observed for any 
intrinsic message characteristics, or interactions of those characteristics, on anticipated 
hope. Whilst it was hypothesised that the avoidance of loss would generate anticipation of 
hope, perhaps the simple avoidance of severe injuries does not specifically generate hope, 
which is a future oriented emotion. To summarise, 
H2 Loss avoidance framed messages will 
generate positive anticipated emotions. 
Not Supported 
7.3.2.9 Anticipated delight 
One hypothesised relationship regarding anticipated delight was generated in chapter 4; 
H2, that loss avoidance framed messages will generate positive anticipated emotions The 
analysis did not find support for this hypothesis, with the statistical test being non-significant 
(F(1.990)=.199 p=656). Again, like anticipated hope, there were no effects of intrinsic 
message characteristics, or interactions of those characteristics, observed at all on 
anticipated delight. Whilst it seems intuitively plausible that the avoidance of loss would 
generate anticipation of delight, it could be that (like anticipated hope above) perhaps 
simply the avoidance of severe injuries does not specifically generate delight, which is a 
happiness emotion. Indeed, whilst it seems that individuals would be happy to avoid serious 
injuries, perhaps the anticipation of delight is inappropriately positively valenced for this 
context. To summarise, 
H2 Loss avoidance framed messages will 
generate positive anticipated emotions. 
Not Supported 
7.3.3 Cognitive appraisals  
7.3.3.1 Perceptions of severity  
Three hypotheses were developed regarding the effect of intrinsic message characteristics 
on perceptions of severity. However, only one of these hypotheses was statistically 
significant. H16a stated that graphic images will generate increased perceptions of severity, 
which is supported by the ANCOVA results (F(5,093)= 7.348 p=.007), with means 
presented in table x below. This result is not surprising, because whilst the severity of 
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injuries were described identically across the experimental conditions, the graphic image 
uses cues such as blood, which are hypothesised to generate instinctive responses, and 
implicitly indicate severity of injury.  
The remaining two hypotheses were not supported. H3a stated that loss framed messages 
increase perceptions of severity which was not significant (F(5,093)=.018 p=.894). It is 
surprising that message frame did not have a significant influence on perceptions of 
severity, as the avoidance of loss is less severe than experiencing loss. However, in this 
context it is important to remember that participants were not making a comparison between 
conditions due to the between subjects design, where participants were only exposed to 
one condition. H11a stated that self-directed messages will increase perceptions of severity, 
which also was not supported, with F(5,093)=.063 (p=.803). Again, this is a surprising result, 
as the self-reference effect would suggest that individuals who feel their sense of self is 
threatened, or (in this context) to suffer a serious injury, would perceive this consequence to 
be more severe. However, this effect was not supported by the results.  
Treatment Graphic Mean Std. Error 
No graphic -.12 .067 
Graphic .12 .066 
 
Table 98 - Graphic treatment means for severity ANCOVA 
To summarise, 
H3a Loss framed messages increase 
perceptions of severity  
Not supported 
H11a Self-directed messages will increase 
perceptions of severity  
Not supported 
H16a Graphic images will generate increased 
perceptions of severity  
Supported 
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7.3.3.2 Perceptions of susceptibility 
Three hypotheses were developed in Chapter 4 regarding the effect of intrinsic message 
characteristics on perceptions of susceptibility. However, none of these hypotheses were 
supported by the ANCOVA results. H3b stated that loss framed messages increase 
perceptions of susceptibility, which was not significant (F(1,696)=.212 p=.645). H11b stated 
that self-directed messages will increase perceptions of susceptibility, again which was not 
supported (F(1,696)=2.319 p=.128). Finally, H16b stated that graphic images will generate 
increased perceptions of susceptibility, which was also not supported with F(1,696)= 2.328 
(p=.128).  
Further, none of the interactions between the intrinsic message characteristics influenced 
perceptions of severity. It is important to note that whilst these results indicate that the 
variables manipulated in the experiment did not influence perceptions of susceptibility, that 
is not to say that participants did not perceive their own susceptibility, but rather that there 
were no differences across the different message treatments. Even so, these results are 
surprising as the self-reference effect does not appear to influence susceptibility in this 
context. Indeed, the use of a graphic image was proposed to increase perceptions of 
susceptibility but this is not supported in the results. This will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 8, but to summarise, 
H3b Loss framed messages increase 
perceptions of susceptibility 
Not supported 
H11b Self-directed messages will increase 
perceptions of susceptibility 
Not supported 
H16b Graphic images will generate increased 
perceptions of susceptibility 
Not supported 
7.3.3.3 Self-efficacy 
Chapter 4 presented two hypotheses concerning the influence of message characteristics 
on self-efficacy. H4a stated that loss avoidance messages increase perceptions of self-
efficacy. Unfortunately this was not upheld by the ANCOVA results (F(10,016)=3.494 
p=.062). In addition, H12 stated that self-directed messages will increase perceptions of self-
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efficacy, again not supported by the statistical results (F(10,016)=.076 p=.782). Given that self-
efficacy refers to an individual’s belief that they are able to carry out the recommended 
action, it is somewhat surprising that self –directed messages did not influence this. Indeed, 
the self-reference effect states that individuals are motivated to protect their sense of self. 
As such it is interesting that a message directed towards the self does not influence this. To 
summarise,  
H4a Loss avoidance messages increase 
perceptions of self-efficacy  
Not supported 
H12 Self-directed messages will increase 
perceptions of self-efficacy 
Not supported 
7.3.3.4 Response efficacy 
One hypothesis was developed in chapter 4, to explain the influence of intrinsic message 
characteristics on response efficacy. Namely, H4b stated that loss avoidance messages 
increase perceptions of response efficacy. However, this was not evidenced by the 
statistical results, with F(14,322)=.081 (p=.777). Response efficacy is an individual’s 
perception that the recommendation in the message will be effective in reducing the risk or 
threat. As such a loss avoidance frame was considered as likely to increase perceptions of 
response efficacy, and it was surprising that the results do not support this. This will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 8. To summarise, 
H4b Loss avoidance messages increase 
perceptions of response efficacy 
Not supported 
7.3.4 Elaboration 
Two hypotheses were generated to explain the influence of intrinsic message 
characteristics on mental imagery elaboration in chapter 4. H13 stated that self-directed 
messages will increase mental imagery elaboration, however this effect was not statistically 
significant (F(4,901)=.128 p=.720). This is surprising, as the self is one of the most powerful 
networks in memory (see chapter 3) and as such it was anticipated that elaboration was 
more likely to occur when associated with the self, as opposed to ‘other’. However, no effect 
of message direction was observed for this variable.  
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Further, H17 stated that non graphic images will encourage increased mental imagery 
elaboration, and a significant result was generated for the effect of graphic treatment on 
elaboration (F(4,901)=34.3031 p=.000). However an examination of the means, as 
presented in table x, show that the effect was reverse to that hypothesised. The hypotheses 
was generated based on evidence that suggest individuals are less willing to process 
graphic images and rather would avoid them as such mental elaboration is less likely to 
occur if they did. However, the present results suggest that the opposite may be the case. 
This will be examined in more detail in chapter 8.   
Treatment Graphic Mean Std. Error 
No graphic 3.63 .091 
Graphic 4.38 .090 
 
Table 99 - Graphic treatment means for elaboration ANCOVA 
To summarise, 
H13 Self-directed messages will increase 
mental imagery elaboration 
Not supported 
H17 Non graphic images will encourage 
increased mental imagery elaboration 
Not Supported (reversed) 
7.3.5 Behavioural intention 
Seventeen hypotheses were generated concerning the influence of anticipated emotions, 
cognitive appraisals and anticipatory emotions on behavioural intention. Of the seventeen 
hypothesised relationships, six were found to be statistically significant, to be discussed 
subsequently. The process of testing these hypotheses was accomplished in ANCOVA, 
with the inclusion of the intrinsic message characteristics as independent variables, and the 
emotional and cognitive variables included as covariates. While no effects between the 
message characteristics and behavioural intention were hypothesised, this testing approach 
also provided a useful test of whether any direct effect of message characteristics could be 
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observed on behavioural intention in the presence of the variables hypothesized to mediate 
the influence of message characteristics on behavioural intention. No significant effects 
were observed for any of the message characteristics, although as will be discussed later, 
one interaction was observed.  
Moving to discussion of emotions, it is notable that two hypotheses that relate to the 
anticipation of positive emotions were observed to influence behavioural intention. H19h 
stated that anticipated hope will influence behavioural intention which was confirmed with 
F(11,533) =4.521 (p=.034) Additionally, H19i stated that anticipated delight would influence 
behavioural intention and this was also confirmed (F(11,533)=5.225, p=.023). These results 
are interesting in a threat appeals context, in particular given the earlier results that indicate 
none of the intrinsic message characteristics manipulated in this study influenced 
anticipated hope or anticipated delight (see Chapter 8 for full discussion of this result).  
One hypothesis that identified the influence of a negative anticipated emotion, namely that 
depressed feelings should influence behavioural intention, found support. Indeed, H19f 
stated that anticipated depressed feelings would influence behavioural intention, which was 
supported with F(11,533)=4.503 (p=.034). Interestingly, none of the hypothesised 
relationships between intrinsic message characteristics and the anticipation of depressed 
feelings were supported. However, one unexpected result was observed, which will be 
examined in more detail in chapter 8.  
Three hypotheses that concerned the influence of cognitive appraisals on behavioural 
intention received empirical support. Specifically H21b, which hypothesised the influence of 
susceptibility on behavioural intention, was significant with F(11,533)= 6.666 (p=.010). 
Further, H21c proposed that response efficacy would influence behavioural intention, and 
this hypothesis was supported (F(11,533)= 4.554, p=.033). Lastly, H21d which 
hypothesised the influence of self-efficacy on behavioural intention was also supported 
F(11,533)= 6.558, p=.011. It is of particular interest that perceptions of severity do not 
influence the intention to behaviour in the future. Indeed, this suggests that susceptibility 
has a more pivotal role.  
As already mentioned, an unexpected effect was observed. Indeed, the analysis suggested 
an effect of an interaction between message frame and graphic image (loss frame with no 
graphic image) on behavioural intention (F(11,533)=4.481, p=.035). It was not expected that 
in this ANCOVA the message treatments would directly influence behavioural intention, 
rather that effects would be observed for the covariates, modelled as mediators in Chapter 
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4. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8. Therefore, to summarise in the context 
of hypothesis testing: 
H19a Anticipated emotions, and specifically fear 
influence behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H19b Anticipated emotions, and specifically 
shame will influence behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H19c Anticipated emotions, and specifically 
regret will influence behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H19d Anticipated emotions, and specifically relief 
will influence behavioural intention 
Not supported  
H19e Anticipated emotions, and specifically 
humiliation will influence behavioural 
intention 
Not supported 
H19f Anticipated emotions, and specifically 
depressed feelings will influence 
behavioural intention 
Supported 
H19g Anticipated emotions, and specifically, 
responsible feelings will influence 
behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H19h Anticipated emotions, and specifically, 
hope will influence behavioural intention 
Supported 
H19i Anticipated emotions, and specifically, 
delight will influence behavioural intention 
Supported 
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H21a Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, 
severity will influence behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H21b Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, 
susceptibility will influence behavioural 
intention 
Supported 
H21c Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, 
response efficacy will influence 
behavioural intention 
Supported 
H21d Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, self-
efficacy will influence behavioural intention 
Supported 
H23 Elaboration will influence behavioural 
intention 
Not supported 
H25a Anticipatory emotions, and specifically 
worry will influence behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H25b Anticipatory emotions, and specifically 
relief will influence behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H25c Anticipatory emotions, and specifically 
guilt, will influence behavioural intention 
Not supported 
7.3.6 Behavioural expectation 
Seventeen hypotheses were generated concerning the influence of anticipated emotions, 
cognitive appraisals and anticipatory emotions on behavioural expectation. Of the 
seventeen hypothesised relationships, six were found to be statistically significant. Again, in 
the same way as the ANCOVA for behavioural intention, the message characteristics were 
included as independent variables, with the emotional and cognitive variables treated as 
covariates. 
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Notably, two hypotheses that relate to the anticipation of positive emotions were supported 
by the analysis. H20h stated that anticipated hope will influence behavioural expectation, 
which was confirmed by the analysis, with F(13,421)=12.373 (p=.000). Additionally, H19i 
stated that anticipated delight would influence behavioural expectation and this was also 
confirmed (F(13,421)=10.018, p=002). These results are interesting in a threat appeals 
context, particularly given the earlier results that indicate none of the intrinsic message 
characteristics manipulated in this study actually influenced anticipated hope or anticipated 
delight. Further, this result also mirrors the influence of anticipated hope and anticipated 
delight on behaviour intention, suggesting the key importance of these two variables in this 
context.  
A single hypothesis that identified the influence of a negative anticipated emotion, namely 
anticipated regret, on behavioural expectation found support. Specifically, H20c stated that 
anticipated regret would influence behavioural expectation, which was supported with 
F(11,533)=4.503 (p=.034). Interestingly, the previous discussion shows that none of the 
hypothesised relationships between intrinsic message characteristics and the anticipation of 
regret were supported.  
Three hypotheses that identified the influence of cognitive appraisals on behavioural 
expectation received empirical support. H21b, which hypothesised the influence of 
susceptibility on behavioural expectation, was significant (F(13,421)=38.523 p=.000). 
Further, H21c proposed that response efficacy would influence behavioural expectation, 
and this was statistically significant with F(13,421)=4.837 (p=.028). Lastly, H21d which 
hypothesised the influence of self-efficacy on behavioural expectation was also statistically 
supported (F(13,421)=11.889, p=.001). It is surprising that perceptions of severity do not 
influence the expectation of future behaviour. Indeed, this result suggests that susceptibility 
may have a more pivotal role. To summarise: 
H20a Anticipated emotions, and specifically fear 
influence behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H20b Anticipated emotions, and specifically 
shame will influence behavioural 
expectation 
Not supported 
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H20c Anticipated emotions, and specifically 
regret will influence behavioural 
expectation 
Supported 
H20d Anticipated emotions, and specifically relief 
will influence behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H20e Anticipated emotions, and specifically 
humiliation will influence behavioural 
expectation 
Not supported 
H20f Anticipated emotions, and specifically 
depressed feelings will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H20g Anticipated emotions, and specifically, 
responsible feelings will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H20h Anticipated emotions, and specifically, 
hope will influence behavioural expectation 
Supported 
H20i Anticipated emotions, and specifically, 
delight will influence behavioural 
expectation 
Supported 
H22a Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, 
severity will influence behavioural 
expectation 
Not supported 
H22b Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, 
susceptibility will influence behavioural 
expectation 
Supported 
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H22c Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, 
response efficacy will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Supported 
H22d Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, self-
efficacy will influence behavioural 
expectation 
Supported 
H24 Elaboration will influence behavioural 
expectation 
Not supported  
H26a Anticipatory emotions, and specifically 
worry will influence behavioural 
expectation 
Not supported 
H26b Anticipatory emotions, and specifically 
relief will influence behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H26c Anticipatory emotions, and specifically 
guilt, will influence behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
7.3.7 Behaviour decision task 
As discussed in section 5.4.3, a third measure of future behaviour was also incorporated. 
Specifically, this measure was a behavioural decision task, where subjects predicted their 
likely speed to travel to a job interview, while under time pressure to get there on time. In 
this sense, the measure taps a similar but distinct issue to the more general behavioural 
intention and expectation measures that have been popular in relevant research, and are 
used above. Because of the exploratory nature of this dependent variable, no specific 
hypotheses were drawn in Chapter 4. However, to maintain consistency with the rest of the 
analysis, it is useful to examine the same basic relationships as those examined for both 
behavioural intention and behavioural expectation above. Indeed, this was done, and the 
process of analysis for the behavioural decision task was identical to that already discussed 
above. 
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As with the hypotheses developed in chapter 4 for the behaviour intention and behaviour 
expectation variables, seventeen relationships that mirror the hypotheses were examined 
for the behaviour decision task. These concerned the influence of anticipated emotions, 
cognitive appraisals and anticipatory emotions on the behaviour decision task. Of the 
seventeen relationships, four were found to be statistically significant. Again, in the same 
way as the ANCOVAs for behavioural intention and expectation, the message 
characteristics were included as independent variables, with the emotional and cognitive 
variables treated as covariates. 
Notably, two relationships that relate to the anticipation of negative emotions were 
supported by the analysis. It was predicted that anticipated fear would influence the 
behavioural decision, which was confirmed by the analysis, with ((F4,891)=4.044, p=.044). 
In addition, It was predicted that anticipated feelings of responsibility would influence the 
behavioural decision, which was confirmed by the analysis, with ((F4,891)=6.519, p=.011). 
These results are interesting in a threat appeals context because they suggest that 
anticipated fear and feeling of responsibility (which are associated with guilt) influence 
behavioural decision making. These anticipated emotions did not influence behavioural 
intention or expectation in the above analysis.  
Two relationships that identified the influence of cognitive appraisals on the behaviour 
decision task received empirical support. The influence of perceived severity on the 
behaviour decision task was significant ((F4,891)=8.727, p=.003). Further, self-efficacy 
influenced the behaviour decision task, which was confirmed by analysis ((F4,891)=12.237, 
p=.001). As noted previously, the results above suggest a pivotal role of susceptibility 
regarding future behaviour, however, these results would suggest that perceptions of 
severity may influence more immediate decision making. In this context it is therefore logical 
that perceptions of self-efficacy would also influence the behaviour decision task. To 
summarise: 
Anticipated emotions, and specifically fear 
influence behavioural decision 
Supported 
Anticipated emotions, and specifically shame 
will influence behavioural decision 
Not supported 
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Anticipated emotions, and specifically regret 
will influence behavioural decision 
Not supported 
Anticipated emotions, and specifically relief 
will influence behavioural decision 
Not supported 
Anticipated emotions, and specifically 
humiliation will influence behavioural decision 
Not supported 
Anticipated emotions, and specifically 
depressed feelings will influence behavioural 
decision 
Not supported 
Anticipated emotions, and specifically, 
responsible feelings will influence 
behavioural decision 
Supported 
Anticipated emotions, and specifically, hope 
will influence behavioural decision 
Not supported 
Anticipated emotions, and specifically, delight 
will influence behavioural decision 
Not supported 
Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, 
severity will influence behavioural decision 
Supported 
Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, 
susceptibility will influence behavioural 
decision 
Not supported 
Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, 
response efficacy will influence behavioural 
decision 
Not supported 
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Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, self-
efficacy will influence behavioural decision 
Supported 
Elaboration will influence behavioural  
decision 
Not supported 
Anticipatory emotions, and specifically worry 
will influence behavioural decision 
Not supported 
Anticipatory emotions, and specifically relief 
will influence behavioural decision 
Not supported 
Anticipatory emotions, and specifically guilt, 
will influence behavioural decision 
Not supported 
7.4 Chapter summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an empirical test of the conceptual model 
developed in Chapter 4. More specifically, the objective of the analysis presented here was 
to test the hypothesised influences of threat appeal intrinsic message characteristics on the 
identified emotions and cognitive responses, and then examine the influence of cognitions 
and emotions on behavioural intention and expectation. To achieve this aim, a series of 
factorial ANCOVAs were conducted. The suitability of this as the most appropriate statistical 
technique for analysis was discussed in section 7.2.  
The manipulation checks to ensure the validity of the stimuli are presented in section 7.1. 
As a result of rigorous pre-testing (as described in chapter 5) the intrinsic message 
characteristic treatments were perceived as intended and as such the manipulations were 
deemed to be valid and reliable.  
The results of hypothesis testing is presented in section 7.3. The hypotheses addressed 
thematically, by the dependent variable of interest, as necessitated by the ANCOVA 
procedure. A summary of the hypotheses and whether they are supported or not are 
presented in each sub section and then presented again in table 100 below to provide an 
overview. For ease of reference, table 100 returns the presentation of hypotheses to the 
numerical order presented in Chapter 4. The focus of the hypothesis testing was to observe 
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correlations between intrinsic message characteristics and responses. Whilst some 
hypotheses were supported a number were not. In addition, a number of influences were 
identified that had not been hypothesised but were of note. These will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 8. 
Label Hypothesis Results 
H1 Loss framed messages will generate negative anticipated 
emotions. 
Not Supported 
H2 Loss avoidance framed messages will generate positive 
anticipated emotions. 
Not Supported 
H3a Loss framed messages increase perceptions of severity  Not Supported 
H3b Loss framed messages increase perceptions of susceptibility Not Supported 
H4a Loss avoidance messages increase perceptions of self-
efficacy  
Not Supported 
H4b Loss avoidance messages increase perceptions of response 
efficacy 
Not Supported 
H5 Loss framed messages will generate fear Not Supported 
H6 Loss avoidance messages will generate anticipatory relief Not Supported 
H7a Self-directed messages will evoke anticipated shame Not Supported 
H7b Self-directed messages will evoke anticipated humiliation  Not Supported 
H7c Self-directed messages will evoke anticipated feelings of 
responsibility 
Not Supported 
H8 Self-directed messages will interact with loss frames to 
evoke anticipated fear 
Supported 
H9 Self-directed messages will interact with loss avoidance 
frames to evoke anticipated relief 
Not Supported 
H10 Self-directed messages will evoke anticipated regret Not Supported 
H11a Self-directed messages will increase perceptions of severity  Not Supported 
H11b Self-directed messages will increase perceptions of susceptibility Not Supported 
H12 Self-directed messages will increase perceptions of self-efficacy Not Supported 
H13 Self-directed messages will increase mental imagery elaboration Not Supported 
H14 Self-directed messages will evoke anticipatory guilt Not Supported 
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H15 Other-directed messages will evoke anticipatory worry Supported 
H16a Graphic images will generate increased perceptions of 
severity  
Supported 
H16b Graphic images will generate increased perceptions of 
susceptibility 
Not Supported 
H17 Non graphic images will encourage increased mental 
imagery elaboration 
Not Supported 
(Reversed) 
H18a Graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of disgust Supported 
H18b Graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of fear Supported 
H18c Graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of anger Not Supported 
H18d Graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of 
uncomfortable feelings 
Supported 
H19a Anticipated emotions, and specifically fear influence 
behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H19b Anticipated emotions, and specifically shame will influence 
behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H19c Anticipated emotions, and specifically regret will influence 
behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H19d Anticipated emotions, and specifically relief will influence 
behavioural intention 
Not supported  
H19e Anticipated emotions, and specifically humiliation will 
influence behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H19f Anticipated emotions, and specifically depressed feelings will 
influence behavioural intention 
Supported 
H19g Anticipated emotions, and specifically, responsible feelings 
will influence behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H19h Anticipated emotions, and specifically, hope will influence 
behavioural intention 
Supported 
H19i Anticipated emotions, and specifically, delight will influence 
behavioural intention 
Supported 
H20a Anticipated emotions, and specifically fear influence 
behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H20b Anticipated emotions, and specifically shame will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H20c Anticipated emotions, and specifically regret will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Supported 
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H20d Anticipated emotions, and specifically relief will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H20e Anticipated emotions, and specifically humiliation will 
influence behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H20f Anticipated emotions, and specifically depressed feelings will 
influence behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H20g Anticipated emotions, and specifically, responsible feelings 
will influence behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H20h Anticipated emotions, and specifically, hope will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Supported 
H20i Anticipated emotions, and specifically, delight will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Supported 
H21a Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, severity will influence 
behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H21b Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, susceptibility will 
influence behavioural intention 
Supported 
H21c Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, response efficacy will 
influence behavioural intention 
Supported 
H21d Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, self-efficacy will 
influence behavioural intention 
Supported 
H22a Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, severity will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H22b Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, susceptibility will 
influence behavioural expectation 
Supported 
H22c Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, response efficacy will 
influence behavioural expectation 
Supported 
H22d Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, self-efficacy will 
influence behavioural expectation 
Supported 
H23 Elaboration will influence behavioural intention Not supported 
H24 Elaboration will influence behavioural expectation Not supported  
H25a Anticipatory emotions, and specifically worry will influence 
behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H25b Anticipatory emotions, and specifically relief will influence 
behavioural intention 
Not supported 
H25c Anticipatory emotions, and specifically guilt, will influence 
behavioural intention 
Not supported 
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H26a Anticipatory emotions, and specifically worry will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Not supported  
H26b Anticipatory emotions, and specifically relief will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
H26c Anticipatory emotions, and specifically guilt, will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Not supported 
 
Table 100 - Results of hypothesis testing 
Full discussion of these results will be provided in Chapter 8. However, in brief, the series of 
ANCOVAs reported herein provide general support for the basic principles of the theoretical 
model presented in Chapter 4, although not all of the individual hypotheses found support.  
Of the original 61 detailed hypotheses, 18 found support. For clarity, the supported 
hypotheses are presented in table 101 below.  It is important to note that there were a 
number of unexpected results which will be examined in more detail in chapter 8. The 
discussion in this section, pertains only to the hypothesised relationships.  
The empirical results from hypothesis testing indicate that message frame did not influence 
any of the response variables. In contrast, the graphic treatment variable was observed to 
influence immediate emotions, specifically fear, disgust and uncomfortable feelings. In 
addition, graphic images increased perceptions of severity. The direction of message was 
found to influence anticipated fear. As such, the hypothesised relationships between 
intrinsic message characteristics and cognitive and emotional responses appears, on the 
surface, to rely on instinctive mechanisms. However, the role of anticipated emotions on 
behavioural intention and expectation in this context have been shown to have a greater 
influence on decisions regarding future behaviour than the generation of immediate 
emotional responses. This will be discussed in more detail on chapter 8. Indeed, these 
result also indicate that, in terms of decision making, perceived susceptibility has a more 
important influence than perceived severity, but that perceptions of severity are a direct 
result of exposure to graphic images. This may suggest that graphic images do influence 
immediate and visceral response, but these have little influence on decisions concerning 
future behaviour. This will be explored in more detail in chapter 8.  
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Label Hypothesis Results 
H8 Self-directed messages will interact with loss frames to 
evoke anticipated fear 
Supported 
H15 Other-directed messages will evoke anticipatory worry Supported 
H16a Graphic images will generate increased perceptions of 
severity  
Supported 
H18a Graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of disgust Supported 
H18b Graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of fear Supported 
H18d Graphic images will evoke immediate emotions of 
uncomfortable feelings 
Supported 
H19f Anticipated emotions, and specifically depressed feelings 
will influence behavioural intention 
Supported 
H19h Anticipated emotions, and specifically, hope will influence 
behavioural intention 
Supported 
H19i Anticipated emotions, and specifically, delight will influence 
behavioural intention 
Supported 
H20c Anticipated emotions, and specifically regret will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Supported 
H20h Anticipated emotions, and specifically, hope will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Supported 
H20i Anticipated emotions, and specifically, delight will influence 
behavioural expectation 
Supported 
H21b Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, susceptibility will 
influence behavioural intention 
Supported 
H21c Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, response efficacy will 
influence behavioural intention 
Supported 
H21d Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, self-efficacy will 
influence behavioural intention 
Supported 
H22b Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, susceptibility will 
influence behavioural expectation 
Supported 
H22c Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, response efficacy will 
influence behavioural expectation 
Supported 
H22d Cognitive appraisals, and specifically, self-efficacy will 
influence behavioural expectation 
Supported 
 
Table 101 - Supported hypotheses 
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Overall, these results are notable because they suggest that individual message 
characteristics (i.e. frame, direction, graphicness) can have impacts on individual cognitive 
and emotional responses. However, it is also clear that few of these responses appear to 
have a strong influence on future behaviour-relevant variables, and in particular it seems 
that it is anticipated emotion that plays a key role in influencing future behaviour, a concept 
which has been heretofore absent from threat appeals research. 
This chapter has focussed on a presentation of the results in light of the hypotheses 
generated in chapter 4. The next chapter synthesises the major findings and contributions 
of this study, including a discussion of the unexpected results regarding threat appeals 
research and the research field. Following this, the practical implications are examined. 
Finally, the limitations are highlighted, and as a result of this (as well as previous discussion 
of the study’s findings), some directions for future research are given. 
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Chapter 8 - Discussion and Conclusions 
In this, the final chapter, a summary of the main conclusions to be drawn from the findings 
of the study are presented.  Furthermore, the implications of the findings are analysed, in 
the context of their contribution to both threat appeal theory and the implications of using 
threat appeals in the public sphere. More specifically, section 8.1 examines the theoretical 
implications of the study and clearly highlights the contribution to research on threat appeals 
that has been made in this thesis. The results from the hypothesis tests are discussed, and 
the unexpected (i.e. non-hypothesised) results from the empirical work are also considered 
in depth. Section 8.2 presents a discussion of the practical implications of the research, with 
particular relevance to the manipulation of intrinsic message characteristics. Using this 
information, a number of recommendations are proposed, which may be of practical use to 
governments or other public bodies, charities and other third sector organisations (such as 
voluntary organisations). Finally, in section 8.3 the limitations of the study are outlined, and 
an agenda for future research is provided.  
8.1 Theoretical implications of the study 
In a detailed chronological and thematic examination of the literature (chapters 2, 3 and 4), 
two assumptions were uncovered that in prior research on threat appeals have either a) 
been explicitly reiterated despite little supporting evidence, or b) received limited attention at 
all, in the literature. Specifically, these assumptions are a) that threat appeal characteristics 
can be conflated with their intended responses, and b) that a threat appeal always and 
necessarily evokes a fear response in the subject. A detailed examination of these 
assumptions underpins this thesis. The conceptual framework presented (see chapter 4) 
outlines the role of anticipated and anticipatory emotions, alongside subjective probabilities, 
elaboration and immediate visceral emotions that are resultant from manipulation of the 
intrinsic message characteristics of a threat appeal (namely, message direction, message 
frame and graphic image). In particular, the emotional and cognitive responses to the threat 
appeal manipulations are hypothesised to influence behaviour intentions and expectations 
pertaining to future behaviour. The results from the empirical testing of the research 
hypotheses are presented in chapter 7 and these results will be discussed in detail in 
sections 8.1.1. 
There are four main areas where the present study makes a contribution to existing threat 
appeal theory. First and foremost is the development of a novel theory of responses to 
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threat appeals, which is grounded in the extant literature and evidence, rather than based 
on questionable assumptions. The new theoretical framework makes a significant and 
original contribution to knowledge in the threat appeals domain of literature and includes: 
1. Intrinsic message characteristics associated with the core characteristics of threat 
appeals that have been demonstrated to influence emotional and cognitive 
appraisals, namely message direction, message frame and use of graphic image. 
 
2. Key cognitive appraisal variables that have been shown in the extant literature to 
be important responses to threat appeals and to influence decision making.  
 
3. The introduction of anticipated and anticipatory emotions alongside immediate 
emotional responses, to better understand the appraisal process and decision 
making about future behaviour. 
 
4. A consideration of the cognitive process associated with elaboration as a variable 
that will influence behavioural intention and expectation. 
 
5. Relevant outcome variables (i.e. behaviour intention and expectation), which 
represent a decision about future behaviour as a result of exposure to a threat 
appeal. 
Secondly, this study identifies threat appeal intrinsic message characteristics as the most 
appropriate variables for manipulation in empirical research in the field and highlights the 
utility of this approach, in contrast to the very common conflation of message characteristics 
with their intended effects (see Chapters 1, 2, and 3). Third, a contribution is made by the 
provision of evidence that the new approach has theoretical and practical merit within the 
context of the body of threat appeals research. This is specifically achieved through the 
empirical examination of cognitive, emotional and behavioural response constructs. Finally, 
the study also contributes to the evolving discourse on threat appeals. More specifically, this 
thesis presents an approach that moves beyond the oft-cited confusion in the threat appeals 
field (e.g. Rotfeld, 1997; Johnston et al, 2015), and presents a strong platform from which to 
examine relationships between threat appeals and responses more reliably, and as a 
consequence build towards a more coherent body of research. These and related issues 
are subsequently discussed in depth in the following sections. The next section will focus on 
a discussion of the results from the empirical testing of the research hypotheses that have 
been presented in chapter 7. 
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Research on threat appeals is regularly described as confused (Rotfeld, 1997), which is an 
issue that has pervaded the literature for many decades. Indeed, Kay (1972, p16) observed 
that contradictions have occurred in research concerning ‘fear appeals’ due to a failure to 
explicitly define the nature of the specific factor, or intrinsic message features to be 
measured. This has meant that researchers “whose findings were at variance with each 
other appeared to believe they were all measuring the same thing, but in likelihood were 
not.” This thesis provides empirical evidence that indicates that the effects of intrinsic 
message characteristics and interactions of these characteristics can be observed, 
therefore indicating how the components of threat appeals can be manipulated to generate 
different responses. Whilst, this requires significant further research, the use of intrinsic 
message characteristics will allow for a body of research to develop, whereby findings can 
be compared and contrasted in a more reliable fashion. Indeed, the effects of use of graphic 
image can be compared across studies reliably, whereas ‘high’ or ‘low’ threat appeals 
cannot. In addition the re-framing of responses to threat appeals as a decision about future 
behaviour has generated some interesting insights, particularly with regard to the role of 
anticipated emotions which merit further investigation.  
8.1.1 Examining the empirical findings 
The results of hypothesis testing have been presented in chapter 7. Discussion now turns to 
an examination of the findings themselves in relation to the extant literature.  A number of 
hypotheses were supported in the study (as outlined in chapter 7). Specifically the results 
show that graphic images evoked the immediate emotions of disgust, fear and 
uncomfortable feelings. This is in general support of prior research that has widened 
consideration of emotional responses to graphic images in this context away from solely 
fear (e.g. Dahl et al, 2003; Sabbane et al, 2009; Miller et al, 2009; Kees et al, 2010). Indeed, 
given that the review of the literature presented in this thesis identifies the assumption that 
emotional responses to threat appeal are limited to fear, this result supports that a range of 
immediate emotions are evoked through exposure to threat appeals. Indeed, the intrinsic 
message characteristic of graphic images evokes fear, disgust and uncomfortable feelings. 
Biener et al. (2005) in particular identified the immediate emotion of anger as an emotional 
response to graphic images. Whilst the results did not indicate that the graphic image 
manipulation alone caused anger, it was found that an interaction between graphic image, 
loss frame and other direction did evoke anger. This suggests that whilst fear, disgust and 
uncomfortable feelings are directly manipulated by the graphic components (e.g. blood) of 
an image, anger is evoked by the presence of a graphic image placed in the context of loss 
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(e.g. suffering severe injuries) combined with the subject of the image being someone else 
(i.e. the other condition, which in this study was presented as an individual’s best friend).  
In addition, prior research has shown that the inclusion of graphic images with a threat 
appeal increases perceptions of threat (e.g. Cauberghe et al, 2009; Sabanne et al, 2009). 
Presently though, perceptions of threat have been operationalised as perceptions of 
severity and susceptibility, as discussed earlier. The results indicate that graphic images do 
influence perceptions of severity, as expected. However, the results did not identify the 
influence of graphic images on susceptibility. It is not surprising that a graphic image 
increases perceptions of severity, as the presence of blood generates visceral emotional 
responses (as discussed above). However, the presence of blood alone does not provide 
any information regarding how susceptible an individual may be to having an accident. 
Rather, it presents information about the consequences of having an accident, and 
therefore it is not surprising that the use of a graphic image had no influence on perceptions 
of susceptibility. This particular finding suggests the importance of separating out the key 
aspects of a ‘threat’, unlike prior work which has tended to measure a global construct.  
It was also hypothesised that non-graphic images would influence elaboration, because 
individuals instinctively avoid graphic images (Kees et al, 2010), and therefore in such cases 
elaboration cannot be assumed. Conversely, when non-graphic images are presented, 
subjects are better able to elaborate. When high levels of elaboration are evoked, central or 
systematic processing occurs. (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981), which involves the careful 
consideration of, and critical attention paid to, the arguments central to the message. 
Alternatively, when low elaboration is evoked, a peripheral or heuristic route is prompted, 
where shallow cues serve to persuade (Green and Brock 2000). It was suggested that the 
presence of graphic features (e.g. blood) in a threat appeal is a shallow cue (instinctively 
recognised as something to avoid) and as such low elaborative processing is more likely for 
graphic images and conversely higher for non-graphic images. However, the results 
indicate that graphic images in fact served to increase elaboration. This unexpected result 
may be explained by the specific operationalisation of the elaboration construct in terms of 
mental imagery. Indeed, when considering that graphic images have been shown to 
generate visceral emotional responses (as identified above) it is unsurprising that the image 
will also be subject to more mental imagery elaboration.  
Further, the empirical results identified that the graphic images influenced anticipated 
humiliation. This was not specifically hypothesised, but is nonetheless an interesting finding. 
It might be possible to attribute this effect to the specific type of injury presented in the 
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graphic image used in this study, which was a severe facial injury. It is possible that the 
anticipation of facial injuries that leave permanent damage would evoke anticipated 
humiliation, particularly because injury to the face is something which is likely to be an injury 
that is highly visible to others. In such a case, it is likely to be that subjects may feel the 
likelihood of humiliation, when compared with a more private injury which may be more 
effectively hidden. This result is particularly interesting, and suggests that future research 
may even need to take the specific nature of the consequential injuries into account when 
designing stimuli for research, to avoid inconsistent results.  
Regarding message frame, it was hypothesised that message frame would influence a 
number of emotional and cognitive responses. Specifically, it was argued that exposure to a 
loss frame would evoke negative emotions and influence perceptions of severity and 
susceptibility. Indeed, in the review of the literature it was apparent that the influence of loss 
framed messages on perceptions of severity and susceptibility is widely upheld in prior work 
(Rothman et al, 2006; Bartels et al, 2010). This is because the perception of risk associated 
with perceived severity and susceptibility are believed to be fundamental to the persuasive 
mechanism that underpins loss framed messages (Block and Keller, 1995; O’Conner et al, 
2005). In addition, it was hypothesised that exposure to a loss avoidance frame would 
evoke positive emotions, self-efficacy and response efficacy as this frame highlights that the 
recommended action is effective and achievable. However, none of these hypotheses were 
supported.  
This lack of support indicates that the intrinsic message characteristic alone does not 
influence emotions and cognitions in this context. This idea is supported by the fact that the 
empirical findings did suggest effects of message frame that had not been hypothesised. 
These effects were generated by the interaction between message frame and other intrinsic 
message characteristics (either / or direction of message and graphic treatment). Indeed, as 
noted above, an interaction between message frame, direction and graphic image evoked 
the immediate emotion of anger. In addition, whilst the emotion of disgust was generated by 
the use of graphic image, an interaction between graphic image, loss frame and self-
direction, also evoked disgust. It was hypothesised that loss frame and self-direction would 
evoke fear, but the interaction between loss frame and self-direction also generated some 
interesting results that were not hypothesised.  
The interaction between loss frame and self-direction was found to evoke anticipated 
emotions, namely anticipated fear, anticipated shame, anticipated humiliation, and 
anticipated depressed feelings. This is a very interesting finding that has substantive 
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implications for future work. It is possible that prior researchers (e.g. Passyn and Sujan, 
2006) have assumed that the measures employed to capture emotional responses have 
recorded information about immediate emotions, when in fact individuals were actually 
experiencing an anticipation of emotions. Indeed, it was acknowledged in the review of the 
literature that message frame itself is unlikely to generate visceral emotional responses (for 
example the fight or flight fear mechanisms resultant from an immediate threat.) As such it 
was argued that, the immediate emotions experienced as a result of message frame 
manipulations are far more likely to be anticipatory emotions (Baumgartner et al, 2008). 
Given that, typically, the threat is not immediately present when an individual is exposed to 
a threat appeal, the short term and long term consequences of engaging (or not) in the 
recommended behaviour (e.g. Gerrend and Cullen, 2008; Apanovitch et al, 2003; Kiene et 
al, 2005) are important. This is in line with the idea of anticipatory emotions, as these are 
emotions experienced in the present, but which are caused by consideration of the prospect 
of a future event (Baumgartner et al, 2008). However, message frame did not interact with 
other intrinsic message characteristics to evoke anticipatory emotions. Rather, it is that the 
results identify anticipated emotions as the response which indicates that the temporal 
distance of the threat is key. Indeed, these results suggest strong support for the re-framing 
of research regarding responses to threat appeals in a decision making context about future 
behaviour.  
Three of the hypothesised relationships regarding direction of message found support. 
Indeed, direction of message directly influenced anticipated fear, anticipatory worry and 
perceptions of severity. Interestingly, there was no effect observed on the emotions of 
anticipated shame or responsible feelings. Particularly because shame and guilt involve 
perceptions of self and therefore have strong personal implications (Boudewyns et al, 2013) 
it was hypothesised that self-directed messages were more likely to generate these 
emotions. However, in order for shame or guilt to be directly experienced or anticipated, an 
individual has to either have performed a negative act, or to imagine how they would feel if 
they actually engaged in a negative act (Agrawal and Duhachek, 2010). Shame is evoked 
when an individual violates a moral or social norm (Tangney, 1991) which leads to an 
individual believing their identity is somehow tarnished (Ferguson et al, 2007). It seems that 
the manipulation of the direction of message does not lead to greater or lesser violations of 
moral or social norms or more or less tarnishing of an individual’s identity, which explains 
why these emotional responses were not evoked in response to this manipulation.   
Another interesting result which was not hypothesised was the influence of other directed 
messages on anticipated regret. It was expected that self-directed messages would 
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influence anticipated regret, as regret is tightly bound to individuals’ sense of self. Regret 
can only be experienced after an action or behaviour has occurred, or when an individual 
imagines the anticipated regret they would experience if they were to actually engage in a 
negative behaviour in the future. Indeed the motivating influence of regret is well 
documented. For example, Lechner et al, (1997) conducted a study in the context of 
communicating the potential threat of not engaging with breast cancer screening. 
Individuals who experienced anticipated regret were more likely to have a breast scan, than 
those who did not experience anticipated regret.  Importantly, the experience of anticipated 
regret is dependent on an individual feeling responsible for the outcome (Tsiros and Mittal, 
2000), and therefore it was expected that regret would be evoked by self-directed 
messages, and it was surprising to see that empirical results did not support this idea. A 
possible explanation for this lack of effect is that individuals are more loss averse when 
considering other people. For example, Polman (2012) found that when individuals were 
asked to make choices for others in a gambling task, less loss aversion (the preference for 
avoiding losses as opposed to acquiring gains) occurred than when individuals were making 
choices for themselves. Therefore, while this is admittedly somewhat speculative, perhaps 
imagining that someone else (e.g. a best friend) sustains serious injuries from a car 
accident generates anticipated regret because the individual may feel they could have 
changed the outcome in some way. As the gambling example above shows, individuals are 
motivated to be more loss averse when considering other people. This possibility appears to 
be worthy of future research, as will be discussed in due course. 
Interestingly, the intrinsic message characteristics and interactions of those characteristics 
did not evoke any positive anticipated emotions. Admittedly, this is somewhat unsurprising, 
given the context of the message and the focus on injuries sustained from a car accident. 
However, that isn’t to say that positive anticipated emotions are not relevant to an 
examination of responses to threat appeals. Indeed, the empirical results presented in 
Chapter 7 here showed that both anticipated hope and anticipated delight influenced 
behaviour intention and behaviour expectation.  Given that anticipated emotions hinge on 
imagining events occurring, combined with the notion that individuals are motivated to 
protect their sense of self (as outlined above), the anticipation of positive emotions 
associated with engaging in the recommended action could influence future behaviour 
intentions and expectations. Interestingly, anticipated hope and delight did not influence the 
decision making task, which would indicate that these emotions are only pertinent to an 
individual’s cognitions about future behaviour prior to engaging in the behaviour.  
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Further, empirical findings suggested that anticipated depressed feelings influenced 
behavioural intention and anticipated regret influenced behavioural expectation. While the 
finding that anticipated regret was influenced by other directed messages was surprising, 
this latter result is not especially so. As previously stated, regret is a very powerful emotion, 
and as such its influence on behavioural expectation is to be expected.  It was also 
identified that the anticipated emotions of fear and responsible feelings influenced the 
decision task. Indeed, whilst anticipated emotions were found to have an effect on the 
measures linked to future behaviour and the decision making task, immediate (i.e. visceral 
or anticipatory) emotions were not found to influence any of these constructs.  
Moving to discussion of the effects of cognition variables, cognitive appraisals were found to 
influence the outcome variables. Behavioural intention and behavioural expectation were 
both influenced by susceptibility, self-efficacy and response efficacy. Perceptions of severity 
were not found to influence either of these constructs. However, perceptions of severity and 
self-efficacy did influence the decision task. Indeed, these results support the idea that 
cognitions about future behaviour differ from those required in the decision making task 
immediately after exposure.  
It is important to note that the empirical results suggested that the anticipated emotions of 
fear, regret and depressed feelings were also influenced by manipulations of the intrinsic 
message characteristics employed in this study. However, the intrinsic message 
characteristics used in this study did not influence anticipated hope, anticipated delight or 
perceptions of susceptibility. Therefore there is support for the model in that it is successful 
in identifying the relationships between the variables but finding the combination of 
appropriate intrinsic message characteristics to generate particular effects requires a lot 
more research.  
Finally, it is important to note that – while these effects were not specifically hypothesised – 
empirical analysis suggested that an interaction between message frame and graphic 
treatment have an influence on behavioural intention. This suggests that at least two of the 
intrinsic message characteristics had a direct impact on behavioural intention, which was 
not mediated through any of the emotional or cognitive response variables.  This is of 
particular interest and requires further examination. Indeed, a key feature of theories and 
models developed to explain responses to threat appeals (as outlined in chapters 2 and 3) 
all have  cognitive (and sometime emotional) variables that mediate the relationship 
between threat appeal and outcome variable.  
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Overall, these results indicate that immediate emotions (beyond just fear), cognitive 
appraisals, elaboration, and anticipated emotions, are generated by exposure to the 
identified intrinsic message characteristics of threat appeals. However, immediate emotions 
and elaboration were not found to have any detectable effect on cognitions about future 
behaviour, while only a small number of anticipated emotions and cognitive appraisals did 
have an effect. That is not to say the emotional and cognitive responses produced no 
effects at all, but that the variables of interest in the study were only specifically influenced 
by a limited number of these response variables. As such, the results reported in this 
chapter reinforce the notion that the instinctive threat mechanism that is assumed to drive 
behaviour in the threat appeals field (i.e. the immediate visceral fear response) is not 
particularly important in achieving the objectives of threat appeals (i.e. behaviour change in 
the future). However, anticipated fear was found to influence the decision making task, and 
as such it is proposed that anticipations of fear may influence decisions soon after exposure 
to a threat appeal, but do not influence cognitions about future behaviour.  
These findings have significant implications for future work in the area, which will be 
discussed in later sections of this chapter. In brief, it has been argued above that the 
present study makes a number of significant contributions to existing research by virtue of 
the creation and explication of a new consideration of responses to threat appeals. It is also 
true that the work done in this study contributes to existing theory due to the examination of 
existing constructs, such as immediate emotional responses to threat appeals. Indeed, the 
results of this study demonstrate that threat appeals do generate fear, disgust anger and 
uncomfortable feelings as a result of the intrinsic message characteristics or interactions of 
these. This supports the widening of consideration of emotional responses to threat appeals 
away from just fear (e.g. Witte, 1992) incorporate these emotions (e.g. Morales et al, 2012). 
Whilst these emotions did not influence the outcome variables of this study, the effects of 
these immediate emotions warrant further research. In addition, this study finds support for 
the influence of cognitive response variables as identified in the extended parallel process 
model (Witte, 1992) namely perceived severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy and response 
efficacy. Indeed, these variables are found to influence behavioural intention and 
expectation and as such are confirmed as an integral response to threat appeals. 
 
8.2 Practical Implications 
Whilst there are many other communication strategies that can be utilised – and indeed 
authors such as Hastings et al. (2004) call for a rise in use of alternative strategies – for the 
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general task of behaviour change within a social marketing context (i.e. the reduction of 
harmful public behaviour, or the encouragement of positive public behaviour), threat 
appeals of the general type studied in the present thesis are arguably the most common, 
and have been historically very popular amongst a number of groups for this purpose. While 
this popularity has generated a large amount of research in the area from academics, 
unfortunately, the early chapters of this thesis make clear that existing research has proven 
inconclusive. The position taken in this thesis is that there is a pressing need for additional 
research in the area because of the fact results are mixed and there are major “gaps” 
(Leshner et al, 2011, p77) in scholarly understanding in the field. Also given that threat 
appeals are employed by government, charities and third sector organisations and require 
significant financial investment, as evidenced in the earlier chapters of this thesis (see 
Chapter 1), the public are regularly exposed to threat appeals. Therefore, the practical 
implications of the present study fall into two broad areas. Implications for research was 
discussed earlier in the present chapter, and this chapter will discuss implications for 
practitioners. 
Whilst this research approach is novel and, as will be discussed in Section 8.3, requires 
replication and further investigation, there are some significant implications for practitioners. 
Perhaps the most important implication for practitioners in the area is the clear evidence 
that specific message characteristics can be manipulated to have specific effects. 
Importantly, practitioners need to understand that it is not appropriate to assume that 
response emotions can somehow be ‘encoded’ into a threat appeal so that all individuals 
will experience that response. Rather, different characteristics and combinations of 
characteristics can be manipulated to have specific effects.  
Further, the general reframing of responses to threat appeals as a decision making situation 
has major implications for the type of responses that these threat appeals should be 
designed to influence. For example, prior research in the area has implied that immediate 
emotions such as fear are important in creating the intended effect of the threat appeal. 
However, the present study suggests (and finds evidence for) the idea that this may be 
somewhat illogical. Specifically, it is often the case that the individual is exposed to the 
threat appeal at a time when they are not engaging in the specific behaviour in question 
(although it is recognised that at times this may not be the case). In such a situation, the 
intended effect of the threat appeal must logically be some sort of behaviour change in the 
future. As such, the present study shows that a focus on immediate responses such as fear 
is less important that influencing future-oriented emotions such as anticipated and 
anticipatory emotions. 
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The present research also provides a number of interesting implications as to the specific 
responses that interested practitioners should aim to influence. Importantly, it seems that 
influencing  immediate emotions such as fear is less important in changing future behaviour 
than influencing anticipated emotions such as anticipated regret (which influenced 
behavioural intentions), anticipated depressed feelings (which influenced behavioural 
expectation), and anticipated fear and responsibility (which influenced scores on the 
decision task). Cognitions such as susceptibility, self-efficacy, and response efficacy were 
all found to influence the future oriented behavioural concepts of expectation and intention, 
while perceptions of severity and self-efficacy influenced the decision task. Since (as shown 
above) this present study provides clear evidence as to which specific message 
characteristics can be manipulated consistently to effect individual response in terms of 
these variables, this study should prove of significant use to practitioners who wish to 
design evidence-based threat appeals. Similarly, it was also found (although not specifically 
hypothesized), that the specific message characteristics of message frame and graphicness 
had an important direct influence on behavioural intentions. Combined with the results of 
the other analysis, this suggests the strong importance of changing the design emphasis of 
threat appeals from ‘generating fear’, to instead combining specific message characteristics 
for specific purposes. 
With this in mind, a number of the unexpected results reported in section 8.1 suggest the 
possibility that different combinations of message characteristics are more or less useful for 
different specific threat appeal contexts. While this was not explicitly tested, due to the 
single context used (and consequently will be discussed as a key direction for future 
research in section 8.3), it may be the case that specific ‘types’ of consequence (e.g. facial 
injuries or more generally consequences visible to others) may be more able to influence 
key variables such as anticipated humiliation, and graphic images may actually be able to 
access elaboration mechanisms more than is suggested by prior research in such cases. It 
is also important for practitioners to note the findings of the present study regarding what 
threat appeals of this type can not do. Specifically, it seems that because of the difficulty in 
operationalizing any positive information in such a context, threat appeals may struggle to 
generate any positive anticipated emotions. However, the present results suggest that 
anticipated home and delight may be important influences on future behaviour as found 
herein. This suggests that practitioners in the area may wish to combine different types of 
campaign with the more traditional threat appeal, to take advantage of various possible 
effect pathways. 
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8.3 Study limitations and directions for future research  
The present study adopts a novel approach to understanding responses to threat appeals, 
and as a consequence of a detailed review of existing relevant literature presents a new 
conceptual framework that conceptualizes threat appeals as part of a decision making 
process regarding future behaviour. This appears to be a more useful perspective from 
which to examine the influence and intended effect of threat appeals than the models that 
generally guide existing work.  Whilst the results from this initial study are promising, the 
framework is designed for threat appeals in general, and as such it is necessary to replicate 
findings, in particular across different appropriate topics (e.g. smoking or binge drinking). 
Furthermore, it is also necessary to replicate the specific relationships uncovered in this 
study, in particular the effects of anticipated emotions, as these have rarely if ever been 
tested in the general context before.  
This thesis has demonstrated that the rationale for widening considerations of emotional 
responses to threat appeals has significant merit. However, there are specific limitations 
associated with the various methods employed, although when taken in context they 
represent the most appropriate way of examining the hypothesized model. In particular, 
there are well-known limitations of self-report measurement of emotions. Of particular 
relevance to this study is the difficulty in distinguishing self-report measures of immediate 
and anticipatory (note, not anticipated) fear, which are conceptualized herein as different 
types of emotion, as discussed throughout the thesis. Indeed, a similar issue is present 
regarding the differentiation between all visceral responses and anticipatory emotions as 
they are all experienced immediately but have a differing focus (i.e. fear of an immediate 
event right now, versus fear of a future event occurring). This issue is not new, but it is 
important to acknowledge it as a limitation. Of course, it may be possible in future to provide 
greater objectivity in the measurement of emotion by using techniques such as those from 
psychophysiology or neuroscience, but these techniques are not a panacea either, and are 
subject to key limitations (e.g. Lee et al, 2007). While there are limitations to the use of self-
report measures, their key advantages are their wide applicability and comparability with 
existing work, as well as their ease of use for respondents, which allows a larger sample 
size to be conducted, as well as a greater range of emotions to be tapped. This is perhaps 
why self-report measures have proved overwhelmingly popular in research within the threat 
appeals and social marketing field. Taken together, it is therefore considered that the use of 
self-report measures of emotion is appropriate presently, as long as the limitations are 
recognised, and steps are taken to minimize their impact (see Chapter 5 for more 
discussion). 
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In addition, while a large sample was taken, which increases the power of the analysis to 
examine the research hypotheses, it was also necessary to utilise a snowball-type sample 
rather than use a sampling frame drawn from an accurate list of the entire population. Of 
course, this limitation is not unique to the present study, and again is extremely common in 
research within the relevant fields. When considering this issue, it is felt that the power 
afforded form the larger sample size, which in practical terms was a result of the enhanced 
response rate helped by the snowball method, outweighs this. Further, a key advantage of 
this particular sample is that it does not rely on student subjects, as so much research in the 
area does. While student samples may have certain internal validity advantages that are not 
available to the snowball approach used here, the increase in external validity is considered 
to be significantly more useful herein. 
As this research outlines a novel approach to the conceptualization of threat appeals, the 
opportunities for future research are consequently numerous. In particular, three specific 
intrinsic message characteristics were identified for this study (message frame, message 
direction, and message graphicness), however, future research could widen the 
consideration out to other message characteristics and examine the influence of these on 
responses to threat appeals. One avenue that seems particularly ripe with potential is the 
type of threat; which for example could include physical versus psychological threats. When 
combined with other message characteristics as explored herein, it seems likely that 
interesting findings will result. 
Equally, whilst a wide range of specific emotional responses have been measured in this 
study (e.g. fear, disgust, anger) future work could include other appropriate emotions and 
examine the effects of various intrinsic message characteristics on these. Of course, it was 
necessary for the purposes of practicality to restrict consideration of various responses to a 
manageable level. However, future research should not consider itself restricted to only the 
emotions and cognitions tested here, as a number of fruitful avenues for research are likely 
to suggest themselves with further research. 
As well as this, a number of the specific response variables examined in the present study 
look likely to justify detailed future research. In particular, based on the findings of the 
research study (as outlined in chapter 7) the role of anticipated regret, both in terms of the 
message characteristics that evoke regret and the influence of anticipated regret on 
outcome variables appears a key area for future scholars to focus on.  
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In a general sense, the model proposed here should best be seen as a baseline for a novel 
approach to future work and as such, it may require further testing and refinement. 
However, it is evident from the results presented in this thesis that it seems to be a good 
starting point for future research. In particular, further research concerning the outcome 
variables will be valuable. Indeed, longitudinal work to examine the decision making 
explored herein (i.e. behavioural intention, expectation, and the decision task) and then 
following up to measure the actual execution (or not) of behaviour change would enable a 
deeper understanding of the influence of threat appeals on behaviour – which after all is the 
ultimate objective of almost all threat appeal campaigns. However, such research will be 
difficult, and is likely to require significant support from key constituencies (such as policy 
makers of third-sector organizations) to enable such work to be conducted. 
Also, the proposed framework could be examined in terms of the specific order of the 
constructs in the model. This suggestion is inherently linked to a greater examination of the 
temporal dimension that underpins the present decision-based approach. Indeed, the model 
presented in this thesis re-frames the consideration of responses to threat appeals as a 
decision about future behaviour, but at this point it is not specified how far into the future the 
behaviour is likely to occur (or not), and whether this variable may have an influence on the 
effects suggested herein. Indeed, it could be argued that there are multiple points are which 
we make decision about a future behaviour, including immediately prior to engaging in that 
behaviour. Therefore future research could investigate decision making about behaviours 
that are likely to occur in the short term and the longer term. In addition examining multiple 
decision points and how these influence behaviour would be beneficial.  
In addition, further research concerning single and multiple advertisement exposures would 
be beneficial. This is an issue that has received considerable debate in the advertising and 
marketing literature (e.g. Weitz and Wensley, 2002). The current research is based on a 
single exposure to a threat appeal, however a longitudinal research design with multiple 
exposures may influence behaviour in a different manner. Indeed, given that the 
government and charities regularly use threat appeals as part of integrated campaigns 
examining how the print threat appeal element of an integrated communication campaign 
influences behaviour is an option for future research.  
Finally, studies which tap the interactions between different ‘types’ of appeal aimed at the 
same basic objective are likely to offer major insights. More specifically, while the model of 
threat appeals examined here focuses on future behaviour as a decision process, it could 
be that the most effective way to achieve the campaign objectives is to actually combine 
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such appeals with different types of appeals. For example, taking the speeding context 
examined herein, the primary threat appeal here is the threat appeal advertisement, which 
necessarily is viewed at a different point than the behaviour of interest will take place. While 
the present study has provided significant insight into how to design such a campaign 
effectively, it could be the case that reinforcing the campaign with one focused on 
immediate response, presented in context where the behaviour is taking place (e.g. as 
motorway billboards) may lead to even more effective results. 
In summary, it is hoped that the findings of the present study will stimulate other 
researchers to examine the ideas and concepts presented here, and conduct further 
research in the area. To this end, the suggestions presented above should provide future 
researchers with some preliminary directions and a platform for future research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 5.1 - Table with examples of prior topics employed by 
research studies 
Topic Selected References 
AIDS Dillard et al (2007); LaTour and Pitts 
(1989); Marchand and Filiatrault (2002); 
Muthusamy et al (2009) 
Anti-Drug Stephenson and Palmgreen (2001); 
Banerjee et al (2011); Dillard et al (2007) 
Anti-Smoking Adams et al (2011); Arthur and Quester 
(2004); Leshner et al (2011); Davis et al 
(2011); Dickinson and Holmes (2008; 
Dickinson-Delaporte and Holmes (2011); 
Dunlop et al (2008); Erceg-Hurn and 
Steed (2011); Gallopel-Morvan et al 
(2009); Kees et al (2010); Keller and 
Block (1996); Lee et al (2011); Leshner 
et al (2009); Leshner et al (2010); 
Maddux and Rogers (1983); Michaelidou 
et al (2007); Miller et al (2007); Nixon et 
al (2008); 
Binge Drinking Dillard et al (2007); Jessop and Wade 
(2008); Lee and Shin (2011) 
Breast Cancer Harris and Napper (2005); Jones and 
Owen (2006) 
Caffeine consumption Nestler and Egloff (2012); Block and 
Williams (2002) 
Charitable giving Dillard et al (2007); Hibbert et al (2007) 
Child abuse Bagozzi and Moore (1994) 
Climate change O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) 
Computer equipment Cochrane and Quester (2005); Johnston 
and Warkenten (2010) 
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Dangerous driving/ Road Safety Carey and Sarma (2011); Algie and 
Rossiter (2010); Taubman Ben-Ari et al 
(2000); Block (2005); Cauberghe et al 
(2009); Dillard et al (2007); Goldenbeld 
et al (2008); Hunt and Shehryar (2002); 
Janssens and De Pelsmacker (2007); 
Lewis et al (2007); Lewis et al (2007b); 
Megia et al (2011); Mowen et al (2004); 
Neilson and Shapiro (2009) 
Developing community Dillard et al (2007) 
Downloading music Levin et al (2007) 
Environment Cornelissen et al (2007); Meijnders et al 
(2001) 
Exercise Dillard et al (2007); Milne et al (2002) 
Finance/ Credit card Chebat et al (1995) 
Flossing Dillard et al (2007) 
Genetically modified food Laros and Steenkamp (2004) 
Health news (STD, Heart attack, Cancer):  Hong 
(2011) 
Homeless children Basil et al (2008) 
Influenza Dillard and Anderson (2004) 
Obesity/ Healthy eating Passyn and Sujan (2006); Chan et al 
(2009) 
Olestra (health) Block and Williams (2002) 
Parenting Dilllard et al (2007) 
Pharmaceuticals Kavadas et al (2007) 
Politics and terrorism De Castella et al (2009); Dean, (2005) 
Radon LaTour and Tanner (2003) 
Rape LaTour and Rotfeld (1997); LaTour et al 
(1996) 
Repetitive strain injury de Hoog et al (2005) 
Safe sex/ STDs Armitage and Talibudeen (2010); Block 
and Keller (1997); Block and Keller 
(1998); Keller (1999); Mewborn and 
Rogers (1979) 
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Skin cancer Block and Keller (1997); Boer et al 
(2006); Mukherjee and Dube (2012); 
Dunlop et al (2008); Hevey et al (2010); 
McMath and Prentice-Dunn (2005); 
Passyn and Sujan (2006) 
Stress Das et al (2003) 
Testicular cancer Eppright et al (2002) 
Tetanus vaccination Leventhal et al (1965); Ordonana et al 
(2009) 
Violent crime Henthorne et al (1993) 
 
Appendix 5.2 - Pictures commissioned from the make-up artist 
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Appendix 5.3 - Pre-test information & Adverts 
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Appendix 5.4 - Measures Table 
Mediating variables 
Construct Scale Items 
Immediate 
Emotions 
Anger Frustrated 
Angry 
Irritated 
Fear Scared 
Afraid 
Panicky 
Fearful 
Happy Happy 
Pleased 
Joyful 
Delighted 
Glad 
Disgust Disgusted 
Repulsed 
Revolted 
Nauseated 
Uncomfortable Uncomfortable 
Anticipatory 
Emotions 
Worry Nervous 
Worried 
Tense 
Guilt Guilty 
Accountable 
Bad 
Responsible 
Optimism Optimistic 
Encouraged 
Hopeful 
Excited 
Pride Proud 
Relief Relieved 
Satisfaction Satisfied 
Anxiety Anxious 
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Construct Scale Items 
 Anticipated 
Emotions 
Anticipated Optimism 
Anticipated Encouragement 
Anticipated Hope 
Anticipated Happiness 
Anticipated Pleased 
Anticipated Joy 
Anticipated Delight 
Anticipated Gladness 
Anticipated Excitement 
Anticipated Pride 
Anticipated Relief 
Anticipated Satisfaction 
Anticipated Self assurance  
Anticipated Frustration 
Anticipated Anger 
Anticipated Irritation 
Anticipated Depressed 
Anticipated Sadness 
Anticipated Miserable 
Anticipated Scared 
Anticipated Afraid 
Anticipated Panic 
Anticipated Fear 
Anticipated Embarrassment 
Anticipated Ashamed 
Anticipated Humiliation 
Anticipated Guilt 
Anticipated Accountable 
Anticipated Bad 
Anticipated Responsible 
Anticipated Upset 
Anticipated Disappointment 
Anticipated Uncomfortable 
Anticipated Anxiety 
Anticipated Regret 
Anticipated Sorry 
Elaboration Mental Imagery The advert made me imagine or picture something in my mind 
The imagery which occurred was clear 
The imagery that occurred was detailed 
The imagery that occurred was vivid 
I really only experienced one image 
I imagined a number of things 
Many images came to my mind 
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Construct Scale Items 
Cognitive 
Processes 
Defensive 
Avoidance 
When I drive I tend to avoid thoughts of speeding accidents 
When I speed I tend to avoid thoughts of speeding accidents 
Susceptibility I am at risk of having an accident from speeding 
It is likely that I will have an accident from speeding 
It is possible that I will have an accident from speeding 
Severity I believe that having an accident from speeding is severe 
I believe that having an accident from speeding has serious 
negative consequences 
I believe that having an accident from speeding is extremely 
harmful 
Response Efficacy Obeying the speed limit is effective in preventing accidents 
Obeying the speed limit works in preventing  accidents 
If I obey the speed limit I am less likely to have an accident 
Self-Efficacy I am able to obey the speed limit to prevent getting having an 
accident 
I have the ability to obey the speed limit to prevent having an 
accident 
I can easily obey the speed limit to prevent having an accident 
 
Dependent variables 
Construct Scale Items 
Behaviour Behavioural intention To what extent do you intend to drive over the speed limit in the 
near future? 
Behavioural 
expectation 
How likely is it that you will drive over the speed limit in the near 
future? 
Decision Task Imagine you are going to an interview for an exciting new job that 
you really want. 
You are running 10 minutes late to set out for this really important 
interview which is 20 miles away.  
You know the roads well and have taken the journey before so 
you estimate the journey should take approximately 30 minutes.  
The speed limit is 40 miles an hour for the entirety of the journey. 
 
The conditions are dry and visibility is good. You know there 
are no speed cameras on the journey and you have never seen a 
police officer on these roads before. 
 Please indicate the average speed you would travel for this 
journey using the speed slider below. 
 
As you move this slider you will see how much time you could gain 
or lose in the box below. Please select the average speed you 
would travel at for the journey to the interview and click on the 
arrow at the bottom of the page. 
 
- 356 - 
Control variables 
Construct Scale Items 
 Social 
Desirability 
I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable  
There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.  
I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget 
I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my own way. 
No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. 
Attitude to 
Speeding  
 Unacceptable – Acceptable 
Foolish- wise 
Wrong – right 
Unfavourable – favourable 
Bad – Good 
Risky – safe 
Anxiety 
Sensitivity  
 It is important to me not to appear nervous 
When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I worry that I might be going crazy 
It scares me when I feel “shaky” (trembling) 
It scares me when I feel faint 
It is important to me to stay in control of my emotions 
It scares me when my heart beats rapidly 
It embarrasses me when my stomach growls 
It scares me when I am nauseous 
When I notice my heart is beating rapidly, I worry I might have had a heart 
attack 
It scares me when I become short of breath 
When my stomach is upset I worry that I might be seriously ill 
It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on a task 
Other people notice when I feel shaky 
Unusual body sensations scare me 
When I am nervous I worry that I might be mentally ill 
It scares me when I am nervous 
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Construct Scale Items 
Style of 
Processing  
 Visual items 
There are some special times in my life that I like to revive by mentally 
“picturing” just how everything looked. 
When I’m trying to learn something new, I’d rather watch a demonstration 
than read how to do it. 
When I’m trying to learn something new, I’d rather watch a demonstration 
than read how to do it. 
I like to daydream. 
I generally prefer to use a diagram rather than a written set of instructions. 
I like to “doodle”. 
I find it helps to think in terms of mental pictures when doing many things. 
After I meet someone for the first time I can usually remember what they 
look like but not much about them 
When I have forgotten something I frequently try to form a mental “picture” 
to remember it. 
I prefer activities that don’t require a lot of reading. 
I seldom daydream. 
My thinking often consists of mental “pictures” or images. 
Verbal items 
I enjoy doing work that requires the use of words 
I can never seem to find the right word when I need it 
I do a lot of reading 
I think I often use words in the wrong way 
I enjoy learning new words 
I often make written notes to myself 
I like to think of synonyms for words 
I like learning new words 
I prefer to read instructions about how to do something rather than have 
someone show me 
I spend very little time attempting to increase my vocabulary 
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Construct Scale Items 
Construal 
level 
 Independent 
My personal identity, independent of others is very important to me 
I enjoy being unique and different from others 
Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me 
I take responsibility for my own actions 
Speaking up at work/ task group/ class is not a problem for me 
Having a lively imagination is important to me 
I’d rather say “no” directly then risk being misunderstood 
I am comfortable being singled out for praise or rewards 
I am the same person at home that I am at work/ university 
I act the same way no matter who I am with 
I feel comfortable using someone’s first name soon after I meet them, even 
when they are much older than I am 
I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I have just met 
I value being in good health above everything 
Interdependent 
My relationships with those in my group are more important than my 
personal accomplishments 
My happiness depends on the happiness of those in my group 
I am careful to maintain harmony in my group 
I would sacrifice my self-interests for the benefit of the group 
I will stay in a group I they need me, even if I’m not happy with the group 
I respect the decisions made by my group 
If my brother or sisters fail, I feel responsible 
I have respect for authority figures with whom I interact 
I respect people who are modest about themselves 
Even when I strongly disagree with group members I avoid an argument 
Perspective 
Taking 
 Before criticising somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel in their place 
If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to 
other peoples arguments 
I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things 
look from their perspective 
I believe there are two sides to every question and ty to look at them both 
I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view 
I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision 
When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a 
while 
Empathetic 
Concern 
 When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective 
toward them 
When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very 
much pity for them 
I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me 
I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person 
Sometimes I don't feel sorry for other people when they are having 
problems 
Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal 
I am often quite touched by things that I see happen 
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Construct Scale Items 
Confound  The message was clearly written 
I clearly understood this message 
I learned a lot about speeding from this message 
The quality of the arguments in the message were good 
Perceived 
Manipulation 
 The message was manipulative 
The message was misleading 
The message tried to manipulate me 
This message was exploitative 
Message 
Derogation 
 This message was exaggerated 
This message was distorted 
This message was overblown 
This message was overstated 
 
Manipulation checks 
Construct Scale Items 
Direction  You – your best friend 
Graphicness  Shocking 
Scary 
Frightening 
Vivid 
Intense 
Powerful 
Graphic 
Unpleasant 
Highly arousing 
Gruesome 
Severity of 
injury 
 Not serious at all – very serious 
Message 
Frame 
 Breaking the speed limit and having an accident – obeying the speed limit 
and avoiding an accident 
 
 
- 360 - 
Appendix 5.5 - Screenshot of decision task 
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Appendix 5.6 - Copy of the measurement instrument 
Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this study.    The questionnaire will take approximately 15 minutes to 
complete.    Please note that participation in this research is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time.   The principal 
researcher for this study is Laura Chamberlain (Aston University) under the supervision of Professor John Rudd (Aston University) and 
Professor Nick Lee (Loughborough University)     Please use a computer or laptop to fill out this questionnaire and not a mobile device.   
Please read the information below:      TERMS AND CONDITIONS:    The following information outlines the procedure for this study. 
Participation is voluntary and everyone is free to withdraw from the study at any time. Please read the following information and if you 
agree to participate in this study please tick the box below. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to ask Laura Chamberlain at 
L.M.Chamberlain1@aston.ac.uk   Please note that some of the images used in the stimuli may be graphic and you may find them 
shocking (for example, showing pictures of individuals with severe injuries). In addition you will be asked to provide some personal 
information about experiences you may or may not have had in your lifetime. These answers will not involve detailed description and will 
not be linked to your identity in any way, if you feel uncomfortable at any point or do not wish to complete the task, please stop what 
you are doing and close your internet browser window.    If any of the following images or questions cause you upset or distress and you 
are an Aston student or staff member please follow the appropriate link below in order to get the support you may need. If you are not 
an Aston student or staff member please contact the principal researcher   Aston University Staff: 
http://www1.aston.ac.uk/staff/counselling/?OriginalPath=/staff/counselling/   Aston University 
Students: http://www1.aston.ac.uk/current-students/counselling/     The study is structured as follows:     -        At the first stage you will 
be asked to demonstrate your understanding of; the instructions, your right to withdraw from the study and your consent to partake in 
the study by ticking the box provided on the computer screen. You will then be asked some questions about yourself. Answers to these 
questions will be recorded by ticking the relevant box displayed on the computer screen using the mouse.      -        At the next stage you 
will be asked to view an advertisement which will be displayed on your computer screen.     -        After you have viewed the 
advertisement we would like you to answer some questions about the advert you have seen which will be displayed on the computer 
screen. Answers to these questions will be recorded by ticking the relevant box displayed on the computer screen using the 
mouse.      Confidentiality of information    This research study is one component of a PhD being undertaken by Laura Chamberlain. It is 
important to note that the data generated by this study may, if applicable, be used for publications. The confidentiality of personal 
information and the anonymity of all volunteers involved in this investigation will be preserved in the following ways:    We will only ask 
for your contact details, with your consent, to enter you into the prize draw.    This information will not be linked to the questionnaire 
data collected during the study. This information will be kept in a secure location which can only be accessed by Laura Chamberlain and 
will be destroyed six weeks after your participation in this study. Details that would allow you to be identified will not be published or 
made available to anyone other than Laura Chamberlain.    It will not be possible to identify you from any information generated by the 
research study.      Volunteer’s statement     I have read and understand the above explanation. I agree to take part in the study outlined 
above and I have been informed that I am free to withdraw my participation from this study at any time.     We are offering participants 
of this study the opportunity to enter a prize draw. The prizes on offer are as follows:    One lucky winner will win the 1st Prize; a iPad 
mini 3 16GB Wi-Fi  Two lucky winners will win 2nd Prizes; a Kindle Fire 6 HD Tablet 16GB  each   Four lucky winners will win 3rd Prizes; a 
£50 Amazon gift voucher each      If you would like to enter this prize draw please enter your e mail address in the box provided at the 
end of the study. Please note you are not able to enter the prize draw unless you complete the study but you can complete the study and 
chose not to enter in to the prize draw.    Please tick the box at the bottom of this page to demonstrate you have read and understand 
this statement and you agree to continue with this study. Once you have done this please use the arrow in the bottom right hand corner 
to proceed to the next stage of the study.              
 I have read the information and agree to continue with this study (1) 
 
Q2 We would like to know a little more information about you, your lifestyle and the experiences you have had in your life. Please 
indicate your answers to the following questions.       Are you over the age of 18? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To Unfortunately you are not eligible to... 
 
 
Q3  Have you or anyone you are close to been in a traumatic car accident causing serious injury or death?      
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
If Yes Is Selected, Then Skip To Unfortunately you are not eligible to... 
 
Answer If We would like to know a little more information about you, your  lifestyle and the experiences yo... <span style="font-
size:13px;">No</span> Is Selected Or Have you  or anyone you are close to been in a car accident causing  serious injury or death?... 
<span style="font-size:13px;">Yes</span> Is Selected 
Q4 Unfortunately you are not eligible to participate in this study. Thank you for taking the time to attempt to participate        If you have 
any questions regarding this study please contact the principal researcher at L.M.Chamberlain1@aston.ac.uk     It would be helpful if you 
could send the link for this questionnaire to people you know who would be willing to fill it out. If you would like to do this please copy 
and paste the link to the questionnaire into an e mail.     Thank you very much for your time.    
If Unfortunately you are not e... Is Displayed, Then Skip To End of Survey 
 
Q5 We would like to know a little more information about you, your lifestyle and the experiences you have had in your life. All answers 
you provide to these questions are confidential. Please read the questions and use your mouse to click on your answer. You must answer 
all questions in this section.    If any of the following questions cause you upset or distress please follow the appropriate link in order to 
get the support you may need.  Aston University Staff 
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: http://www1.aston.ac.uk/staff/counselling/?OriginalPath=/staff/counselling/ Aston University   Aston University 
Students: http://www1.aston.ac.uk/current-students/counselling/  Other: L.M.Chamberlain1@aston.ac.uk.        
 Please tick this box to indicate you understand these instructions (1) 
 
 
Q6 Please indicate what you think about breaking the speed limit whilst driving 
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 
Unacceptable:Acceptable 
(1) 
              
Foolish:Wise (2)               
Wrong:Right (3)               
Unfavourable:Favourable 
(4) 
              
Bad:Good (5)               
Risky:Safe (6)               
 
 
Q7 Are you male or female?    
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 
Q8 What is your current age?  
 Less than 18 (1) 
 18 - 25 (2) 
 25 to 34 (3) 
 25 to 34 (4) 
 35 to 44 (5) 
 45 to 54 (6) 
 55 to 64 (7) 
 65 or over (8) 
 
Q9 What is your nationality? 
 
Q10 What is your ethnicity? 
 White British (1) 
 White Irish (2) 
 Any other white background (3) 
 Mixed (4) 
 Asian British (5) 
 Asian (6) 
 Black British (7) 
 Black Caribbean (8) 
 Black African (9) 
 Any other black background (10) 
 Chinese (11) 
 Other (12) 
 
Q11 What is the highest qualification you have achieved?  
 CSE/GCSE (1) 
 A Level or equivalent (2) 
 BA/BSc (3) 
 MA/MSc (4) 
 PhD (5) 
 Other (6) 
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Q12 What is your current relationship status? 
 Single (1) 
 In a relationship but not living together (2) 
 Living with partner (3) 
 Civil partnership (4) 
 Married (5) 
 Separated (6) 
 Divorced (7) 
 Widowed (8) 
 
Q13 Do you have a child or children? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q14 Do you have a driving licence? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q15 Do you own a car? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q16 Do you drive a car? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q17 How often do you drive a car? 
 Daily (1) 
 A couple of times a week (2) 
 Once a week (3) 
 Once a fortnight (4) 
 Once a month (5) 
 Less than once a month (6) 
 Never (7) 
 
Q18 How often do you break the speed limit in a 30mph zone? 
 Every time (1) 
 Almost every time (2) 
 Frequently (3) 
 About half the time (4) 
 Occasionally (5) 
 Rarely (6) 
 Almost never (7) 
 Never (8) 
 
Q19 How often do you break the speed limit in a 60mph zone? 
 Every time (1) 
 Almost every time (2) 
 Frequently (3) 
 About half the time (4) 
 Occasionally (5) 
 Rarely (6) 
 Almost never (7) 
 Never (8) 
Q20 How often do you break the speed limit in a 70mph zone? 
 Every time (1) 
 Almost every time (2) 
 Frequently (3) 
 About half the time (4) 
 Occasionally (5) 
 Rarely (6) 
 Almost never (7) 
 Never (8) 
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Q21 How many times have you been caught speeding by a speed camera, the police or another authority? 
 0 (1) 
 1 (2) 
 2 (3) 
 3 (4) 
 4 (5) 
 5 (6) 
 More than 5 (7) 
 Prefer not to say (8) 
 
Q22 How many car accidents have you been involved in? 
 0 (1) 
 1 (2) 
 2 (3) 
 3 (4) 
 4 (5) 
 5 (6) 
 More than 5 (7) 
 Prefer not to say (8) 
 
Q23 Of these accidents, how many of these required the attendance of the emergency services? 
 0 (1) 
 1 (2) 
 2 (3) 
 3 (4) 
 4 (5) 
 5 (6) 
 More than 5 (7) 
 Prefer not to say (8) 
 
Q24 Of these accidents, how many have involved some injury to a person? 
 0 (1) 
 1 (2) 
 2 (3) 
 3 (4) 
 4 (5) 
 5 (6) 
 More than 5 (7) 
 Prefer not to say (8) 
Q25  The aim of this next section is to find out more about you.  Please answer the following questions openly, as there is no right or 
wrong answer. We ask that you provide honest and accurate answers.  Please answer Each question by clicking on one of the possible 
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responses linked to each     statement that reflects your thoughts, feelings or behaviours most accurately. Please answer all the 
questions. 
 
Q26 Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements by clicking on your answer. 
 
Definitely true 1 
(1) 
Mostly true 2 (2) 
Don&#39;t know 
3 (3) 
Mostly false 4 (4) 
Definitely false 5 
(5) 
I am always 
courteous, even 
to people who 
are disagreeable 
(1) 
          
There have 
been occasions 
when I took 
advantage of 
someone. (2) 
          
I sometimes try 
to get even 
rather than 
forgive and 
forget (3) 
          
I sometimes feel 
resentful when I 
don’t get my 
own way. (4) 
          
No matter who 
I’m talking to, 
I’m always a 
good listener. 
(5) 
          
 
Q27 Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements by clicking on your answer.      
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Strongly disagree 1 
(1) 
Disagree 2 (2) 
Neither agree or 
disagree 3 (3) 
Agree 4 (4) 
Strongly agree 5 
(5) 
It is important to 
me not to appear 
nervous (1) 
          
When I cannot 
keep my mind on 
a task, I worry 
that I might be 
going crazy (2) 
          
It scares me when 
I feel “shaky” 
(trembling) (3) 
          
It scares me when 
I feel faint (4) 
          
It is important to 
me to stay in 
control of my 
emotions (5) 
          
It scares me when 
my heart beats 
rapidly (6) 
          
It embarrasses me 
when my stomach 
growls (7) 
          
It scares me when 
I am nauseous (8) 
          
When I notice my 
heart is beating 
rapidly, I worry I 
might have had a 
heart attack (9) 
          
It scares me when 
I become short of 
breath (10) 
          
When my 
stomach is upset I 
worry that I might 
be seriously ill 
(11) 
          
It scares me when 
I am unable to 
keep my mind on 
a task (13) 
          
Other people 
notice when I feel 
shaky (14) 
          
Unusual body 
sensations scare 
me (15) 
          
When I am 
nervous I worry 
that I might be 
mentally ill (16) 
          
It scares me when 
I am nervous (17) 
          
 
 
Q28  Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements by clicking on your answer. 
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 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 
I enjoy doing work that 
requires the use of 
words (1) 
        
There are some special 
times in my life that I 
like to revive by 
mentally “picturing” 
just how everything 
looked. (2) 
        
I can never seem to 
find the right word 
when I need it. (3) 
        
I do a lot of reading. 
(4) 
        
When I’m trying to 
learn something new, 
I’d                       rather 
watch a demonstration 
than read how to do it. 
(5) 
        
I think I often use 
words in the wrong 
way. (7) 
        
I enjoy learning new 
words. (8) 
        
I like to picture how I 
could fix my apartment 
or a room if I could buy 
anything I wanted. (9) 
        
I often make written 
notes to myself. (10) 
        
I like to daydream. (11)         
I generally prefer to 
use a diagram rather 
than a                 written 
set of instructions. (12) 
        
I like to “doodle”. (13)         
I find it helps to think 
in terms of mental 
pictures when doing 
many things. (14) 
        
After I meet someone 
for the first time I can 
usually remember 
what they look like but 
not much about them. 
(15) 
        
I like to think of 
synonyms for words. 
(16) 
        
When I have forgotten 
something I frequently 
try to form a mental 
“picture” to remember 
it. (17) 
        
I like learning new 
words. (18) 
        
I prefer to read 
instructions about how 
to                           do 
something rather than 
have someone show 
me. (19) 
        
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I prefer activities that 
don’t require a lot of 
reading. (20) 
        
I seldom daydream. 
(21) 
        
I spend very little time 
attempting to increase 
my vocabulary. (22) 
        
My thinking often 
consists of mental 
“pictures” or images. 
(23) 
        
 
Q29 Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements by clicking on your answer.   
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Strongly 
disagree 1 (1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 
Strongly 
agree 7 (7) 
My personal 
identity, 
independent of 
others is very 
important to me 
(30) 
              
My relationships 
with those in my 
group are more 
important than 
my personal 
accomplishments 
(2) 
              
I enjoy being 
unique and 
different from 
others (3) 
              
My happiness 
depends on the 
happiness of 
those in my 
group (4) 
              
Being able to 
take care of 
myself is a 
primary concern 
for me (5) 
              
I am careful to 
maintain 
harmony in my 
group (6) 
              
I take 
responsibility for 
my own actions 
(7) 
              
Speaking up at 
work/ task 
group/ class is 
not a problem 
for me (8) 
              
Having a lively 
imagination is 
important to me 
(10) 
              
I would sacrifice 
my self-interests 
for the benefit of 
the group (11) 
              
I will stay in a 
group I they 
need me, even if 
I’m not happy 
with the group 
(12) 
              
I’d rather say 
“no” directly 
then risk being 
misunderstood 
(13) 
              
I am comfortable 
being singled out 
for praise or 
rewards (14) 
              
- 370 - 
I respect the 
decisions made 
by my group (15) 
              
I am the same 
person at home 
that I am at 
work/ university 
(17) 
              
I act the same 
way no matter 
who I am with 
(18) 
              
If my brother or 
sisters fail, I feel 
responsible (19) 
              
I have respect for 
authority figures 
with whom I 
interact (20) 
              
I respect people 
who are modest 
about 
themselves (21) 
              
I feel 
comfortable 
using someone’s 
first name soon 
after I meet 
them, even when 
they are much 
older than I am 
(22) 
              
I prefer to be 
direct and 
forthright when 
dealing with 
people I have 
just met (23) 
              
I value being in 
good health 
above everything 
(24) 
              
Even when I 
strongly disagree 
with group 
members I avoid 
an argument (25) 
              
 
 
Q30 Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements by clicking on your answer.         
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Strongly 
disagree 1 (1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 
Strongly 
agree 7 (7) 
Before 
criticising 
somebody, I try 
to imagine how 
I would feel in 
their place (1) 
              
If I’m sure I’m 
right about 
something, I 
don’t waste 
much time 
listening to 
other peoples 
arguments (2) 
              
I sometimes try 
to understand 
my friends 
better by 
imagining how 
things look 
from their 
perspective (3) 
              
I believe there 
are two sides to 
every question 
and try to look 
at them both 
(4) 
              
I sometimes 
find it difficult 
to see things 
from the "other 
guy's" point of 
view (5) 
              
I try to look at 
everybody's 
side of a 
disagreement 
before I make a 
decision (6) 
              
When I'm upset 
at someone, I 
usually try to 
"put myself in 
his shoes" for a 
while (7) 
              
When I see 
someone being 
taken 
advantage of, I 
feel kind of 
protective 
toward them 
(8) 
              
When I see 
someone being 
treated 
unfairly, I 
sometimes 
don't feel very 
much pity for 
them (11) 
              
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I often have 
tender, 
concerned 
feelings for 
people less 
fortunate than 
me (10) 
              
I would 
describe myself 
as a pretty soft-
hearted person 
(9) 
              
Sometimes I 
don't feel sorry 
for other 
people when 
they are having 
problems (13) 
              
Other people's 
misfortunes do 
not usually 
disturb me a 
great deal (14) 
              
I am often quite 
touched by 
things that I see 
happen (15) 
              
 
 
Q31 You will now view a mock advertisement which will be displayed on your computer screen. The advert is not in finished form but is a 
draft example of a marketing communication that may be used in the public sphere.    After viewing the advertisement you will be asked 
to answer a questionnaire which will ask you about your reactions to the advertisement. Please view the advertisement at your own 
pace.      The rest of the questionnaire should take approximately 5 minutes.     Please view the advertisement at your own pace and when 
you have finished please click on the arrow underneath the advertisement to continue to the questionnaire.     You cannot go back to 
look at the advert again so please view the advert at your own pace.     The advert may take a couple of seconds to load, please do not 
click on the screen until you see the picture.     Please remember if you feel uncomfortable at any time and wish to discontinue the study 
please exit the questionnaire by closing your internet browser.  
 
EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT HERE 
 
Q48    The aim of this section is to find out your reactions to the advertisement you have just seen. Please answer the following questions 
openly as there is no right or wrong answer. We ask that you provide honest and accurate answers. Please answer each question by 
clicking on one of the possible responses linked to each statement that reflects your thoughts or feelings most accurately.    
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Q49 How did this advert make you feel? 
 
Not at all 1  
(1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 
Very much 
so 7 (7) 
Frustrated (1)               
Angry (2)               
Irritated (3)               
Scared (4)               
Afraid (5)               
Panicky (6)               
Fearful (7)               
Depressed (8)               
Sad (9)               
Miserable (10)               
Happy (11)               
Pleased (12)               
Joyful (13)               
Delighted (14)               
Glad (15)               
Uncomfortable 
(16) 
              
Disgusted (17)               
Repulsed (18)               
Revolted (19)               
Nauseated 
(20) 
              
Unfulfilled (21)               
Discontented 
(22) 
              
Nervous (23)               
Worried (24)               
Tense (25)               
Embarrassed 
(26) 
              
Ashamed (27)               
Humiliated 
(41) 
              
Optimistic (28)               
Encouraged 
(29) 
              
Hopeful (30)               
Excited (31)               
Guilty (32)               
Accountable 
(33) 
              
Bad (34)               
Responsible 
(35) 
              
Upset (36)               
Proud (37)               
Relieved (38)               
Satisfied (39)               
Anxious (40)               
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Q50 Please indicate whether the message in this advert was about... 
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 
Breaking the 
speed limit and 
having an 
accident:Obeying 
the speed limit 
and avoiding an 
accident (1) 
              
 
 
Q51 How serious is the injury displayed in the advertisement?  
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 
Not serious 
at all:Very 
serious (1) 
              
 
 
Q52 The information in this advert focuses on... 
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 
Suffering serious 
injuries as a 
result of 
speeding and 
having an 
accident:Avoiding 
suffering serious 
injuries as a 
result of obeying 
the speed limit 
and avoiding an 
accident (1) 
              
 
 
Q53 Please indicate whether the advert was about how speeding could hurt... 
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 
You:Your 
Best Friend 
(1) 
              
 
 
Q54 The information in this advert focuses on... 
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 
You:Your 
Best Friend 
(1) 
              
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Q55 Please rate the extent to which this picture was  
 
Not at all 1 
(1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 
Definitely 7 
(7) 
Shocking  (1)               
Scary  (2)               
Frightening 
(3) 
              
Vivid (4)               
Intense (5)               
Powerful (6)               
Graphic (7)               
Unpleasant 
(8) 
              
Highly 
arousing (9) 
              
Gruesome 
(10) 
              
 
 
Q56 The aim of this section is to find out your reactions to the advertisement you have just seen. Please answer the following questions 
openly as there is no right or wrong answer. We ask that you provide honest and accurate answers. Please answer each question by 
clicking on one of the possible responses linked to each statement that reflects your thoughts or feelings most accurately.     Please 
answer the following questions with the driving advert you just read in mind.  
 
Not at all 1 
(1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 
Definitely 7 
(7) 
To what 
extent do 
you intend 
to drive 
over the 
speed limit 
in the near 
future? (1) 
              
 
 
Q57 Please indicate your answer to the following question 
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 
How likely is 
it that you 
will drive 
over the 
speed limit 
in the near 
future? (1) 
              
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Q58 Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements 
 
Strongly 
disagree 1 (1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 
Strongly 
agree 7 (7) 
The advert 
made me 
imagine or 
picture 
something 
in my mind 
(1) 
              
The imagery 
which 
occurred 
was clear (2) 
              
The imagery 
that 
occurred 
was detailed 
(3) 
              
The imagery 
that 
occurred 
was vivid (4) 
              
I really only 
experienced 
one image 
(5) 
              
I imagined a 
number of 
things (6) 
              
Many 
images 
came to my 
mind (7) 
              
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Q59 Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements 
 
Strongly 
disagree 1 (1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 
Strongly 
agree 7 (7) 
When I 
drive I tend 
to avoid 
thoughts of 
speeding 
accidents 
(1) 
              
When I 
speed I tend 
to avoid 
thoughts of 
speeding 
accidents 
(2) 
              
Q60 When I was reading the message and looking at the pictures, my instinct was to: 
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 
Want to 
protect 
myself from 
speeding 
accidents:Not 
want to 
protect 
myself from 
speeding 
accidents (1) 
              
Want to 
think about 
speeding 
accidents:Not 
want to think 
about 
speeding 
accidents (2) 
              
Q61 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements  
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Strongly 
disagree 1 (1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 
Strongly 
agree 7 (7) 
I am at risk of 
having an 
accident from 
speeding (1) 
              
It is likely that 
I will have an 
accident from 
speeding (2) 
              
It is possible 
that I will 
have an 
accident from 
speeding (3) 
              
I believe that 
having an 
accident from 
speeding is a 
severe 
problem (4) 
              
I believe that 
having an 
accident from 
speeding has 
serious 
negative 
consequences 
(5) 
              
I believe that 
having an 
accident from 
speeding is 
extremely 
harmful (6) 
              
Obeying the 
speed limit is 
effective in 
preventing 
accidents (7) 
              
Obeying the 
speed limit 
works in 
preventing  
accidents (8) 
              
If I obey the 
speed limit I 
am less likely 
to have an 
accident (9) 
              
I am able to 
obey the 
speed limit to 
prevent 
getting 
having an 
accident (10) 
              
I have the 
ability to 
obey the 
speed limit to 
prevent 
having an 
accident (11) 
              
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I can easily 
obey the 
speed limit to 
prevent 
having an 
accident (12) 
              
 
 
Q62 Please rate the advert you have just seen according to the following statements 
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (8) 5 (9) 6 (10) 7 (11) 
The message 
was clearly 
written (1) 
              
I clearly 
understood 
this message 
(2) 
              
I learned a 
lot about 
speeding 
from this 
message (3) 
              
The quality 
of 
arguments 
in this 
message 
were good 
(4) 
              
The message 
was 
manipulative 
(5) 
              
The message 
was 
misleading 
(6) 
              
The message 
tried to 
manipulate 
me (7) 
              
This 
message 
was 
exploitative 
(8) 
              
This 
message 
was 
exaggerated 
(9) 
              
This 
message 
was 
distorted 
(10) 
              
This 
message 
was 
overblown 
(11) 
              
This 
message 
was 
overstated 
(12) 
              
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Q63 Imagine the next time you drive your car you obey the speed limit and avoid an accident. How would you feel?    
 
Not at all 
1 (1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 
Very 
much 
so 9 (9) 
Optimistic 
(1) 
                  
Encouraged 
(2) 
                  
Hopeful (3)                   
Happy (4)                   
Pleased (5)                   
Joyful (6)                   
Delighted 
(7) 
                  
Glad (8)                   
Excited (9)                   
Proud (10)                   
Relieved 
(11) 
                  
Satisfied 
(12) 
                  
Self-
assured 
(13) 
                  
 
 
Q64 Imagine the next time you drive your car you break the speed limit and have an accident. How would you feel?    
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Not at all 
1 (1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (12) 
Very 
much 
so 9 
(13) 
Frustrated (1)                   
Angry (2)                   
Irritated (3)                   
Depressed (4)                   
Sad (5)                   
Miserable (6)                   
Scared (7)                   
Afraid (8)                   
Panicky (9)                   
Fearful (10)                   
Embarrassed 
(11) 
                  
Ashamed (12)                   
Humiliated 
(13) 
                  
Guilty (14)                   
Accountable 
(15) 
                  
Bad (16)                   
Responsible 
(17) 
                  
Upset (18)                   
Disappointed 
(19) 
                  
Uncomfortable 
(20) 
                  
Anxious (21)                   
Regretful (22)                   
Sorry (23)                   
 
SLIDER QUESTION HERE 
 
Q109 Thank you for answering this section of the questionnaire.      If you would like to be entered into the prize draw for a chance to 
winthe following prizes, please enter your e mail address in the box below.   Prize Draw:  One lucky winner will win the 1st Prize; a iPad 
mini 3 16GB Wi-Fi  Two lucky winners will win 2nd Prizes; a Kindle Fire 6 HD Tablet 16GB  each   Four lucky winners will win 3rd 
Prizes; a £50 Amazon gift voucher each    Once you have entered your e mail address please click on the arrow in the bottom right hand 
corner.  If you would not like to enter the prize draw, please click on the arrow to proceedE mail: 
 
Q110 Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this study.      Winners of the prize draw will be notified by e mail.     If you have 
any questions regarding this study please contact the principal researcher at L.M.Chamberlain1@aston.ac.uk     It would be helpful if you 
could send the link for this questionnaire to people you know who would be willing to fill it out. If you would like to do this please copy 
and paste the link to the questionnaire into an e mail.     Thank you very much for your time.  PLEASE CLICK ON THE ARROW BELOW TO 
SUBMIT YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE    
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Appendix 5.7 - Pre-test demographic profile of participants results 
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White British White Irish Any other white background
Mixed Asian British Asian
Black British Black Caribbean Any other black background
Other
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Participant highest qualification achieved 
CSE/GCSE A Level or equivalent BA/ BSc MA/ MSc PhD Other
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Single, never married in a relationship, not living together
Living with partner Married without children
Married with children Divorced
Widowed
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Appendix 5.8 - Pre-test Exploratory Factor Analysis results 
Graphicness 
The exploratory factor analysis results indicated that the items loaded onto one factor. 
Whilst the correlation matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed nine coefficients 
above .3, one item; highly arousing did not load at all. This is shown below.  
Coding 
number 
Items Factor 1 
1 Shocking .910 
2 Scary .830 
3 Frightening .797 
4 Vivid .885 
5 Intense .894 
6 Powerful .819 
7 Graphic .854 
8 Unpleasant .795 
9 Highly arousing  
10 Gruesome .846 
Principal Axis Factoring. I factor extracted. 5 iterations required 
KMO = .900 
Bartletts’ test = 1748.192 
df: 45 
p= 0.000 
 
Given the above results, the factor analysis was repeated with item 9, highly arousing 
suppressed. Cronbach’s alpha was .985 higher than the threshold of 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978). 
The correlation matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed all nine coefficients above 
.3. In addition the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. 
Exploratory factor analysis extracted one factor thus the nine items were retained.  This is 
shown below. 
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Coding number Items Factor 1 
1 Shocking .835 
2 Scary .861 
3 Frightening .851 
4 Vivid .812 
5 Intense .839 
6 Powerful .747 
7 Graphic .788 
8 Unpleasant .652 
10 Gruesome .732 
Principal Axis Factoring. I factor extracted. 5 iterations required 
KMO = .900 
Bartletts’ test = 1727.442 
df: 36 
p= 0.000 
 
Mental Imagery  
Mental imagery was measured using the seven item mental imagery scale. However, the 
exploratory factor analysis results indicated that the items loaded onto two factors. Four of 
the original items loaded onto one factor and the other four items loaded onto the second 
factor. The pattern matric for the two factors is presented below. 
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Coding 
number 
Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
1 The advert made me imagine or picture 
something in my mind 
 -.579 
2 The imagery which occurred was clear .837  
3 The imagery that occurred was detailed .899  
4 The imagery that occurred was vivid .855  
5 I really only experienced one image .325 .323 
6 I imagined a number of things  -.896 
7 Many images came to mind  -.903 
Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation converged in 15 iterations 
KMO = .775 
Bartletts’ test = 905.518 
df: 21 
p= 0.000 
 
Analysis of the pattern matrix suggested that the first factor represented clarity of image 
items and the second factor represented imagination / mind items. As the item “I only really 
experienced one image” was low and loaded onto both the factors this was suppressed.  As 
such, the items were split into two, omitting the fifth item. For the clarity of image items 
Cronbach’s alpha was .934, higher than the threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). The 
correlation matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed all coefficients above 0.3. For 
the imagination/mind factor Cronbach’s alpha was .881, higher than the threshold of .7 
(Nunnally, 1978). The correlation matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed all 
coefficients above 0.3. In addition the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an 
appropriate data set. Exploratory factor analysis extracted one factor explaining x of 
variance, thus all six items were retained.  This analysis is shown below. 
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Coding number Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
1 The advert made me imagine or picture 
something in my mind 
 .584 
2 The imagery which occurred was clear .899  
3 The imagery that occurred was detailed .947  
4 The imagery that occurred was vivid .847  
6 I imagined a number of things  .948 
7 Many images came to mind  .984 
Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
KMO = .769 
Bartletts’ test = 877.159 
df: 15 
p= 0.000 
 
Confound  
The exploratory factor analysis indicated results loaded onto one factor. Cronbach’s alpha 
was .839, higher than the threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). The correlation matrix obtained 
from the factor analysis displayed all coefficients above 0.3. In addition the KMO and 
Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. Exploratory factor analysis 
extracted one factor explaining variance, thus all four items were retained.  This analysis is 
shown below. 
Coding number Items Factor 1 
1 The message was clearly written .819 
2 I clearly understood this message .768 
3 I learned a lot about speeding from this message .628 
4 The quality of arguments in this message were good .795 
Principal Axis Factoring.  1 Factor extracted, 6 iterations required 
KMO = .718 
Bartletts’ test = 323.088 
df: 6 
p= 0.000 
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Perceived manipulation  
The exploratory factor analysis indicated results loaded onto one factor. Cronbach’s alpha 
was .821, higher than the threshold of .7 (Nunnally, 1978). The correlation matrix obtained 
from the factor analysis displayed all coefficients above 0.3. In addition the KMO and 
Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an appropriate data set. Exploratory factor analysis 
extracted one factor explaining variance, thus all four items were retained.  This analysis is 
shown below. 
Coding number Items Factor 1 
1 The message was manipulative .851 
2 The message was misleading .486 
3 The message tried to manipulate me .856 
4 The message was exploitative .739 
Principal Axis Factoring.  1 Factor extracted, 7 iterations required 
KMO = .752 
Bartletts’ test = 288.268 
df: 6 
p= 0.000 
 
Message derogation  
Message derogation was measured using xxx. The exploratory factor analysis indicated 
results loaded onto one factor. Cronbachs alpha was .916, higher than the threshold of .7 
(Nunally, 1978). The correlation matrix obtained from the factor analysis displayed all 
coefficients above 0.3. In addition the KMO and Bartlett’s test were both indicative of an 
appropriate data set. Exploratory factor analysis extracted one factor explaining variance, 
thus all four items were retained.  This analysis is shown below. 
 
  
- 390 - 
Coding number Items Factor 1 
1 This message was exaggerated .778 
2 This message was distorted .741 
3 This message was overblown .964 
4 This message was overstated .939 
Principal Axis Factoring.  1 Factor extracted, 6 iterations required 
KMO = .810 
Bartletts’ test = 585.295 
df: 6 
p= 0.000 
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Appendix 6.1 - Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Anger (1) 1              
Fear (2) .527** 1             
Uncomfortable (3) .395** .583** 1            
Disgust (4) .541** .630** .626** 1           
Worry (5) .503** .807** .626** .635** 1          
Guilt (6) .385** .464** .419** .461** .543** 1         
Relief (7) .143** .152** 0.054 .144** .177** .386** 1        
Ant'd. Hope (8) .223** 0.277 .250** .205** .258** .223** .035 1       
Ant'd. Relief (9) .101** .217** .238** .136** .199** .122** -.032 .608** 1      
Ant'd. Delight (10) .184** .253** .176** .198** .217** .186** .061 .774** .638** 1     
Ant'd. Depres. (11) .176** .238** .229** .166** .227** .165** .023 .307** .260** .268** 1    
Ant'd. Fear (12) .126** .315** .257** .182** .276** .141** -.041 .302** .347** .285** .652** 1   
Ant'd. Shame (13) .036 .093* .152** .073 .102** .090* .028 .176** .242** .165** .601** .592** 1  
Ant'd. Humiliation (14) .132** .206** .195** .163** .186** .160** .026 .240** .210** .226** .618** .650** .778** 1 
Ant'd. Resp. (15) .013 .068 .163** .030 .078* .084* -.044 .224** .283** .191** .496** .547** .683** .558** 
Ant'd. Regret (16) .006 .112** .183** .063 .117** .041 -.056 .199** .295** .185** .575** .634** .715** .586** 
Mental Imagery (17) .186** .289** .372** .293** .278** .209** .023 .187** .136** .145** .104** .111** .072 .147** 
Def. Avoid. (18) -.011 .107** .100** .056 .088* .051 .041 -.022 -.041 .026 -.050 -.039 -.033 -.058 
Susceptability (19) .067 .118** .122** .138** .130** .223** .042 .051 .082* .063 .083* .103** .037 .037 
Severity (20) -.008 .096* .189** .099** .113** .032 -.097* .177** .186** .142** .235** .293** .236** .251** 
Resp.Eff. (21) .025 .127** .114** .075* .096* .070 -.040 .194** .188** .156** .203** .246** .254** .253** 
Self Eff. (22) -.006 .048 .055 .013 .030 -.032 -.050 .115** .150** .099* .171** .191** .241** .196** 
Att. to Speed'g (23) -.065 -.143** -.114** -.115** -.099** -.033 -.002 -.171** -.176** -.142** -.176** -.201** -.199** -.222** 
Anx. Sens. Men.l (24) .279** .406** .238** .245** .303** .202** .104** .104** .074 .070 .168** .157** -.004 .108** 
Anx. Sens. Phys. (25) .164** .307** .273** .214** .282** .124** .003 .191** .205** .145** .213** .279** .123** .179** 
Vis.Process. (26) .055 .131** .050 .033 .083* .054 .016 .163** .146** .137** .131** .121** .062 .076* 
Verb. Process.l (27) .015 .100** .012 .067 .083* .053 .094* .006 -.054 .053 -.060 -.074 -.130** -.104** 
Indep. Const. (28) .031 -.081* .072 -.071 -.041 -.088* -.156** .086* .075* -.018 .115** .054 .106** .066 
Inter. Const. (29) .028 .099** .138** .035 .120** .075* -.019 .091* .055 .058 .130** .101** .152** .131** 
Persp. Tak. (30) .056 .084* .132** .042 .106** -.003 -.005 .173** .179** .129** .234** .230** .223** .194** 
Emp. Concern (31) -.026 .075 .165** .036 .107** .029 -.164** .195** .260** .159** .220** .291** .209** .205** 
Confound (32) .148** .326** .253** .211** .301** .203** .027 .256** .163** .211** .176** .183** .159** .186** 
Perc'd Manp. (33) .203 .034 .116** .186** .073 .092* .116** -.051 -.076* -.063 -.052 -.086* -.054 -.035 
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Msg. Derog. (34) .150** .035 .039 .171** .044 .051 .103** -.074 -.138** -.057 -.082* -.131** -.156** -.112** 
Beh. Int. (35) -.034 -.132 -.112** -.070 -.108** .000 -.003 -.141** -.139** -.065 -.115** -.198** -.178** -.174** 
Beh.l Exp. (36) -.082 -.178** -.099** .115** -.132** -.011 .004 -.178** -.125** -.076* -.117** -.154** -.093* -.124** 
Slider (37) -.106** -.089* -.071 -.106** -.073 -.069 -.043 -.069 -.078* -.052 -.106** -.139** -.119** -.115** 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlation Matrix (continued) 
 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Anger (1)                 
Fear (2)                 
Uncomfortable (3)                 
Disgust (4)                 
Worry (5)                 
Guilt (6)                 
Relief (7)                 
Ant'd. Hope (8)                 
Ant'd. Relief (9)                 
Ant'd. Delight (10)                 
Ant'd. Depres. (11)                 
Ant'd. Fear (12)                 
Ant'd. Shame (13)                 
Ant'd. Humiliation 
(14)                 
Ant'd. Resp. (15) 1                
Ant'd. Regret (16) .742** 1               
Mental Imagery (17) .113** .066 1              
Def. Avoid. (18) -.049 -.046 .084* 1             
Susceptability (19) .070 .074 .025 .016 1            
Severity (20) .246** .293** .105** .016 .150** 1           
Resp.Eff. (21) .214** .238** .086* -.008 -.009 .372** 1          
Self Eff. (22) .171** .190** .030 -.001 -.063 .387** .615** 1         
Att. to Speed'g (23) -.114** -.171** -.057 .092* .091* -.220** -.403** -.344** 1        
Anx. Sens. Men.l (24) -.065 -.034 .146** -.073 .087* -.020 .009 -.017 -.057 1       
Anx. Sens. Phys. (25) .072 .124** .133** -.021 .067 .096* .097* .077* -.112** .548** 1      
Vis.Process. (26) .091* .110** .136** .017 .009 .057 .063 .054 -.007 .117** .136** 1     
Verb. Process.l (27) -.145** -.098* .011 .086* .098* -.051 -.030 -.079* -.034 .061 .053 -.099** 1    
Indep. Const. (28) .180** .171** .108** .043 -.037 .135** .080* .114** .013 -.036 .015 .214** -.300** 1   
Inter. Const. (29) .114** .174** .103** .006 .086* .107** .033 .011 -.002 .108** .160** .163** -.068 .203** 1  
Persp. Tak. (30) .236** .250** .082* -.062 -.003 .158** .148** .177** -.110** .045 .147** .200** -.236** .313** .317** 1 
Emp. Concern (31) .250** .305** .150** -.033 .067 .215** .149** .122** -.101** .036 .217** .186** -.158** .258** .297** .409** 
Confound (32) .115** .107** .348** .049 .036 .217** .320** .206** -.184** .082* .087* .069 .001 .003 .059 .088* 
Perc'd Manp. (33) -.016 -.077* .024 .029 .030 -.044 -.182** -.202** .148** .071 -.015 .004 -.066 .005 -.025 -.045 
Msg. Derog. (34) -.159** -.172** -.027 .082* .028 -.132** -.303** -.256** .155** .140** .041 .018 .033 -.055 -.052 -.092* 
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Beh. Int. (35) -.124** -.157** -.020 .075 .126** -.212** -.370** -.351** .554** -.092* -.204** -.052 .070 -.016 -.056 -.157** 
Beh.l Exp. (36) -.057 -.053 -.085* .107** .243** -.137** -.359** -.351** .566** -.097* -.164** -.027 .022 .008 -.019 -.102** 
Slider (37) -.005 -.071 -.036 .094* .044 -.033 -.238** -.256** .398** -.079* -.065 .008 -.014 .035 .003 -.045 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlation Matrix (continued) 
 
 31 32 33 34 35 36 
Anger (1)       
Fear (2)       
Uncomfortable (3)       
Disgust (4)       
Worry (5)       
Guilt (6)       
Relief (7)       
Ant'd. Hope (8)       
Ant'd. Relief (9)       
Ant'd. Delight (10)       
Ant'd. Depres. (11)       
Ant'd. Fear (12)       
Ant'd. Shame (13)       
Ant'd. Humiliation (14)      
Ant'd. Resp. (15)       
Ant'd. Regret (16)       
Mental Imagery (17)       
Def. Avoid. (18)       
Susceptability (19)       
Severity (20)       
Resp.Eff. (21)       
Self Eff. (22)       
Att. to Speed'g (23)       
Anx. Sens. Men.l (24)       
Anx. Sens. Phys. (25)       
Vis.Process. (26)       
Verb. Process.l (27)       
Indep. Const. (28)       
Inter. Const. (29)       
Persp. Tak. (30)       
Emp. Concern (31) 1      
Confound (32) .072 1     
Perc'd Manp. (33) -.139** -.138** 1    
Msg. Derog. (34) -.208** -.220** .693** 1   
Beh. Int. (35) -.184** -.185** .121** .177** 1  
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Beh.l Exp. (36) -.105** -.189** .123** .148** .747** 1 
Slider (37) -.071 -.146** .059 .074 .410** .435** 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 7.1 - Homogeneity of regression slopes 
Construct (DV) .Sig Control Covariates 
Anger .592 Attitude to Speeding, Independent Construal, 
Interdependent Construal (anger has to have a focus) 
perceived manipulation perspective taking empathetic 
concern 
Fear .763 Attitude to Speeding, Independent Construal, 
Interdependent Construal (fear has to have a focus) 
Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, Anxiety Sensitivity Physical 
(Anxiety is conceptually related to fear and therefore we 
must control for how anxiety prone individuals are) 
perceived manipulation 
Uncomfortable .589 Attitude to Speeding, Independent Construal, 
Interdependent Construal (fear has to have a focus) 
Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, Anxiety Sensitivity Physical 
(Anxiety is conceptually related to discomfort and 
therefore we must control for how anxiety prone 
individuals are) perceived manipulation 
Disgust .852 Attitude to Speeding, , Style of Processing Visual, Style 
of Processing Verbal. (Disgust has to have a focus but 
also because the graphic element of the advert is  the 
picture we need to control for visual or verbal processing 
of information) anx mental anx physical perc manip 
Worry .840 Perceived Manipulation, Attitude to Speeding, Anxiety 
Sensitivity Mental, Anxiety Sensitivity Physical, 
Independent Construal Interdependent Construal (worry 
has to have a focus) (Anxiety is conceptually related to 
worry and therefore we must control for how anxiety 
prone individuals are) 
Guilt .788                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       Perceived Manipulation, Attitude to Speeding, Anxiety
Sensitivity Mental, Anxiety Sensitivity Physical, 
Independent Construal Interdependent Construal (guilt 
has to have a focus) 
Relief .373 Perceived Manipulation, Attitude to Speeding, Anxiety 
Sensitivity Mental, Anxiety Sensitivity Physical, 
Independent Construal Interdependent Construal 
Mental Imagery .791 Attitude to Speeding, Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, Anxiety 
Sensitivity Physical, Style of processing visual, style of 
processing verbal. (Arguably these constructs may 
influence the amount or vividness of mental imagery), 
perceived manipulation, empathetic concern, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal 
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Susceptibility .149 Attitude to Speeding, Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, Anxiety 
Sensitivity, perceived manipulation 
Severity .380 Attitude to Speeding, Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, Anxiety 
Sensitivity, perceived manipulation 
Response 
Efficacy 
.379 Attitude to Speeding, Independent Construal, 
Interdependent Construal, perceived manipulation 
Self-efficacy .182 Attitude to Speeding, Independent Construal, 
Interdependent Construal, style of processing visual, 
style of processing verbal, empathetic concern, 
perspective taking 
Anticipated 
Hope 
.384 Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Focus.  
Anticipated 
Relief 
.702 Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Focus. 
Anticipated 
delight 
.065 Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Focus. 
Anticipated 
depressed 
.569 Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Anxiety sensitivity mental, anxiety sensitivity physical, 
perspective taking, empathetic concern 
Anticipated 
fearful 
.130 Attitude to speeding perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Anxiety sensitivity mental, anxiety sensitivity physical, 
perspective taking, empathetic concern, style of 
processing verbal, style of processing visual 
Anticipated 
ashamed 
.457 Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Anxiety sensitivity mental, anxiety sensitivity physical, 
perspective taking, empathetic concern, style of 
processing verbal, style of processing visual 
Anticipated 
Humiliation 
.581 Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Anxiety sensitivity mental, anxiety sensitivity physical, 
perspective taking, empathetic concern, style of 
processing verbal, style of processing visual 
Anticipated 
responsible 
.074 Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Anxiety sensitivity mental, anxiety sensitivity physical, 
perspective taking, empathetic concern,  
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Anticipated 
regret 
.126 Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Anxiety sensitivity mental, anxiety sensitivity physical, 
perspective taking, empathetic concern, 
 
Dependent Variable Sig Control Covariates Mediating Covariates 
Behaviour Intention .906 Attitude to speeding, 
Anxiety Sensitivity 
Mental, Anxiety 
Sensitivity Physical, 
Style of Pro cessing 
Visual, Style of 
Processing Verbal, 
Independent Construal, 
Interdependent 
Construal, Perspective 
Taking, Empathetic 
Concern. 
Anger, Fear, Disgust, Worry, 
Guilt, Mental Imagery, 
Defensive avoidance, 
Susceptibility, Severity, 
Response Efficacy, Self-
efficacy, Anticipated Hope, 
Anticipated delight, 
Anticipated depressed, 
Anticipated fearful 
Anticipated ashamed, 
Anticipated responsible, 
Anticipated regret 
Behaviour 
Expectation 
.776 Attitude to speeding, 
Anxiety Sensitivity 
Mental, Anxiety 
Sensitivity Physical, 
Style of Pro cessing 
Visual, Style of 
Processing Verbal, 
Independent Construal, 
Interdependent 
Construal, Perspective 
Taking, Empathetic 
Concern. 
Anger, Fear, Disgust, Worry, 
Guilt, Mental Imagery, 
Defensive avoidance, 
Susceptibility, Severity, 
Response Efficacy, Self-
efficacy, Anticipated Hope, 
Anticipated delight, 
Anticipated depressed, 
Anticipated fearful 
Anticipated ashamed, 
Anticipated responsible, 
Anticipated regret 
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Appendix 7.3 - Covariate variables in the ANCOVA analysis 
Dependent 
Variable 
Control Covariates Mediating 
Covariates 
Anger Attitude to Speeding, Independent Construal, 
Interdependent Construal, Perceived manipulation 
Perspective taking, Empathetic concern 
 
Fear Attitude to Speeding, Independent Construal, 
Interdependent Construal, Anxiety Sensitivity 
Mental, Anxiety Sensitivity Physical Perceived 
manipulation 
 
Uncomfortable Attitude to Speeding, Independent Construal, 
Interdependent Construal, Anxiety Sensitivity 
Mental, Anxiety Sensitivity Physical, Perceived 
manipulation 
 
Disgust Attitude to Speeding, Style of Processing Visual, 
Style of Processing Verbal, Anxiety Sensitivity 
Mental, Anxiety Sensitivity Physical, Perceived 
manipulation  
 
Worry Perceived Manipulation, Attitude to Speeding, 
Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, Anxiety Sensitivity 
Physical, Independent Construal Interdependent 
Construal  
 
Guilt Perceived Manipulation, Attitude to Speeding, 
Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, Anxiety Sensitivity 
Physical, Independent Construal Interdependent 
Construal 
 
Relief Perceived Manipulation, Attitude to Speeding, 
Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, Anxiety Sensitivity 
Physical, Independent Construal Interdependent 
Construal 
 
Mental 
Imagery 
Attitude to Speeding, Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, 
Anxiety Sensitivity Physical, Style of processing 
visual, style of processing verbal. Perceived 
manipulation, empathetic concern, Independent 
Construal, Interdependent Construal 
 
Defensive 
avoidance 
Attitude to Speeding, Independent Construal, 
Interdependent Construal 
 
Susceptibility Attitude to Speeding, Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, 
Anxiety Sensitivity, perceived manipulation 
 
Severity Attitude to Speeding, Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, 
Anxiety Sensitivity, perceived manipulation 
 
Response 
Efficacy 
Attitude to Speeding, Independent Construal, 
Interdependent Construal, perceived manipulation 
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Dependent 
Variable 
Control Covariates Mediating 
Covariates 
Self-efficacy Attitude to Speeding, Independent Construal, 
Interdependent Construal, style of processing 
visual, style of processing verbal, empathetic 
concern, perspective taking 
 
Anticipated 
Hope 
Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal.  
 
Anticipated 
Relief 
Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal.  
 
Anticipated 
delight 
Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal.  
 
Anticipated 
depressed 
feelings 
Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Anxiety sensitivity mental, anxiety sensitivity 
physical, Perspective taking, Empathetic concern 
 
Anticipated 
fear 
Attitude to speeding perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Anxiety sensitivity mental, anxiety sensitivity 
physical, perspective taking, empathetic concern, 
style of processing verbal, style of processing 
visual 
 
Anticipated 
ashamed 
Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Anxiety sensitivity mental, anxiety sensitivity 
physical, perspective taking, empathetic concern, 
style of processing verbal, style of processing 
visual 
 
Anticipated 
Humiliation 
Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Anxiety sensitivity mental, anxiety sensitivity 
physical, perspective taking, empathetic concern, 
style of processing verbal, style of processing 
visual 
 
Anticipated 
responsible 
feelings 
Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Anxiety sensitivity mental, anxiety sensitivity 
physical, perspective taking, empathetic concern,  
 
Anticipated 
regret 
Attitude to speeding, perceived manipulation, 
Independent Construal, Interdependent Construal. 
Anxiety sensitivity mental, anxiety sensitivity 
physical, perspective taking, empathetic concern, 
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Dependent 
Variable 
Control Covariates Mediating 
Covariates 
Behaviour 
Intention 
Attitude to speeding, Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, 
Anxiety Sensitivity Physical, Style of Pro cessing 
Visual, Style of Processing Verbal, Independent 
Construal, Interdependent Construal, Perspective 
Taking, Empathetic Concern. 
Anger, Fear, Disgust, 
Worry, Guilt, Mental 
Imagery, Defensive 
avoidance, 
Susceptibility, 
Severity, Response 
Efficacy, Self-efficacy, 
Anticipated Hope, 
Anticipated delight, 
Anticipated 
depressed, 
Anticipated fearful 
Anticipated ashamed, 
Anticipated 
responsible, 
Anticipated regret 
Behaviour 
expectation 
Attitude to speeding, Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, 
Anxiety Sensitivity Physical, Style of Pro cessing 
Visual, Style of Processing Verbal, Independent 
Construal, Interdependent Construal, Perspective 
Taking, Empathetic Concern. 
Anger, Fear, Disgust, 
Worry, Guilt, Mental 
Imagery, Defensive 
avoidance, 
Susceptibility, 
Severity, Response 
Efficacy, Self-efficacy, 
Anticipated Hope, 
Anticipated delight, 
Anticipated 
depressed, 
Anticipated fearful 
Anticipated ashamed, 
Anticipated 
responsible, 
Anticipated regret 
Decision Task Attitude to speeding, Anxiety Sensitivity Mental, 
Anxiety Sensitivity Physical, Style of Pro cessing 
Visual, Style of Processing Verbal, Independent 
Construal, Interdependent Construal, Perspective 
Taking, Empathetic Concern. 
Anger, Fear, Disgust, 
Worry, Guilt, Mental 
Imagery, Defensive 
avoidance, 
Susceptibility, 
Severity, Response 
Efficacy, Self-efficacy, 
Anticipated Hope, 
Anticipated delight, 
Anticipated 
depressed, 
Anticipated fearful 
Anticipated ashamed, 
Anticipated 
responsible, 
Anticipated regret 
 
